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Khrushchev Lied

The Evidence That Every
"Revelation" of Stalin's (and Beria's)

"Crimes" in Nikita Khrushchev's
Infamous "Secret Speech" to the 20th

Party Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union on February
25, 1956, is Provably False*

By Gf over Fur f

Erythros Press and Media, LLC
Corrected Hdition, Ju/y 2011

(* All except one, which I can neither prove true nor disprove.)

Khrushchev IJed

First English Edition February- 2011; corrected edition July 2011
Published in Russian by Algoritm Publishers, Moscow, December 2007
under the title Antistalinskaia Podlosr

http://www.algoritm-kniga.ru/ fcrr-g.-antistalinskaya-podlost.html
Republished by EKSMO Publishers, Moscow, November 2010
under the title Tent XX S"ezdu. AnlistaUnskaia Podhst'
http://www.eksmo.ru/catalog/882/481650/

Published by

Ecythros Press and Media, LLC

PO Box 291994
Kettering, Ohio 45429-0994
USA

Published and printed with permission of the author, who assumes all
responsibility for the content herein.

IJbrary of Confess Catalcguing-in-Publicalion Da/a

Furr, Cirover C. (Grover Cart)

Khrushchev Lied: The Evidence That Every "Revelaiion" of Stalin's
(and Beria's) "Crimes" in Nikita Khrushchev's Infamous "Secret Speech"
to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Part)' of the Soviet Union
on February 25, 1956, is Provably False / Grover C. Furr; translations by
Grover C. Furr

ISBN: 978-0-615-44105-4

1. Khrushchev, Nikita Scrgeevich, 1894-1971. 2. Khrushchev, Nikita Ser-
geevich, 1894-1971. Rech' na zakxytom zasedanii dvad't'satogo S"ezda
KPSS. y. Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953. 4. Soviet Union-Politics and gov-
ernment— 1917-1936. 5. Soviet Union— Politics and government- 1936-
1953. 1. Title.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements and Dedication 1

Introduction. The Khrushchev School of Falsification: "The 20th

Century's Most Influential Speech" 2

Chapter 1. The Cult and Lenin's 'Testament*' 7

1. The Cult 7

2. Lenin's "Testament" 1 1

Chapter 2. CoUegiality "Trampled" 21

3. "CoUegialit)'" In Work 21

4. Stalin "Morally and Physically Annihilated" Leaders Who Opposed Him
22

5. Mass Repressions Generally 24

6. "Enemy of the People" .....26

7. Zinoviev and Kamenev 28

8. Trotskjites 29

9. Stalin neglected Party 31

Chapter 3. Stalin's "Arbitrariness" Towards the Party 34

10. Reference to "a party commission under the control of the Central
Committee Presidium"; fabrication of materials during repressions 34

11. December 1, 1934 "directive" signed by Enukidze 38

12. Khrushchev Implies Stalin's involvement in Kirov's murder. 39

13. Stalin's and Zhdanov's telegram to the Politburo of September 25
1936 40

14. Stalin's report at the February-March 1937 CC Plenum 42

1 5. "Many Members questioned mass repression", especially Pavel
Post)'shev 45

Chapter 4. The "Cases" Against Party Members and Related Questions48

16. Eikhe 48

17. Ezhov 53

18. Rudzutak 56

19. Rozenblium 59

20.1.D. Kabakov 62

21-24. S.V. Kossior, V. la. Chubar'; P.P. Postyshev; A.V. Kosarev 64

25. The Lists 70

26. Resolutions of the January 1938 CC Plenum 73

27. "Beria's gang" 75

28. 'Torture telegram'' ; 76

29. Rodos tortured Chubar' and Kosior on Beria's orders 81

Chapter 5. Stalin and the War 84

30. Stalin didn't heed warnings about war 84

31. Vorontsov's letter 86

32. German soldier 87

33. Commanders Killed 88

34. Stalin's "Demoralization" after the beginning of the war 90

35. Stalin A Bad Commander 92

36. Khar'kov 1942 93

37. Stalin Planned Military Operations on a Globe 94

38. Stalin Downgraded Zhukov 95

Chapter 6. Of Plots and Affairs 97

39. Deportations of nationalities 97

40. The I^ningrad Affair 101

41. The Mingrclian Affair 103

42. Yugosbvia 105

43. The Doctors' Plot 105

Chapter 7. Beria, His "Machinations" and "Crimes" 109

44. Beiia 109

45. Kaminsky accuses Beria of working with the Mussavat 110

46. Kartvelishvili Ill

47. Kedrov 113

48. Ordzhonikidze's brother 114

Chapter 8. Ideolog)' and Culture 117

49. Stalin, Short Biography 117

50. The 'Short Course' 121

51. Stalin Signed Order for Monument to Himself on July 2, 1951 124

52. The Palace of Soviets 126

53. The Lenin Prize 1 26

Chapter 9. Stalin's Last Years in Power 128

54. Stalin Suggested Huge Tax Increase on Kolkhozes 128

55. Stalin Insulted Postyshev 129

56. "Disorganization" of Politburo Work 130

57. Stalin Suspected Voioshilov an "En^sh Agent" 131

58. .Andreev; 59. Molotov. 60. Mikoian 132

61. Expansion of the Presidium 135

Chapter 10. A Typology of Prevarication 137

A Typology of Khrushchev's Prevarication 137

Exposing a Lie is Not the Same as Establishing the Truth 143

Historical vs. Judicial Evidence 145

Torture and the Historical Problems Related To It 147

A typology of Khrushchevian prevarication 150

The "Revelations" 152

The lypolog)' 153

Chapter 11. The Results of Khrushchev's "Revelations"; Falsified
Rehabilitations 159

Falsified Rehabilitations 159

Conclusion 169

Chapter 12. Conclusion: The Enduring L^acy of Khrushchev's
Deception 192

Why Did Khrushchev Attack Stalin? 192

The Khrushchev Conspracy? 196

Aleksandr S. Shcherbakov 202

Implications: The influence on Soviet society » 208

Political Implications 213

Trotsky 214

Unresolved weaknesses in the Soviet system of socialism 215

Appendix - Quotations from Piimafy and Other Sources 218

l.Cult 218

2 Lenin's "Testament" 232

3. "CoUegiality" In Work 240

4. Stalin "Morally and Physically Annihibted" Leaders Who Opposed Him.
250

5. Mass Repressions generally 250

6. "Enemy of the people" 257

6a. "Convindng and Educating" 260

7. Zinoviev & Kamenev 260

8. Tiotskyires 261

9. Stalin neglected Part}' 266

10. Ref. to "a party commission under the control of the Central
Committee Presidium"; fabrication of materials during repressions 268

11. December 1, 1934 "directive" signed by Enukidze 269

12. Khrushchev Implies Stalin's involvement in Kirov's murder 269

13. Stalin's and Zhdanov's telegram to the Politburo of September 25
1936 271

14. Stalin's report at the February-March 1937 CC Plenum 273

1 5. "Many Members questioned mass repression". Especially Post^-shcv.
282

16. Hikhe 288

17. Ezhov 292

18. Rudzuiak 306

19. Rozcnblium 310

20. Kabakov 312

21. Kosior, 22. Chubar'; 23. Post)'shev; 24. Kosarev 316

25. The Lists 322

26. Resolutions of the January' 1938 CC Plenum 322

27. "Beiia's gang" 327

28. 'Torture telegram" 328

29. Rodos tortured Chubar' & Kosior on Beria' orders 333

30. Stalin didn't heed warnings about war 334

31. Vorontsov's Lcner 340

32. German soldier 341

33. Commanders Killed 347

34. Stalin's "Demoralization after beginning of war 349

35. Stalin A Bad Commander 353

36. Khar'kov 1942 355

37. Stalin Planned Militai)' Operations on a Globe 360

38. Stalin Downgraded Zhukov 362

39. Deportations of nationalities , 365

40. Leningrad .Affair 367

41. Mingielian Affair 369

42. Yugoslavia 371

43. Doctois' Plot 372

44. Bena 375

45. Kaminsky- about Beiia working with Mussavat 378

46. Kaxtvelishvili (Lavrent'cv) 382

47. Kediov 383

48. Ordzhonikidze's brother 387

49. Stalin, Short Biography 388

50. The Short Course 394

51. Sialin Signed Order for Monument to Himself on July 2, 1951 395

52. Palace of Soviets 397

53. Lenin Prize 398

54. Stalin Suggested Huge Tax Increase on Kolkhozes 403

55. Stalin Insulted Postyshev 406

56. "Disoiganization" of Politburo Work 406

57. Stalin Suspected Voroshilov as an "English Agpnt" 407

58. .Andreev; 59. Molotov; 60. Mikoian 408

61. Expansion of the Presidium 41 1

)graphy and Sources 414

1 415

Acknowledgements and Dedication

I wish to express my special gratitude to my editor, translator, and friend
Vladimir L Bobrov, of Moscow. Without his encouragement and help at
eveiy step this book would never have been written.

My special thanks to the Inter-library Loan librarians at Harry S. Sprague
Library, Montclair State University - Kevin Prendetgast, Arthur Hudson,
and Seigio Ferreira, for their tireless help in obtaining hard-to-find Soviet
and other books and articles.

* * *

I dedicate this book to the memory of my son Jbseph Furn wonderful
son and friend, skilled diesel truck mechanic, and one of "the salt of the
earth."

Intxoduction.
The Khrushchev School of Falsification:
"The 20th Century's Most Influential

Speech"

The fiftieth anniversary of Nikita S. Khrushchev's "Secret Speech", de-
livered on February 25, 1 956, ehcited predictable comment. An article in
the London (UK) Telegraph called it "the 20th century's most influential
speech." In an article the same day in the New York Times William Taub-
man, whose biography of Khrushchev won the Pulitzer Prize for Biogra-
phy in 2004, called it a "great deed" that "deserves to be celebrated" on
its anniversary. >

Some time ago I reread Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" for the first time
in many years. I used the HTML version of the edition of the speech
published in a special issue of The New Leader in 1962.^ During my read-
ing I remarked that the noted Menshevik scholar Boris Nikolaevsky, in
his annotations to Khrushchev's talk, expressed his opinion that certain
of Khrushchev's statements were false. For example, early in his speech
Khrushchev says the following:

Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Bcria gang,
the Central Committee looked into a series of matters
fabricated by this gang. This revealed a very ugly picture
of brutal willfulness connected with the incorrect
behavior of Stalin.

Boris Nikolaevsky's note 8 to this passage reads:

This statement by Khrushchev is not quite true:
Investigation of Stalin's terrorist acts in the last period of

' 'Ilic full text of Khrushchev's speech is available online ar
http://chss.mc>ntdair.edu/english/furr/ research /kl/ spcech.html

^ Khrushchev, Nikita S. 'Ilie New I x-ader/llie (Irimes of the Stalin ICra. Intrcnluction by
Anatol Shub, notes by Horis Nikolaevsky. New York: 'llie New Ix'adcr, 1962.

IntnxJuction. 'I lie Khrushchev School of I'alsification

his life was initiated by Beria. ... Khrushchev, who now
depicts himself as having well-nigh initiated the probe of
Stalin's torture chambers, actually tried to block it in the
first months after Stalin's death.

I remembered diat Arch Getty wrote something very similar in his magis-
teiial work Origins of the Gnat Pur^s

Other inconsistencies in Khrushchev's account include
an apparent confusion of Ezhov for Beiia. Although
Ezhov's name is mentioned occasionally, Beria is
charged with as many misdeeds and repressions;
however, the latter was merely a regional secretary until
1938. Further, many reports note that the police terror
began to subside when Beria took over from Ezhov in
1938. Could Khrushchev have conveniently substituted
Beria for Ezhov in his account? What else might he
have blurred? At any rate, Beria's recent execution by
Khrushchev and the leadership made him a convenient .
scapegoat. Khrushchev's opportunistic use of Beria
certainly casts suspicion on the exactitude of his
other assertions, (p. 268 n.28; emphasis 'added GF)

So I suspected that today, in the light of the many documents from for-
merly secret Soviet archives now available, serious research might dis-
cover that even more of Khrushchev's "revelations" about Stalin were
false.

In fact, I made a far different discovery. Not one specific statement of
'Vevelation'* that Khrushchev made about either Stalin or Beria
turned out to be true. Among those that can be checked for verifica-
tion, every single one turns out to be false. Khrushchev, it turns out, did
not just "lie" about Stalin and Beria - he did virtually nothing else except
lie. Tlie entire "Secret Speech" is made up of fabrications. This is the
"great deed" Taubman praised Khrushchev fori (A separate, though
much shorter, article might be written to expose the falsehoods in Taub-
man's own New York Times Op-Ed article celebrating Khrushchev's
meretricious speech).'

^ A few examples here: It was Heria, not Khrushchev, who released many piisonere,
though not "millions", as Taubman claims. 'Ilie "thaw" he celebrates had begun during
the last Stalin years. Khrushchev limited it to "rightist", anti-Stalin material only. Stalin

Khrushchev lic-d

For me, as a scholar, this was a troubling and even unwelcome discovery.
If, as I had anticipated, I had found that, say, 25% or so of Khrushchev's
"revelations*' were falsifications, my research would surely excite some
skepticism as well as surprise. But in the main I could anticipate accep-
tance, and praise: "Good job of research by Furr", and so on.

But I feared - and my fears have been bom out by my experience with
the Russian -language original of this book, published in December 2007
- that if I claimed evefy one of Khrushchev's "revelations" was false, no
one would believe me. It would not make any difference how thoroughly
or carefully I cited evidence in support of my arguments. To disprove the
whole of Khrushchev's speech is, at the same time, to challenge the
whole historical paradigm of Soviet history of the Stalin period, a para-
digm to which this speech is foundational.

llie most influential speech of the 20^^ century - if not of all time - a
complete fraud? The notion was too monstrous. Who would want to
come to ^ps with the revision of Soviet, Comintern, and even world
history that the logic of such a conclusion would demand? It would be
infinitely easier for everyone to believe that I had "cooked the books,"
shaded the truth - thjit I was falsifying things, just as I was accusing
Khrushchev of doing. Then my work could be safely ignored, and the
problem would "go away." Especially since I am known to have sympa-
thy towards the worldwide communist movement of which Stalin was
the recognized leader. \Xlien a researcher comes to conclusions that sus-
piciously appear to support his own preconceived ideas, it is only prudent
to suspect him of some lack of objectivity, if not worse.

So I would have been much happier if my research had concluded that
25% of Khrushchev's "revelations" about Stalin and Beria were false.
However, since virtually all of those "revelations" that can be checked
are, in fact, falsehoods, the onus of evidence lies even more heavily on
me as a scholar than would ordinarily be the case. Accordingly, I have
organized my report on this research in a somewhat unusual way.

The entire book is divided into two separate but interrelated sections.

had tried t() rctia* in Ocnibcr 1952, but the \9'*^ Part\- (!()ngn:ss had rcTuscd to permit it.
I aubman claims Khrushchev said he was "not involved" in the repressions, yet
Khrushchev had not a-sponded to Stalin's urgings, but had taken the inidadvc,
demanding higher "tjuotas" for repressions than the Stalin leaderiihip wanted. 'I'aubman
claims "Khrushchev somehow retained his humanit)'." It would be more accurate to say
the opposite: Khrushchev appears more like a thug and murdeicr.

Inuixlucbon. 'llic Khrushchev Sch(N)l of l*alsificadon

In the fust sections, consisting of Chapters 1 through 9, 1 examine each
of the statements, or assertions, that Khrushchev made in his report and
that constitute the essence of his so-called "revelations." (To jump ahead
a bit, I note that I have identified sixty-one such assertions).

Each of these "revelations" is preceded by a quotation from the "Secret
Speech" which is then examined in the light of the documentary evi-
dence. Most of this evidence is presented as quotations from primary
sources. Only in a few cases do I quote from secondary sources. I have
set myself the task of presenting the best evidence that I can Hnd, drawn
in the main from former Soviet archives in order to demonstrate the false
character of Khrushchev's Speech at the 20* Party Congress. Since, if
interspersed with the text, long documentary citations would make for
difficult reading, I have only briefly referred to the evidence in the text
and reserved the fuller quotations from the primary (and occasionally
secondary) sources themselves in the sections on each chapter in the Ap-
pendix..

The second section of the book. Chapters 10 through 12, is devoted to
questions of a methodological nature and to a discussion of some of the
conclusions which flow from this study. I have given special attention to
a t)'pology of the falsehoods, or methods of deception that Khrushchev
employed. A study of the "rehabilitation" materials of some of the Party
leaders named in the Speech is included here.

I handle the references to primary sources in two ways. In addition to the
traditional academic documentation through footnote and bibliography I
have tried wherever possible to guide the reader to those primary docu-
ments available either in part or in full on the Internet. All of these URL
references were valid at the time the English language edition of this
book was completed.

In a few cases, I have placed important primary documents on the Inter-
net myself, normally in Adobe Acrobat (pdf) format. In a few cases this
has made it possible for me to refer to page numbers, something that is
either clumsy or impossible if using hypertext markup language (HTML).

In conclusion I would like to thank my colleagues in the United States
and in Russia who have read this work in its earlier drafts and given me
the benefit of their criticism. Naturally, they bear no responsibility for
any errors and shortcomings that remain in the book despite their best
efforts.

Khrushchev I icxl

My espedal gratitude goes to my wonderful colleague in Moscow, Vladi-
mir L'vovich Bobrov. Scholar, researcher, editor, and translator, master
of both his native Russian and English, I would never have undertaken
this work, much less completed it, without his inspiration, guidance, and
assistance of all kinds.

I will be grateful for any comments and criticisms of this work by read-
ers.

Chapter 1 .
The Cult and Lenin's "Testament"

1. The Cult

Khrushche\':

Comrades! In the report of the Central Committee of the
part)' at the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by
delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the
plenarj' CC/CPSU [Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union] sessions, quite a
lot has been said about the cult of the individual and
about its harmful consequences.

After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the party
began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and
consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the
spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to
transform him into a superman possessing supernatural
characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a man
supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for
everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior.

Such a beUef about a man, and specifically about Stalin,
was cultivated among us for many years.

ITie objective of the present report is not a thorough
evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's
merits, an entirely sufficient number of books,
pamphlets and studies had already been written in his
lifetime. The role of Stalin in the preparation and
execution of the Socialist Revolution, in the Civil War,
and in the Rght for the construction of socialism in our
country, is universally known. Everyone knows this well.

At present, we are concerned with a question which has
immense importance for the party now and for the
future - with how the cult of the person of Stalin has
been gradually growing, the cult which became at a

Khrushchev lied

certain specific stage the source of a whole series of
exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party
principles, of part)' democracy, of revolutionary legality.

This Speech is often referred to as one of "revelations" by Khrushchev
of crimes and misdeeds done by Stalin. The issue of the "cult of person-
ality", or "cult of the individual", around the figure of Stalin was the main
subject of the Speech. Khrushchev did not "reveal" the existence of a
"cult of personality" itself. Its existence was, of course, well known. It
had been discussed at Presidium meetings since immediately after Stalin's
death.

Yet Khrushchev does not speciBcally state at the outset that Stalin pro-
moted the "cult". This was clearly deliberate on Khrushchev's part.
Throughout his speech Khrushchev implies - or, rather, takes it for
granted - what he ought to have proven, but could not: that Stalin him-
self fostered this cult in order to gain dictatorial power. In fact, through-
out his entire Speech, Khrushchev was unable to cite a single truthful ex-
ample of how Stalin encouraged this "cult" - presumably, because he
could not find even one such example.

Khrushchev's whole speech was built on this falsehood. All the rest of
his "revelations" were fitted within the explanatory paradigm of the
"•cult" around himself which, according to Khrushchev, Stalin created
and cultivated.

This study will show that virtually all of Khrushchev's "revelations" con-
cerning Stalin are false. But it's worth mentioning at the outset that
Khrushchev's explanatory framework itself - the notion of the "cult"
constructed by Stalin and as a result of which the rest of his so-called
"crimes" could be committed with impunity - this is itself a falsehood.
Not only did Stalin not commit the crimes and misdeeds Kluushche\'
imputes to him. Stalin also did not construct the "cult" around himself
In fact, the evidence proves the opposite: that Stalin opposed the disgust-
ing "cult" around himself.

Some have argued that Stalin's opposition to the cult around himself
must have been hypocrisy. After all, Stalin was so powerful that if he had
really wanted to put a stop to the cult, he could have done so. But this
argument assumes what it should prove. To assume that he was that
powerful is also to assume that Stalin was in fact what the "cult" absurdly
made him out to be: an autocrat with supreme power over everything
and everyone in the USSR.

(Chapter One. 'Ilic C^ult and Ixnin's "Testament"

1. StaJin's Opposition to the Cult

Stalin protested praise and flattery directed at himself over and over again
over many years. He a^eed with Lenin's assessment of the "cult of the
individual", and said basically the same things about it as Lenin had.
Khrushchev quoted Lenin, but without acknowledging that Stalin said
the same things. A long list of quotations from Stalin is given here in evi-
dence of Stalin's opposition to the "cult" around him.^ Many more could
be added to it, for almost every memoir by persons who had personal
contact with Stalin gives further anecdotes that demonstrate Stalin's op-
position to, and even disgust with, the adulation of his person.

For example, the recently-published posthumous memoir Stalin. Kak la
Z/m/ ("Stalin As I Knew Him", 2003) by Akakii Mgeladze, a former
First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party later punished and
marginalized by Khrushchev, the author often comments on Stalin's dis-
like of the "cult" around him. Mgeladze, who died in 1980, recounts how
Stalin wished to suppress any special celebration of his 70^ birthday in
1949 and acceded to it with reluctance only because of the arguilients
made by other Party leaders that the event would serve to unite the
communist movement by bringing together its leaders from around the
worid.

Stalin was more successful in preventing others in the Politburo from
renaming Moscow "Stalinodar" (= "gift of Stalin") in 1937. But his at-
tempt to refuse the award of Hero of the Soviet Union was thwarted
when the award, which he never accepted, was pinned to a pillow which
was placed in his coffin at his death.

2. MaIenkov*s Attempt to Call a CC Plenum Concerning
the "Cult" April 1953

Immediately after Stalin's death, Malenkov proposed calling a Central
Committee Plenum to deal with the harmful effects of the cult. Malenkov
was honest enough to blame himself and his colleagues and reminded
them all that Stalin had frequently warned them against the "cult" to no
avail. This attempt failed in the Presidium; the special Plenum was never
called. If it had been, Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" could not have
taken place.

'' Sec the quotations for Chapter 1 in Appendix 1 for a long list of ijuotations of Stalin
showing his opposition to the "cult" around him.

Khnishchcv lied

Whether Khrushchev supported Malenkov's proposal or not - the evi-
dence is unclear on this point - he was certainly involved in the discus-
sion. Khrushchev knew all about Malenkov's attempt to deal with the
"cult" openly and early on. But he said nothing about it, thereby effec-
tively denying that it had occurred.

3. July 1953 Plenum - Beria Attacked for Allegedly
Opposing "Cult"

At the July 1953 Plenum, called to attack an absent (and possibly already
dead) Beria, a number of the figures blamed Beria for attacking the cult.
Khrushchev's leading role at this Plenum and in the cabal of leaders
against Beria shows that he was complidt in attacking Beiia and so in
supporting the "cult" as a weapon with which to discredit Beria.

4. Who Fostered the "Cult"?

A study of the origins of the "cult" is beyond the scope of this article.
But there is good evidence that oppositionists either began the "cult"
around Stalin or participated eagerly in it as a cover for their oppositional
activities. In an unguarded moment during one of his m:hitye siavki (face-
to-face confrontations with accusers) Bukharin was forced to admit that
he> urged former Oppositionists working for li^estua to refer to Stalin
with excessive praise, and used the term "cult" himself Another Opposi-
tionist, K^l Radek, is often said to have written the first full-blown ex-
ample of the "cult", the strange futuristic Zodchii Sotsialistichesko^ Oh-
shchestva ("The Architect of Socialist Society"), for the January 1, 1934
issue of I^stiia^ subsequendy published as a separate pamphlet.

5. Khrushchev and Mikoian

Khrushchev and Mikoian, the main figures from the Stalin Politburo who
instigated and avidly promoted the "de-Stalinization" movement, were
among those who, in the 1930s, had fostered the "cult" most avidly.

If this were all, we might hypothetically assume that Khrushchev and
Mikoian had truly respected Stalin to the point of being in awe of him.
This was certainly the case with many others. Mgeladze's memoir shows
one example of a leading Party official who retained his admiration for
Stalin long after it was fashionable to discard it.

But Khrushchev and Mikoian had participated in the Presidium discus-
sions of March 1953 during which Malenkov's attempt to call a Central

Chapter Unc. 'Ilic Cult and I xnin's "rcstamcnc"

Committee Plenum to discuss the "cult" had been frustrated. They had
been leaders in the June 1953 Plenum during which Beria had been
shaipty criticized for opposing the "cult" of Stalin.

lliese matters, together with the fact that Khrushchev's "revebtions" are,
in reality, fiibticabons means there must be something else at work here.

2. Lenin's "Testament"

Khrushchev:

Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet
nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct
characteiization of Stalin, pointing out that it was
necessar)' to consider the question of transferring Stalin
from the position of the Secretary General because of
the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not
have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that he is
capricious and abuses his power.

In December 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress,
Vladimir Ilyich wrote: 'After taking over the position of
Secretary General, Comrade Stalin accumulated in his
hands immeasurable power and I am not certain whether
he will be always able to use this power with the required
care.'

We must interrupt this quotation to note an important fact. Khrushchev
here attributes to Lenin the accusation that Stalin "abuses his power." In
reality, Lenin wrote only that he was "not certain whether he [Stalin] will
be always able to use this power with the required care." There is nothing
in Lenin's words about accusing Stalin of "abusing his power."

Khrushchev continues:

This letter - a political document of tremendous
importance, known in the party history as Lenin's
"testament" - was distributed among the delegates to the
20th P^rty Congress. You have read it and will
undoubtedly read it again more than once. You might
reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is
given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the party,
the people, the state, and the future direction of party
policy.

Khrushchev lied

Vladimir Ilyich said:

Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can
be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts
among us Communists, becomes a defect which
cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of
the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose
that the comrades consider the method by which
Stalin would be removed from this position and by
which another man would be selected for it, a man
who, above all, would differ from Stalin in only one
quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty,
greater kindness and more considerate attitude
toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc.

'Iliis document of Lenin's was made known to the
delegates at the 13 th Part)' Congress who discussed the
question of transferring Stalin from the position of
Secretary- General. The delegates declared themselves in
favor of retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he
would heed the critical remarks of Vladimir Ilyich and
would be able to overcome the defects which caused
Lenin serious anxiety.

Comrades! The Party Congress should become
acquainted with two new documents, which confirm
Stalin's character as already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich
I^nin in his "testament." These documents are a letter
from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaia to (Lev B.]
Kamenev, who was at that time head of the Political
Bureau, and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
to Stalin.

I will now read these documents:
LEV BORISOVICH!

Because of a short letter which I had written in
words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by
permission of the doctors, Stalin aUowed himself
yesterday an unusually rude outburst directed at me.
This is not my first day in the party. During aU these
30 years I have never heard from any comrade one
word of rudeness. The business of the party and of

(Jhaptcf One. 'IIil- Cult and Ixiiin's '"I'cstamcnt"

Uyich are not less dear to me than to Stalin. I need at
present the maximum of self-control. What one can
and what one cannot discuss with Uyich I know
better than any doctor, because I know what makes
him nervous and what does not, in any case I know
better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to
Grigorii [E, Zinoviev] as much closer comrades of
V. I. and I beg you to protect me from rude
interference with my private life and from vile
invectives and threats. I have no doubt as to what
will be the unanimous decision of the Control
Commission, with which Stalin sees fit to threaten
me; however, I have neither the strength nor the
time to waste on this foolish quarrel. And I am a
living person and my nerves are strained to the

utmost."

N. KRUPSKAIA

Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on
December 23, 1922. After two and a half months, in
March 1 923, Vladimir Uyich Lenin sent Stalin the
following letter:

TO COMRADE STALIN:

COPIES FOR: KAMENEV AND ZINOVIEV

Dear Comrade Stalin!

You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife
to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her.
Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to
forget what was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and
Kamenev heard about it from her. I have no
intention to forget so easily that which is being done
against me; and I need not stress here that I consider
as directed against me that which is being done
against my wife. I ask you, therefore, that you weigh
carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your
words and apologizing or whether you prefer the
severance of relations between us.

SINCERELY: LENIN

Khnishchcv lied

MARCH 5, 1923
(Commotion in the hall.)

Comrades! I will not comment on these documents.
They speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could
behave in this manner during Lenin's life, could thus
behave toward Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaia -
whom the party knows well and values highly as a loyal
friend of Lenin and as an active fighter for the cause of
the party since its creation - we can easily imagine how
Stalin treated other people. These negative characteristics
of his developed steadily and during the last years
acquired an absolutely insufferable character."

The document in question was not widely "known in the party history as
Lenin's Testament'". Khrushchev took this term from Trotsky, who
wrote a book with that title in 1 934. It had never been known as such in
the Bolshevik Party except among oppositionists. In fact there is a history
to the very use of the term "Lenin's Testament" - one that does not re-
flect well on Khrushchev.

•

In 1925 Trotsky, in a shaq) criticism of Max Eastman's book Since L^nin
Died, had explicitly repudiated Eastman's lie that Lenin left a "testament"
or '^^Aoll." Along with the other members of the Politburo, Trotsky said
that Lenin had not done so. And that appears to be correct: there is no
evidence at all that Lenin intended these documents as a "testament" of
any kind. Then, in the 1930s, Trotsky changed his mind and began writ-
ing about "Lenin's Testament" again, this time as a part of his partisan
attack on Stalin. Therefore Khrushchev or, more likely, one of his col-
laborators, must have taken this usage from Trotsky - though they would
never have publicly acknowledged doing so.

Other aspects of Khrushchev's speech are similar to Trotsky's writings.
For example, Trotsky viewed the Moscow Trials as faked frame-ups -
naturally enough, because he was an absent co-defendant in them. Al-
though the first Moscow Trial defendant, Akbal Ikramov of the March
1938 "Bukharin" Trial, was not officially "rehabilitated" until May 1957,
after the 20'** Party Congress^ Khrushchev did deplore the executions of

^ Ikramov wxs rehabilitated on June 3. 1957. Sec RfabiJUla/aia. Kak EJo Bjh. FArraJ' 1956 -
itofikdf gO kh gulov. Moskva: 'Tilalmk". 2003. (hcit-aftcr RKEB 2), 851. Sec also
http://www.mcmo.ru/mcmof)'/communarl(a/chaptcr5.htm

Chapter One. 'Ilic Cult and Ixnin's 'Testament"

Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotskyites in the Secret Speech. This consti-
tuted at least an implicit declaration of their innocence, since their pun-
ishment would not be considered too harsh for anyone really guilty of the
comes to which they confessed in 1936.

But in fiict the whole tenor of Khrushchev's speech, which blamed Stalin
alone for derailing socialism through immense crimes of which Khru-
shchev held him alone responsible, was identical to Trotsky's demonized
portrait of Stalin. I'rotsky's widow recognized this fact, and applied for
the rehabilitation of her late husband and within a day of the "Secret
Speech".^ The &ct that Natalia Sedova-Trotskaia learned of the suppos-
edly "secret" speech immediately it happened suggests that the Trotsky-
ites may have still had high-level informants in the CPSU.

There are good reasons to suspect that Lenin's letter to Stalin of March S,
1923 may be a for^ry. Valentin A. Sakharov has published a major
scholarly book on this subject on this thesis with Moscow University
Press. His general argument is outlined in several articles of his and in
reviews of the book.^

•

There is no question that at the time Stalin himself, and everybody who
knew about it, believed that it was genuine. But even if genuine, Lenin's
letter to Stalin of March 5 1923 does not show what it has often been
assumed to show - that Lenin was estranged from Stalin. For less than
two weeks later his wife Nadezhda Konstantinova Krupskaia (called
"c(omrade) Ul'ianova (N.K.)" in this exchange) told Stalin that Lenin had
very insistendy asked her to make Stalin promise to obtain cyanide cap-
sules for him, in order to end his great suffering. Stalin agreed, but then
reported to the Pobburo on March 23 that he could not bring himself to
do it, "no matter how humane it might be."

' Aimcrmakhcr, I., V.IU. Afiani, ct al. cds. Doklad Khrushcheva o knPk i'cbmsfi Staiiia na XX
j"e^KPSS. DokMmeHtj. Moscw: ROSSPEN, 2002. (hereafter DokJad Khmshcbeva) Razdcl
r\', Dok. No. 3, p. 610. The editors of this official volume note that the letter must be
dated on or after February 25; that is, they relate it to Khrushchev's Speech, which was
delivered the same day. Another possibility is that Scdova's letter was written in response
to Mikoian's speech to the (Congress on i'cbfuaty 16. A facsimile of Scdova's letter to the
Presidium of the 20''' Party (!ungrcss is at

http:/ / chss. montclair. ed u/english /fan/ research/ sedovaln022856.ipg

' V.A. Sakharov, "PoBttehukoe ^^atnuicbaiue'VJ. l^miia: ntU'nost' istoiii i miff poBliki. Moscow:
Izdatcl'stvo MClU (Moscow State University], 2003.

Khrushchev I JliJ

These documents were quoted by Dmitrii Volkogonov in his very hostile
biography of Lenin.* Copies of them remain in the Volkogonov Papers in
the Library of Congress. There is no doubt about their authenticity. Lidia
Fodeva, one of Lenin's secretaries, had made a note in 1922 that Lenin
had told her he would request cyanide capsules if his illness progressed
beyond a certain point.^

Therefore, even if Lenin's letter of March 5, 1923 be genuine - and Sak-
harov's study calls this into serious question - Lenin siill trusted and re-
lied upon Stalin. There was no estrangement between them.

According to Volkogonov (and others).

In the morning of December 24 Stalin, Kamenev and
Bukharin discussed the situation. They did not have the
right to force their leader [Lenin] to be silent. But care,
foresight, the greatest possible quite, were essential. A
decision was taken:

1. Vladimir Ilich is given the right to dictate daily for 5-
10 minutes, but this must not be in the form of
correspondence, and Vladimir Ilich must not expect
answers to these notes. No meetings are allowed.

. 2. Neither friends nor family are permitted to

communicate anything of political life to Vladimir Ilich,
so as not to thereby present materials for consideration
and excitement.'*'

According to Robert Service (L^/im), Lenin suffered serious "events"
(probably strokes) on the following dates:

• May 25, 1922 - a "massive stroke" (p. 443);

• December 22-23, 1922 - Lenin "lost the use of his
whole right side" (p.461);

^ A facsimile of Stalin's letter to the Politburo of March 23, 1923 is published in D.A.
Volkogonov, L/ff/ff. PMebeskii point. V 2-kh knigakh. Kji. 11. Moscow: Novosti, 1994, pp.
384-385. Stalin's letter to the Politburo of March 23, 1923 is rcproducctl, with
commentary, at hnp://www.hrono.ru/libfis/stalin/1 6-67.html and in Appendix 1 of the
present b<M)k.

' This note was published in 1991 and can be consullcxl at
http://www.hrono.rU/Iibrii:/stalin / 1 6-9.htfnl

>•> Volkogonov, Dmitri. Sta/in. Vol. I. M., 1992, Ch. 2, par. 156; cited at
http://militera.lib.ru/bio/volk()gtjnov_dv/02.html

(Chapter One. 'Ihc (iult and Ix-nin's "Testament"

• The night of March 6-7, 1 923 - Lenin "lost the use of
the extremities of the lig^t side of his body." (pp.
473-4).

On December 18 the Politburo put Stalin in charge of Lenin's health and
forbade anyone to discuss politics with him. Krupskaia violated this rule
and was reprimanded for it by Stalin, on December 22. That very night
Lenin suffered a serious stroke.

On March 5, 1923 Krupskaia told Lenin that Stalin had spoken rudely to
her back in December. Incensed, Lenin wrote Stalin the famous note.
According to Krupskaia's secretary V. Dridzo, whose version of this
e\'ent was published in in 1989, it happened this way:

Now, when Nadezhda Konstantinovna's name and
Stain's relationship with her is more frequently
mentioned in some pubUcadons, I wish to tell about
those matters I know for certain.

Wh)' was it only two months after Stalin's rude
conversation with Nadezhda Konstantinovna that V.I
Lenin wrote him the letter in which he demanded that
Stalin excuse himself to her? It is possible that I am the
only one who really knows how it happened, since
Nadezhda Konstantinova often told me about it.

It happened at the very beginning of March 1 923.
Nadezhda Konstantinovna and Vladimir Ilich were
talking about something. The phone rang. Nadezhda
Kcwistantinovna went to the phone (in Lenin's apartment
the phone always stood in the corridor). When she
returned Vladimir Ilich asked her: *Who called?' - 'It was
Stalin, he and I have reconciled.' — "What do you mean?'

And Nadezhda Konstantinovna had to tell everything
that had happened when Stalin called her, talked with her
very rudely, and threatened to bring her before the
Control commission. Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked
Vladimir Ilich to pay it no mind since everything had
been settled and she had forgotten about it.

But Vladimir Ilich was adamant. He was deeply offended
by I.V. Stalin's disrespectful behavior towards Nadezhda
Konstantinovna and on March 5 1923 dictated the latter
to Stalin with a copy to Zinoviev and Kamenev in which

Khnjshchcv 1 Jed

he insisted that Stalin excuse himself. Stalin had to
excuse himself, but he never fotgot it and did not fo^ve
Nadezhda Konstantinovna, and this had an effect on his
relationship with her."'*

The next day Lenin had a further serious stroke.

In each case Lenin had a stroke shortly after Krupskaia discussed political
matter with him - something that, as a Party member, she was not sup-
posed to do. This cannot have been a coincidence, for Lenin's doctors
had specifically warned against getting Lenin upset about anything. So it
seems more than possible that, in fact, it was Krupskaia's actions that
precipitated Lenin's last two serious strokes.

As one of Lenin's long-time secretaries Lidia Fotieva said,

Nadezhda Konstantinovna did not always conduct
herself as she should have done. She might have said too
much to Vladimir Ilich. She was used to sharing
everything with him, even in situations when she should
not have done that at all. . .For example, why did she tell
Vladimir Ilich that Stalin had been rude to her on the
telephone?. . . '2

Incidentally, when Stalin's wife committed suicide in 1932, Krupskaia
wrot£ the following letter of consolation to Stalin, which was published
in Pravda on November 16, 1932:

Dear losif Vissarionych:

These days everything somehow makes me think about
you, makes me want to hold your hand. It is hard to lose
a person who is close to you. I keep remembering those
talks with you in Ilich's office during his illness. They
gave me courage at that time.

I press your hand yet again. N. Krupskaia.'^

V.S. l^rid/o, "Vospominania." K/mmiimst S

'2 1.. I'odcva. (3ircd in .\. Kck, "K istorii poslcdnikh Icninslcikh dokumcntov. V/. arkhiva
pisatclia, bcscdovavshcgn v 1967 s lichnymi sckrctafiami I mina." Moskavskit Nomti No.
17, April 23, 1989, pp. 8-9.

( jtcd in i:..N. (iu:>lian)v, StaHn » ^hi^L Sisltmatijjnvamtji svoH vospominanH sommtmikav,
dokjimeiilov ^Um, venii istonkov. Moscow: ()l.M.\'Prcss, p. 237. Online at
http://www.stalin.su/lx)()k.php?action=pagc&fr_pag»;=6fltfr_book_id=l Al«> cited in
Novoe VrtmiaHiy 46. Nov. 14. 2004.

ChapicrOnc. llic (^ult ami Ixnin's "Testament"

This letter shows once again that Stalin was not estranged from Lenin's
wife after the December 1922 dispute.

Stalin was held in very high esteem by all those in Lenin's household. The
writer Aleksandr Bek wrote down the reminiscences of Lidia Fotieva, in
which she said:

You do not understand those times. You don't
understand what great significance Stalin had. Stalin was
great... Maria Il'inichna [Ul'lanova, Lenin's sister] during
Vladimir Ilich's lifetime told me: 'After Lenin, Stalin is
the most intelligent person in the party. . . Stalin was an
authorit}' for us. We loved Stalin. He was a great man.
Yet he often said: 'I am only a pupil of Lenin's.' (In Bek,
op.iil.)

Khrushchev was simply trying to make Stalin "look bad," rather than
transmit any understanding of what went on.

It is obvious that Khrushchev took Lenin's letter to Stalin out of context,
and in so doing he seriously distorted the situation. He omitted die fact
that the Central Committee had instructed Stalin to make sure Lenin was
isolated from political issues for the sake of hi^ health. This prohibition
explicit])' mentioned "friends" and "domestic persons." Since Lenin's
secretaries were not likely to violate a Central Committee directive,
probably the term "domestic persons" was specifically intended to in-
clude Lenin's sister and Krupskaia, his wife. Stalin had criticized Krup-
skaia for violating this isolation.

Nor did Khrushchev mention Stalin's reply of March 7, 1923 to Lenin's
note, or Lenin's later request to Stalin for poison. By omitting these facts,
Khrushchev seriously distorted the context in which Lenin's note to Sta-
lin of March 5 1923 occurred, and deliberately distorted Lenin's relation-
ship with Stalia

Khrushchev omitted the accounts of Lenin's sister Maria Il'inichna.
Lenin's secretaries Volodicheva and Fodeva, and Krupskaia's secretary
Dridzo, were still alive, but their testimony was not sought. He omitted
the evidence that Krupskaia's actions in violating the CC's prohibition
about getting Lenin upset may well have been the cause of two Lenin's
strokes. He omitted the fact that, far from making any break with Stalin,
two weeks later Lenin trusted only Stalin with the secret request to be
given poison if he asked for it. Finally, he omitted Krupskaia's reconcilia-
tion with Stalin.

Khrushchev liud

Khrushchev strove to depict Stalin in a bad light in this affair at all costs
He showed no interest in what had really happened or an understanding
of the events in their context.

Chapter 2.
Collegiality "Trampled"

3. "CoUegiaUty" In Work

A( several points in his speech, Khrushchev complains about Stalin's lack
of collegiality and violation of collective leadership. Here is a typical pas-
sage:

We have to consider seriously and analyze correcdy this
matter in order that we may preclude any possibility of a
repetition in any form whatever of what took place
during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate
collegialit}' in leadership and in work, and who practiced
brutal violence, not only toward everything which
opposed him, but also toward that which seemed, to his
capricious and despotic character, contrary to his
concepts.

This very general accusation can be easily refuted, but only in similarly
general terms, by citing the testimony of many others who worked with
Stalin, some more closely than Khrushchev ever had. Marshal Georgii
Zhukov had worked with him closely during the war, and testifies to Sta-
lin's method of work. In the first quotation he obviously has the "Secret
Speech" in mind and calls Khrushchev a liar. General Shtemenko says
much the same thing.

According to Ivan A. Benediktov, long-time Minister for Agriculture,
decisions were always taken coUegially. Dmitrii T. Shepilov, by far Stalin's
junior, did not work as closely with Stalin, but his anecdote is revealing.
Even Khrushchev himself, in his memoirs, contradicted himself and
called Stalin's ability to change his own mind when faced with someone
who disagreed with him and defended his viewpoint well, "characteris-
tic."

I'' 'rhvsc and other quotations arc g;ivcn in Appendix 1.

Khrusihchcv 1 icd

Anastas Mikoian supported Khrushchev wholeheartedly and was very
antagonistic to Stalin. Yet Mikoian complained that democracy and col-
lective leadership were never achieved at any lime under Khrushchev or
Brezhnev.

It was Khrushchev himself who refused to lead collectively, and was re-
moved in large part for that in 1964. It appears that Mikhail A. Suslov,
who gave the main speech against Khrushchev, echoed in his wording
both Lenin's "characteristics" letter about Stalin of 1922 and Khru-
shchev's "Secret Speech" attacks on the "cult" around Stalin. The irony
could not have been lost on Khrushchev or his audience.

4. Stalin ^^Morally and Physically Annihilated"
Leaders Who Opposed Him

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and
patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his
concepts and demanding absolute submission to his
opinion. \X'hoever opposed this concept or tried to
prove his viewpoint and the correctness of his position
was doomed to removal from the leading collective and
to subsequent moral and physical annihilation.

There is not one single example, during Stalin's whole life, of his
**removing'* someone "from the collective leadership*' because that
person disagreed with Stalin. It is significant that Khrushchev himself
does not even allege a specific instance.

Stalin was the General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee. He
could be removed by the Cenlral Committee at any time. Flis was only
one vote in the Politburo and in the Central Committee. Stalin tried to
resign from his post as General Secretary four times. Each time his at-
tempt was rejected. The last such attempt was at the 19'** Party Congress,
in October 1952. It too was rejected.

Khrushchev and the rest not only could have opposed Stalin, but did in
fact oppose him. Some examples are given below - for example, that of
the taxes on the peasantry, which apparently came up in Februar}' 1953.'^
None of those who opposed the tax increase were "removed from the

'lliis daim of Khrushchev's is discusiSL-d in (Ihaptcr9.

(.'haptir Twu. "(^(illq^lity" 'I'nmplcd

leading collective," "morally annihilated" - whatever that means — or
"physically annihilated"

Although Stalin never removed anyone from the leadership for opposing
him, Khnishchev did Khrushchev and the others had Lavrentii Beria
arrested suddenly on June 26, 1953, on false charges and without any
evidence. Subsequendy they had Beda killed, together with six others —
Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik, and Vlodzimixskii -
who had been close associates of his.

Nor was Beiia the only person in the leadership of the Party whom
Khmshche^' had removed for disagreeing with him. In July 1957 Khru-
shchev called a CC Plenum to have Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich,
and Shepilov removed firom the leadership simply because they disagreed
with his policies and had tried to get Khrushchev voted out of the Patty
leadership. Khrushchev's high-handedness was a main reason for his re-
moval by the Central Committee in 1964.

Khnishchev and those who supported him needed to have some kind of
explanation or excuse for failing to oppose Stalin in all his alleged
"crimes" during all the years they shared the Party leadership with him. It
seems that this - the threat of "annihilation" - became their alibi. Khru-
shchev evidently said many times that, if "the/* had tried to "restore
Leninist norms to the Party," or to ask him to retire, "not even a wet spot
would have remained of us."'*

Others in the communist movement saw through this thin excuse:

VChen the Soviet leader Anastas Mikoian led the CPSU
delegation to China to attend the CCP's 8* Congress in
1956, P'eng (Te-huai] asked him face to face why it was
only now that the Soviet party was criticizing Stalin.
Mikoian apparently replied: 'We did not dare advance
our opinion at that time. To have done so would have
meant death.' To which P'eng retorted: "What kind of a
communist is it who fears death?'*^

But of course the accusation itself was false.

<6 by ]Urii Shapuval, "Proshchanic s vlast'iu". ZtrhJo NtM Oct 23-29, 2004. .\t
http://www.zcrkalo-ncdcli.com/nn/pnnt/481 1 3/

■7 Rodcnck Macfarquhar, The Orient oj Ae CtAur^ Revobitioii, VoL 2 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983), p. 194,

Khrushchev I Atl

5. Mass Repressions Generally

Khrushchev:

Worth noting is the fact that, even during the progress of
the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, the
Zinovievites, the Bukharinites and others, extreme
repressive measures were not used against them. The
fight was on ideological grounds. But some years later,
when socialism in our country was fundamentally
constructed, when the exploiting classes were generally
liquidated, when the Soviet social structure had radically
changed, when the social basis for political movements
and groups hostile to the party had violently contracted,
when the ideological opponents of the party were long
since defeated politically - then the repression directed
against them began. It was precisely during this period
(1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression
through the Government apparatus was bom, first
against the-enemies of Leninism - Trotskyites,
Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long since politically defeated
by the party - and subsequently also against many honest
Communists, against those party cadres who had borne
the heavy load of the Civil War and the furst and most
difficult years of industrialization and collectivization,
who actively fought against the Trotskyites and the
rightists for the Leninist party line.

Nothing in Khrushchev's speech was more shocking than his accusation
that Stalin had instigated massive and unjustified repression against high-
ranking Bolsheviks. We will examine his specific allegations below, and
preface those remarks here by stressing a few basic points.

Khrushchev himself was responsible for massive repressions, possibly
more than any other single individual aside from Nikolai Ezhov, head of
the NKVD from 1936 to late 1938, who was certainly bloodier than any-
one else.'" Unlike Stalin and the central Party leadership to whom he re-
ported, but like Ezhov and many others, Khrushchev either had to know

I" lUrii /.hukov adds Robert I. Mikhe to this group of bltxxJiest repressors. See
"INidlinnaia istoriia lostfa Stalina?" Utenaimuia Ga^la No. 8 , l*ebniafy 28, 2007. We will
return to this quesiian below.

(^haplcr 'I'wa "CvAKgaiixy" Trampled

that many, probably the vast majonty of those he repressed were inno-
cent or, at the very least, that their fates were decided without detailed
investigation.

Khrushchev was defending both Ezhov and Genxikh lagoda (Ezhov's
predecessor as head of the NKVD) as late as February 1 1956, twenty-
four days before the "Secret Speech". He reiterated this defense, though
in somewhat more moderate terms, in the "rough draft'' of his speech
dated February 18, 1956. This is hard to explain unless Khrushchev were
already trying to deny that any conspiracies had actually taken place, and
therefore that all those who had been repressed were innocent. Khru-
shchev did in fact take that position, though not till well after the 20*''
Part)' Congress. In his Speech Khrushchev claimed Stalin must have been
responsible for aU of Ezhov's repressions. He had to know this was false,
since he had far more evidence at his disposal than we do today. It is
clear from what relatively litde we now have that Ezhov was guilty of
huge illegal repressions.

Khrushchev was either candidate or full Politburo member during the
investigations that established Ezhov's guilt. However, so were others,
such as Mikoian, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov. Mikoian was a
close accomplice of Khrushchev's. But the acquiescence to Khrushchev's
speech by Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov, though only tempo-
rary, can't be explained in the same way.*'

Khrushchev declared many executed Party leaders "rehabilitated", inno-
cent, in defiance of the evidence we have today, after the release of a
small fraction of the documents relating to them. Sometimes he declared
them to have been innocent victims of unfounded repression j priori^
even before the formality of a study of the evidence. Prosecutor's protest,
and Supreme Court decision had been completed or even b^un. The
Pospelov Report^' was drawn up to provide evidence for Khrushchev
that the Party leaders had been unjustly executed, and came to foregone

" Wc return to this (question in the final chapter.

^'Ilic "Pospdov (Commission Report" or simply "Pospelov Report" is dated l*ebruary 9,
1956. Its official tide is '"llic Report of the Commission of the CC CPSU to the
Presidium of the CC CPSU tolvstabUsh the ('auscs of the Mass Rcpncssions Against
Members and Candidate Members of the CC CPSU lUccted at the \7'^ Party Congress."
'llic Report was signed by A.B. .\ristov,N.M. Shvcmik, and P.l'. Komarov in addition to
Pospelov. I'or the Russian text sec DokJad Khmsbdimi 185-230; RKEB 1 317-348 does not
contain the appendices, including Eikhc's letter.

Khrushchev lied

conclusions. It failed to consider a great deal of the evidence we know
exists. Even as it stands it does not prove the innocence of the persons
whose repression it studies.

All the evidence we presently have points to the existence of a wide-
spread Rightist-Trotskyist series of anti-govemment conspiracies involv-
ing many leading Party leaders, both NKVD chiefs lagoda and Ezhov,
high-ranking militar)' leaders, and many others.^' Broadly speaking, this is
more or less the picture drawn by the Stalin government at the time, ex-
cept that some vital details, such as Ezhov's involvement in the leader-
ship of the Ri^tist conspiracy, were never publicly revealed.

There is a lot of circumstantial evidence to suggest that Khrushchev him-
self may well have been a participant in this Right-Trotskyite conspir-
acy.22 Such an hypothesis makes sense of much of the evidence we have,
but it is suggestive rather than conclusive. However, such a hypothesis
would go far towards explaining Khrushchev's attack on Stalin, and even
the subsequent history of the CPSU.

Included in the Appendix section below and online in Russia and English
are:

• evidence of Khrushchev's massive repressions;
^ • excerpts from confessions by lagoda, Ezhov, and Frinovskii

(Ezhov's second-in-command) concerning their participation in
the Rightist-Trotskyist conspiracy, in the separate section on
Ezhov.

6. "Enemy of the People'*

Khrushchev:

2' Sec (Chapter 4.

^ l*()r some of this sec the Appendix on the present chapter.

(ihaplcr 'I'wix "CuUct^ity" 'I'ramplcd

reputations. This concept "enemy of the people" actually
eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological 6ght
or the making of one's views known on this or that issue,
even those of a practical character. In the main, and in
actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms
of current legal science, was the "confession" of the
accused himself; and, as subsequent probing proved,
"confessions" were acquired through physical pressures
against the accused. This led to glaring violations of
revolutionary legality and to the fact that many entirely
innocent persons, who in the past had defended the
patty line, became victims.

We must assert that, in r^ard to those persons who in
their time had opposed the party line, there were often
no sufficiently serious reasons for their physical
annihilation. The formula "enemy of the people" was
specifically introduced for the purpose of physically ,
annihilating such individuals.

Stalin certainly did not "originate the concept." The phrase I'ennemi du
ptupk was widely used during the great French Revolution. It was used by
the writer Jean-Paul Marat in the very first issue of his revolutionary
newsletter UAmi duPeupk in 1793.^ Subsequent use of the term derives
from the French Revolution. It is famously the name of a play by Ibsen.
Maxim Gorky used the term in his sketch "The Taudde Chersonese"
("Khersones Tavricheskii") in the "Oath of the Chersonesers," a sketch
published in 1897.

Because all the revolutionaries of 1917 tended to view the revolution in
Russia through the lenses of the revolution of 1789, the term was used
widely from the very beginning. Lenin used the term before the revolu-
don. The Constitutional Democratic Party, called the "Cadets", which
was the party of the rich bourgeoisie, was banned by the Coundl of Peo-
ple's Commissars on November 28 1917 as an "enemy of the people." It
was signed by Lenin.

A locus classicm iox the use of the term "enemy of the people" during the
1930s is the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet
of People's Commissars of August 7, 1932, also known as "the law of the

^ Sec hnp://mcnibrcsJycos.fr/ipmafat/ipmif.html

(Chapter Twu "(Julkgialit)-" 'I nmplcd

really existed - is a private letter from Stalin to Kagaoovich, Sist pub-
lished in 2001. It's dear from this letter that Stalin is reading the confes-
sions of the defendants at tiial and trying to learn and draw conclusions
from them.

The section of Dmitriev's confession first published in 2004 is part of an
investigative report sent to Stalin by Beria on October 23, 1938. Beda
was in the process of rooting out NKVD men who had conspired to
frame innocent people, mislead investigations, and aid the Rightists Buk-
harin, Rykov and others to overthrow the government. The accused.here,
D.M. Dmiiriev, had been head of the NKVD in Sverdlovsk oblast'. He
refers directly to the interrogation of Kamenev's wife to which Stalin had
referred, and so provides striking verification of the genuine nature of
Stalin's letter to Kaganovich of August 23, 1936 printed among the
documents in the Appendix. It is completely consistent with a Rightist
plot.

We now have a few of Zinoviev's, Kamenev's, and Bukharin's pre-trial
interrogations from the Volkogonov Papers, in which all mutually, accuse
one another - that is, all their confessions are mutually reinforcing, and
consistent with their testimony at trial.

We also possess their appeals for clemency to the Supreme Court, which
they wrote after their sentencing. In them they again reaffirm their guilt
Even the Rehabilitation report on them published in 1989, though heav-
ily edited, contains suggestions of their guilt, for in it Zinoviev twice
states that he is "no longer" an "enemy."

Sentencing Zinoviev and Kamenev, among others, to be shot for treason
was not arbitrary if they were guilty, as all the evidence at our disposal at
present su^ests. We may assume Khrushchev had no evidence of their
innocence, or he surely would have had it released. Therefore, we have
every reason to conclude that Khrushchev lied hypocritically when he
deplored Zinoviev 's and Kamenev's fates.

8. Trotskyites

Khrushchev:

Or, let us take the example of the Trotikyites. At
present, after a sufficiendy long historical period, we can
speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete
calm and can analyze this matter with sufficient
objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose

Khrushchev 1 Jed

origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois
society. Part of them belonged to the party intelligentsia
and a certain part were recruited from among the
workers. We can name many individuals who, in their
time, joined the Trotskyites; however, these same
individuals took an active part in the workers' movement
before the Revolution, during the Socialist October
Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the
victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them
broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist
positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people?

In a speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum on March 3, Stalin did
refer to Trotskyites in very hostile terms. But he did not advocate perse-
cuting them. While stressing the need for renewed vigilance Stalin also
proposed the establishment of special ideological courses for all leading
party workers. That is, Stalin saw the problem of Trotskyism as a result
of a low level of political understanding among Bolsheviks.

Meanwhile at the same Plenum, in his concluding speech on March 5,
Stalin argued strongly against punishing everyone who had ever been a
Trotskyist, and called for "an individual, differentiated approach." This is
prec^gely what Khrushchev, in the "Secret Speech," claimed that Stalin
did not do. So Khrushchev advocated exactly what Stalin advocated at
the Feb.-March 1937 Plenum,^ while denying that Stalin did this. The
parallel between Khrushchev's and Stalin's speeches are so close that
Khrushchev may in fact have copied this passage out of Stalin's very
speech!

There's a great deal of documentary evidence that Trotsky and his sup-
porters were involved in anti-Soviet conspiracies, including with the Na-
zis. Full documentation must await a separate study,^ but General Pavel

'llicrc is now c()nsiJcrablc evidence t() supp<irt Soviet allegations of the 1930s that
Trotsky was involved with other ( )ppositionists within the USSR in a conspiracy to
ovenhn>w the Stalin ^ivemmcnt, and even that he was in touch with the (icnnan and
Japanese military. 'Iliere Ls also evidence that clandestine I'rot.skyist groups, both out.sidc
and inside the Party, were involved in sabotage and espionage within the USSR, and in
spreading false accusations of treason against others.

^ Sec ( J rover I'urr, "Mvidence of 1^-on 'I'rorsky's (loilaboration with Cietmany and
Japan." Cu/liirt^Lopc (2009), at http://clugic.cserver.org/2009/l-urr.pJf

ff!1iiln'irij''T— jfad

Hisrrii diifD, together with some Nazi documentation showing
^Pyillir iras idling the tzulfa^ is dted in Appendix 1 at this point.

9. Stalin neglected Party

(Hioea^ dudng the 6rst few yeafs after Lenin's death,
^utf congiQses and Central Committee plenums took
pihoemoieorless r^ulaxiy, later, when Stalin b^n
ioaeaaog^ to abuse his power, these principles were
hnilalty violated. This was especially evident during the
fast 15 years of his life. Was it a normal situation when
over 13 years ebpsed between the 18th and 19th Party
CoDgiesses, years during which our party and our
country had expenenced so many important events?

Hcnhdiev implies chat Stalin fiiled to call any such Congress. The little
Wdatct dut has been published so far &om the former Soviet archives
■ggesti that the Stalin leadership wished to call a Congress in 1947 or ,
1948^ but that diis suggestion was rejected by the Politburo for some rea-
lOD that has Dot been disclosed. The proposal was made by Andrd
^^liuusv, who was very close to Stalin. It is hig^y unlikely that Zhdanov
■Duld have made this proposal without Stalin's agreement.

Ruthmnore, as a member of the Politburo Khrushchev would have
beeo dicre to hear iti This makes the fact that Khrushchev does not actu-
ilty Male, in so many words, that Stalin "refused" or "failed** to call a
Coi^Kess, significant, many in his audience may have been aware of the
plan fior an earlier conference. Nor did Khrushchev mention the war of
1941-45 or the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40. If peacetime years only
aie counted, then a Congress in 1947 or 1948 would have been timely -
difcc peacetime years (1940-1, 1946, 1947) since the Eighteenth Party
CoQgrtss in 1939.2^

So once s^in Khrushchev was not being honesr. a Congress was
plaoned for 1947 or 1948, but was never held. Khrushchev must have
known the details of this very interesting discussion, including the rea-
sons for not calling the Congress. But he never alluded to the fact at all.
Nor did he or any of his successors ever release the transcript of this and
succeeding CC Plenums. It has not been released to date.

" See Usiav Vs«s«iuznoi KomniunistichL-skoi I'litii (bol'iihcvikov) . . . Moscow, t94S, p.
13.

Khrushchev lied

Khrushchev also made the following similar and equally false accusation:

It should be sufficient to mention that during all the
years of the Patriotic War not a single Central
Committee plenum took place. It is true that there was
an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in
October 1941, when Central Committee members from
the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited
two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain.
Stalin did not even want to meet and talk to the Central
Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized
Stalin was in the first months of the war and how
haughtily and disdainfully he treated the Central
Committee members.

Even Boris Nikolaevsky's note to the original Neuf leader edition of this
speech recognized that this is a lie, though in his final sentence Ni-
kolaevsky shows that he prefers to believe Khrushchev rather than Stalin-
era Soviet sources.

If one were to trust official Soviet sources, this statement
by Khrushchev would not be true: According to the
collection, The Communist Part)' of the Soviet Union in
the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses,
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums (published
by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute of the Party
Central Committee in 1954), one Central Committee
plenum was held during the war (|anuary 27, 1944),
when it was decided to give the various Union Republics
the right to have their own foreign ministries and it was
also decided to replace the Internationale by the new
Soviet national anthem. But it is likely that Khrushchev
is correct, that there was no Central Committee plenum
in 1944 and a fraud was perpetrated: The plenum was
announced as having occurred although it never had.

Wishful thinking on Nikolaevsky's part! For if Khrushchev lied here,
where else might he have lied? The 1989 Russian edition of Khrushchev's
Speech acknowledges that these two Plena were scheduled,^ and that

» DuMaJ Khnjshchcva 152 n. 23.

(.'hapicr 'I'wo. "CJolk.-giaiii)'" I'lamplcd

one of them took place, though without pointing up the obvious conclu-
sion - that Khnishchev had lied

In October 1941 leading party members were at the front and at this, the
most cnidal time of the war. With the Nazi annies near Moscow, they
could not be recalled for a CC meeting. And not only was there, in fact, a
CC Plenum on January 27, 1944 — it was the Plenum at which the Soviet
National Anthem was changed. Virtually everyone in Khrushchev's 1956
audience had Co know this! Yet Khrushchev still said itl^ Perhaps this is
best explained as one of Khrushchev's blunders. It was certainly one of
many falsehoods in his speech that must have been obvious even at the
time.

Chapter 3.

Stalin's "Arbitrariness" Towards

the Party

10. Reference to ^^a party commission under

the control of the Central Committee
Presidium"; fabrication of materials during

repressions

Khrushchev:

The commission has become acquainted with a large
quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and with
other documents and has established many facts
pertaining to the fabrication of cases against
• Communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses of
socialist legality, which resulted in the death of innocent
people. It became apparent that many party, Soviet and
economic activists, who were branded in 1937-1938 as
"enemies," were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers,
etc., but were always honest Communists; they were only
so stigmatized and, of ten, no longer able to bear barbaric
tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the
investigative judges -falsifiers) with all kinds of grave and
unlikely crimes.

[...1

It was deteniiined that of the 139 members and
candidates of the party's Central Committee who were
elected at the 17th Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 per cent,
were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938).
(Indignation in the hall.) ... The same fate met not only
the Central Committee members but also the majority of
the delegates to the 17th Party Congress. Of 1,966

OMpierlluoc. Sulin's ".AibitrariiK'Ss" to the Patiy

delates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108
persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary
ditnes, it., decidedly more than a majority.

This statement is one of my three "Special Cases''^' for the fdlowing
leason: Khmshchev implies that Stalin was responsible for something,
but docs not say precisely what. Nor does he make an explicit accusation.
Therefore, stricdy speaking, there is no ''revelation,'* and nothing to ex-
pose.

However, Khrushchev's statement was certainly meant to imply that Sta-
lin simply had all these Party members murdered. That implication is
con^letely false, and it will be refuted in the present section of this essay.
However, even though this implication was clearly intentional and is, as
we shall see, false, Stalin is not explicitly accused of anything.

We now have the report of this commission, known as the Pospelov
Commission,"^' after Petr N. Pospelov, director of the Institute of Marx-
Engels-I^enin and secretary of the Central Committee. An historian,
Pospelov directed this commission and later wrote the first draft of
Khrushchev's "Secret Speech." During Stalin's lifetime Pospelov's works
were among the most flagrant examples of the "culi.^' He became a close
ally of fGirushchev's. Pospelov is considered to have been a very politi-
cally-biased historian. Given his position, it would be surprising if he had
not been. Even if we knew nothing about him, however, the report that
bears his name would suggest that this was the case.

The Pospelov Commission report does indeed conclude that many exe-
cuted Party f^ures were innocent. But the evidence cited in the report
does not demooBtrate their ioooceQce. The Commission simply de-
clared them innocent. The whole structure of the report makes it clear
that its purpose was to find Stalin guilty of massive repressions and to
hush up any evidence that contradicted this foregone conclusion.

We also have the summary reports prepared (on the ^^rehabilitations" of
those leading Party figures repressed duiing the 1930s. Some of these

" Sec Chapter tO, ".\ Typolc^ of Khtushchcv's Prevarications," for discussixMi of this
and other catcgotk's of Khtushchcv's prevarications.

Cr. RfobtStatsiia. Kak Elo Bjb. DokMrnw/f Pn^nma TsK KPSS idntpe mataii^. V )-kb
tsmakk Tom I. Mart 1953 - Frvrat 1956. Moscow: MczhdunaroUnyi Fond Dcmokratiia,
2000, pp. 317'34S. Also at http.-//w>irttr.a)cundciyakovlcv.oig/almaiuh/insidc/alinanah-
duc/S57S2

Khrushchev lied

reports were prepared before the Pospelov Report, and most of them
were prepared afterwards. Edited and published by Alexandr N. lakov-
lev's "Memorial" fund, they include the Pospelov Report within them,
but much other material too. "Memorial" is a very anti-communist or-
ganization extremely hostile to Stalin. It can be assumed that they would
have included any and all evidence that tended to make Stalin look guilty
of repressing innocent people. ^2

In this section we cover the following matters:

• There is a great deal of evidence suggesting that a
significant number of the high-ranking Part)'
members whose repression is cited by Khrushchev
appear to have been guilty after all! At the very least,
there is sufficient evidence of their guilt that the short
summaries of their cases given in the Pospelov
Report are utterly insufficient to establish their
innocence.

• Hzhov was responsible for fabricaiing cases against
many Soviet citizens. It is possible that this includes a
few of the Party members cited by Khrushchev.
Ezhov confessed to doing this and was tried and
executed for it (See the separate section 17 on Ezhov,
below).

• Many, if not most, of the investigations that
established the fact of fabrications of confessions and
torture against those arrested, were done during
Beria's tenure as head of the NKVD, after he
replaced Ezhov in late 1938.

• Khrushchev initiated a covenip of the specific
reasons for arrests, investigative and trial information,
and executions of Central Committee members.

Khrushchev referred to the large per centage of the Central Committee
elected at, and Delegates to, the 17''' Party Congress in 1934 who were
subsequently the victims of repression. As with the more detailed "ac-

^2 Op^ dl. Wc have also studic-tJ the two further volumes of "rehabilitation" materials, but
as they publish materials later than the 2£fi* Party (Congress, they have no direct bearing on
Khrushchev's "Secret Speech."

Chaptn'l'hRr. Stalin's "iAtbitnrincss" to the I^arty

counting" of the CC delegates later published^^ Khrushchev g;ives no
details about when and why different delates were arrested, tried, and
many of them executed. His account gives the impression that his was
done in an undifferentiated way by "Slalin."

But Khnishchev knew bener. We can be sure of that, because we have
the "rehabilitation" leports, including the Pospelov Commission report.
Their contents make dear that there were several different reasons for
these arrests and executions.

According to the Commission,

• "Most" were innocent. That implies that some were
not, although the Commission did not specify which
were guilt)', except for Ezhov.

• Some were falsely implicated by others. Both Eikhe
and E.G. Evdokimov speak of falsely accusing
others, including CC members, when they were
beaten or otherwise tortured

• Some were tortured into signing false confessions
and accusations against others.

In addition the Commission emphasizes that Stalin was sent confessions
and interrogations of many of those accused, which he then sent on to
others on the Politburo. We know this is true, since a few of these have
now been published.

Both Khrushchev and the Pospelov Commission try to blame Becia for
repression as well as Ezhov. But their own facts - many gathered during
Beha's investigation of NKVD crimes and excesses during Ezhov's ten-
ure - and their own statistics, give the lie to this theory. The reality is that
Beria put an end to the "Ezhovshchina".

The Pospelov Commission report lifts the curtain a tiny bit on what was
really going on, while Khrushchev's ''Secret Speech" keeps it all reso-
lutely hiddea But neither during the existence of the USSR nor since
1991 have the relevant materials been made available to researchers. So
the truth of what went on continues to be covered up. It is reasonable to
iurmise that this is so because such a study would tend to exculpate both

' In I^liia TtKKPSS No. 12, 1989, pp. 82-1 13.

Khrushchev lied

Stalin and Beria, whom Khrushchev and Co. went to great lengths to
blame for everything.

In fact Khrushchev himself was one of those most guilty of mass repres-
sion. We discussed this briefly in the previous chapter and cite docu-
ments as evidence in the Appendix.

In this chapter and the following one, we will examine the case of each of
the repressed Party figures named by Khrushchev. In none of these cases
did the "rehabilitation" materials, including the Pospelov Commission
report, cite sufficient evidence to establish their innocence. In fact, in a
number of cases the report itself admits the existence of contradictoi\'
evidence.

Since the end of the USSR and the very partial opening of former Soviet
archives to a few researchers some evidence relating to the charges
against the high Party officials mentioned by Khrushchev and discussed
in the Pospelov Commission's report has come to light. The Russian
government has refused to make public the full investigative materials
about any of these figures. Therefore, we cannot be certain that these
men were guilty. But the evidence available to us today demonstrates the
utter inadequacy of the Pospelov Commission's conclusions that these
men were innocent. The vast preponderance of evidence available to us
today points towards their guilt.

11. December 1, 1934 "directive" signed by

Enukidze

Khrushchev:

On the evening of December 1, 1934 on Stalin's
initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau -
which was passed two days later, casually)...

This is a false statement. Khrushchev was complaining to the Party lead-
ership that this law had been signed by the Governmental body - the
Presidium of the TsIK - but not by the Politburo of the Party.

But the Soviet Constitution said nothing about the Politburo of the Party,
and there was thus no reason for the Politburo to pass on this decision. It
was signed by Kalinin and Enukidze, Chairman and Secretary' of the Cen-
tral Executive Committee respectively. Khrushchev gives no evidence
that it was passed "on Stalin's initiative." Stalin wrote a note on the draft
that he was "for publication." This means it had been submitted to him

(ihaptcr llinv. Stalin's "Arbimnncss" to the Patty

10 ask him if he agreed with publishing it. Since it had been submitted to
him, this draft at least cannot have come from him in the first place.^

llie question of this decree is distorted in the 1989 official Russian edi-
tion of Khrushchev's Speech, which states that it was not submitted for
confinnation by a session of the Central Executive Committee of the
USSR. No CN'idence is given in support of this statement. But even if this
is so - what does it have to do with Stalin? He was not Chairman of the
CEC. And it is irrelevant to our purpose anyway, as Khrushchev was not
referring to ratification by the CEC at all. He was complaining that the
PoUtburo - a Part)' organ - had not passed on it beforehand. But there
u"as no need for it to do so.

The fact that Khrushchev complained Stalin had not sought approval by
the Politburo for this decree supports the theory put forward by some
researchers that one of Khrushchev's motives in attacking Stalin was Sta-
lin's attempt to move the Party out of governing society and running the
economy. This theory has been supported in various ways by researchers
such as lurii Zhukov, Arch Getty, and lurii Mukhin, as well as the aethor
of this present work,'*

12. Khrushchev Implies Stalin's involvement
in Kirov's murder.

Khrushchev:

It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances
surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are
inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful
examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the
killer of Kirov, Nikolaev, was assisted by someone from
among the people whose duty it was to protect the
person of Kirov. A month and a half before the killing,
Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious

Khrushchev lied

behavior but he was released and not even searched. It is
an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the
Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for
an interrogation, on December 2, 1934, he was killed in a
car "accident" in which no other occupants of the car
were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top
functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very
light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can
assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces
of the organizers of Kirov's killing.

In this passage Khrushchev implied, though without stating it overtly,
that Stalin was involved in Kirov's murder. As Arch Getty has pointed
out, several Soviet and post-Soviet commissions tried to find evidence
that Stalin was involve in Kirov's assassination, and all failed. In a longer
discussion in The Road To Terror (\4\-T) Getty concludes that there is no
evidence at present that Stalin had anything to do with Kirov's assassina-
tion. Sudoplatov too concluded there was no reason to suspect Stalin in
this assassination.

Getty, along with most Russian researchers, believes that Stalin "framed"
— fabricated a false case against - the Oppositionists who were tried,
convicted, and executed for involvement in Kirov's assassination. But
there is good evidence that they were not framed at alL For example,
though only a tiny amount of the investigative material from the Kirov
assassination is even open to researchers, and much less than that has
been published, we have a partial transcript of an interrogation of Ni-
kolaev, the assassin, in which he incriminates an underground Zinovievist
group that included Kotolynov, and a partial interrogation of Kotolynov
of the day before in which he accepts "political and moral responsibility"
for the assassination of Kirov by Nikolaev.^

13. Stalin's and Zhdanov's telegram to the
Politburo of September 25 1936.

Khrushchev:

^ LubtMJka. S/aHi, I V'ChKGPV-OGPU-NlKVD. lAwar' 1922 - lUkabr' 1936. Mosc<.w:
2003, N()S. 481 and 482, pp. 575-577. Vladimir Hobrov and I arc preparing a
detailed study ()f the Kirov Assassination.

jptcf Ihtix. Stalin's "Arbitrariness" to the Pait>'

Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of
1936 after a telegram from Stalin and [Andrei] Zhdanov,
dated from Sochi on September 25, 1936, was addressed
to Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the
Political Bureaa The content of the telegram was as
follows:

'VC'e deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that
Comrade Ezhov be nominated to the post of
People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has
definitely proved himself to be incapable of
unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The
OGPU is four years behind in this matter. This is
noted by all party workers and by the majority of the
representatives of the NKVD.'

This Stalinist formulation that the "NKVD is four years
behind" in applying mass repression and that there is a
necessity for "catching up" with the neglected work
direcdy pushed the NKVD workers on the path of mass
arrests and executions.

lin's phrase did not refer to repression, much le&s mass repression, at
but to dissatisfaction with the invesdgadon of the recendy-discovered
)tskyite-Zinovievite bloc. Getty^^ shows that the phrase "four years
lind" must mean four years, not from the Riutin Platform but from
discovery of the bloc of Rights and Trotskyites formed in 1932. That
it showed suspicion of lagoda. Thurston and Jansen and Petrov
Ee.M

&ct, Khrushchev knew this too, but hid the fact in the "Secret
€ch." The Pospelov-Aristov draft of Khrushchev's speech stated di-
ly that the "four years" was since the formadon of the bloc in 1932.
khd Kbrushcheva, 125). Pospelov and Axistov introduced the words
nial' ufmhchetitioe ("catch up what has been n^lected*'). But this was
nvention of theirs. Stalin had not used these words.

IT)', OriffHs, Chapter 5; Cictty, "The C»rcat Puigi*s Rcconsidcrcd". Unpub. PhD diss.
>n College, 1979, p. 326.

ben lliurston. Life ami Temriii StaSifj Rjusia, 1 934- 1941. (Yale University Press;
I, p.35; Marc Jansen, Nikita Petrov. SlaBits LajfoJ Extatioiitr Piopyi Commissar Nikala
1, 1895-1940. (Hoover Institution Press, 2002), p.54.

Khrushchev lied

Khrushchev picked up this expression, but omitted the fact that the
'*four years" was since the formation of the bloc. The Pospelov Report
also omitted reference to the "bloc," interpreting the "four years" to
mean the need for repression {DokJod Khrushcheva^ 220). An important
part of Khrushchev's and Pospelov's basic premise is that no bloc ex-
isted

It's clear that the "neglected work" Stalin and Zhdanov meant in their
telegram was the investigation of the Right-Trotskyite bloc and its in-
volvement with representatives of foreign governments in planning a
"palace coup" and with "terror" {terror = assassination, murder). Both
Getty and prominent Trotskyist scholar Pierre Broue affirm that such a
bloc really existed. Their studies in Trotsky's own archives at Harvard
University, opened in 1980, prove this beyond doubt.''^

14. Stalin's report at the February-March 1937

CC Plenum

Khrushchev:

Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee
plenum in 1937, 'Deficiencies of party work and
•methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and of
other two-facers', contained an attempt at theoretical
justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext
that as we march forward toward socialism class war
must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history
and Lenin taught him this.

Stalin's report at this Plenum did not contain any such theoretical justifi-
cation. Khrushchev seriously distorted Stalin's words. Stalin never said
that "as we march forward towards socialism class war must sharpen."
What he said was:

. . . the further forward we advance, the greater the
successes we achieve, the greater will be the fury of the
remnants of the broken exploiting classes, the sooner
will they resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more

^ J. Arch (icny, "'I'rotsky in Mxilc: 'llic l-'ounding of the I'ourth Intcraational." Switl
S/udiaii No. 1 (lanuary 1986), 28 and n. 19 p. 34; Pierre Broue, "Trotsky et Ic bloc Jl-s
oppositions de 1932." Cahim Lion Tntskj 5 (1980) S-37.

llhafcSiilm's "Aifainrificss" to the Paity

«iM diC7 seek to hanii the Soviet state and the more will
fhcf dutch at the most desperate means of snuggle, as
die last Ksoct of doomed people. It should be borne in
miod that the renmants of the broken classes in the
US5.R. are not alone. They have the direct support of
our enemies beyond the bounds of the U.S.S.R.^

$lilia went on to call for an individual approach and for political educa-
fioa,BOt for anything like repressions or "terror." But about the "direct
mppott of eoemies beyond the bounds of the USSR" Stalin was correct.
A fftat deal of evidence that foreign a^its were recruiting Soviet citi-
aens iolo sabotage and espionage had already been ^thered, and a lot
moce would be uncovered in the months after the Plenum.

Aod, in fact, Lenin had said something very similar to this in a passage
Stalio had quoted in a speech of Apol 1929. Even in this speech the solu-
doos Stalin called for were vigibnce, along with political education
courses to be organized for all Party leaders above a certain rank. This
call for politiwi education, not mass repression, marks the culn)inating
point of his speech.

On March 5 1937 Stalin also made another, concluding report at the Feb-
luaiy-March CC Plenum. This closing speech of the Plenum could never
be teimed a "theoretical justiEcacion of the mass tccror policy". Stalin
explicitly aigued that "there must be an individual, differentiated ap-
pcoach. Further on in the report Stalin made the same point again, explic-
itty aiguing agaiost a mass approach. Stalin argues that there are, at
most, only a few thousand Party members who could be said to have
sympathized with the Trotskyites, or "about 12,000 Party members who
sympathized with Trotskyism to some extent or other. Here you see the
tola] forces of the Trotskyite gentlemen."^'

Rather than calling for a "mass terror policy," Stalin made a strong argu-
oient against it. ludi Zhukov (Inoi Suslin^ 360 ff.) agrees that Stalin's
speech was very mild. A resolution was prepared on his report It was
passed unanimously, but has never been published. Zhukov quotes it
irom an archival copy (362-3).

«>J.V. Sialin, Maitmiig tMshevim (New York: W<Klicts I Jbraiy, 1937). p. 30. .\t
hop:/ / www.inan2nuo.ccmi/Scilin/MB57.hnnl

Khrushchev lied

Far from calling for "mass repression", as Khrushchev falsely claimed,
Stalin called for more inner-Party political education, espedally for Party
leaders such as those at the Central Committee Plenum. He called for
each such Party leader to pick two replacements for him so he could go
to Party courses that would last four months, while more local Part)'
leaders would go to courses lasting six months.

Many or most of the Delegates to the Plenum were First Secretaries and
local Party secretaries. They could have interpreted this plan as a threat.
In effect, they were to choose their own potential replacements. A kind
of "competition" for these high Party posts seemed to be in the offing. If
the Party Secretaries went off to these courses, who could say that they
would return?

In reality, it was the Party First Secretaries and others around the counin'
- including, as we have seen, Khrushchev himself - who turned to "mass
repression." These courses were never set up. At the next Plenum in June
1937, the Secretaries instead turned to Stalin with frightening stories of
threats by reactionaries and returning kulaks. They demanded extraordi-
nary powers to shoot and imprison tens of thousands of these people.
This will be discussed in more detail below.

Earlier in the Plenum also, on February 27, Stalin gave the report of the
commission on the investigation of Bukharin and Rykov. This marked a
total of three reports by Stalin — the most he ever made at any Plenum. In
this report he recommended a very mild resolution. Getty and Naumov
(411-416) study the voting of the commission and point out that Stalin's
recommendations were mildest of all - internal exile. Ezhov, the original
reporter, along with Budienniy, Manuil'skii, Shvemik, Kosarev and lakir
all voted to "turn [them] over to trial with a recommendation to shooi
them."

See the detailed discussion by Vladimir Bobrov and Igor' Pykhalov^^in
an article that examines a rumor, spread by Bukharin's widow Larina in
her memoirs, that Stalin had been for execution and and laldr had op-
posed it - exactly the opposite of what really occurred, but a bit of and-
Stalin "folklore" that became elevated to the status of historical "fact"
until the documents were published in post-Soviet times.

"lakir I Bukharin: Splvrni I Dokumc-iit)'." http://dcl()sialina.ru/?p=333 and clsnvhca*.
It is reprinted in Igor' !*ykhal()v, ViBkii OInlgflHirjfi Va^M' (Moscow: Yau;:a, 2010), (Chap-
ter 6, 355-366.

(ihapK.T'lhfn.-. Stalin's "vVrbitranncss" to the Fart)'

Stalin had outlined a view that the class struggle had to shaipen as the
Soviet Union developed towards socialism. But this was not in 1937, but
at the April 1928 Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central
Control Commission:

What is the issue here? It*s not at all the issue that the
further ahead we drive, the stronger the task of socialist
construcbon becomes developed, then the stronger will
grow the opposition of the capitalists. That isn't the
issue. The issue is why does the opposition of the
capitalists grow stronger? (Emphasis added, GF)^^

•According to Bordiugov and Kozlov this thesis had been further devel-
oped by Valerian Kuibyshev at the September 1928 Plenum. They add
that Bukhann had opposed it at the April 1929 Plenum, but in an equivo-
cal wa)-: Bukharin had agreed that class struggle sharpened at certain
times - and agreed that 1929 was one of those times - but said that it was
not a general principle.

•

15. '^Many Members questioned mass
repression**, especially Pavel Postyshev

Khrushchev:

At the February-March Central Committee plenum in
1 937 many members actually questioned the rightness of
the established course r^arding mass repressions under
the pretext of combating "two-facedness.

Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts.
He said:

I have philosophized that the severe years of fighting
have passed. Party members who have lost their
backbones have broken down or have joined the
camp of the enemy; healthy elements have fought
for the party. These were the years of
industrialization and collectivization. I never thought
it possible that after this severe era had passed

Uncorrected transcript of Stalin's speech at the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC of
the .\UCI>(b) .April 22. 1929, in Kak lomaB NEP. Sttmffoimj Pkmam TsK VKP(b} t92S-
1929 gg. VStomakh. Tom 4. (Moscow: MDI',2000). p.655.

Khrushchev lied

Kaipov and people like him would find themselves
in the camp of the enemy. (Karpov was a worker in
the Ukrainian Central Committee whom Postyshev
knew well.) And now, according to the testimony, it
appears that Kaipov was recruited in 1934 by the
Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in 1934
an honest party member who had trod the long road
of unrelenting fight against enemies for the party
and for socialism would now be in the camp of the
enemies. I do not believe it. . . I cannot imagine how
it would be possible to travel with the party during
the difficult years and then, in 1934, join the
Trotskyites. It is an odd thing. . . ^

In the mid-1990s the trsuiscript of this February- March 1937 Central
Committee Plenum was finally published. We can now see that, while this
quotation of Postyshev is genuine, Khrushchev's commentary is deliber-
ately false.

Khrushchev obviously knew he was lying about it. Khrushchev said
"many members... questioned the rightness..." In fact, not a single
member did so. Even Postyshev did not do sol After the section quoted
by Khrushchev, Postyshev went on to condemn Karpov, and anyone else
who had joined forces with the enemy.

Postyshev was actually harshest of all at expelling large numbers of peo-
ple, and was removed as candidate member of Politburo for this at the
January 1938 CC Plenum. Getty demonstrates at length how Postyshev
was raked over the coals at this Plenum for excessive repression, speak-
ing of "the overvigilant Postyshev as being sacrificed for the sake of end-
ing mass expulsions in the party. . (Getty & Naumov 517; cf 533ff.)

** Sex- Lubiaiihi. StaSn i Glmtm uprm/kmi guhc^pasimH NKID 1937-1938. Moscow: MI!)!'.
2004 (hcrc-aftcr I.ubianka 2) No. 17, pp. 69 ff., a report made to Stalin by Itzhov on
I'ebruary 2» 1937 of an interro)ration of .Asranfian about a "Ri^ht-lieftist" ot^nization in
the Ukraine that was collaborating with the 'rrotsk)'ist and Ukrainian Nationalist
undergrounds. In the transcript of .Nsranfian's confession of January 14, 1937 Stalin
circled Karpov's name and wrote "AX'lio is thisr^' in the margin - p. 7 1 -2.

(lelt)', J. Arch and Oleg \'. Naumov, Tht Rixui/o Tenw. Statin ami tht St^-Dtstnuthii e/tbt
Bobbmks, 1932-1939. New I laven: Yale University Press, 1999 (hereafter (ietty & Nau-
mov)., 517; cf. 533 ff. 'llie dtKument confirming Postyshcv's expulsion and arrest is
nrproduced on pp. 514-516.

(iluptcf lliai-. Stalin's "Arfaitcaiincss" to the Puiy

luii Zhukov's analysis agrees that at the January 1938 Plenum the Stalin
leadership again tried to put brakes on the First Secretaries' illegal repres-
sions. The document confirming Postyshev's expulsion and arrest for
repressing innocent people in a mass way is quoted at length, in transla-
tion, by Getty and Naumov.

Khnishchev was present at the January 1938 CC Plenum, and certainly
knew all about Postyshev's fate and why he was sacked. As a Plenum
panidpant Khrushchev also had to know that "many members" did not
"question the rightness" of the repressions. Khrushchev himself made a
hanh, repressive speech at the February-March 1937 CC Plenum in
uiiich he supported the repression wholeheartedly.

Futtheimore, it was Khrushchev who replaced Postyshev as candidate
member of Politburo.^ According to Getty and Naumov Khrushchev
himself was one of those who were **speaking up forcefully against Po-
siy'shei'.*^'

Therefore, Khrushchev was lying. Far from "questioning" the mass re-
pressions, Postyshev was one of those who most flagrantly engaged in
them himself, to the point where he was the 6rst to be removed from
candidate membership in the Politburo, and soon after that expelled
from the I\irty and arrested The partial transcript of this Plenum now
available confirms this. Postyshev's lawless and arbitrary repressions are
dociunented in a letter &om Andreev to Stalin of January 31, 1938.

Postyshev was soon arrested, and later confessed to involvement in some
kind of conspiracy to participating in a Rightist conspiracy, naming a
number of others, including other First Secretaries and CC members.
According to Vladimir Karpov, Postyshev confirmed his confession to
Molotov.

Given the documentation cited above — a small fraction of all that is
available but not yet released — there is every reason to believe that Posty-
shev's arrest, trial and execution were justified. His execution came more
than a year after his arrest. We know there is a lengthy investigative file
on him, and a trial transcript, but virtually none of this has been released
by the Russian government.

^ Stalinskoc Politbiuro v iO^ gody. Sbotnik dokumentov (Moscow: AIRU-XX, 1995),
p.l67.

Getty & Naumov, 512

Chapter 4.

The "Cases" Against Party Members and
Related Questions

16. Eikhe

Khrushchev:

The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary
to inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases"
against the members of the party's Central Committee
elected at the 17th Party Congress. An example of vile
provocation, of odious falsification and of criminal
violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the
former candidate for the Central Committee Political
Bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the party
and of the Soviet Government, Comrade Eikhe, who
was a party member since 1905.

Khrushchev goes on to quote from several documents pertaining to
Eikhe's case, including part of the text of Eikhe's letter to Stalin of Octo-
ber 27, 1939. This letter - really a declaration of a complaint of mistreat-
ment - exists. Tliere's no reason to doubt Eikhe's claim in it, that he was
beaten by the interrogators into confessing things he never did. However,
there is no reason to believe that Eikhe was telling the truth, or the whole
truth, either.^

The Pospelov Report quotes somewhat more from the text of Eikhe's
letter, but does not contain any evidence concerning Eikhe's guilt or in-
nocence. It concludes with the single sentence: "At the present time it
has been unquestionably established that Eikhe's case was falsified." ^'^

'*"'rhc letter bi published in Doklad Khrushcheva, pp. 225-229, without archival idcntificni.
The original letter, as well as perhaps much else from l-akhe's investigation file, is still
ki-pt top secret by Russian authorities tcxlay. I wen the editors of this official publication
were not permitted to cite its exact Iwation in the archives. We have translated and annu-
tatixJ it in Clhapter 1 1 below.

« RXEBl.p. 328.

Cbapicrl'uur. 'Ilic "Cases" Against I'arty Mcmbeis

Concerning *Torture"

We should keep in mind some things that are, or should be, obvious. The
faa that somebody has been beaten or tortured does not mean that that
person was "innocent." The fact that a person may have given false con-
fessions under torture does not mean that person was not guilty of yet
other offenses. The Bict that a person claims that he was beaten, tortured,
intimidated, etc., into giving a false confession does not mean that he is
telling the truth - that he was, in fact, tortured or that the confessions he
gave were false. Of course, it doesn't mean that he is lying, either.

In short, diere is no substitute for evidence. Eikhe's letter is not sufficient
evidence to establish anything, including whether he was tortured or not.

In one of the few quotations we have from his own trial in 1940, Ezhov
claims to have been beaten into false confessions as well. Yet there can
be no doubt that Ezhov was guilty of falsifying confessions, beatings and
torture, fabricating cases against many innocent people and executing
them.

However, this is only part of the Eikhe story. We do not know all of it,
because neither Khrushchev, nor any of his successors as heads of the
CPSU, nor Gorbachev, Yeltsin, or Putin, have evec seen fit to publish the
documents in Eikhe's case, or even to make Eikhe's case available to re-
searchers.

There is good evidence suggesting that it was precisely Eikhe who led the
u'ay for the First Secretaries in demanding extraordinary powers to shoot
thousands of people and send thousands more to what became the GU-
LAG - that it was, in fact, Eikhe who began the mass repression that
Khrushchev is claiming to denounce. luri Zhukov outlines the details
we know. {KP Nov. 16, 2002). He believes that Ezhov was working with
the First Secretaries on this, and would have arrested and executed Stalin
if Stalin had refused them (Nov, 16 2002; Nov. 20, 2002).

In early 2006 a volume was published with transcripts of a single, long
interrogation each from Ezhov and Frinovskii, Ezhov's second-in-

^Scc S.N. Mironov's note to Nikolai l^xhov uf June 17, 1937, printed in Iv/hov's "special
cummunication" to Stalin of June 22, 1937, in Vbdimir Khaustov and Ix'nnart
Samucl'son, SlaSu. NKVD / rrpnsai 1 936-1 938^- (Moscow: RCJSSPKN, 2009) 332-333.
Miiunov explicitly names Mikhc in this note.

Khrushchev Ucd

command in the NKVD.^' Both confess to being a part of the conspiraq-
of the Rights that included Bukharin, Rykov, and Ezhov's predecessor as
head of the NKVD lagoda. Frinovskii names Evdokimov and Ezhov, as
well as lagoda, as leading Rightist conspirators. He specifically mentions
Eikhe, once as a visitor of Evdokimov's, a second dme together with
both Ezhov and Evdokimov." Evdokimov was very close to Ezhov, and
was tried, convicted, and executed together with Ezhov in February 1940.
It is clear that Frinovskii suspected Eikhe was involved in the same
Rightist conspiratorial group that he, Ezhov, Evdokimov and others
were, or he would not have mentioned him in this connection. But he
does not give specifics concerning Eikhe.

Zhukov's h)pothesis best explained the known facts even before the
publication of Frinovskii's statement of April 11, 1939. In it Frinovskii
confirms the existence of a very broad Rightist conspiracy all over the
Soviet Union. Evdokimov, who outlined this conspiracy to Frinovskii in
1934, told him that already by 1934 the Rights had recruited a large num-
ber of leading Soviet officials around the USSR.*^ It was precisely the
trials and executions of such people that Khrushchev claimed StaUn had
fabricated. Frinovskii's statement makes it clear this was no fabrication.

Evdokimov emphasized that it was now necessary to recruit among the
lower levels of Party, state, and peasant - i.e., kolkhoz - members, in or-
der to take charge of the wave of uprisings which were already under
way, and which the Rights hoped to organize into a movement for a

According to documents avaibblc to Jansen and Petrov, many of which
have been re-dassifled by the Russian government, Eikhe interfered in
NKVD matters, insisting on the arrest of persons against whom there
was no evidence.^^ Ezhov told his subordinates not to oppose Eikhe but
to cooperate with him. This is consistent with Frinovskii's statement

a LubiMka. StaSii i NK\^ NKGB-GUKR "Smmh". 1939 - mart 1946. Moscow MDI-,
2006, Hoc. No. 37, pp. S2-72. and Doc. No. 33, pp. 33-SO. I hLs volume wiU be died
hereafter as Lubianka 3.

I'jkhe confirms one such visit to M/hov's together with Iwdokimov in the letter to
Stalin Cf. DoUad^ 22S.

>^ Lubianka 3, p. 38.

M Ibid

M.Jansen, N.Petrov. StaSii's Loyal Extaitioiier Ptt^le's ComaissarNikoU Ex^kv. 1895-
1940 (I loovcr Inst4ituiion Press, 2002). p.91.

(Ihaptcf l-our. 'Ilit "(bases'* A^nst Pany Members

about the way Ezhov, and he himself, operated — beating and (raming
innocent persons in order to appear to be fighting a conspiraqr while
hiding their own conspiracy.

Zhukov believes that the goal of Eikhe, together with other First Secre-
taries, was to avoid at all costs the contested elections scheduled for De-
cember 1937, by claiming that the oppositional conspiracies were too
dangerous.^ Whether they really believed this or not, at the October
1937 CC Plenum they were successful in persuading Stalin and Molotov
to cancel the contested elections.

Stalin was under other pressures, too. One of his closest collaborators on
the Constitudon and election issues, la. A. lakovlev, was suddenly ar-
rested on October 12, 1937. In a confession-interrogation that was first
published only in 2004 lakovlev said he had been working for the Trot-
sk\ist underground since the time of Lenin's death, and was cooperating
with Trotsky through a German spy.^^ Given this avalanche of evidence
that real and extremely dangerous conspiracies involving highly-placed
persons in the Soviet government. Party and military, Stalin and the Pol-
itburo were in no position to ignore firm demands from a number of
First Secretaries for an all-out war against the danger.

It is interesting that Eikhe appears to have been tried and executed at the
same time as Ezhov and Ezhov's associates. Can it be that the real
charges against Eikhe at trial were not those of espionage, but that he
conspired with Ezhov to accuse, perhaps to torture, and to execute with-
out evidence? A.S. lakovlev, the famous aircraft designer, wrote in his
memoirs that Stalin had told him Ezhov had been executed because he
had "killed many innocent people."^ It appears that Ezhov was executed

^ SiaJin wanted elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR tu take place with 2-3
candidates for a given posidon. (Candidates would be proposed not just by the
Communist Party (A(IP(b)) but also by union-wide social organizations. As evidence
Xhukov publishi'd a sample ballot for the December 1937 elections on which is written:
"Ixavc on this ballot the last name of ONIv candidate for whom you wish to vote. Cross
out the rest." It is the sixth illustration after p. 256 in Zhukov, lU. Iiiei StaBm. Moscow:
N'agiius, 2003. 1 have put it online at

htTp://chss.montclair.cdu/english/furT/fcscafch/sample_bal]ot_1937.htm]
" l.ubianka 2 Doc. No. 26, pp. 387-395.

" /\.S. lakovlev, TsePZhi^. Moscow: Politizdat, 1973, p. 264. This book is also available
unlinc at http://militeia.lib.tu/memo/russian/yakovlev-as/20.html

Khrushchev I jcd

for that, and for his own participation in the Rightist conspiracy. Perhaps
that was so with Eikhe.

The whole text Eikhe's letter to Stalin of October 27, 1939 was appended
to the Pospelov Commission's report. In it, Eikhe makes clear that he
was charged with either conspiring, or working closely with, Ezhov. (p.
229) The evidence we cite here, which was available to Petrov, strongly
suggest that Eikhe was deeply involved in Ezhov's mass repression.

Eikhe's claims in his letter to Stalin that he was beaten and tortured into
making false confessions is very credible, since he names Ushakov and
Nikolaev [-Zhurid] as his torturers. We know independendy that these
two specific NKVD officers tortured many others, and in fact were tried
and executed for precisely this under Beria.

Nikolaev-Zhurid was finally arrested in October 1939 under Beria. This
is the same month that Eikhe wrote his letter to Stalin. Nikolaev-Zhurid
was also executed, and therefore probably tried, at the same time as were
Ezhov and Eikhe, in early February 1940. So was Ushakov.

This suggests that Ezhov and his men may have been trying to put the
blame on each other ia order to disguise their own responsibility. This is
consistent with the way Frinovskii described Ezhov. Frinovskii explicitly
describes Ezhov as demanding that Zakovskii be shot so that Beria
would not be able to question him and, possibly, leam about Ezhov's
role in massive illegal repressions and in the Rightist conspiracy.^^

Eikhe was arrested on April 29, 1938, long before Beria joined the
NKVD, and therefore long before Ezhov had to fear Beria's interrogat-
ing Eikhe. Given what we know from Jansen and Petrov's summary of
the documents tliey got to see, it seems clear that Ezhov and Eikhe had
some kind of falling out. We know from Frinovskii's statements and
from other sources that Ezhov and his men routinely tortured those they
arrested, whether guilty or not, to force them to make confessions in-
criminating themselves.

What we do not have is the rest of Eikhe's case file, including the trial
documents - the actual accusations made against him at his trial in Feb-
ruary 1940, evidence, testimony, the prosecudon's charge {obvinilefiioe
^kJiuchenie) and sentence. We know that the '^archival-invesdgatoty fde"

»I.ubianka3.45.

(^lupicr i-'uur. 'Ihc 'Xltscs" Against I'arty McmbcfS

on Eikhe exists - or did in Khrushchev's day, because it was dted as the
place where Eikhe's letter was taken from (p.229).

But the only thing released from the Eikhe case file was the letter to Sta-
lin. The rest of the contents of that file have not been released. And not
all of Eikhe's letter to Stalin was in either Khrushchev's Speech or in the
Pospelov Report. Specifically, Eikhe wrote that he was not willing to

...undergo beatings again for Ezhov, who had been
arrested and exposed as a counter-revolutionary, and
who was the undoing of me [or, **who has destroyed
me"] was beyond my strength.''"

llic underlined section was carefully excised from the Pospelov Report,
as were the following words:

My confessions about counter-revolutionary ties with
Ezhov are the blackest spot on my conscience.

Eikhe evidently believed that Ezhov was a counter-revolutionary; had
confessed to counter-revolutionary ties with Ezhov which he here denies;
and blamed Ezhov, rather than Beda, for his downfall.

Khnjshchev wanted to blame Beria rather than Ezhov. Eikhe blamed
Ezhov, so it's easy to see why Khrushchev omitted these passages.
Eikhe's claim that Ezhov was in reality a counter-revolutionary would
have raised questions in the minds of the Central Committee - questions
inconvenient for Khrushchev. The recendy-published interrogations of
Ezhov and statement by Ftinovskii flesh out Ezhov's conspiratorial ac-
tivity and his frame-ups of innocent people. Khrushchev and Pospelov
covered them up too, for the sake of casting all the blame on Stalin and
Beiia.

Though we'd like to know a lot more, the interrogation /confessions of
Ftinovskii and Ezhov are fully consistent with the facts outlined above.

17. Ezhov

Although it breaks the order of the original somewhat, it is convenient to
examine what Khrushchev says about Ezhov here, since it is closely
linked to Eikhe.

Khrushchev:

u> Duklad Khnishchcva, p. 229.

Khrushchev lx*d

We are justly accusing Ezhov for the degenerate
practices of 1937. But we have to answer these
questions: Could Ezhov have arrested Kossior, for
instance, without the knowledge of Stalin? Was there an
exchange of opinions or a Political Bureau decision
concerning this? No, there was not, as there was none
regarding other cases of this type. Could Ezhov have
decided such important matters as the fate of such
eminent party figures? No, it would be a display of
naivete to consider this the work of Ezhov alone. It is
clear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that
without his orders and his sanction Ezhov could not
have done this.

The interrogations of both Ezhov and Frinovskii published in early 2006
(iilly confirm Ezhov's deliberate torturing and killing of a great many in-
nocent people. He organized these massive atrocities to cover up his own
involvement in the Rightist conspiracy and with German military espio-
nage, as well as in a conspiracy to assassinate Stalin or another Politburo
member, and to seize power by coup d'etat.

These confessions are the most dramatic new documents to appear in
years that bear upon our subject. They completely contradict Khnj-
shchev's allegations on every point: his contention that Ezhov was just
doing Stalin's bidding that the Military leaders were "framed"; and thai
the Moscow Trials were faked (as Khrushchev suggests). We now (201 0)
have a great many more interrogations of Ezhov's, all of which conBim
the existence of his very serious conspiracy and give much detail about
it.*^'

Khrushchev, his supporters, and those who did the "research" for the
Pospelov Report and the "rehabilitation" reports, had all this information
at their disposal. So why did they not deal with it in those reports? The
most obvious reason is that they covered it up in order to reach condu-
sions exacdy the opposite from the truth.

" I'lnglish translations of the texts of all of l''xhov's inrerrogalions published as of 2O10
arc in (trover l-'urr, "Interrogations of Nikolai luhov, former K-ople's (lommissar fur
Internal Affairs," at

http://chss.montdairx.'du/cng|ish/furT/rcscarch/c%hovintcrrc>f>s.html

(Iha|)iLY i-'utir. 'llic "Clues" Against Patty Members

llic question naturally arises: Why did Ezhov do all this? Zhukov thinks
he may have been in league with a number of the First Secretaries in
some kind of conspiracy. Ezhov's men functioned together with the First
Secretaries in the provinces. In documents available to jansen and Petrov
in the early '90s and extensively quoted by them in their book, S.N. Mi-
ronov, head of the NKVD of the Western Siberian region, tells of being
instructed by Ezhov not to interfere with Eikhe even though the latter
was insisting on the arrest of persons without evidence and was person-
ally interfering in the investigations.^ The trial transcripts fot those tried
at the same time as Ezhov have not been released. But it seems very
likely that a number of these men, of whom Eikhe was one, were tried
and convicted of working with Ezhov to kill innocent people.

llie rccendy published confessions of Frinovskii and Ezhov now con-
firm that FjeHov himself headed an important Rightist conspiracy, in col-
lusion with the German military, and that he conspired to seize power in
the USSR himself

All this information, and much more, was of course available to Khru-
shchev and his investigators. Yet as late as February 1, 1956, Khrushchev
took the position that Ezhov was completely innocent, and Stalin was to
blame!''^ He modified this view of Ezhov only slightly in the "Secret
Speech" as he tried to shift all the responsibility for Ezhov's actions onto
Stalin.

Stalin, however, blamed Ezhov, and his testimony is entirely consistent
with the evidence presented by Jansen and Petrov. In Russia, at least, the
passage from aircraft designer A. lakovlev's memoirs, in which Stalin
explained to him how Ezhov had innocent men framed, is very well
known. Molotov and Kaganovich said similar things in their interviews
with Felix Chuev.

Ezhov was removed from office, evidently with difficulty. In April 1939
Ezhov was arrested for, and immediately confessed to, gross abuses in
invesdgations: beatings, falsified confessions, torture, and illegal execu-
tions. Jansen and Petrov, relying in part on documents no longer avail-
able to researchers and in part on some documents only released in 2006,
show the tremendous extent of these abuses and describe the criminal
methods of Ezhov and his men. There is zero evidence — none at all ~

^ Sctr the Appendix to this chapter for quotations.

^ Sec RKEB t, pp. 308-9 and Appendix to this chapter.

Khrushchev lici

that Stalin or the central leadership wanted him in any way to act like this
and plenty of evidence that they thought this criminal.

18. Rudzutak

Khrushchev:

Comrade Rudzutak, candidate-member of the Political
Bureau, member of the party since 1905, who spent 10
years in a Tsarist hard-labor camp, completely retracted
in court the confession which was forced from him. ...
After careful examination of the case in 1955, it was
established that the accusation against Rudzutak was
false and that it was based on slanderous materials.
Rudzutak has been rehabilitated posthumously.

According to the rehabilitation materials Rudzutak did, in feet, confess.^
Evidently this was a very detailed confession in which he named "mon
than sixty people" with whom he was involved in the conspiracy - in-
cluding Eikhe, who is named twice in the two pages of his rehabilitatioi]
report. Then he retracted this confession at trial, stating that he
"forced" to confess by "an abcess \gnqyn/k] not yet uprooted from the
NKVD." It is interesting that he evidently did not claim he had been tor-
tured, or the Rudenko's report would have so stated. Molotov later told
Chuev Rudzutak had been tortured and did not confess.''^

There is a great deal of testimony against him. The Rehabilitation Maten-
als by Rudenko of December 24, 1955 do not establish Rudzutak's inno-
cence. Furthermore, they acknowledge that Rudzutak was inculpated by a
great many other defendants.

Obviously it is problematic to convict someone of a serious crime based
only upon his own confession. By the same token, a person cannot be
declared innocent solely because he denies consistently denies his guilt
But multiple, independent accusations by different defendants, inteiro-
gated by different investigators, is strong evidence in any judicial system.
For example, in the United States today, defendant are routinely con-
victed of conspiracy solely on the testimony of alleged confederates. And

« RKEB 1 pp. 294-5.
I'M Chucv. Mohtw: Po/udefxhaimyi VlasttMii. Minscovr. OI.MA-PRlvSS, 1999. p. 484.

(.'hapicr i-'our. 'llic "(.'ascs" Against Pany Members

co-conspirators are guilty of crimes committed by other members of the
conspiracy.

llicrc is no evidence in that "rehabilitation" that Rudzutak was innocent,
as Khrushchev claimed. The only "evidence" the rehabilitation report can
come up with is that the testimonies against him are "contradictory."
This is not evidence that they are false. Just the opposite: if a substantial
number of confessions or testimonies were identical that would be prima
facit evidence that they had been "orchestrated" in some way.

Rudzutak evidently retracted his confession at trial. But we can't be sure
he retracted all of it. The Rudenko Rehabilitation Materials of 1955 give
much more extensive information on the accusations against Rudzutak.
The Pospelov Report mentions only the accusation that he was in a "Lat-
\-ian nationalist organization, engaged in sabotage, and was a spy for for-
eign intelligence."^. Khrushchev falsified even this:

They did not even call him to the Politburo, Stalin did
not want to speak with him. . . . Through an exhaustive
verification carried out in 1955 it was established that the
case against Rudzutak was falsified. And he was
condemned on the basis of slanderous evidence.

There's nothing in either the Rudenko materials or the Pospelov Report
about these things. Perhaps Khrushchev just made them up.

.And a great deal is omitted. For instance, the Rehabilitation materials on
Rudzutak do not even mention Tukhachevsky, though Rudzutak was
closely associated with him in expulsions, etc^*^

'ITiis is how we know Khrushchev lied - if the "rehabilitation" report on
Rudzutak does not clear him, then Khrushchev did not know, in reality,
whether Rudzutak was guilty or not. Khrushchev spoke "in flagrant dis-
r^axd for the truth" — he may not have known what it was, but he
claimed to know. And of course Khrushchev and Pospelov had access to
all of Rudzutak's file and to all of the investigative materials linked with
it. If exculpatory evidence existed, why did they not cite it?

Still, we do know now that Ezhov and, at his instruction, his men, were
&bricating confessions against many thousands of people. It's quite pos-
sible that there was some falsification in Rudzutak's case. Ezhov and his

«R/CEB /.p.328.
* ' RKEB 1 .pp. 294-5.

Khrushchev I Jcd

interrogators could have falsified some information against Rudzutak
even though Rudzutak had admitted his guilt on some matters, and had
been implicated by a great many others.

It is all the more important, then to be able to carefully scrutinize all the
evidence available to Soviet investigators and courts at the time. But this
is exactly what we cannot do. Neither in Khrushchev's day, in Gorba-
chev's time when "glastnost'", or "openness", was supposed to lead to
the archives being "opened", nor to this day, have any but a liny propor-
tion of the investigative materials against even the major defendants at
the three famous Moscow Trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938 been released.

No materials from Rudzutak's case have ever been published, either dur-
ing the USSR or since. This in itself is suspicious, as Rudzutak was ar-
rested in close association with Tukhachevsky.

Rudzutak was one of the people accused by Stalin of involvement in the
Military Conspiracy on June 2, 1937 at the expanded extraordinary ex-
panded session of the Military Soviet.'^ Yet he was not executed until jul}-
28, 1938, over a year after the Tukhachevsky group. This suggests that a
long, serious investigation occur;red. But we do not have access to any of
it.

Rudzutak was convicted through the testimony of others, despite the lack
of any confession of his own. He is named in several NKVD documents
published in Lubianka 2, such as

• No. 290, M.L. Rukhimovich's very detailed
confession. Rudzutak is named on p. 484.

• No. 323, pp. 527-37; Rudzutak is named on p. 530.

Of course these do not prove his guilt, all the more so since they are
"Ezhov" documents, confessions made during Ezhov's tenure as heacloi
the NKVD — and we have seen above the kind of stuff that went on un-
der Ezhov. But they are incompatible with any claim Rudzutak was inno-
cent - that is, with his "rehabilitation." A defendant's confession of guilt
may not be truthful, for one reason or another. But it can never be evi-
dence of innocence.

Stalin's private annotations on these'^' as well as other documents art
consistent with someone trying to learn from the police reports being

<^ I Aibianka 2, No. 92 pp. 202 ff. ( )n RuJ/.utak particularly sec 204-5.
*»Hnitp. 537.

(!hap(n I'ouf. 'llic "(.'ascs" Against I'any Mcmbcfs

submined to him, but not at all with someone "fabncating" anything. It
is hard to imagine anyone making such annotations, intended only for the
eves ofliis closest supporters, if he did not in fact accept them as true.

Rudzutzk is named many times in the 1938 Moscow Trial by defendants
Grin'ko, Rozengol'ts and Krestinsky, who testify about him at length and
in great detail In another interrogation - confession just published in
early 2006 Rozengol'ts is named by Tamann as the person who recruited
him into the Right-Trotskyite conspiracy.'"

According to Krestinsky, Rudzutak was central to the whole conspiracy.
Molotov agrees Rudzutak told him he had been beaten and tortured, but
sciD refused to confess. However, there was much testimony against

him/'

19. Rozenblium

Khrushchev:

The way in which the former NKVD workers ,
manufactured various fictitious "anti-Soviet centers" and
"blocs" with the help of provocatory methods is seen
from the confession of Comrade Rozenblum, party
member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937 by the
Leningrad NKVD.

During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case
Rozenblum revealed the following fact: When
Rozenblum was arrested in 1937, he was subjected to
terrible torture during which he was ordered to confess
false information concerning himself and other persons.
He was then brought to the office of Zakovskii, who
offered him freedom on condition that he make before
the court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the
NKVD concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion
in a terroristic center in Leningrad" (Movement in the
hall.) With unbelievable cynicism, Zakovskii told about
the vile "mechanism" for the crafty creation of
&bricated "anti- Soviet plots."

™l.ubianka 3,84-90,92-93.
"Chucv.A/oiMtor. 483-5.

Khrushchev I jo

"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rozenblum,
"Zakovskii gave me several possible variants of the
organization of this center and of its branches. After
he detailed the organization to me, Zakovskii told
me that the NKVD would prepare the case of this
center, remarking that the trial would be public.
Before the court were to be brought 4 or 5 members
of this center Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozem,
Shaposhnikova (Chudov's wife) and others together
with 2 or 3 members from the branches of this
center. . .

"... The case of the Leningrad center has to be built
solidly, and for this reason witnesses are needed.
Social origin (of course, in the past) and the party
standing of the witness will play more than a small
role.

"'You, yourself,' said Zakovskii, Svill not need to
invent anything. The NKVD will prepare for you a
ready outline for every branch of the center; you will
have to study it carefully and to remember well all
.questions and answers which the Court might ask.
This case will be ready in four-five months, or
perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be
preparing yourself so that you will not compromise
the investigation and yourself. Your future will
depend on how the trial goes and on its results. If
you begin to lie and to testify falsely, blame yourself.
If you manage to endure it, you will save your head
and we will feed and clothe you at the Government's
cost until your death.'"

This is the kind of vile things which were then practiced.
(Movement in the hall.)

Khrushchev never explicitly states, but strongly implies, that Stalin
involved in this. In reality, the evidence we have today — and that Khru-
shchev had then - shows that Zakovskii was Ezhov's man.

OifU Pout llic "Cases" Against Patty Mcmbcis

Boceabliuin testified about Zakovskii's fabrication of cases. Zakovskii
WIS "one of Ezhov's closest coworkeis."'^^ Zakovskii was arrested on
^dl 30, 1938, and sentenced to death on August 29, 1 938. Beria was
naxned as Ezhov's second-in-command in August 1 938.

If Rozenblium^^ was telling the truth here, then two conclusions emerge.
Rnt, Zakovskii would not have done aU this without Ezhov's leadership.
TIkrefore it's dear that Ezhov was involved in some kind of major con-
spincy to build himself up by fabricating large-scale conspiracies. This is
coosistent with the details available to, and reported by, Jansen and Pet-
rav concerning Ezhov's conspiracy, which we have examined briefly
abov&

Second, Beria - which means Stalin and those around him in the Polit-
buio - was involved in invest^ting, and ultimately uncovering and
diminsting, this conspiracy. Stalin and Beria were involved in smashing
Ezhov's conspiracy, not in fomenting it. This is consistent with Zhukov's
deductions.

jansen and Petrov (151) quote Ezhov as having Zakovskii shot in August
1938 to get him out of the way, so he could not testify against him
(Ezhov). Fcinovskii affirms this in his recently-published (February 2006)
confession statement of April 1 1, 1939. According to Frinovskii and the
other evidence we have, Zakovskii was part of Ezhov's conspiracy. Fri-
novskii quotes Ezhov as telling him in October 1 937 chat Zakovskii "is
oompktely 'ours"'. Then on August 27-28 1938 Evdokimov, Ezhov's
fi^t-hand man, told Frinovskii to make sure Zakovskii and '*all of
lagoda's men" had been shot, because Beria might reopen their cases and
"these cases could cum against us."^^

Zakovskii was expliddy blamed for torturing people '*as a rule" in Stalin's
tek^ram of Jan. 10, 1939 (which may in fact have been sent, or resent, in
July - foe this telegram, see below). Even without the recent statements

E/hov is called "one of the closest coworkers of N.i. Kzhov" in the /jkovskii
biofrnphy from Zalcsky, lopaiia SlaSiia, at http://www.hrono.ni/bic^af/zakov$lu.html

^ A.M. Rcuccnbiium, according tu the Pospclov Report of l-'cb. 9, 1956 - sec DokLui
KhnubcbevA, p. 193. 865; RKEB 1 . 323. VXlicn arrested in 1937 he was the chief of the
Political dt-pamncnt of the October railroad. In his speech Khrushchev did not refer to
Rf»cnblium*s cnminal case file but to his staiements to the (^mmission of the CC CPSU
in 195S.

'*Jaascn & Petrov, 151. Lubianka 3, p. 45. Cf text at
liitp://chss.(nonicbir.edu/cngb$h/furT/fcsearch/ffinovskyeng.hlinl

Khrushchev I iud

and confessions by Ezhov, Frinovskii and others, this would be strong
evidence that Stalin was opposed to this kind of behavior.

But Khrushchev omitted this part of the Stalin telegram in the **Secrei
Speech" - undoubtedly because it would conflict with the impression he
was attempting to produce here. Therefore Khrushchev is blaming Stalin
for Ezhov's conspiracy, while in fact Stalin had Ezhov arrested, tried, and
executed for precisely this conspiracy.

20. 1.D. Kabakov

Khrushchev:

Even more widely was the falsification of cases practiced
in the provinces, llie NKVD headquarters of the
Sverdlov Oblast "discovered" the so-called "Ural
uprising staff — an organ of the bloc of rightists,
Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, church leaders -
whose chief supposedly was the Secretar)' of the
Sverdlov Oblast Party Committee and member of the
Central Committee, All- Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks), Kabakov, who had been a party member
since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show
that in almost all krais, oblasts [provinces] and republics
there supposedly existed "rightist Trotskyite, espionage-
terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and
centers" and that the heads of such organizations as a
rule — for no known reason — were first secretaries of
oblast or republic Communist party committees or
central committees.

Despite the Russian government's refusal to release investigative matcn-
als of this period, there is quite a lot of evidence against Kabakov.

The American mining engineer John D. Littlepage was hired during the
Depression to work in the USSR developing the mining industr)^, and
wrote a memoir of his years there upon his return to the USA (he
from Alaska). In In Searvh of Swiet Gold NY: Harcourt, Brace and Co^
1938 (1937) Littlepage discusses sabotage in Urals. He specifically sus-
pects Kabakov; claims that Kabakov had never competently seen to (he
fruitful exploitation of the rich mineral area under his stewardship; diims
he suspected some kind of conspiracy in all this; and expressed no sur-
prise when Kabakov was arrested shordy after the Piatakov trial, since

(ihapiY I'uur. 'Ilic "C.2scs" Against Pany Members

(he two had long been closely associated. More recently, James Harris has
seen and quoted evidence against Kabakov from Kabakov's criminal case
without suggesting any bkery in it.^^

Kabakov was dismissed from both the CC and the Party itself by a reso-
lution circulated to the CC on May 17-19, 1937 and confirmed at the
June 1937 on June 29*. This may surest some kind of relationship ei-
ther with the Tukhachevsky — military conspiracy, which was being un-
raveled at that time, or with the Rightist conspiracy generally, as lagoda
w-as being intensively questioned about this time.

Kabakov was named by L.I. Mirzoian, former First Secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, as a leader of the
Right- Trotskyite underground.^' He figured in Ezhov's report to the June
1937 CC Plenum on the widespread nature of the conspiracy.^

Kabakov was named by P.T. Zubarev, one of the defendants in the
March 1938 "Bukhaiin" Moscow Trial, as known by him to be a member
of the Rightist conspiracy in the Urals as early as 1929. Zubarev claimed
to have worked closely with Kabakov in this conspiracy since* that time.
Rykov, one of the main defendants along with Bukharin, also named Ka-
bakov as an important member of the Rightist conspiracy. There is no
evidence that Rykov or, indeed, any of the defendants in this Tiiai were
subjected to torture.

Kabakov was named as head of a counterrevolutionary organization in
Urals in a note to the Politburo signed by Kabakov's successor. First Sec-
retary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom A. la. Stoliar. NKVD man D.M.
Dmitriev of Sverdlovsk later confessed to being involved in a conspiracy
himself, and fingered Stoliar as a conspirator too. But he also speaks of
the "liquidadon of the kabakovshctrintf* in the Urals in 1937 - that is, Ka-
bakov was the first to go but other conspirators, including him and Sto-
liar, remained. Stalin's annotation on StoUar's note suggests he is not or-
ganizing this news, but learning of it.^

In declaring Kabakov "rehabilitated", therefore, Khrushchev was casting
the strongest doubt on the 1938 Moscow Trial, as he had already done

James R. I lanis. Tbt Gnat VnJs: ngoiuBsm amdtbe evobitioii of tbt Sonet system (Ithaca NY:
Cornell Univeisily Preass, 1999) 163 at notes 78 and 81.

» RXEB /, Doc. No. 52, p. 280; cf Pospelov rqwrt, ibid, p. 323.

"Janscn & Pctrov, p. 75.

» Lubianka 2, Doc. No. 276, p. 463.

Khrushchev I

on the 1936 Trial in declaring that Zinoviev and Kamenev had b
treated too harshly. For present purposes, though, it's clear that Kh
shchev did not speak the truth about Kabakov in his "Secret Speech."

21-24. S.V. Kossior; V. la. Chubar*; P.P.
Postyshev; A.V. Kosarev

Khrushchev:

Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists
have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of
such "cases," as a result of the fact that all kinds of
slanderous "confessions" were accepted, and as a result
of the pracdce of forcing accusations against oneself and
others. In the same manner were fabricated the "cases"
against eminent party and state workers — Kossior,
Chubar, Postyshev, Kosarev and others.

(For Postyshev, see Chapters 3 and 9.)

Kosior, Chubar', Postyshev, and Kosarev are listed in that precise or
in a letter of March 16, 1939, to Stalin from V. V. Ul'tikh, Chairman
the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR, which is rep
duced in facsimile at:

http://www.memo.nj/history/vkvs/images/ulrih-39.jpg
The relevant section reads as follows:

Military Collegium

Of the Supreme Court

Of the Union ofSSR

March 15, 1939
No. 001119...
Re: No. 1-68/1 12
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ACP(b)
To Comrade J. V. STALIN

Q^MffFour. 'Die "Cases" Against l^aity Mcmbcn

fieiween Februacy 21 and March 14 1939 the Militaiy
Collegtum of the Supreme Court of the USSR in closed
court sessions in Moscow heard the cases of 436
persons.

413 \vete sentenced to be shot The sentences have been
earned out on the basis of the law of December 1, 1934.

Ar court sessions of the Military Collegium the following
persons fully confessed their guilr KOSIOR S.V.,
CHUBAR', V. lA., POSTYSHEV P.I., KOSAREV

A.V,...

According to the rest of Uliikh's note others among the accused re-
Dounced their confessions but "were exposed by other evidence in the
case." That is, Kosior, Chubar', Kosarev, and Postyshev did not re-
nounce their confessions, as others did, but reafGrmed them at trial.

Kosior and Chubar'

In his confession-intenogation of April 26 1939 Ezhov name» Chubar'
and Kosior as two of a number of high-ranking Soviet officials who were
passing information to Gennan intelligence — in plain language, German
spies. Ezhov says that the Gennan agent Nordcn was in touch with "a
great many" others. ^

According to the Rehabilitation materials of Postyshev prepared for
Khnishchcv, Kosior implicated Postyshev, then withdrew his confes-
sions, but then reiterated them again.^ In his own confessions Postyshev
impliMted Kosior, as well as lakir, Chubar', and others. (/foV/., 218) Chu>
bar" was implicated in the Right-Trolskyite conspiracy by Antipov,
Kosior, Piamnek, Sukhomlin, Postyshev, Boldyrev, and others."

Interviewed by Felix Chuev the aged Lazar' M. Kaganovich said that he
had defended Kosior and Chubar', but had g^ven up when he was shown
a lengthy handwritten confession of Chubar's.^ Molotov told Chuev that
he himself was present when Antipov, Chubar's friend, accused Chubar'.

^I.ubiaiika3,p.57.
«RKEfl/,p.219.
»' fkd, p. 251.

e Chuev. Ki^iiitk Shipibp. Moscow: Ol.MA.PRliSS. 2001. p. 117

Khrushchev IJc

Chubar' denied it heatedly and got veiy angry at Antipov. Molotov kne
both of them very well.'*

According to the Pospeiov Report prepared for Khrushchev, Kosior wa
arrested on May 3, 1938 - that is, under Ezhov - and both tortured (m
details are given) and subjected to prolonged interrogations of up to 1^
hours at a stretch. Of 54 interrogations of Kosior only 4 were pre
served.**^ So far this has all the earmarks of a Ezhov frameup.

However, Kosior was sentenced on February 26, 1939, three month
after Ezhov's ouster. By this time cases were being reviewed, and it hac
long been recognized that Ezhov and his men had tortured innocen
men.

We know, from the Urrikh letter cited above, that Kosior and Chubar
acknowledged their guilt at trial, though others did not. But no details d
this trial have been released, either in the Pospeiov Report or in the Kt
habilitation Materials. Once again, it appears that the Khrushchev-en
materials were not an objective study of the investigative materials, bul
rather a falsified attempt to make all those convicted appear to havt
been "innocent."

In the long transcript of the October 1938 confession - interrogation ol
Dmitriev, former head of the NKVD in Sverdlovsk. Dmitriev speaks ol
the "count'errevolutionary underground headed by Kosior, who was one
of the most clandestine of the Rights in the Ukraine."*^

Ezhov's confession makes it clearer than ever that Chubar' and Kosior
were guilty of being involved in the underground organization of Righc
without more information. Even without it, it's obvious that therevb'asa
great deal of evidence against him. Khrushchev failed to release it, and ii
has never been released since.

Kosarev

It is not true that, as Khrushchev stated, the Rehabilitation Materials es-
tablished that the case against Kosarev had been fabricated.

There is very little information about Kosarev in the published Rehabili-
tation materials, i^abilitatsiut Kak Etc Bjlo 1, 79-80; 166-8; 219; in funirt

Chucv, Mohlov, pp. 486-7.
" RXEB /, p. 326.
"M.ubLanka 3. p. 590.

(ihjptcr l-our. 'Ihc "CtSKs" .Against Party Members

RKEB 1) He did confess, and short pans are published - though the re-
habilitation report of 1954 claims Kosarev was tortured into making the
confession by Beria (167). His own dossier - interrogations, trial, etc. —
has never been made available to researchers.

Kosare\' is named in the UPrikh letter of March 16, 1939, as one of the
accused who confirmed his admission of guilt at trial (see above). We also
know that Postyshev accused Kosarev.

.According to the rehabilitation report Kosarev had been hostile towards
Betia when Beria was First Secretary of the Georgian party. They con-
tinue that Kosarev was tortured into confessing, and also perhaps
framed. Kosarev did confess at trial. According to the rehabilitation re-
port he was duped into thinking this would save him. We do know of
examples in which defendants claimed they were beaten into confessing
during interrogations but renounced those confessions at trial. But it is
hard to imagine why anyone would confess to a capital crime at trial in
order to save himself!

The Rehabilitation Materials on Kosarev are very concerned to blame
Beiia for ever^'thing, as is a letter written by Kosarev's widow in Decem-
ber 1953, at the time Beria and others were sgpposedly on trial. {RKEB 1,
79-60) And Khrushchev was quick to claim that virtually anyone arrested
and convicted during Beria's tenure as head of the NKVD was "framed."

Kosarev was arrested on November 29, 1937 after Ezhov was effectively
ousted. He had had some contact with Ezhov, having been editor of the
Komsomol newspaper that Ezhov^s wife worked on. Jansen and Petrov
speculate that he may have been involved with Ezhov in some way,
though they caution that this was unlikely. (185)

But in a recendy-published interrogation (February 2006) A.N. Babulin,
Ezhov's live-in nephew, fellow conspirator, and witness to Ezhov's and
Ezhov's wife Evgeniia's "moral degeneration," names Kosarev as one of
the "most frequent guests in the Ezhov home," along with Piatakov,
L'ritsky, Mikhail Kol'tsov, Glikina, lagoda, Frinovskii, Mironov, Agranov,
and other NKVD men later tried and executed along with Ezhov. It was
strange company for an "innocent" leader of the Komsomol to be keep-
ing! In his own recendy-published interrogation Ezhov himself names
Kol'tsov and Glikina - both on Babulin's list of "most frequent guests" -
as English spies, along with his late wife Evgeniia.

Vadim Rogovin wrote that Kosarev was dismissed from his post as head
of the Komsomol and arrested for unjustified repression of Komsomol

Khrushchev 1 Jet

workers. A number of articles have appeared in the popular press, somi
by Kosarev's family, setting forth the view that he was unjustly accusec
and that Ol'ga P. Mishakova, the Komsomol worker Kosarev had pin-
ponedly maltreated, had wrongly denounced him."^

Whoever was at fault, this does seem to be the reason for Kosarev's ar-
rest, since it is referred to by Mgeladze in his memoirs. The rehabilitadoo
report of 1954 does not mention it at all. Rather, it sets Kosarev's arrest
down to a personal hatred of him by Beria, for some negative things Ko
sarev had reputedly said about Beria.

After Beria's arrest in June 1953 Khrushchev, abetted by the rest of tht
CPSU leadership, went about demonizing Beria in every possible u-ay.
This failure to even mention the real reason for Kosarev's arrest is fur
ther evidence that the rehabilitation reports were fabricated for politid
purposes, not serious studies of the evidence against those repressed.

We don't have enough information about Kosarev that is reliable - (hu
is, not based upon anecdote or rumor - to say more than that he had a
very suspicious relationship with Ezhov and his wife, and many othet
associates of the Ezhov^, all of whom seem to have been involved in
Ezhov's NKVD-centered Rightist conspiracy.

The Rehabilitation reports on Kosarev allege that he was tortumi
(RKE& 1, 79-80; 166-8 ; 219). Since Frinovskii says that, in order to de^
fleet the investigation away from his own conspiracy, Ezhov had cht
guilty as well as the innocent tortured, including some friends of his, it
may well be that he had Kosarev tortured too. (See under 16. Ezhor.
above).

W^e certainly do not have any evidence at aU that either Stalin or Baa
"framed" Kosarev. Even the anecdotal information merely accuses StaliD
of being too credulous. What we do know is that Khrushchev and iht
"rehabilitation commission" hid a great deal of information about Ko-
sarev, as about many others.

In the case of Kosarev, they hid his connections to Ezhov, which seeic
to have been his undoing. These are not even mentioned in the Khni-

^ S<tmc of these articles insist that Kcisarev never c(>nfeSiH:d, despite the fact thil tht
Khrushchev-era rehabilitation materials affirm that he was "tricked" into a confcssica
while the Ulrikh letter states defmitely that he confessed, 'lliereforc, it's unlikely that (hex
articles are reliable in the least. Without more evidence from interrri^tion and trial mjii-
rials, we just can't tcU.

(!lupiiT l-uur. 'llic "(bases'* Against I^uty Mcmbcn

shchev-era rehabilitation materials. The most cautious conclusion we can
reach is that Khrushchev declared Kosarev innocent **in flagrant disre-
gard for the tnith," without any serious study of his guilt or innocent.

Akakii Mgeladze, later First Secretary of the Georgian Party but in the
1930s a leading Komsomol figure, had liked and respected Kosarev when
the btter was the head of the Komsomol. According to his recendy-
published memoirs written in the 1960s Mgeladze discussed Kosarev
with Stalin in 1947 (p. 165). Stalin listened and then patiendy explained
that Kosarev's guilt had been carefully veriOed by Zhdanov and An-
dreev.*^

This is consistent with what we know from other sources — that these
Politburo members, as well as others, had been assigned to check up on
NKVD arrests and accusations against leading Party members.^ Mge-
ladze, who clearly wished to believe that Kosarev was either entirely in-
nocent and had been framed by Beria for personal reasons, or had simply
made some nustake or other, then told Stalin he himself had read these
reports, as well as one by Shkinatov, and found it impossible to doubt
what they said.

If Nigeladze's account is significant at all, it is because Mgeladze had great
difficulty believing Kosarev was guilty - to the point where he con-
fronted Stalin, however politely, on this question — and Stalin calmly re-
peated his belief, based on investigation, that Kosarev had been guilty.
According to N^eladze, Stalin went on to explain that everybody made
mistakes, and that many mistakes were made in 1937. But Stalin did not
apply this to Kosarev's case.

To this day all of the documentary materials relating to Kosarev's dis-
missal, arrest, investigation, and tdal are kept secret by the Russian gov-
ernment. Kosarev was criticized and removed from leadership of the
Komsomol at the 7'*» Plenum of the Centra] Committee of the Komso-
mol, held in Moscow on November 19-22 1938. The transcript of this
Plenum exists; it is quoted in a recent biography of Geofgii M. Popov,

" A.I. Mgeladze. Stalia Kakim ia ego znal. Straniisy nedavnogo proshlogo. N.pl., 2001,
pp. 165: 172.

SomtsJue KukomLtvo. PenpUka 1928-1941. Moscow. Rosspen, 1999, rcpiinrs a number
of these letters by both Andiccv and Zhdanov.

Khrushchev Ikii

who spoke at this Plenum. Therefore it existed in Khrushchev's day. Bui
Khrushchev never mentioned it."'

25. The Lists

Khrushchev:

The vicious practice was condoned of having the NK VD
prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the
jurisdiction of the Military Collegium and whose
sentences were prepared in advance. Yezhov would send
these lists to Stalin personally for his approval of the
proposed punishment. In 1937-1938, 383 such lists
containing the names of many thousands of party,
Soviet, Komsomol, Army and economic workers were
sent to Stalin. He approved these lists.

These bsts exist, and have been edited and published, first on CD*' and
now on the Internet, as the "Stalinist 'Shooting' Lists". But this is a ten
dentious, inaccurate name, for these were not lists of persons "to be
shot" at all.

As Khrushchev did, the verj' anti-Stalin editors of these lists do in faa
call the lists "sentences" prepared in advance. But their own researdi
disproves this claim. The lists give the sentences that the prosecuiioi
would seek if the individual was convicted - that is, the sentence (he
Prosecution would ask the court to apply. In reality these were lists sent
to Stalin (and other Politburo or Secretariat members) for "review" -
rassmotnnie — a word that is used many times in the introduction to the
lists, (http://www.memo.ru/history/vkvs/images/introt .htm)

Many examples are given of people who were not convicted, or uiM
were convicted of lesser offenses, and so not shot. A.V. Snegov, whotn
Khrushchev mentions by name later in this speech, is on the lists at leasi
twice.

• At http://stalin.memo.ru/spiski/pgl3026.htm
No. 383;

I C.V. Taranov, 'Vartiiaii gitbernator Moskiy Geoigii Popov (^oxovr. Izd-vo (ilavarkhiva
Moskvy, 2004), 12-14 and note 17 p. 104.

^ Zhcftvy politichcsk()g» tcmiia v SSSR. Na 2-kh diskakh. Disk 2. Stalinskic nsan-Tnyc
spiski. Moscow: /vcn'ia, 2004. At http://www.mcino.ru/hi!;tory/vkvs/

pier I'our. The "Cases" Against Paity Members

• At http://stdin.memo.ru/spisld/pg05245.htin
No. 133.

this bst reference Snegov is specifically put into "1^' Category", mean-
: maximum sentence of death in the event of conviction. A brief
nmai)' of the Prosecutor's evidence against him is provided, and there
flis (o have been a lot of it. Nevertheless Snegov was not sentenced to
iih but instead to a long term in a labor camp.

cording to the editors of these lists '*many" people whose names are
(hem were not in £ict executed, and some were freed.

For example, a selective study of the list for the
Kuibyshev oblast' signed on September 29, 1938 has
shows that not a single person on this list was convicted
by the VK VS (the Military Collegium of the Supreme
Court), and a signiScant number of the cases were
dismissed altogether.

•

http://www.memo.ru/history/vkvs/images/intro.ht
m

Khrushchev knew that Stalin was not "sentencing" anybody but
ler reviewing the lists in case he had any objections. We can be certain
: Khrushchev knew this because the note from S. N. Kruglov, Minis-
of Internal Affairs (MVD) to Khrushchev of February 3, 1954 has
rived. It says nothing about "sentences prepared in advance," but
!S die tnjth:

These lists were compiled in 1937 and 1938 by the
NKVD of the USSR and presented to the the CC of the
ACP(b) for teview right away, [emphasis added, GF]^'

Prosecutor went to trial not only with evidence, but with a sentence
xommend to the judges in case of conviction.

)pears that the names of Party members, but not of non-Party mem-
, were sent on for review. The disingenuous Introduction notes that
e signing the lists comprised "not all the Politburo members but only

those of its members who were closest to Stalin" But the evidence sug
gests that it was the members of the Party Secretariat rather than the Pol
itburo to whom the lists were submitted. Even the editors note tha
Ezhov - a member of the Secretariat but not of the Politburo - signet
"as a secretary of the Central Committee. '"^^

Khrushchev concealed the fact that not Stalin, but he himself, was deepi;
involved in selecting the persons for inclusion on these lists, and fo
choosing the category of punishment proposed for them. Khrushchei
mentions that the NKVD prepared the lists. But he does not mention th^
fact that the NKVD acted together with the Party leadership, and that ;
great many of the names on these lists - perhaps more than From an;
other region of the USSR - originated in the areas under Khrushchev';
own power.

Until January 1938 Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Party in Mos
cow and Moscow obJast* (province). After that he was First Secretary in
the Ukraine. The letter to Stalin (see section 4) asking for permission to
shoot 8500 people is dated July 10, 1937, the same date as the first of the
"shooting lists" from Moscow.'-*

In the same letter Khrushchev also confirms his own participation in the
troika responsible for selecting these names, along with the head of the
directorate of the NKVD for Moscow, S.F. Redens, and the assistant
prosecutor K.I. Maslov (Khrushchev does admit that '*when necessan^"
he was replaced by the second secretary A. A. Volkov).

Volkov served as second secretary of the Ntoscow Region of the
AUCP(b) only till the beginning of August 1937, when he left to ser\'e as
First Secretary of the Belorussian party. After that he was no longer
Khrushchev's subordinate, which may have saved his life.'^ Maslov le-

^ "Not all the members of the I'olitburo, but only the members who were closest to
Stalin, t(X}k part in the review (in re-aliry. the cosigning) of the lists." .At
http:/ / www.memo.r\i /history / vk vs/ images/ intrcxh tm

^ "On 8 lists we find the signature of I'!/hov (evidently here he was acting not as the
l^coplc's (lommissar for Internal .\f fairs, but as a secretary' of the (X!)", ibid.

Cf. http://www.memo.nj/history/vkvs/spiski/p(f02049.htm

'* On .August 11 1937 Volkov was chosen l-iist Secretar)' of the VX'. of the (Communist
I'arty (b) of Hclorussia, and from October 1938 to l-'ebruary 1940 occupied the post of
I'irst Secretary' of the (ihuvash Obkom of the .\(H'(b). As far as we can tell he died in
1941 or 1942. .\ moie detailed account of Volkov was publishL>d in the newspaper
SoveUAaa Be/anssia of April 21, 2001. Cf http://sb.by/aiTiclc.php?articlelI)=4039

Four, lite 'YJases" Against Mcmben

OHBied die Procuror (prosecutor) of the Moscow tAlast' (province) until
Nomnber 1937. In 1938 he was arrested and executed in March 1939,
afia having been found guilty of subversive counterrevolutionary activ-
iil^.^The same fate befell KJ. Mamonov who at first occupied Maslov's
positioo and was later shot the same day as Maslov.^ Nor did Redens
punishment He was arrested in November 1938 as a member of a
Tolisb diveisionist-espionage group", tried and sentenced, and shot on
Jtouaiy 21, 1940. Jansen and Petrov describe Redens as one of '*Ezhov's
men."" During the years of the "thaw" Redens was rehabilitated at
Khfushdiev^s insistence but by such crude violations of legal procedures
lliat in 1988 Redens* rehabilitation was reversed - at a time when a huge
wave of rehabilitations was under wayt^

Id other words, with the exception of Volkov aU of Khrushchev's closest
cchwoikeR who took part in repressions in Moscow and Moscow oblasf
^/ax severely punished. How did Khrushchev manage to escape the
same punishment? The answer to this puzzle remains to be uncovered. In
die final chapter we will examine some interesting facts concerning
Khnishchev's successor as Moscow Party leader, A.S. Shcherbakov, that
may bear on this question.

26. Resolutions of the January 1938 CC

Plenum

Khmshchev:

Resolutions of the January plenum of the Central
Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in
1938 had brought some measure of improvement to the
party ocganizations. However, widespread repression
also existed in 1938.

Khmshchev implies - and states a little further on — that the repression
was driven by Stalin. As we have already seen, though, the evidence

*Cf. hnp:// www xnosoblproc.ru/hisioiy/ prokurors/7/ and
hnpy /www.mcmo.ru/incmo(y/donskoc/d39.htni

^ CJ. hitp:// www.niosoblproc.iu/hisiofy /prokurore/8/ and
hnp://mos. nienK>.iu/shot-63.htni

* J»nscn& Petrov, pp. 84; 148.

"RiCEfli.p. 660.

strongly suggests that it was driven by Ezhov and a number of First Sec
retaries, including Khrushchev himself as one of the leading "repressers.
Stalin and the central party leadership who were not involved in th
Rightist conspiracy wanted the repression limited. Eventually they se
verely punished those who were proven to have fabricated cases aiu
killed or punished innocent people.

Getty and Naumov have made the longest study so far of this Januan
1938 Plenum.'"" Their account makes it clear that the Stalin central Paitv
leadership was very concerned about irresponsible repressions. It was ai
this Plenum that Postyshev was removed on just such grounds.
Thurston's discussion confirms the fact that Stalin was trying to rein in
the First Secretaries, the NKVD and repression generally.""

At the January 1938 CC Plenum, Malenkov gave the report, obviouslv
echoing Stalin, that far too many and capricious expulsions had taken
place. For our present purposes it is most significant that Postyshev
the person singled out as most guilty. The Resolution of January 9, 1938
specifically blamed Postyshev for this, reprimanded him, and removed
him from his post as first secretary of the Kuybyshev obkom (city com-
mittee).

According to I.A. Benediktov, who was a high official in agriculture (ei-
ther People's Commissar or First Deputy Minister of Agriculture) frorc
1938 to 1953, on the CC and a frequent participant in Politburo meet-
ings, Stalin began to correct the illegalities of the repressions at this Pk
num. Lev Balaian, whose study of Khrushchev's falsifications, while in-
complete, is very useful, gives additional details.

Khrushchev's head of NKVD in Ukraine from January 1938 was A.I
Uspensky. Having been warned by Ezhov, Uspensky fled arrest on No-
vember 14, 1938 and feigned suicide by leaving a note that he would
jump into the Dnepr river. Uspensky was at length located and arrested
on April 14, 1939. Stalin believed Ezhov had warned Uspensky by caves-
dropping on his telephone call to Khrushchev.

CIcrt)' & Naumov 498-512.

Robert 'ITiurston. Life anHTemriti Siatii's Rjissia, 1934-1941. (\'alc Univcisity IVl-js;
1998), p. 109. 11 2; also sl<c Part 4 of his book.

QifBRwc The "Oaei' Against l*a(Ty Members

mnlEver Uspensky was guilty of, Khrushchev must have been guilty of
faaODg innoceot people as well - they were both in the same twika.^^"^ In
iMeaogvaons no longq: available to researchers today Uspensky revealed
Bdiov's direcbons to &lsify cases massively.**'^ Qansen and Petrov 84;

27. "Beria*8 gang**

Khfusbchcv.

Meanwhile, Beria's gang, which ran the organs of slate
secudty, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested
and the truth of matexiab which it falsified.

Hiis is ^e. Thurston discusses Khrushchev's distortion of what really
bppaied once Beria took over the NKVD« and the "astonishing liberal-
ism" that was instituted immediately under Beda. Torture ended, and
ianutes received privil^es again. Ezhov's men were removed from of-
fice; many of than tried and convicted of repressions.*^

Accofdiiig to the Pospelov report, arresli dropped hugely, by over 90%,
ia 1939 and 1940 in comparison to 1937 and 1938. Exccudoos io 1939
aid 1940 dropped to fya lese than TA of the levels of mass cxccu-
lioas io 1937 and 1938J<'^ Beria took over as head of the NKVD in De-
cember, 1938, so this corresponds precisely with Beria's period in com-
mand Khrushchev, therefore, knew of this, but omitted it from the "Se-
cret Speech" and so concealed it from his audience.

It was during the Beda years that trials and executions of men convicted
of iUe^ repressions, mass killings, torture, and fiilsifications took place.
Many - certainly more than 100,000 — persons wrongly repressed were
ideased from GULAG camps and prisons. Khrushchev knew, and
concealed, this too.

KB Khnishchcv, Vmna, U$i^, Vhtt'. Km. I, tiatff (Nfosccw. Moskovskie Novosti, 1999),
pp 172-5

•"Jansw & Pctmv p. 84; p. 148.
>»*-11iuiston,pp. tt8-119.

Ki^ RKEB 1, p. 317. Cf. hiip://www.alcxandcfyakovlcv.»rg/alfnanah/insidc/alnianah-

doc/55752

tot Sec the note by ()kh<idn and Roginskii in Danilov,V., ct al.» cd., TragfdUa Smtskot
DimmivtA. 5 No. 2 (Mosc»w: ROSSPI%N 2006) 517. Also Nfaik iUngc. Gcnnadii

Khrushchev Im

28. "Torture telegram"

Khrushchev:

When the wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939,
and the leaders of territorial party organizations began to
accuse the NKVD workers of using methods of physical
pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded
telegram on January 10, 1939 to the committee
secretaries of oblasts and krais, to the central committees
of republic Communist parties, to the People's
Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of
NKVD organizations. This telegram stated:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) explains that the
application of methods of physical pressure in
NKVD practice is permissible from 1937 on in
accordance with permission of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks) ... It is knoWn that all bourgeois
intelligence services use methods of physical
influence against the representatives of the socialist
proletariat and that they use them in their most
scandalous forms.

"The question arises as to why the socialist
intelligence service should be more humanitarian
against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against
the deadly enemies of the working class and of the
kolkhoz workers. The Central Committee of the All-
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that
physical pressure should sdll be used obligatorily, as
an exception applicable to known and obstinate
enemies of the people, as a method both justifiable
and appropriate."

Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party

l)c)rdiug()v, Rol'f Binncr, Vtrtikaf borshogft Temra (Nfoscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2008),
490. n. 55.

Qifiia Votu. The "dasn" AgpiiM Vaxty Membcn

(Bolsheviks) the most bnital violation of socialist l^ality,
tomire and oppression, which led as we have seen to the
slandering and self-accusation of innocent people.

Kbnishchcv dclibecately deceived his audience in at least three, and pos-
sibly four ways.

• He omitted important parts of the text of the
telegram that undermined his assertions.

• He did not tell his audience that the text of the
"telegram" he had was certainly never sent. In fact,
the text we have looks like a copy made in 1956.

• Khrushchev did not divulge the doubtful nature of
the text of this supposed telegram. We know of it
because it was discussed in the later June 1957
Central Committee Plenum called to punish
Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich.

• Khrushchev may, in fact, have had this **telegfam"
fotged.

• There are many problems with the text of the
''original" of this telegram, which was published
during the 1990s. It would take a full article-length
study to disentangle all the problems with it. Some of
them will become clear in the discussion below.

This entire "tel^ram'*part of the speech is highly suspicious, beginning
with the first sentence, which makes the Party Secretaries look like angels.
And Khrushchev makes exacdy this point in his speech — the 'Headers of
the local party organizations'* were complaining about torture, and it was
all Stalin's and Beria's fault! Stalin, with his henchman Beria, were the
"bad guys" - the Party First Secretaries were trying to resist them!

Thanks to Zhukov*s primary document research published in Inqy Sfaiifty
we know that it was, in fact, these same Party First Secretaries that in-
sisted on the mass executions to begin with. Stalin and that the central
party leadership of the Politburo (the "narrow leadership", as Zhukov
puts it) strongly resisted it. Zhukov claims he has seen the document in
which Khrushchev asks for permission to raise ^'Category one" to 20,000

Khrushchev IjuX

- a number, with no names. Getty cites Khrushchev's request for 41,001
people in both categories.'*'^

It appears, therefore, that a main purpose of the "Secret Speech" was t(
cover up the bloodthirsciness of the First Secretaries such as himselt
Khrushchev does blame Ezhov somewhat - he mentions him a fevi
times. But Khrushchev mainly blames Beria, whom he really hates, bui
who actually stopped the Ezhovshchina and corrected its abuses by re
viewing sentences. And, of course, Khrushchev lays the main blame oc
Stalin, who was more responsible than anyone else for stopping the re-
pression.

The fir^t thing we should note, for our purposes, is what Khrushchev
omitted - the entire passage in boldface (see Quotations). This passage
does several things:

• It qualifies, limits, and restricts the conditions under
which "means of physical pressure" are to be used.

• It names well-known, high-ranking NKVD men,
close associates of Ezhov's, by name, and stresses
that they have been punished.

This includes Zakovskii, whom Khrushchev, through Rozenblium, citd
as a chief fabricator of false charges (see section 1 8. above). Had Khni
shchev quoted this part of the telegram's text it would have undermined
Khrushchev^s main contention throughout the "Speech" that Stalin had
been promoting the massive repressions rather than tr)'ing to rein them
in. In the recendy released confession-interrogation Ezhov name;
Zakovskii as one of his most devoted men, and confirms that he ordered
Zakovskii killed so that he would not tell Beria about the falsifications
and murders Ezhov and his men were engaged in.

The "Torture Telegram" is a complicated example of Khrushchev's pre-
varicating, and deserving of a lengthy analytical study. The main poinis
for our purposes are these:

1. The document we have - the "January 10, 1939" document - is, ai
best, a draft copy. It is not on official stationery. It contains no signature,
not Stalin's or anyone else's. The most recent, semi-official edition, no

KomomoJsJkaia Pravfia Wx:cm\M:T 3 2002, J. Arch CIctty. "Mxccsscs arc not pciminnl.:
Mass Terror and Stalinist (lovemance in the ].atc 1930s". Tbe Rjiuiaii Rm«v. \'<il.6l
Oanuary 2002),p.l27.

(.'luptcri'our. 'llic "dascs" A^inst Party Members

longer claims it was "signed'* by Stalin, but contains the claim that hand-
uTitten emendations are in Stalin's handwriting J °" This is pure bluff; the
editors cite no evidence this is the case. What is dear is that the editors
ttish to convince readers that this is a genuine document from 1939.

1 If it is not a forgery it may or may not be an unsent "draft." It loolm
like a copy typed up in 1 956, as this is stated directly on it. Furthermore,
the typeface of the 1956 addition and that of the rest of the telegram
looks identical

this would have to be sdentiBcally and objectively verified. But the
Russian government is not about to carry out this kind of study either
with this document or with any of the many other documents of ques-
tionable veradty supposedly discovered since the end of the USSR. But if
it is a copy, as seems likely, where is the original document of which it is
a copy?

3. At the July 1957 Central Committee Plenum, at which the "anti- Party
group" of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov was arraigned
for trying to have Khrushchev ousted the year before, Molotov states
that a dedsion to use "physical pressure" against certain arrestees did
exist, but that all Politburo members signed it. Khrushchev then insists
that there were two such documents, and that he is talking about the
second one. He never returns to the subject of the 6rst one. What was
this Orst document? We never leam.

.As for the supposed second document, according to another CC member
in this discussion the original has been destroyed, but one copy remained
in the Dagestan obkom (regional committee). However, that copy is cer-
tainly not the copy we have, because the text we have is not on any sta-
tionery and is, at best, a draft, perhaps a later (1956) typed copy of a
draft, and possibly even a forgery altogether. No other such copy has
nimed up, and the "Dagestan obkoni* document has never turned up ei-
dier.

Surely Khrushchev would never have destroyed such valuable evidence
against Stalin - unless it incriminated himself, in some way. Or, unless it
never existed in the first place! In this case A.B. Aristov's (one of Khru-
shchev's main supporters in the Central Committee) mention of the

Khrushchev 1 ictl

**copy from the Dagestan obkoni^ was a bluff to intiinidate the "anti-Part\
group" in front of the rest of the CC.""

Getty has stated that he has found the text of a similar telegram dated
July 27, 1939."" If it is genuine (it has not been published), and if
Molotov was correct in July 1957 that all Politburo members had signed
such a telegram, then Khrushchev would have signed it too, as Khru-
shchev was made a Politburo member on March 22, 1939, and was a
candidate member (taking the disgraced Postyshev's place) after the Janu-
ary 1938 CC meeting). This would have made Khrushchev just as re-
sponsible as Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich.

If the telegram had really been sent on January 10, 1939, as stated by
Khrushchev in the "Secret Speech", he would not have signed it. How-
ever, he would certainly have (a) seen it, and (b) been responsible for car-
rying it out, i.e. applying "physical pressure" to prisoners, since he vi-as
First Secretary of the Ukraine, where he was repressing thousands oi
people.

Therefore it's possible that Khrushchev searched for genuine copies of
the July 27, 1939 telegram, and had all those he could find destroyed.
Before doing that, he had a copy .made with the same text (omitting
Ezhov's name, which is in the later version), but predated to a period
before he had joined the Politburo. We can't be sure.

Many scholars and others have assured us that Khrushchev had a great
number of documents destroyed. luri Zhukov, Nikita Petrov, and MaH^
Junge and Rolf Binner all attest to the fact that it appears that Khru-
shchev destroyed more documents than anyone else.'" Benediktov, for-
mer agriculture minister, said the same thing in an article published in
1989. In this scenario, the document Getty has found is a copy thai
Khrushchev failed to find and destroy. We don't really know.

What we do know is that, at the very least, Khrushchev quoted selec
lively from this document with the intent to deceive his audience.

Mobtov, M<dtHke», KagaMonth, 1957. Sttw^amma im 'sktigt pltnuma TsK KPSS I drvgi
liokt/meHty. VA A.N. lakovlcv, N. Kovalcva, .\. Konnkov, ct al. Moscow: MDI*', 1998, pf

121-2.

CIctty, "i :xccs.scs" p. 114, n.4.

•« lU. /hukov, "/hupcl .Stalina", l>art 3. Komsomorskaia Pravda, Nov. 12, 2002), Nikiu
Petrov, l»aH Strop, Moscow 200S, pp. 1 57- 1 62; Mark Jungc and Rolf Dinner, Kak Term
Sta/Borsbm. Moscow, 2003. p. 16, a 14.

(Chapter l-our. Hit- "Cases" A|^st Paiiy Members

29. Rodos tortured Chubar' and Kosior on

Beria's orders

Khrushchev:

Not long ago - only several days before the present
Congress - we called to the Central Conunittee
Presidium session and interrogated the investigative
judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and
interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosarev. He is a vile
person, with the brain of a bird, and morally completely
degenerate. And it was this man who was deciding the
fate of prominent party workers; he was making
judgments also concerning the politics in these matters,
because, having established their "dime," he provided
therewith materials from which important political
implications could be drawn.

'llie question arises whether a man with Such an intellect
could alone make the investigation in a manner to prove
the guilt of people sudi as Kossior and others. No, he
could not have done it without proper directives. At the
Central Committee Presidium session he told us: "I was
told that Kossior and Chubar were people's enemies and
for this reason I, as an investigative judge, had to make
them confess that they are enemies."

(Indignation in the hall.)

He would do this only through long tortures, which he
did, receiving detailed instructions from Beria. We must
say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he
cynically declared: "I thought that I was executing the
orders of the party." In this manner, Stalin's orders
concerning the use of methods of physical pressure
against the arrested were in practice executed.

These and many other facts show that all norms of
correct party solution of problems were invalidated and
everything was dependent upon the willfulness of one
man.

Khrushchev's deception here is in his implication that confessions, ob-
tained by Rodos' beatings, were the only grounds on which Chubar' and

Khrushchev lied

Kosior were convicted and executed As we have already seen, there i:
plenty of evidence against both Chubar* and Kosior that has nothing tc
do with "means of physical pressure." For example, they were both
named by Ezhov in his confession-interrogation of April 26, 1939 as
members of the Rightist conspiracy and German spies.

Khrushchev implies that Rodos was Beria's man.^'^ But rehabilitation
materials state that he was involved in the investigation of suspects dur-
ing Ezhov's tenure too {RKEB 1, 176).

It is possible that Rodos had simply "followed orders", as he claimed he
had done. If, as alleged by Khrushchev and the "torture telegram," tor-
ture had been authorized by the Central Committee, and if Rodos had
been told to torture some defendants, as he seems to have admitted, then
he had merely been following orders. It so, he had committed no crime.
Perhaps his real crime was to have been an investigator under Beria as
well as under Ezhov. Khrushchev did his best to blame everything on
Beria.

Rodos was tried and sentenced during the period February 21-26, 1956 -
during the 20*' Party Congress itself!'" (RXEB / 411, n. 13 ). Why? ThL*
suggests that Rodos may have been "tried" and executed to shut him up.
As the chief of the Investigative Section of the NKVD Rodos would
have taken an active part in^the investigations of Ezhov's activities and
would have been in charge of the cases of those who were in the dose
circle around Ezhov's wife, including Isaac Babel, Vsevolod Meierkhol'd,
and others.

Another possibility is that his fate was intended to warn others to gei
them to cooperate with Khrushchev's "rehabilitations", say what he
wanted them to say. Pavel' Sudoplatov, one of Beria's subordinates, was
evidently imprisoned for fifteen years because he refused to falsif}'

> Nikita l^ctrov .states that R(kJo.s wa;: arrested on ( )ctobcr 5 1 953, during the .same
peiicxJ that others in "Hcria's gang" were under arrest and being interrogated. N. Petrov,
PenyipmiseiLaer KGB Ivan Sem. Moscow, 2006, p. 393.

' RXEfi /, p. 41 1 , note 1 3. RckIos's investigative file has not yet been dcclassiRed. In thr
exhibition "1953 god. Mc/hu proshlym i budu.shchini" (2004) in the ICxhibition Hall of
the l-'cderal Archives in Mo.scow there were on exhibit two documents concerning Rud<u-
Scc the catalog of the exhibition at

http://www.rusarchives.ru/cvants/exhibitions/stalin_sp.shtml , Nos 269 and 270. It
seems likely that KcnJos' investigative file still exists.

(.'lupicr l-'our. 'Ilic "(Jascs" Against Party Mcmbcts

charges against Beiia, only escaping execution by the difficult strat^em
of feigning insanity for a few years.

Rodos' trial mateiials have never been released. He had obviously not
been prosecuted after Ezhov's dismissal, as had so many other NKVDers
who had tortured defendants and fabricated cases. It was surely conven-
ient for Khnishchev to have Rodos and Beria on whom to blame repres-
sions. This njsh to get tid of Rodos suggests that there may have been
some kind of connection between Khrushchev and Ezhov that ronains
unknown to us today and whose origins go back to the years in which
Khnuhchev was one of the First Secretaries.

General Pavel Sudoplatov was asked by Roman Rudenko, head Soviet
Prosecutor and a creature of Khrushchev's, to write false testimony
against Beiia after the latter's death. When Sudoplatov refused he was
arrested and accused of being a participant in an imaginary "conspiracy"
of Sena's. According to Sudoplatov's account General Ivan I. Maslenni-
kov, a Hero of the Soviet Union, committed suicide rather than do the
same thing. Sudoplatov evaded execution only successfully feigning
insanity but remained in prison for 15 years.^*^ It's possible that some-
diing similar happened to Rodos.

■■^ I'avcl Sudoplatov, SpHtoptratsii. Liibiaiika i KrwiF 19)0-1950 gtdf. Moscow:
.Sovccmcnnik, 1997. llic chapter in quesdon is online at
htq)://www.hrono.fu/libns/Ub_s/benal.php

QapierKivv. S(aUn an J the War

Hie G«niun Anny had a disinfonnadon plan to spread false rumors to
tbe Soviet leadership. A detailed order to this effect by Field Marshal
WBbclm Keitel, dated February 15* 1941, has been published-''^

As Kozhinov points out, Khrushchev's accusations here can be turned
■round on his own thesis. Historians do not blame President Roosevelt
for (ailing to foresee the atlsck on Pearl Harbor. Therefore to blame Sta-
lin for not foreseeing the precise time and place of the Nazi attack is to
Ul prey to the "cult of personality", to believe Stalin was supposed to
bre superhuman abilities and inexplicably failed to use them."<>

The Soviets could not declare a mobilization because that was universally
understood as a declaration of war. It was precisely such a mobilization
that had set off the First World War. It would have given Hitler the op-
poctunity to declare war, leaving the USSR vulnerable to a separate deal
between Hitler and the Allies. And in a plan for "Operation 'Ost'" drawn
up in 1940 German General>Major Marks make the regret^l remark that
The Russians will not do us the favor of attacking us [fixst]."ii7

Ihe Soviets could not rely upon British warnings* for the British clearly
wanted to set Hider against the Soviet Union and weaken both, if not use
die opportunity to make peace with Hitler against the Soviets, as many in
the British establishment wanted.

Marshal K.A. Meretskov, no admirer of Stalin, believed the situation im-
mediately preceding the war was very complex, impossible to predict. His
memoirs were published after Khrushchev's ouster, in 1968. Zhukov,
who had been demoted in disgrace after the war by Stalin and had helped
Khnishchev attack Stalin in 1957, thought the Soviet Union under Stalin
had done everything it could to prepare for the war.

f94f gkl Dokumefity. V. 2-Jeb IulKilI . Moscow, t998, pp. 661-664. Ihc document U
"Uka^anicShtaba Operadvnogo Rukovodsrva () Mcropnbliiakl) DczinfonnatsiL" I have
put item line at hllp://chss.montclairedu/c*^;bsh/fiirr/icKairh/gcnnandisinfo.hlnil

Althouj>h Khiushchcv docs not dif ccdy addicss die question here, we wish to mention
that good evidence has now been pubbshcd that Gcncial Dmitiy Pavlov, commander of
the Western front, where the Red Army was taken completely unpreparc-d, where the
gnatcst lasses were suffcfctl, and where the Gcnnans effected their greatest penetration
into the USSR after June 22, was in fact guihy of plotting defeat to benefit the Germans.
Some quotations and bibliography on this quesiion arc included in the Russian langu^e
ux6on at this point.

1941 god V 2-kh knigakh. Kni^ pervaia (Moscow: M1*D, 1998} p. 154.

QapierKivv. S(aUn an J the War

Hie G«niun Anny had a disinfonnation plan to spread false rumors to
tbe Soviet leadership. A detailed order to this effect by Field Macshal
WBbclm Keitelf dated February 15, 1941, has been pubLshed'i^

As Kozhinov points out, Khrushchev's accusations here can be tuzned
■round on his own thesis. Historians do not blame President Roosevelt
for (ailing to foresee the atlsck on Pearl Harbor. Therefore to blame Sta-
lin for not foreseeing the precise time and place of the Nazi attack is to
Ul prey to the "cult of personality", to believe Stalin was supposed to
bre superhuman abilities and inexplicably failed to use them."<>

The Soviets could not declare a mobilization because that was universally
understood as a declaration of war. It was precisely such a mobilization
that had set off the First World War. It would have given Hitler the op-
poclunity to declare war, leaving the USSR vulnerable to a separate deal
between Hitler and the Allies. And in a plan for "Operation 'Ost'" drawn
iq) in 1940 German General>Ma)or Marks make the regretful remark that
"The Russians will not do us the favor of attacking us [first]."*)?

Ihe Soviets could not rely upon British warnings, for the British clearly
wanted to set Hider against the Soviet Union and weaken both, if not use
the opportunity to make peace with Hitler against the Soviets, as many in
the British establishment wanted.

Marshal K.A. Meretskov, no admirer of Stalin, believed the situation im-
mediately preceding the war was very complex, impossible to predict. His
memoirs were published after Khrushchev's ouster, in 1968. Zhukov,
who had been demoted in disgrace after the war by Stalin and had helped
Khrushchev attack Stalin in 1957, thought the Soviet Union under Stalin
had done everything it could to prepare for the war.

Althouj>h Khiushchev docs not dii ecdy addicss die question here, we wish to mention
that good evidence has now been published that Gcncial Dmitry Pavlov, commander of
die Western front, where the Red Army was taken completely unpreparc-d, where the
gnatcst lasses were suffcfctl, and where the Gcnnans effected their greatest penetration
into the USSR after June 22, was in fact guihy of plotting defeat to benefit the Gerafians.
Some quotations and bibliography on this question arc included in the Russian langu^e
ux6on at this point.

1941 god V 2-kh knigakh. Kni^ pervaia (Moscow: M1*D, 1998} p. 154.

Khrushchev Ijli

Marshals Vasilevskii and Zhukov disagreed about whether Stalin shoul
have ordered all the troops to take positions along the border. Commeni
ing on Vasilevskii's article in 1965, after Khrushchev's buster, Zhuko
wrote said he believed this would have been a serious error.

Although Khrushchev does not refer to it here, it's worth mentioning th
most famous "warning" of an impending German attack, that from th
famous Soviet spy Richard Sorge who was in the German embassy i
Japan, has recently been denounced as a fake created during the years c
Khrushchev's "Thaw.">'«

31. Vorontsov*s Letter

Khrushchev:

We must assert that information of this sort concerning
the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory
was coming in also from our own military and
diplomatic sources; however, because the leadership was
conditioned against such information, such data was
dispatched with fear and assesscfd with reservation.

Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on May
6, 1941 by th^ Soviet military attache, Captain
Vorontsov, stated: "Soviet citizen
Bozer. . .communicated to the deputy naval attache that,
according to a statement of a certain German officer
from Hider's headquarters, Germany is preparing to
invade the USSR on May 14 through Finland, the Baltic
countries and Latvia. At the same time Moscow and
I^eningrad wiU be heavily raided and paratroopers landed
in border cities..."

In this case we know that Khrushchev deliberately lied, because we now
have the full text of the Vorontsov letter. Khrushchev omitted AdminJ
Kuznetsov's evaluation of it, which changes the whole meaning of the
letter. Khrushchev deliberately concealed from his audience the dci thai
the Navy had decided this was disinformation intended to mislead the
Soviet leadership! (See Appendix)

iiR "22 iiunia 1941 gtxJa. Moglo li vsc byt' po-inomu?" f'Junc 22, 1941: Could it have all
been otherwise P"), Kramaia Zve^ }\inc 16 2001. Online at
htip:/ /w>vw.rcdstar.ni/ 2001 /06/ 1 6_06/4_01 .html

Ol^ilBFive Stalin and the War

Khnishchcv's dishonest reference to the Vorontsov letter was evidently
hia own idea. It is not mentioned in the Pospelov Report; in the
Pbspelov-Acistov draft of Khrushchev's Sp«ech of February 18, 1956, or
io Khnishchev's additions to that draft of February 19, 1956. We do not
know how or from whom Khrushchev obtained the letter.

Hie editors of Doklad Khmshcheoa do not reprint it, or identify where the
ooginal was published, or discuss it in any way. They could not possibly
luve been ignorant of the original of the letter, for it was published in the
major military journal Voenno-htoncheskii Zhumat (No. 2, 1992, 39-40).
They erroneously identify "Bozer" with the Soviet spy within the Ger-
man SS Schulze-Boysen, even though Bozer is clearly identified as a "So-
viet dozen."

k appears as though they wished to conceal Khrushchev's lie by not
Nkntif)i»g it. All this points to a deliberate coverup by the editors of this
supposedly authociMdve book.

Examples such as Vorontsov's letter demand that we examine Khru-
shchev's possible motives for lying in the Secret Speech.

32. German soldier

A little later in the "Secret Speech" Khrushchev returned to this theme of
"warnings":

The following fact is also known: On the eve of the
invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union by the
Hitlerite anny, a certain German ddzen crossed our
border and stated that the German armies had received
orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union on
the night of June 22 at 3 o^dock. Stalin was informed
about this immediately, but even this warning was
ignored.

litis statement of Khrushchev's is also false. Unlike the Vorontsov letter,
which was secret undl recendy, the story of the German soldier must
have been remembered by many people in Khrushchev's audience.

The soldier in question was Alfred Liskow. His warning was not ignored
at all. His desertion, at 9 p.m. on June 21, was reported at 3:10 a.m. on
June 22 by telephone, 40 minutes before the Nazi invasion. Therefore
Stalin was not "informed immediately", nor is there any evidence that he
"ignored" it, as Khrushchev said. Liskow's platoon commander, a Lieut.

Khrushchev Ij

Schulz, had told his men "towards evening" (podmherom) of the impei
ing invasion.

Liskow was sent to Moscow. On June 27 1941 his story was printed
Pravda"^. A leaflet with his story, picture, and a call for German soldi
to desert to the Soviet side, was produced. According to one accou
one unit immediately blew a bridge and went to defensive positio:
where they were wiped out to a man with the German attack a few hoi
later

In his memoirs, written in the 1960s, Khrushchev himself does not
peat the claim that the German soldier's warning was ignored.

33. Commanders Killed

Khrushchev:

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to
the beginning of the war, followed Stalin's annihilation
of many military commanders and political workers
during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and
through slanderous accusations. During these years
repressions were instituted against certain parts of
military cadres beginning Lterally at the company and
battalion commander level and extending to the higher
military centers; during this time the cadre of leaders
who had gained military experience in Spain and in the
Far East was almost completely liquidated.

Khrushchev does not directly state, but instead alludes to, the follouii
claims which he and others made subsequently:

• Marshal Tukhachevsky and the seven other
commanders condemned and executed with him on
June 1 1, 1937, were innocent of what they were
charged with ~ conspiring to overthrow the
government and with espionage contacts with
Germany and Japan.

• So many military commanders were executed or
dismissed that Soviet military preparedness was

I have put this anicic inline at
http://chss.montclair.cdu/cn|;lish/fun'/rc$carch/lisk()wpniv(Ja062741.pdf

O^Fhre. Stalin ami the War

greatly harmed. The militaiy commanders executed
or dismissed were better commanders — more
eduMted, with more military experience — than those
who rcpbced them.

Rcseuch has disprovcn these statements. The facts are otherwise.

1, Since the end of the USSR a large mass of evidence has been published
dttt confirms that Tukhachevsky and these other commanders were
pifliy as charged Since Khrushchev's time these same commanders have
beoi considered heroes in the USSR and, now, in post-Soviet Russia. The
gornnment, whidi controls the Presidential archive where the materials
for this and the 1936-1938 trials and investigations are kept today, has
ool^ released small bits of this documentation, and official historians still
denyr that the commanders were guilty.

But even that documenlation demonstrates their guilt beyond any rea-
sonable doubt. For example, in his recendy-published (February 2006)
•onfcssion-inteiTogation of April 26 1939 Ezhov fully confirms the exis-
tence of three separate, ^competing military conspiracies: one consisting
of "major military leaders" headed by Marshal A.l. Egorov; a Trotskyist
group led by Gamamik, lakir and Uborevich; and a "Bonapartist group
of ofBocts" led by Tukhachevsky.'**

To compound his dishonesty, Khrushchev had Tukhachevsky and most
of the others "rehabilitated" in 1957. But Khrushchev did not set up a
commission to study the question of their guilt until 1962. Its report, with
additional evidence of their guilt, was kept secret until 1994.^^^

2. Khrushchev and the anti-communist historians who have come after
him have gready exaggerated the number and per centage of military
commanders executed and dismissed during 1937-38. Good studies of
this subject existed in Khrushchev's time, and have been done today,
likewise, the level of military training, and even of batdefield experience
- at least, experience in the First World War - increased as a result of the

*^ I have put this confcssion-inanotsation of lizhov's online at

http:/ /chss.inontdair.ct)u/ english/ fbn/ccscarch/czhov042639cng.htnil (Russian text:

./c/hoviu.htinl ).'lhc full bibliogiaphical reference to it is at the top of the article there.

<2< ihctc is an enormous amount of evidence that Tukhachevsky and the other
commanders tiicd and executed with him were guilty as charged 'llic author and
Moscow histoiian Vladimir I.- Bobrov arc pnpaiing a lengthy study on the whole
"Tukhachtnrsky Af faif^ c|ucstion.

Khrushchev \ja

replacement of executed, arrested, and dismissed officers with thos
promoted to replace them.

The best summaries of recent Russian publications on these subjects are

• Gerasimov, G.I. "Destvitel'noe vliyanie repressiy
1937-1938 gg. Na ofitserskiy korpus RKKA.
Rossiiskiy IsfomhefkJy Zhumal'Ho. 1, 1999. Also at
http://www.hrono.ru/statii/2001/rkka_repr.html

• Pykhalov, Igor'. V^elikaya Obolgannaya Vqyna. Moscow:
"Yauza", "Eksmo", 2005. Ch. 2: "Byla li
*Obe2glavlena' Krasnaya Amiiya?" Also at
http://militera.lib.ru/research/pyhalov_i/02.html

Marshal Konev, speaking in 1965 with writer Konstantin Simonov, dis
agreed sharply with Khrushchev.

What's more, Khrushchev himself was direcdy responsible for "annihilai
ing'* most of the commanders in the Kiev (Ukraine) Military Distiici
Volkogonov quotes a directive from Khrushchev, dated March 1938;
The longer version, from the Russian edition, is translated here (sec .Ap-
pendix); a much shorter version is given in 'the English edition, Dmitni
A. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. (NY: Grove Weidenfeld
1991), p. 329.

■

34. Stalin's ^^Demoralization" after the
beginning of the war

Khrushchev:

It would be incorrect to forget that, after the first severe
disaster and defeat at the front, Stalin thought that this
was the end. In one of his speeches in those days he said:

"All that which Lenin created we have lost forever."

After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the
militai)' operations and ceased to do anything whatever.

This is completely false, and Khrushchev had to know that it was. Mos;
of those who worked closely with Stalin during the first weeks of the vlv
(and afterwards) were still alive and in high positions. Yet they never ^^
ported anything like this. Khrushchev himself was in the Ukraine duhng
this whole period, and could have had no first-hand knowledge of anv
thing Stalin said or did.

(.'bpicr I'ivc. Stalin and the War

Ilie logbooks of those who came to Stalin's office to work with him
have been published now. They demonstrate that Stalin was extremely
active from the very Brst day of the war. Of course, they were available to
Khrushchev as well The logbooks for June 21-28 1941 were published in
IjtoriiheskJi ArkJvv No. 2, 1996, pp. 51-54, and document Stalin's continu-
ous activity. We have also put facsimile copies of the original handwritten
pages online.

Marshal Zhukov had no particular love for Stalin. Stalin had demoted
him after the war when Zhukov had been caught stealing German war
booty for himself. Zhukov had also supported Khrushchev in his 1957
ouster of the "Stalinists" Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich. Neverthe-
less Zhukov appears to have retained a good deal of respect for Stalin,
and he refuted Khrushchev's claim in his memoirs.

Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian head of the Comintern, wrote in his diary
that he was summoned to the Kremlin at 7 a.m. on June 22 1941, where
he fouixl Poskrebyshev (Stalin's secretary). Marshal Timoshenko, Admi-
ral Kuznetsov, Lev Mekhlis, editor of Pravda and head of the Political
Directorate of the Army, and Beria, head of the NKVD. He remarked:
"Striking calmness, resoluteness, confidence of Stalin and all the oth-
ers."'2J

.Attempting to rescue Khrushchev's falsehood about Stalin's allied inac-
mit)' Cold- War biographers of Stalin have seized on the fact that there
are no entries in the logbook of visitors to Stalin's office for June 29 and
30. Therefore, they conclude, his supposed breakdown must have oc-
curred then.

Even Soviet dissident historian and ferocious anti-Stalinist Roi Medvedev
has given the lie to this version of events. Khrushchev's version, says

■^'Ihcy have been reproduced at http://www.hrono.ru/libfis/slalin/16-13.htinl. One
convenient source for this information is in Igor' l^khalov's article "Did Stalin Collapse
inro Inactivity?" ("Did Stalin l<all into Prostration?"), Chapter 10 of his book VeBkofa
(Mlganiurjta VoiHa(\)\c Circat Calumniated War), also online at

http://inilitera.lib.fu/ research /pyhalov_i/ lO.html

I'acsimilcs of the original archival copies arc at

http://chss. montclair.edu/ engiish/ fiirr/ research/ stalinvisi to r>4 1 .pdf

The pages from Jstonebtska j4rkbiv No. 2, 1996, are reproduced at
http://chss.montclair.edu/cnglish/furr/rcsearch/stalinvisitors41_istarkh96.pdf

>" Tbt Diary o/Geo/ff Dimlrw, ed. Ivo Banac (Yale U.P., 2003), p. 166

Khrushchev IJcd

Medvedev, is "a complete fabrication,"'^^ but has appeared in biographie
of Stalin by Jonathan Lewis and Phillip Whitehead (1990), Alan BuUod
(1991), and the Oxford Emjclofyaedia of the Seimd \!t^arld \!f^ar Med
vedev goes on to cite the evidence.

Stalin was continuously very active from June 22 onward, including June
29 and 30. On June 29 occurred a famous argument with his command
ers, including Timoshenko and Zhukov. Mikoian described it to G.A
Kumanev (RJadom so Stalinym^ pp. 28-9). Also on June 29 Stalin formu
lated and signed the important directive concerning partisan warfare. On
June 30 the Decree of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of People's
Commissars, and the Central Committee of the Party, forming the Stait
Defense Committee, was issued.

General Dmitri Volkogonov and Pavel' Sudoplatov agree that Khnj
shchev was Ijing. Both were hostile towards Stalin, Volkogonov ti
tremely so, in the '90s, when they wrote their books.

35. Stalin A Bad Commander

Khrushchev:

Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real
situation whicjj was developing at the front. This was
natural because, during the whole Patriotic War, he never
visited any section of the front or any liberated city
except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk highway
during a stabilized situation at the front. To this incident
were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all
sorts and so many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was
interfering with operations and issuing orders which did
not take into consideration the real situation at a given
section of the front and which could not help but result
in huge personnel losses.

Aside from Khrushchev, nobody says thisl By contrast, writing aftc
Khrushchev's fall Marshal Zhukov thought Stalin an extremely compe-
tent military leader. In his memoirs NIarshal Vasilevsky specifically men
tioned Khrushchev's statement here and strongly disagreed with it. Mar-

■» K.Mcdvodcv. /.Mcdvcdcv. The Unknown StaBiiQV/invlsXocV, NY: llic OvcilcNik Wo,
2003), p. 242

Lhiptcr I'lvc. Stalin and the War

shal Golovanov spoke of Stalin and his abilities as a commander in the
highest tenns.

36. Khat'kov 1942

lOifushchev:

I will allow myself in this connection to biing out one
characteristic fact which illustrates how Stalin directed
operations at the fronts. Hiere is present at this
Congress Marshal Bagramian, who was once the chief of
operations in the headquarters of the southwestern front
and who can corroborate what I will tell you. When
there developed an exceptionally serious situation for our
Army in 1942 in the Kharkov region. . .And what was the
result of this? The worst that we had expected. The
Germans surrounded our Army concentrations and
consequently we lost hundreds of thousands of our
soldiers. This is Stalin's military "genius"; this is what it
cost us.

Not only is this wrong - most generals do not blame Stalin - but some
sav Khnjshchev himself is to blame!

In an anniversary article on the subject of Khrushchev's ''Secret Speech"
\ikTiter Sergei Konstantinov summed up the reactions of many military
leaders at Khrushchev's remarks about Stalin. (See Appendix) According
10 Academician A.M. Samsonov Zhukov disagreed with Khrushchev's
account. In his memoirs Zhukov does blame Stalin, but only in part'^

As we have seen (see section 35, Appendix) Marshal Vasilevskii directly
called Khrushchev's version of the Khar'kov defense a lie. He says that
Khrushchev and General Kirponos were in fact given plans and sample
rocket-launchers, as well as advice on how to build their own weapons.
In effect, Vasilevskii says, the fault was Khrushchev's, not Stalin's. Histo-
rian Vadim Kozhinov points out that Khrushchev used this story to dis-

However, Zhuk(iv was vccy angry at Stalin - Stalin demoted him for stealing Cjerman
trophies, 'litis is fuUy documented in Voeimie Arkliivf Raisii, 1993, pp. 175 ff.; fur /hu-
kov's confession see pp. 241-44. Khrushchev knew thi^, and had it all quashed, undoubt-
edly to get Zhukov on his side.

Khrushchev 1 icJ

credit Malenkov'^, and completely avoided the obvious point that, as
First Secretary of the Ukraine for over three years already, Khrushchev'
could have seen to the preparation of rifles long beforehand.

The Short History of the Great Patriotic War (1970 edition, pp. 164-5) pub-
lished after Khrushchev's ouster carries this version, which blames the
front command rather than Stalin and the GKO. This is consistent with
Stalin's letter of June 26 1942 quoted by many sources, including Portu-
gal'skii et al.'s biography of Timoshenko, and which blamed not only Ba-
gramian, but also Timoshenko and Khrushchev himself.

Earlier in the "Secret Speech" Khrushchev claimed that ">X'hoever op-
posed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint and the correctness ot
his position was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to
subsequent moral and physical annihilation." This is not true, and Khni-
shchev did not even give a single example of it. Marshal Timoshenko
outlived Stalin by 17 years, Khrushchev, by 18, Marshal Bagramian by 29
years. They all had insisted on their "viewpoint", and yet none was pun-
ished, much less "annihilated."

Dmitry Volkogonov, who was intensely hostile .to Stalin, suggests that
Khrushchev had either misremembered after so many years, or was sim-
ply lying on this point in his "Secret Speech."

37. Stalin Planned Military Operations on a

Globe

Khrushchev:

I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him: "Alexander
Mikhailovich, take a map" - Vasilevsky is present here -
"and show Comrade Stalin the situation which has
developed." We should note that Stalin pbnned
operations on a globe. (Animation in the hall.) Yes,
comrades, he used to take the globe and trace the front
line on it. I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: "Show him the
situation on a map . . .

•26 Vailim Kozhinov, Rossiia. Vek XX (1939-m4). Moscow: Alporitin, 1999, p. 75. lUni
I'lmtTianov says much the same thing in "Mif XX S'cxda". SJovo No. 3, 2000. VS.
http:/ / sialinism.nt'wmail.nj/cmclian2.hnn.

) hipur l-ivc. Sialin and ihc War

\hi is perhaps the most obvious lie in Khrushchev's entire speech. No
one has ever defended this statement. Many authorities refute it, some
indignantly. I refer to the reader to the quotations from military leaders as
well as (torn Molotov.

38. Stalin Downgraded Zhukov

Khrushchev:

Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of
Comrade Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often
for my opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have
known Zhukov for a long time; he is a good general and
a good military leader."

After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsense
about Zhukov, among others the following, "You
praised Zhukov, but he does not deserve it. It is said that
before each operation at tht front Zhukov used to
behave as follows: He used to take a handful of earth,
smell it and say, "We can begin the attack,' or the
opposite. The planned operation cannot be carried
oul'" I stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not
know who invented this, but it is not true."

It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for
the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of
Marshal Zhukov.

No one else ever heard Stalin say this. According to a remark by Zhukov
himself that is quoted by several writers, Stalin demoted him but never
insulted him. This remark of Zhukov's was probably a direct rebuke to
Khrushchev here, since it's hard to imagine any other reason he might
have made it.

Stalin did have Zhukov demoted after the war when it was discovered
that the Marshal had been stealing German war booty on a grand scale,
instead of contributing it to the State to be used in rebuilding the im-
mense destruction wrought by the Germans during the war.'^^ Since eve-

'Ilic details were published in an obscure but evidently official journal l^oemuyt Arkbiiy
Rmu 1, 1993, pp. 175-245. 'llicie was never another issue of this mysterious journal. A
facsimile of these specific pagjcs may be downloaded from
hitp:/ /chss. montclair.ed u/eng|is h/ fun/ research/ zhukovthe ft4648_vaf93.pdf

Khrushchev

cybody knew of Zhukov's demotion after the war, but few knew the
talis of why it had occurred, Khrushchev was probably just currying f:
with Zhukov here. He needed Zhukov the following year, to help
defeat the "Stalinists" Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepi
who tried to get him voted out of office.

Chapter 6.
Of Plots and Affairs

39. Deportations of nationalities

Khrushchev:

Comrades, let us reach for some other facts. The Soviet
Union is justly considered as a model of a multinational
state because we have in practice assured the equality and
friendship of all nations which live in our great
Fatherland.

All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was
Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic Leninist
principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state. We
refer to the mass deportations £rom their native places of
whole nations, together with all Communists and
Komsomols without any exception; this deportation
action was not dictated by any military considerations

Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common
sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations
responsible for inimical activity, including women,
children, old people, Communists and Komsomols, to
use mass repression against them, and to expose them to
misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual
persons or groups of persons.

Khrushchev is not "revealing" these deportations; they were well known
at the time they happened. What was "new" was his three accusations
against Stalin here: (1) the deportations were made "without any excep-
tion"; (2) the deportations were "not dictated by any military considera-
tion;" (3) "whole nations" were punished "for the hostile acts of individ-
ual persons or ^oups of persons." These are the "revelations" we will
deal with.

Khrushchev mentions Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechen-Ingush, Balkais. For
some reason he does not mention Crimean Tatars or Volga Germans.

Khnishchcv 1 i<

The events leading up to these deportations, the deportations themselvt
and the aftermath, are extremely well documented in Soviet archive
Though none of this archival information was published until after d
end of the USSR, Khrushchev undoubtedly had access to it. He, or h
aides, had to know that each of the criticisms Khrushchev made w
false.

1. Examples of exceptions to the deportations are cited by Pykhalo
from Soviet documents published by N.F. Bugai, the main Russian expe
on this question and an extremely anti-Stalin researcher.

2. The militaiy necessity for the deportations was to secure the R<
Army's rear. In each of the cases of the deported nationalities, very lain
parts of the population were either actively or passively aiding the Ge
mans in rebelling against the Soviet government, and constituted a sei
ous danger to Soviet forces. In addition, the Soviets could not be su
that the German armies would not push eastward again in 1944, as the
had done in each of the three previous years.

According to Bugai and A.M. Gomov, who are hostile to Stalin and d
not approve of the deportations at all,

...the Soviet government had by and large allocated its
priorities correctly, basing those priorities on its right to
maintain order behind the froht lines, and in the North
Caucasus in particular.

In the "Secret Speech" Khrushchev noted with an attempt at humor

The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because
there were too many of them and there was no place to
which to deport them. Otherwise, he would have
deported them also. {Laughter and animcdion in the hall)

This was supposed to be a joke, since Khrushchev did not seriously clain:
Stalin had wanted to deport the Ukrainians. But perhaps Khnishchet-
mentioned the Ukrainians for a reason, because, as he well knew, a m
number of Ukrainians, most of whom had entered the Soviet Union
along with the Nazis and who had abetted the Nazis' crimes, was in re-
volt, on the Nazis' side and against the Soviet Union. This caused huge
problems in the rear of the Red Army as it advanced westward towaid

*^ N.l*. Hu^aiand .\.M. Ounuv. '^'Ilic h'onxil l''vacuatic>n of the (Chechens and ihc
Ingush." BjusioH Studies in His/try. vol 41, no. 2, l-'ali 2002, pp. 43-61 , at p. 59.

( ihapti-T Six. Of l*lots and A ffairs

Poland and Gemiany in 1944-45.'^ In the light of the massive nature of
the anti-Soviet rebellions going on in Chechen-Ingushia and among the
Crimean Tatais, the Soviets had every reason to fear that the same thing
u-ould have occurred there.

3. 'llie question of whether whole nationalities should have been de-
poned or not resolves down to two points. First, how massive were the
rebellions among these ethnic groups? Were they so massive that they
involved a majority of the population? We'll cite evidence below that, in
(he case of two of these nationalities that we pick for examples here, the
rebellions were massive, involving much more than half the population.

Second, there is also the question of genocide. To split up a small na-
aonal group that is tighdy knit by a unique language, history, and culture,
is in &ct to destroy it.

In the case of the Chechen-Ingush and the Crimean Tatars, coUaboradon
\\ith the Nazis was massive, involving most of the population. To try to
isobie and punish "only the guilty" would have been to split the nadon
up, and would likely have indeed destroyed the nadonality. Instead, the
national ^up was kept together, and their population grew.

I assume that my readers, like I myself, support punishing individuals for
the Climes of individuals. However, the Nazi collaboration of these
groups was so massive that to punish the individuals involved would
have endangered the survival of these ethnic groups as groups. It would
ha\'e meant depleting these groups of )'oung men, through imprisonment
and execution, leaving very few young men for the young women to
man}'.

Deportation kept these groups intact. The deportations themselves were
almost completely free of casualties. This enabled the populations of
these ^oups to increase in future years, right up to the present. So their
cultures and languages, and in fact their existence as peoples, did in fact
remain alive. Furthermore, they became so well established in the places
of their deportation that many of them never returned to their aboriginal
areas when they were permitted to do so.

Here is the conundrum: to punish only the individuals guilty of desertion
or Nazi collaboration would have been consistent with Enlightenment
views of individual, not collective, punishment — views that I myself

/.hukov, ID. SioBh: Taiiiy Vlasli. Moscow: Vagrius, 2005. pp. 432-3.

100

Khrushchev I

share. But it would also have led to a greater evil: the destruction of tl
ethnic groups as "peoples" - in short, to genocide!

Crimean Tartars

The Crimean Tartars were deported en masse. Many documents conci
ing their deportation have been published in Russia, from formerly cb
fied Soviet archives- Naturally, they have been published by a
communist researchers, whose commentaries are very tendentious,
the documents themselves are very interesting!

In 1939 there were 218,000 Crimean Tartars. That should mean ab
22,000 men of military age - about 10% of the population. In 1941,
cording to contemporary Soviet figures, 20,000 Crimean Tartar sold
deserted the Red Army. By 1944 20,000 Crimean Tartar soldieis I
joined the Nazi forces and were fighting against the Red Army.

So the charge of massive collaboration sticks.'^* The question is: W
should the Soviets have done about this?

They could have done nothing - let them all go unpunished. Well, tl
weren't going to do that!

They could have shot the 20,000 deserters. Or, they could have imp
oned - deported -just them, the young men of military age. Either wo
have meant virtually the end of the Crimean Tartar nation, for th
would have been no husbands for the next generation of young Tai
women.

Instead, the Soviet government decided to deport the whole national
to Central Asia, which they did in 1944. They were given land, and soi
years of relief from all taxation. The Tartar nation remained intact, t
had grown in size by the late 1950s.

The Chechens and Ingush

In 1943 there were about 450,000 Chechens and Ingush in the Chcche
Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (CHASSR). This shou

Researcher J. Otto Pohl, an extremely aniicommunist author, has argued fruni
(ierman sources that not all these men joined Naxi forces. See "'llie l*alse ('hargi.-:; of
Treason a^nst the ('rimcan Tatars." (International ('ommitlee for ('rimca, \X'a.sh(n^iir..
DC, 18 May 2010). Hut even if true this makes no difference, 'llie Soviets could noi hiu
known this; desertion wa.s still a serious offense; and most men would have juincd anb
Soviet partisan or bandit groups.

(iluptcr Six. Of Plots and Af faint

101

have meant about 40,000-50,000 men of age for militaiy service. In 1942,
It the height of the Nazis' military successes, 14576 men were called to
tnilitai}' service, of whom 13560, or 93%, deserted and either hid or
joined rebel or bandit groups in the mountains.

lliere was massive collaboration with German forces on the part of the
Chechen and Ingush population. On February 23 2000 Radio Svoboda
inten'iewed Chechen nationalists who boasted proudly of a pro-German
ann-Soviet anned rebellion in February 1943, when the German penetra-
tion towards the Caucasus was at its greatest.

Ilic problem with this account is that it lies by omission. The revolt in
(juestion took place, but it was under a Na2i flag, and with the goal of a
Na^i alliance.

Casualties among the deportees during the deportation were low — 0.25%
of those deported, according to Bugai and Gomov.

NKVD records attest to 180 convoy trains carrying
493,269 Chechen and Ingush nationals and members of
other nationalities seized at the same time. Fifty people
were killed in the course of the operation, and 1,272 died
on the journey, (p. 56)

Since it happened in the winter, and during the Gercest war in European,
perhaps world, history, that figure does not seem very high.

But that is not our concern here, which is simply to verify or disprove
Khrushchev's accusations. Khrushchev claimed: (1) that the national
groups were deported "without any exception;" (2) there was no military
reason for the deportations; (3) that the collaboration and treason were
the "acts of individual persons or groups of persons." All three of these
assertions of Khrushchev's are fabe: (1) exceptions existed; (2) as did
military reason; and (3) there was massive, not merely individual, betrayal.
Khrushchev's assertions were not truthful. The question of exceptions is
covered by the quotations in the Appendix.

40. The Leningrad Affair

Khnishchev:

After the conclusion of the Patriotic War, the Soviet
nation stressed with pride the magnificent victories
gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts.

102

Khrushchev Imx

The country experienced a period of political
enthusiasm. ...

And it was precisely at this time that the so-called
"l^ningrad affair" was bom. As we have now proven,
this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their
lives included Comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov,
Rodionov, Popkov, and others. ...

How did it happen that these persons were branded as
enemies of the people and liquidated?

Facts prove that the 'T^ningrad affair" is also the result
of willfulness which Stalin exercised against party cadres.

The Leningrad Affair is mysterious, important, and fascinating, 'llicrc l>
plcnt)' of reason to think that it was not simply a question of falsificatioa
but that serious crimes were involved.

Fortunately for us, wc do not have to try to unravel it here. We simph
have to prove that Khrushchev was lying when he claimed the case wis i
result of "Stalin's willfulness."'^' This is a case of Khrushchev's "flagrant
disregard for the truth."

Khrushchev changed his story about who was responsible for the "I .en
ingrad Affair" several times, evidcndy jo suit his needs of the moincni
On June 25, 1953, the day before his arrest (and, possibly, his murder) a;
Khrushchev's hand, Beria wrote to the Presidiium concerning the inve>
dgation of former NKVD man M.D. Riumin. In this document Hcni
accuses Riumin of falsifying the Leningrad Affair. The problem tor
Khrushchev seems to have been that this direcdy implicated Ignat'ev, iIk
former head of the MVD and a man dismissed by Stalin.

A year later, on May 3 1954, the Presidium headed by Khrushcho" l-
sued a "Resolution \j)os(movlenie] of the Presidium of the CC CPSL' or.
the *I.€ningrad Affair.' " This document blames Abakumov and - Bcm
But Beria had nothing to do with the MGB or MVD at the time of tlw
"Leningrad Affair" or anything close to it.

Two years later in the "Secret Speech" Khrushchev laid all the blame a;
Stalin. Than again, little more than a year after the "Secret Speech", u
June 1957 Khrushchev said that Stalin had been against the arrests oi

In fact there is giMxl evidence ihut no fabrication was involved in the "I x-nin)>raJ
Affair" either, but we will lun undertake a study of this complicated matter here.

ChapHTSix. Of Plots and A f fains

103

N'oznesenskii and the otheis, and that Becia and Malenkov had instigated

it!

Viliaiever Malenkov*s role may have been, Betia was certainly not in-
voKred in it, since he was not in the MVD at the time. But there is no
more reason to think Khrushchev was telling the tiuth in 1957 than there
is (o believe him at any other time.

41. The Mingrelian Affair

Khrushchev:

Instructive in the same way is the case of the Mingrelian
nationalist organization which supposedly existed in
Georgia. As is known, resolutions by the Central
Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were
made concerning this case in November 1951 and in
March 1952. These resolutions were made without prior
discussion with the Political Bureau. Stalin had
personally dictated them. They made serious accusations
against many loyal Communists. On the basis of falsiSed
documents, it was proven that there existed in Georgia a
supposedly nationalistic organization whose objective
was the liquidation of the Soviet power in that republic
with the help of imperialist powers.

In this connection, a number of responsible par^ and
Soviet workers were arrested in Georgia. As was later
proven, this was a slander directed against the Georgian
party organization.

The only specific accusation Khrushchev makes here is that Stalin per-
sonally dictated the CC decisions of November 1951 and March 1952,
and without prior discussion of them at the Politburo. We know this is
not true.

A critical edition of the Politburo resolution of November 9, 1951 has
been published. The editors note Stalin's corrections to the original text:
in some cases to make it more precise, but in other places to soften
harsher accusations of nationalism. However, it and the March 27 1952

I" Politbiuro I'sK VKF(b) i Sovct Ministrov iiSSR. 1945-1953 gg. Moscow, 2002, p. 350-
352

104

Khrushchev IJcd

Politburo resolution {ibid., 352-4) were both taken at Politburo sessions
{ibid., p. 351 n. 1; p. 354 no.l). In the latter case Stalin wrote in the title,
but the resolution was on the agenda of the Politburo.^^^

But Khrushchev's main claim is that Stalin was responsible for fabricat-
ing this case - that "All of this happened under the 'genial' leadership of
Stalin, 'the great son of the Georgian nation,' as Georgians like to refer to
Stalin." This is untiue. Documents dted by Nikita Petrov, an extremely
and-Stalin researcher with the extremely anticommunist "Memorial" or-
ganization, suggest that the real matter was "the struggle against 'dan-
nishness' in the Georgian leadership."'"

On April 10 1953, a month after Stalin's death, the Presidium of the CC
of the CPSU adopted a decision blaming, above all others, S. D. Ignat'ev,
the head of the MGB, for fatfricating the entire affair and for subjecting a
number of those arrested to prolonged torture, imprisonment, and mal-
treatment. Khrushchev himself was a member of the Presidium!

Ignat'ev was explicidy named as responsible at the least for not control-
ling his subordinates M.D. Riumin, Tsepkov, and others. On April 1
1953 Ignat'ev was also blamed by the Presidium in the frameup of the
"Doctors' Plot" and on April 3 dismissed from his position as secretan'
of the CC for his negligence (p. 24). A report made by Beria on June 25,
1953 to the Presidium blames Ignat'ev for permitting Riumin and other
subordinates to use torture against, among others, the "Leningrad Affair"
defendants (p.66).'^*

Yet it was Khrushchev himself who restored Ignat'ev to responsible
posts once Beria had been arrested or killed! Ignat'ev was present at the
20'*' Congress, and Khrushchev referred specifically to him with regard to
the "Doctors' Plot" - for his role in which the Presidium had alread}
sharply criticized and demoted him!

Boris Nikolaevsky's note to the Neiv Leader edidon also points to Ig-
nat'ev's responsibility in the "Mingrelian conspiracy."

Khrushchev's statement on the "Mingrelian conspiracy"
does explain the purges in Georgia in 1952. Though he

I'or the texts see Appendix and facsimiles of the pa^'s from ibid., 349-3S4, ar
http:/ / chss.muntclair.edu/ english/ fiirr/ research/ mingrelianrcs.pdf

iM Petrov, Nikita. Penyi pndudaltr KGB. ItviiSerw. Moscow: Matcrik, 2005. p. 114.

Sec facsimiles of Heria's reports from RKEB lat
http:/ /chss.montclair.edu/english/ furr/ a'svarch/mingrelianaf f.pd f

jpa-rSix. Of IMuis and A f fain

105

implies that the "Mingrelian case," like the "Leningrad
case," was also staged by Betia and Abalcumov, this is a
deliberate distortion. It was precisely in November 1951
that S. D. Ignatiev, one of Beiia^s bitterest enemies, was
appointed Minister of State Security; the "Mingrelian
case" was, therefore, trumped up as a blow at Beiia.

42. Yugoslavia

rushchev:

The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in
decisions concerning the internal life of the country but
also in the international relations of the Soviet Union.

The July plenum of the Central Committee studied in
detail the reasons for the development of conflict with
Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played
here. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems
which could not have been solved through party
discussions among comrades. There was no significant
basis for the* development of this "affair"; it was
completely possible to have prevented the rupture of
relations with that country. This does not mean,
however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make
mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these
mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a
monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of
relations with a friendly country.

is another lie. In July 1953 Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov
ked Beria for planning to improve relations with Yugoslavia. Mean-
i, they themselves called Tito and Rankovich "agents of the capital-
who "behave like enemies of the Soviet Union."

here Khrushchev refers to them as "comrades!" In other words,
ishchev et al. attacked Beria for beginning a rapprochement with the
)slavs, and calling them "comrades," which is precisely what Khru-
ev lis doing here, and what he attacked Stalin for not doing!

43. The Doctors* Plot

106

Khrushchev IJul

I^t us also recall the "affair of the doctor-plotters."
(Animation in the hall.) Actually there was no "affair"
outside of the declaration of the woman doctor
Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by
someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of
the organs of state security) to write Stalin a letter in
which she declared that doctors were applying
supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.

Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an
immediate conclusion that there are doctor-plotters in
the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of
eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally issued
advice on the conduct of the investigation and the
method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said
that the academician Vinogradov should be put in
chains, another one should be beaten. Present at this
Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State
Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If
you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we wiU
shorten you by a head."

Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him
instructions, advised him on wFiich investigative methods
should be used; these methods were simple - beat, beat
and, once again, beat.

Shortly after the doctors were arrested, we members of
the Political Bureau received protocols with the doctors'
confessions of guilt. After distributing these protocols,
Stalin told us, "You are blind like young kittens; what
will happen without me? The country will perish because
you do not know how to recognize enemies."

The case was so presented that no one could verify the
facts on which the investigation was based. There was no
possibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those
who had made the confessions of guilt.

We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors
was questionable. VC'e knew some of these people
personally because they had once treated us. When we

(.hiptcr Six. Of Plots and Affairs

examined this "case** after Stalin's death, we found it to
be fabricated from beginning to end.

This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not,
however, have the time in which to bring it to an end (as
he conceived that end), and for this reason the doctors
are still alive. Now all have been rehabilitated; they are
working in the same pbces they were working before;
they ireat top individuals, not excluding members of the
Government; they have our full conQdcnce; and they
execute their duties honesdy, as they did before.

In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very
base role was played by the rabid enemy of our party, an
agent of a foreign intelligence service — Beria, who had
stolen into Stalin's confidence.

This is a completely false account of the "Doctors* Plot."'*

• The "Doctors' Plot" was taj;en up by the MGB in
1952. Timashuk's letters were written in 1948. They
concerned Zhdanov's treatment in his final illness.
They mentioned no Jewish doctors at all. At no time
did Dr. Timashuk have any connection with the
"Doctors' Plot" whatsoever, which did not even arise
until three to four years later. Khrushchev simply
slanders her here.

• Ignat'ev was head of the KGB at this time, not Beria.
On April 1 1953, less than a month after Stalin's
death the Presidium - of which Khrushchev was a
member — had criticized Ignat'ev for his
responsibility in the "Doctors' Plot" fr^meups (Beria
p. 22). It did not occur to them to blame Stalin.

• It was Beria who stopped the Doctors' Plot firame-
ups, who freed the doctors, and arrested those
responsible, including Ignat'ev, who was released
shortly after Beria was done away with (arrested or
killed) in late June 1953.

1^ .All sources arc quoted and identified in the Appendix to this chapter.

108

Khrushchev lied

• According to his daughter Svetlana Stalin did not
believe the Jewish doctors were guilty.

Stalin was in semi -retirement, and was not kept current with develop-
ments. Stalin had thought that the MGB had serious problems (Maly-
shev, about the Dec.l, 1952 Presidium meeting, in Vestmk 5 (1997), p.
141). It's possible that Stalin planned to put Beria in charge to clean up
these problems, especially the phony "Doctors* Plot", though he ttm
have had the "Mingrelian Affair" on his mind as well.

It is hard to imagine how Beria could have been chosen to head both the
NfVD and the MGB at the same time, at the emergency Presidium meet-
ing at the dying Stalin's bedside - a great concentration of power in the
hands of a single man — unless there had been a previous agreement. It's
unlikely such an agreement would have been made during the preceding
days while Stalin was ill, because no one could be sure that Stalin would
die. Therefore, it seems most likely that Beria's joint appointment to
these two ministries was decided with Stalin's agreement and perhaps,
even probably, even at his suggestion.

The "Doctors* Plot" articles stopped appearing in the newspapers before
Stalin died. Anti-Stalinist and former Soviet dissident Zhores Medvcdev
argues that this, together with other facts, shows it was Stalin himself
who ended the '^Doctors* Plot" attacks in the press. Medevedev poink
out that Stalin opposed the anti-semitism that had been a part of the
campaign from the outset. (Zhores Medvedev, Sia/in i Evreiskaia Prrih
/?/!7<3. (Moscow, 2003), 208ff; 216 f.) Stalin himself was famously opposed
to anti-semitism, as Medvedev admits.'^^

'^^ In Tbt Viikjioam StaBn, a collccdon of nsays written at various times, Roi and /hua-$
McxlvcJcv both accuse Stalin of inciting anti-Semitism and then of dccLsivcly ending; the
press campaign about, and preparations for a trial in, the "Doctors' Plot" . 'lliat is, thcsc
two anti-Stalin authors decide that it was Stalin who put an end to the "Doctors' Plot"
campaign. Tht Vnktmvn StaBn (Woodstock and New York: Overlook Ptt-ss, 2004), 32.

Chapter 7.
Beria, His "Machinations"
and "Crimes"

44. Beria

Khrushchev:

In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very
base role was played by the rabid enemy of our party, an
agent of a foreign intelligence service - Beria, who had
stolen into Stalin's confidence.

Nobody today supports Khnisiichev's tale of Beria's being a "foreign
agent." It has been completely exploded by the evidence. Furtheimore,
neither Molotov nor Kaganovich believed it even at that time, though
chey did not say so in 1953.

No one mentioned such a charge during the vicious attacks upon him at
the July 1953 Central Committee Plenum, as Mikoian admitted.'^* Khru-
shchev said that Beria's proposal for a united, neutralist Germany was
"\ielding to the West." But Stalin had suggested a neutral united Ger-
many to the Allies in March 1952. Pravda repeated variations of this offer
in April and May 1953, after Stalin's death. Beria could never have gotten
this into the Party's newspaper by himself.

And in fact Khrushchev's claim that this was "yielding to the West" was
not true - the Allies were very much opposed to this, and turned down
any consideration of a unified Germany. Had the Soviet Union chosen to
stick with this offer, it would have been very embarrassing to the West,
since it would have been extremely tempting to almost all Germans. If
the West had continued to oppose it, it would have been they, not the
USSR, who would have appeared unfriendly to Germany after the war.

l.avrcnlii Bcriia. 1933. Stencjgramma iul'skogo Plenuma TsK Kl'SS i drugic
Jokumcnty. Moscow. MDr*, 1999, p. 315.

110

Khrushchev lied

In conversations with Felix Chuev the aged Molotov went on to explain
(409-10) that he considers Beria's acts as an "agent of imperialism" to be
that of proposing a neutral Germany.'^' This was the same charge raised,
at the July 1953 Plenum. But Beria was only one member of the Presid-
ium, and it was only a proposal. There was nothing at all wrong with his
raising the question; it could not have been put into practice without the
Presidium's approval. To Chuev's direct question whether Beria really
was an agent of foreign intelligence and whether that had been conflimcd
by evidence, Molotov answered in the negative.

45. Kaminsky accuses Beria of working with

the Mussavat

Khrushchev:

Were there any signs that Beria was an enemy of the
party? Yes, there were. Already in 1937, at a Central
Committee plenum, former People's Commissar of
Health Kaminsky said that Beria worked for the
Mussavat inteUigencc service. But the Central" Committee
plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was
arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's
statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beria, and that
was enough for him.

Much material to refute this fabrication of Khrushchev's has been pub-
lished since the end of the Soviet Union. For example, PavlunovskV*
letter of June 1937, testifying that Beria had indeed done Part}' under-
ground work among nationalists, has only recently been published.

Beria's own Party autobiography cites his underground work among na-
tionalists, something he would never have done if he had thought it
would not distinguish his Party service.'^'

Zalessky's biographical encyclopedia, Imperiia Stalina^ is extremely ano
Stalin, but agrees with Beria's contention that he did under^ound work
Indeed, it's impossible to imagine Sergei Kirov's intercession on Ikna?
behalf, or the Beria family's closeness to the Ordzhonikidze family n

1.19 Sec also li'liks (Ihucv, Kagaaovith. l^>oi>ed' slatimkog) aposlcla. Moscow, 1992, p 66.

heriia: Komts Jkar'ery. I'A. V.I-. Nckrasov. Moscow: Politi/dat, 1991, pp. 320-32S; 32}
'lliis tendentious and poorly-document volume nonetheless contains interesting nutiiul*

□ufHcf Scn.-n B«m and his "Machinations" and ^'Crimes"

111

inested in Seigo Becia's memoiis^ unless Becia's loyalty to the Pacty had
bccD aystal clear.

It scons clear that Khrushchev simply revived an old rumor about Beiia
diUi^ hom his days in the nationalist underground. Undercover work is
my dangerous, and Beria's "cover" had to be good enough to fool the
Mussavat Party itself into believing Beda was working for them. It's not
suipcsing that it would also fool rank-and-file Bolsheviks. Beria's own
letter of 1933 to Ordzhonikid2e shows that he was still trying to quash
dus vicious rumor. He would hardly have written a leading Politburo
oionber about this unless he wanted to put it **on record.*'

Khnishchev had access to all the information we now have, and more.
He had to know that this was a lie. It was another tool with which to
smear Beria.

46. Kartvelishvili

Khnishchev:

The long, unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and
Beria were widely known; they date back to the time
when Comrade Seigo [Ordzhonikidze] was active in the
Transcaucasus; Kartvelishvili was the closest assistant of
Sergo. The unfriendly relationship impelled Beria to
fabricate a **case" against Kartvelishvili. It is a
characteristic thing that in this **case" Kartvelishvili was
charged with a terroristic act agunst Beria.

Kartvelishvili (who was also known by his Russianized name Lavrent'ev)
was expeUed from the Party and arrested on June 22, 1937, at the June
1937 CC Plenum, and executed on Ai^ust 22, 1938, under Ezhov, not
Beria.

There exists a note from Beria to Stalin about Beria's alleged uncovering
of an underground Rightist group in Georgia that included Kartvelishvili.
However,

• The note is from July 20 1937, a month after
Kartvelishvili's arrest. (Lubianka 2, No. 142 p. 252)

• Kartvelishvili is mentioned in other documents by
Liushkov, one of Ezhov's, not Beria's, men (No. 196
of Sept. 11. 1937, pp. 347 ff; No. 207 of September
19, 1937, pp. 368 ff.; No. 309 of March 29. 1938)

112

Khrushchev lied

Liushkov was involved in Ezhov's conspiracy, and
had many innocent men tortured and killed. But
Ezhov was 100% against Beria. There was no way
that Liushkov was abetting Beria in naming
Kartvelishvili.

• According to Postyshev's rehabilitation documents
Kartvelishvili was identified as a conspirator by
Postyshev too {RKEB 1, 219).

• Kartvelishvili was named by la. A lakovlev, a close
associate of Stalin's in the drafting of the 1936
Constitution, vice-Chaiiman of the Party Conirol
Commission, and member of the CC. lakovlev was
arrested suddenly on October 12, 1937, and in his
extensive confession of October 15-18 1937 he
names Kartvelishvili, among many others. It is clear
from the annotations and fdlowup note by Stalin
that Stalin was taken by surprise by lakovlev's
confession.

The Rehabilitation file on Kartvelishvili (RXHB 1, 331-2) blames Beria
for everything. Even if Kartvelishvili was framed, though, this cannot be
true. Most of the documents against him are by liushkov or, in the case
of lakovlev's confession, have nothing to do with Beria at all.

Kartvelishvili was arrested in June 1937, long before Beria had anything
to do with the Soviet NKVD. It's hard to find a firm date for his execu-
tion. One "Memorial" webpage gives it as August 1938.*^' If that is accu-
rate, then Beria could not have been involved in his interrogation and, if
any, torture, because Bexia had just become Ezhov's second-in-command
in the NKVD on August 21 or 22, 1938. Beria seems to have remained in
his post as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian
Communist Party until August 31 1938, and evidendy did not arrive in
Moscow to take his position until around the first of September.'^^

According to the Pospelov Report (R/CEB 1, 332), Lavreni'ev-
Kartvelishvili was tortured into confessing and naming others. This is

Sec http://www.incin().ru/incinc)i)'/cc)ininunarka/(^haptl0.htin#_KMi_2450.

Ubianka 2, No. 334, p. 545; N.V. Pctrov, K.V. Skorkin. Kjo nkoiwH/NKl^. 19^4-
mt. Spraveebmk. Moscow: /vcn'ia, 1999. 107. Cf.
htlp://www.mcmo.nj/hisn>f>'/NK\'D/kto/biogr/gl>42.htm

(;iup(cr Seven. Bcria and his "Machinations" and "(Iiimcs"

113

pbusible, since have Ftinovskii's statement that Ezhov and his subor-
dinates, including Fiinovskii himself, r^ularly did this.

Given the dates, though, Betia could not have been responsible for
La\Tent'ev-KartveIishvili's fate. Khrushchev had to know this. This is
probably the reason that the date of Lavrent'ev-Kaitvelishvili's execution
is not given in the Pospelov Report, which was drawn up to help Khru-
shchev blame Beria. Citing a date for the execution before Beria had even
arrived at the NKVD would have contradicted the whole purpose of the
Pospelov Report, which was certainly not to arrive at the truth!

47. Kedrov

Khnishchev:

Here is what the old Communist, Comrade Kedrov,
wrote to the Central Committee through Comrade
Andreyev (Comrade Andreyev was then a Central
Committee secretary): "I am calling to you for help from
a gloomy cell of the Lef ortovsky prison. Let my cry of
horror reach your ears; do not remain deaf, take me
under your protection; please, help remove the
nightmare of interrogations and show that this is all a
mistake.

"I suffer innocendy. . ."

The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found
innocent by the Military Collegium. But, despite this, he
was shot at Beria's order.

We don't know the details of Kedrov's case because the materials have
not been made available to researchers. But for our purposes, we do not
need to do so. A Russian government agency has now published a collec-
tion of documeniB from which we can tell with certainty that the order
for Kedrov's execution was signed by the State Prosecutor, Bochkov."^
Beria was merely carrying it out. It was not **his order."

■'I' Oi^ny gusudarsrvcnnoi bczupasnosd SSSR v Vclikoi Orcchcstvcnnoi voine. 'V.2
Nachalo. Kn. 2 1 scntiabria - 31 dckabria 1941 goda. Moscow: Rus\ 2000, p. 215-6 and
note on p. 21 5. 'Ihc facts laid out in these documents were confiimcd by \nodziinirsldi
and Kobulov during the investi|ption on the "Hcria Affair"; sec A.V'. Sukhomlinov, Kto
vy, I jvrcniii Bcriia? Moscow: Dctcktiv-Prcss, 1993, p. 153 and 219-220. 'llierc is more
information available about Kedrov. It is almost certain that he did, in bet, get sentenced

114

Khrushchev I JlxJ

In £ict we now know more about Kedrov's case. For example, there
seems to be no doubt that his death sentence was handed down by a
court. We don't have the space to explore all the aspects of the Kedrov
matter here. But all of it was available to Khrushchev, who was once
again lying when he made his statements about Beria and Kedrov.

48. Ordzhonikidze's brother

Khrushchev:

Beria also handled cruelly the famify of Comrade
Ordzhonikidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze had tried
to prevent Beria from realizing his shameful plans. Beria
had cleared from his way all persons who could possibly
interfere with him. Ordzhonikidze was always an
opponent of Beria, which he told to Stalin. Instead of
examining this affair and taking appropriate steps, Stalin
allowed the liquidation of Ordzhonikidze's brother and
brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a state that he
was forced to shoot himself.

•

According to Oleg Khlevniuk's research {In Slalin 's Shadow: the carter 0/
'Sa^' Ord^hmkid^. NY: Sharpe, 1995), Sergo committed suicide, most
likely from bad health. He had been very sick a long time and, in faa, had
had a normal work routine his last day of life.'^

His death had nothing whatsoever to do with Stalin, his brother, or Beiia.
On the contrary: "Judging from well-known facts, Ordzhonikidze ac-
tively protected Beria and maintained good relations with him right up to
the middle of the 1930s." (106)

Research by Vladimir L. Bobrov has recently (October 2008) proven (hat
even the story that Ordzhonikidze committed suicide is without founda-
tion, yet another Khrushchev-era fabrication. Ordzhonikidze undoubt-
edly died of natural causes - of heart failure - as was reported at the

t(i death at a trul. Sec texts in the Appendix for this section. Suffice it to say thai
Khrushchev had all this information at his disposal, and lied about Heria's parr in this.

^ Khovniuk, Chapters 12-13; cf. O.V. Khevniuk, J/^/i i Oni^iiikid:^. Konfiktyp
PoBlbitm p 1930-eg)ify. Moscow: Kossiia mol<xJaia, 1993, p. 115. 'Vhc i'ln^lish language
version of Khlevniuk's b<x>k is somewhat different from the Russian original.

(JupiaScwn. Bcna and his "Machinations" and **(!Ihmcs'

IIS

ome.'^* Khlevniuk simply continues to repeat as fact the lies in an unat-
Dibuted introduction to a Khmshchev-er a bip^aphy of Ordzhonikidze.
lliis introduction was omitted when the book was republished four years
btcr. after Khrushchev's ouster.'^

On or about Oct. 24, 1936, his SO'*' birthday, Sergo heard his brother
Papulia had been arrested in Georgia (p. 105)*^^. Seigo*s brother Valiko
defended Papulia at the Georgian Central Committee, and was fited as a
result. Bcria was head of Georgian party, so Sergo phoned Beria in mid-
December to ask for help. According to Khevniuk ^'Beda showed re-
markable concern..." looked into it, got Valiko reinstated, and sent a
polite note to Sergo (p. lOS)'"**

Sct^ died of heart failure during the night of February 17-18, 1937
{U7}**'\ He had had a completely normal workday that day. But he had
long suffered from ill health, and it was gietting worse. Khlevniuk, who
has great hatred for Stalin, tries hard to come up with evidence that Stalin
had something to do with Sergo's death, and attempts to "reconstruct'*
an aigument over the telephone between the two men, but is Bnally un-
able to do so. Khlevniuk could not prove that such a phone call ever
took place, much less what was said in itt

Papulia was shot in November, 1937 (173). Khlevniuk gives no turther
infonnation on this, since evidendy he did not have any. It's obvious that
Sergo's death could not have been related to Papulia's execution.

According to Sergo Beria, Sergo's relations with his brother Papulia were
poor. Papulia himself was hostile to the Soviet Union; and Seigo always
SMved with the Berias rather than with his own brother when he came to

ll>ilisi.

Madimir L Hobrov, "I'aina smcni Ordzhomhidzc", at
hnp://vii2nCMu/nvz/foiuni/archivc/238/238967.htm ; fully footnotixJ Russian veision
ar hnp://chs$.niontdair.cdu/cnglish/furr/(csfiarch/bobrov-orJzhon08.html ; English
liMnslation at http://chss.moniclair.edu/cnglish/furr/naicafch/bobrov-
onl/hun08cn|;.html

(Itimparc the opening section of the 1963 version of 1. Dubinskii-Mukhadzc,
Oni^mki^ with that of the "second, corrccied edition" of 1967 (both editions
Moiscuw: Molodaia Gvaidiia).

(^f. Russian version, p. 77.

Cf. Russian version, p. 80.

■^Cf Russian version, pp. 116-129.

116

Khrushchev

In Khrushchev's, and again in Gorbachev's day stories circulate
"fact" that Ordzhonikidze was a "liberal", opposed to the Moscow T
and so on. There is no evidence for this. According to Arch Getty.

...Ordzhonikidze does not seem to have objected to
terror in general, including that directed against
Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin, and was in fact asked
by Stalin to give the main speech on wrecking in industry
to the February 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee,
[n. 64] The draft of the speech Ordzhonikidze was
preparing to give to the February 1937 Plenum, as chief
reporter on wrecking in industry, was approved by Stalin
and was in character with the hard line of the times:
RTsKhlDNI (TsPA), f.558, op.l d. 3350, U. 1-16. »5»'

To sum up: every statement Khrushchev made about Beria and
Ordzhonikidzes is a lie.

• Ordzhonikidze was not Beria's opponent. Rather he
stayed with the Beria family when he went to Tbilisi,
instead of staying with his older brother Papulia.

• According to Khevniuk, Papulia was executed in
November 1937, long after Sergo's death (February
17-18 1937), which therefore could not possibly have
been motivated by Papulia's "liquidation."

• Ordzhonikidze's death had nothing to do with Beria.
The very anti-Stalin Oleg Khlevniuk concludes that
Ordzhonikidze killed himself because of his own
poor health. But all the evidence suggests that the
"suicide" story is a Khrushchev-era falsification.

J. Arch Clctty, " ITic Politics of Repression Revisited," p. 131 and n. 64. p. UO. In
Ward, Chris, ed. TbeSlahmsl DiaiaonMp. liundon, New York: Arnold, 199a

Chapter 8.
Ideology and Culture

49. Stalin, Short Biography

ichev:

Comrades: The cult of the individual acquired such
monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all
conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his
own person. This is supported by numerous facts. One
of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-
glorification and of his lack of even elementary modesty
is the edition of his Short Biography, which was
published in 1948.

This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery,
an example of making a man into a godhead, of
transforming him into an infallible sage, "the greatest
leader, sublime strat^ist of all times and nations."
Finally, no other words could be found with which to lift
Stalin up to the heavens.

We need not give here examples of the loathesome
adulation filling this book. All we need to add is that they
all were approved and edited by Stalin personally and
some of them were added in his own handwriting to the
draft text of the book.

What did Stahn consider essential to write into this
book.^ Did he want to cool the ardor of his flatterers
who were composing his Short Biography? No! He
marked the very places where he thought that the praise
of his services was insufficient. Here are some examples
characterizing Stalin's activity, added in Stalin's own
hand:

In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators, the
Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and
Kamenevites, there was definitely welded together.

118

Khrushchev I Jitl

after Lenin's death, that leading core of the party. . .
chat upheld the great banner of Lenin, rallied the
party behind Lenin's behests, and brought the Soviet
people into the broad road of industrializing the
country and collectivizing the rural economy. The
leader of this core and the guiding force of the party
and the state was Comrade Stalin. [ (1) — see below
for discussion, GF]

Thus writes Stalin himselH Then he adds:

Although he performed his task as leader of the
party and the people with consummate skill and
enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire Soviet
people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred
by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self ~
adulation. [ (2) - see below for discussion, GF]

Where and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this
worthy of a leader of the Marxist- Leninist type? No.
Precisely against this did Marx and Engels take such a
strong position. This also was always sharply condemned
by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

In the draft text of his book appeared the following
sentence: "Stalin is the Lenin of today."

This sentence appeared to Stalin to be too weak, so, in
his own handwriting, he changed it to read: "Stalin is the
worthy continucr of Lenin's work, or, as it is said in our
party, Stalin is the Lenin of today." [ (3) — see below for
discussion, GF]

You see how well it is said, not by the nation but by
Stalin himself.

It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals
written into the draft text of that book in Stalin's hand
Especially generously does he endow himself with
praises pertaining to his military genius, to his talent for
strategy.

I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning
the theme of the Stalinist military genius. "The advanced
Soviet science of war received further development," he

(Chapter iiight. Iikologyand (Culture

119

wdtes, "at Comrade Stalin's hands. Comrade Stalin
elaborated the theory of the permanendy operating
factors that decide the issue of wars, of active defense
and the laws of counteroffensive and offensive, of the
cooperation of all services and arms in modem warfare,
of the role of big tank masses and air forces in modem
war, and of the artillery as the most formidable of the
amied services. At the various stages of the war Stalin's
genius found the correct solutions that took account of
all the circumstances of the situation." [(4) - see below
for discussion, GF]

And, fiinher, writes Stalin:

Stalin's military mastership was displayed both in
defense and offense. Comrade Stalin's genius
enabled him to divine the enemy's plans and defeat
them. The battles in which Comrade Stalin directed
the Soviet armies are brilliant examples of
operational military skill. [(5) - see below for
discussion, GF]

In this manner was Stalin praised as a strategist. Who did
this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist but in
the role of an author-editor, one of the main creators of
his self -adulatory biography. Such, comrades, are the
facts. We should rather say shameful facts.

[he changes made by Stalin in this biography have now been published,
first in It^stiia TsK KPSS No. 9, 1990, and then reprinted widely. This
allows us to see how Khrushchev lied about Stalin's changes to this biog-
raphy. Even the anti-Stalin editor of these selections for the journal, V.A.
Belianov, admitted that many of Stalin's corrections were in the direction
of removing Msome praise given him by the authors and make Stalin
appear modest.

Khrushchev deliberately distorted the character of some of the quota-
tions he himself cites. For example, Khrushchev dted only the first part
of the following phrase, marked (2) in the passage above. In this way
Khrushchev deliberately changed the meaning of the whole. Here is the
part omitted by Khrushchev:

In his interview with the German writer Ludwig, where
he remarks on the great role of the genius Lenin in the

120

Khrushchev lied

matter of transfonning our country, Stalin said simply
about himself: "As concerns myself, I am only a pupil of
Lenin's, and my goal is to be worthy of him.

In the passage above marked (1), at the point of the ellipsis (three dots),
Khrushchev omitted the names, inserted by Stalin, of many other Part)'
leaders. Here is the full passage; the words omitted by Khrushchev are
underlined.

In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators, the
Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites,
there was definitely welded together, after Lenin's death,
that leading core of the party... that upheld the great
banner of Lenin, rallied the party behind Lenin's behests,
and brought the Soviet people into the broad road of
industrializing the country and collectivizing the rural
economy. The leading core was composed of Stalin,
Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Frunze,
Dzetzhinskii, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov,
laroslavskii, Mikoian, Andreev, Shvecnik, Zhdanov,
Shkiriatov, and others. . .

In the passage marked (3) above, it is obvious even without the oiiginal
that Stalin transformed a passage which equated him with Lenin, into a
passage which makes it clear that he is only a continuer of Lenin's work.

Khrushchev attributed selections (4) and (5) above to Stalin. This is an
error. In fact, they were written by General-Major M.R. Galaktionov.
who wrote this section of the biography. L. V. Maksimenkov, who points
this out, continues:

What's more, in contradiction to Khrushchev's
accusation Stalin, in editing this text, systematically
lowered its triumphant character. For example, the
bureaucratic-pseudodemocratic tide "comrade Stalin"
replaced the original "Generalissimo Stalin", "teaching"
["of the permanently operating factors"] was replaced by
Stalin with "position," and "immortal forms of the
military-operational art" became "significant."'^'

'^1 LX'. Maksimvnkuv. "Kul't. /.ametki o :;luvakh-simvulakh v suvetskoi p()litichcst(H
kul'turu." Svd/odmaa mjtt. No. 10, 1993. At :
http://www.situadon.ru/app/j_aitp_677.htin

(.hjptn Might. Ideology and (lulturc

121

Maksimenkov discusses at length Stalin's very critical remarks, now avail-
able, about the draft of the second, postwar edition of his biography. The
ohginal document shows that Stalin's first directive was to write a new
biography of Leni/i - a fact not mentioned during the Khrushchev era or
even later during Gorbachev's "perestroika."

Stalin strongly criticized the "Socialist-Revolutionary character" of the
praise given to him by the authors of the "Short Biography", reproaching
i( as "the education of idol-worshippers." Stalin rejected any credit for
any of the teachings attributed in the draft to him, giving credit to Lenin

instead.

Maksimenkov concludes that Khrushchev completely distorted the na-
ture of Stalin's changes to this biography, and points out that other writ-
ers of the Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev Soviet period did not cor-
rect them either. Other passages omitted by the original authors and in-
serted by Stalin include a long passage about the importance of women in
(he revolution and Soviet society.

In 1998, while going through the personal papers of V.D. Mochalov, one
of the members of the biographical team, Richard Kosolapov found his
handwritten not^s of two meetings with Stalin concerning the biography.
He pubUshed them on pp. 451-476 of his book Slovo Tovarishchu Stalinu.

Kosolapov is an admirer of Stalin and leads one of the neo-communist
parties in Russia. But this specific work of his is dted several times in the
footaotes to Robert Service's recent biography of Stalin, a work very hos-
tile towards Stalin. So we may consider it appropriate to cite it here as
well An excerpt showing how Stalin condemned the adulation of himself
in the first draft of the biography may be consulted in the Appendix.

50. The *Short Course'

Khrushchev:

As is known. The Short Course of the History of the All-
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was written by a
commission of the party Central Committee. . . . This
fact was reflected in the following formulation on the
proof copy of the Short Biography of Stalin: "A

<u Fv.g. Robert Service. StaSn. A Biofftipby (1 larvard Univcrsit>' Pnss, 2005) p. 6S4, note 1
to Chapter 50.

122

Khrushchev IJcd

commission of the Central Committee, AU-Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks), under the direction of
Comrade Stalin and with his most active personal
participation, has prepared a Short Course of the History
of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)."

But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin: The following
sentence replaced it in the final version of the Short
Biography: "In 1938 appeared the book. History of the
AU-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short Course,
written by Comrade Stalin and approved by a
commission of the Central Committee, All-Union
Communist Pany (Bolsheviks)." Can one add anything
more?

As you see, a surprising metamorphosis changed the
work created by a group into a book written by Stalin. It
is not necessary to state how and why this
metamorphosis took place. . ..

And when Stalin himself asserts that he himself vijote
The Short Course of the History of the AU-Union Communist
Party (Bolshetnks), this calls at least for amazement. Can a
Marxist- Leninist thus write about himself, praising his
own person to the heavens?

It appears that no one but Khrushchev ever asserted that Stalin claimed
authorship of the Short Coune. Neither Khrushchev nor anyone else has
ever adduced any evidence that Stalin claimed to have written it. Molotov
flatly stated that Stalin never claimed to have written it.

Be that as it may, in reality the first indication of the authorship of the
"Short Course" first appeared in the first edition of the "Short Biogra-
phy" of Stalin (1940) - a book to which, according to Maksimcnkov
(cited above) Stalin had no relationship as either author or editor. Mak
simenkov explains:

Occupied with directing the Soviet-Finnish "Winter" war
he [Stalin] distanced himself from the editing of the book
. . . On December 14, 1939, a week before Stalin's
sixtieth birthday, the first draft of the biography in his
name was sent with an accompanying letter signed by
Mitin and Pospelov: "Dear Comrade Stalin. We are
sending you this draft of your "Shon biography",

BpfevG^gbL Idfiulugy and Culture

123

pfeparcd by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, along with
die directions for propaganda and agitation. We request
dut you look through this work and give us your
directions concerning the possibility of its publication/*
Stalin underlined the whole text of the accompanying
letter and wrote with a gree pencil across the page: "No
time to look through' it. Return it to the MELI [Marx-
Engels-Lcnin Institute]. J. Stalin'''^^

Hk seatence about Stalin's role in the nuking of the "Short Course" was
not insoted by Stalin himself about himself, but belongs to the pen of
one of the many authors and editors who worked on the book. And here
Khnishchev lied again.

Hiot fcmains CMily to clanfy the question: What was Sidin's actual role
m die writing of the "Short Course"?

In oDe of his sketches Roi Medvedev, scarcely a sympathizer of Stalin's,
votes of him as "the principal author of the 'Short Course'." The histori-
ins notes that Khrushchev's virtual arraigrvment of Stalin for plagiarism is
ytieriy without foundation. In evidence of his position he refers to the
publication in Vopmry Istorii of the typewritten texts with Stalin's conec'
tions and a number of other materials.'^

Ri^dless of the obvious lacunae and incomplete nature of the primary
dooiments in Medvedev's opinion there is no doubt that work on the
*^ort Course" was conducted under the direction and with the active
participation of Stalin as one of the principal authors of the textbook.

(Ouushchev had asserted that Stalin had had no right to write that he was
the author of the "Short Course" because, he said, he had not written it.
As it tums out, in reality Sialin had every basis to claim that he had been
one of the principal authors, but never made this claim to anyone or
anywhere. Even Molotov, who had been one of Stalin's closest collabora-
tors, did not know predsely how much Stalin had written and beheved
that he had only written the section on dialectics, since they had dis-
cussed this at some point

•»Makskncnkov."Kurt".

"I.V. Stalin V tabotc nad 'Kratkim kuisom istorii VKP(b)'. Publikaisiia, kommcaiarii i
x'stupitd'iiiia stasia M.V. Zdenova." Vofiny liHmi Nos t1-12 (2002), Nos. 3-4 (3003).

124

Khrushchev LicJ

In this instance Khrushchev outsmarted himself. He said Stalin claimed
an authorship he did not deserve. In reality, Stalin was indeed the princi-
pal author, but never claimed to be such.

51. Stalin Signed Order for Monument to
Himself on July 2, 1951

Khrushchev:

It is a fact that Stalin himself had signed on July 2, 1951 a
resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers concerning
the erection on the Volga -Don Canal of an impressive
monument to Stalin; on September 4 of the same year he
issued an order making 33 tons of copper available for
the construction of this impressive monument.

This is no "fact", but a bare assertion. We have only Khrushchev's word
for this. The relevant documents have never been reproduced, and no
one else has claimed to have seen them. Khrushchev never claims thai
Stalin introduced or suggested this monument, so we can assume he
did not.

According to the "Journal of visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office," on July
2 1951 Stalin did work for 1 hour and 45 minutes. The Presidium had
met on June 26 and its "Bureau", consisting of Beria, Bulganin, Kagano
vich, Nlikoian, Molotov, and Khrushchev himself, met with him on July 2
from 9:30 to 11:15 p.m.'** So he could have signed such a resolution ot
the Council of Ministers, if it were presented on that date. We do not
know whether it was or not.

But it is important to note here that the mere fact of "Stalin's signature'
in and of itself means nothing at this period- On February 16, 1951 ihe
Politburo adopted a decision that the Presidium would be chaired by
others, and that a rubber stamp would be used for Stalin's signature whrn
it was necessary as the Head of State (Chairman of Council of Ministers}
'Iliis document, and the rubber stamps, have been exhibited in Uos-
cow'*'^ (see the Appendix for the URLs for these exhibits).

^^''IstotichtskiiArkhir^iii. I, 1997. p. 24.

A phcitMgraph of rhcsc stamps may be viewed at
http:/ /chss.m(>ntdair.ctJu/ cn(>lish/rurr/ research/ stalinsigstampsS Ljpg

(.'lupicr L-Jghi. Ideology and Culture

125

lliat is, Stalin no longer signed "decisions and instructions of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR", but they were still issued under his signature,
in his absence. Since that was the case since February 1951, it is logical to
assume it was sdll the case in July of that same year. But we cannot tell
one way or the other for certain whether Stalin personally signed these
duoiments without seeing the originals, and perhaps not even then.

As for the September 4, 1951 "order" it is unlikely that Stalin could have
issued it. He was on leave, or "vacation", probably for ill health, between
.August 10, 1951 and February 11, 1952, when he returned to his office."^

'Ihe main point is this — and Khrushchev knew it - Stalin was polidcally
acdv e only sporadically by this time. Politburo members, including Khru-
shchev himself, declared in 1953 that Stalin had not been politically ac-
(h'e. Stalin said as much at the Party Congress in October 1952: "I
no longer read papers."'**

.According to the "Journal of visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office" Stalin's
workload began to decrease in February 1950. Judging from this source,
Stalin worked 73 days in 1950, but only 48 days in 1951, and 45 days in

1952.'*"

Therefore, it is ve^ doubtful that Stalin personally signed the September
4, 1951 order. As for that of July 2, 1951, we simply do not know.

But even if Stalin did in fact personally sign this document — that is, even
if diis was not a case of the Politburo's voting to affixing his signature
widi the stamp - it has litde significance. Even Khrushchev does not
claim Stalin initiated the order for the monument.

'llicsc pages from "Visitors to Stalin's Kremlin Office" may be consulted at
hnp://chss.monlclair.cdu/cngli$h/furr/ tcsnrch/istarkh 197.pdf

m '"\' ch'i niki vnichim estaf ctu nashegp vclikogo dcia?' Neopublikovannaia rech' I.V.
Stalina na Plenume 'I'sentrarnogti Komiteta KPS^ 16 okdabria 1952 goda (pu xapisi I^N.
Ivfrcmova)." Smtskahi Kossiia \imarj 13, 2000. At

htTp://chss.montclair.cdu/cnglL4)/fuiT/rescarch/stalinoctl6S2.pdf , and also at
http7/grachev62.narod.nj/sMLlin/t1 8/tl 8_262.htm

>» lU.N./hukov, Tally KnmBa. StaBn, Mohtm, Bema. Ma/eiiJkav. Moscow: THRILA, 2000,
p. 549. C(. also sources at note 7 above. 'Ilic monument to Stalin was built but taken
down ducing Khrushchev's time and later replaced by a monument to Lenin. Monument
to Stalin:

htTp://ck:fantmuUcr.uscr8.photofile.nj/photo/ckrfantmuUcr/291 1 1 72/]darg(.7 1 1 541 1211 .
ipg; to ].cnin: htTp://foto-flcct.uscf«.photofilc.ru/photo/foto-
fkct/95172224/xlafj^/ 1 1 S41 1831 .jpg

126

Khrushchev I Aval

52. The Palace of Soviets

Khrushchev:

At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect
for Lenin's memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite
the decision taken over 30 years ago to build a Palace of
Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, this palace
was not built, its construction was always postponed and
the project allowed to lapse.

In his recent article on the histor}' of the plans, architectural contests, and
ultimate abandonment of the project to build the Palace of Soviets, Mak-
sim Volchenkov directly references Khrushchev's Speech, showing tliat
the latter's statement here is simply not true. Nor did Khrushchev erect
this building cither. The committee in charge of it gradually changed ics
focus to other buildings. 7^e plan to build a Palace of Soviets was aban-
doned - not by Stalin, but by his successors.

53. The Lenin Prize

Khrushchev:

We cannot forget to recall the Soviet Government
resolution of August 14, 1925 concerning "the founding
of Lenin prizes for educational work." This resolution
was published in the press, but until this day there are no
I^nin prizes. This, too, should be corrected.

This is not true, and most of the audience at the 20'*» Part)' Congress
must have known it. In fact, there had been I^nin prizes, from 1925 to
1934, in the fields of science, technology, literature, art, and architecturt.
It's not clear why they were ended, but nobody seems to have bbmd
Stalin for it.'"'

"'" It is likely that the pause, anil then cessation in the award of the I ^'nin prizes u'as
related to the closing of the ( Communist .\cadeniy\ to which the commission on the \xm
prizes was attached. 'Ilie (question of closing the ( Communist Academy "in viewof tht
inexpediency of two parallel Academies, the Academy of Sciences and the (ximmunL<i
Academy," a matter under discussion after the beginning of 1935. ITie Ixnin prize awiiJ«
ceased at this same time. See the Decree "Concerning the I .iijuidation of the ( ](>fnfnunL>i
Academy", by the (].(]. and the (Council of People's (lommissars dated l'cbruar\'7. 1936.
reproduced at http://www.ihst.ru/pn>jects/sohi.>it/d(x:umcnt/an/ 181.htm

(ihaplcr liighl. Ideology and Culture

127

However, the Order of Lenin (Orden Lenind) was the highest decoration
gi\'en b}' the USSR. It was continuously awarded for outstanding
achievements in many Belds from 1930 until the end of the Soviet Union.

Sralin also rejected the proposal that an '*Ordcr of Stalin*' be created in
his honor. Infonnation about that is given in the Appendix Khrushchev
would have icnovvn about this, of course.

At the dme of preparing for the celebration of Stalin's sixtieth birthday in
December 1939 the question of instituting prizes in Stalin's name arose
again.i^' We have no indication that Stalin had anything xo do with this
initiadve. But one thing is well known: the Stalin prizes were not initiated
instead of or in replacement of the Lenin prizes. They were instituted at a
time when there were no annual prizes in sciences and arts in the USSR.
Conset]uently Khrushchev's counterposition of the Lenin and Stalin
prizes is incorrect and dishonest.

ilic Decree of the Sovnarkom of the USSR of December 20, 1 939 on the
establishment of prizes and awards in honor of Stalin was signed by the Chairman of the
.SNK V.M. Molotov and its chief of staff M O. Khiomov {Pnvda December 21, 1939). At
finst these awards did not include the 6eids of artistic creation and criticism. At the
beginning of 1940 a similar decree was passed titled "Concerning the establishment of
Stalin prizes in literature". It was also signed by Molotov and Khiomov {Ptmda I'cbruary
2, 1940). Sec http://fcb-web.tu/fcb/sholokh/crilics/nos/nos-4S6-.htm.

Chapter 9.
Stalin's Last Years in Power

54. Stalin Suggested Huge Tax Increase on

Kolkhozes

Khrushchev:

What is more, while reviewing this project ("to raise the
prices of such products in order to create material
incentives for the kolkhoz, MTS [machine-tractor
station] and sovkhoz workers in the development of
cattle breeding"] Stalin proposed that the taxes paid by
the kolkhozes and bv the kolkhoz workers should be
raised by 40 billion rubles; according to him the peasants
are well off and the kolkhoz worker would need.to seU
only one more chicken to pay his tax in full.

Imagine what this meant. Certainly, 40 bDlion rubles is a
sum which the kolkhoz workers did not realize for all the
products which they sold to the Government. In 1952,
for instance, the kolkhozes and the kolkhoz workers
received 26,280 million rubles for all their products
delivered and sold to the Government.

Did Stalin's position, then, rest on data of any sort
whatever? Of couise not. In such cases facts and figures
did not interest him.

According to Khrushchev, Stalin said this in February, 1953, just before
his death. No one else records this. We have only Khrushchev's word for
this.

Khrushchev first mentioned this alleged tax increase during the July 1933
CC Plenum devoted exclusively to the condemnation of Beiia. Mikoian
and Malenkov both referred to the "40 billion ruble" figure after Khm-
shchev mentions it. But both do so in a way that makes it clear they had
not heard of it prior to Khrushchev's mentioning it.

Mikoian, who spoke up against additional taxes on the peasanti)' at die
October 1952 CC Plenum, affirms that Stalin suggested "only one more

i.hjpicr Nine. Staliii's 1 a:it Yeans in I'owcr

129

chicken" in taxes from the peasants. But Mikoian admits he did not hear
[his personally, since he was not present. Mikoian does not mention the
"•10 billion rubles" in his discussion of this incident in his memoirs.

55. Stalin Insulted Postyshev

Khrushchev:

In one of his speeches Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction
with Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?"

Postyshev answered clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, Comrade
Stalin, a Bolshevik."

Ihis assertion was at first considered to show a lack of
respect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act
and consequently resulted in Postyshev's annihilation
and branding without any reason as a 'people's enemy.'

We have already seen that Postyshev was dismissed, then arrested, and
tiiully tried and executed, for repressing a huge number of Party mem-
bers without any evidence. Khrushchev was present at this Plenum
(January 1938), and knew this. Therefore Khrushchev lied when he said
Post}'shev was repressed "without any reason."

It's most likely that Khrushchev is lying about the exchange above too.
Only Khrushchev records this purported exchange between Postyshev
and Stalin, and only in his Secret Speech. No one else, apparently, ever
claimed to have heard Stalin say it. It is not in Khrushchev's memoirs
either.

According to Getty and Naumov there is no evidence of any particular
friction between Stalin and Postyshev until the January 1938 Plenum. As
we have seen, Postyshev was dismissed from candidate membership in
the Politburo at that Plenum, and arrested not long afterwards. Therefore
this "speech" of Stalin's - if it ever took place at all - must have hap-
pened at this January 1938 Plenum.

Commentators like Boris Nikolaevsky thought it was made at the Febru-
ary-March 1937 CC Plenum. That is because they believed Khrushchev's
earlier assertion in this ''Secret Speech" that Postyshev had opposed Sta-
lin at this Plenum. But the voluminous transcript of that long Plenum

\.l Mikoian, Tak Bjk. Moscow: Vagrius. 1999, Ch. 46, pp. 559-568.

13U

Khrushchev I jliI

was published in 1992-5. Again, as we have already seen, that transcript
proves Khrushchev lied: Poscyshev did not oppose Stalin at all at that
Plenum. Nor did this purported exchange between Stalin and Postyshc\'
take place there.

'Ilie transcripts of the January 1938 Plenum have not been published in
full. But they have been published in excerpt, and some researchers have
read the whole transcripts in the archives. None of them have mentioned
finding this exchange. So it is most probable that Khrushchev is lying
again. But we can't be absolutely certain.

Even if, some day\ evidence comes to light that Stalin did say it, it M^as
certainly not the reason for Postyshev's arrest, trial, conviction and exe-
cution. ITiey were the punishment for Postyshc\''s guiJt in repressing
large numbers of Party members. Whether Stalin said these words or not
therefore - and, to repeat, there is no evidence that he did, aside from
Khrushchev's assertion here — Khrushchev lied in saying this was the
reason for Postyshev's fate.

So why did Khrushchev make the latter claim? Probably in order to pro-
vide an "alibi" for Politburo members who had worked closely with Sta-
lin for many years.

Many communists and Soviet citizens would likely wonder Why did Sta-
lin's closest associates never call him on any of the "crimes" Khrushchev'
was accusing him of? Why did they not take steps to stop Stalin, since
they knew of these things? Lame as it is, the only answer Khrushchev and
the rest could give was this: "We'd be killed if we protested. Look what
happened to Postyshev, just for saying *I am a Bolshevik'!"

56. ^^Disorganization'' of Politburo Work

Khrushchev:

The importance of the Central Committee's Political
Bureau was reduced and its work was disorganized by
the creation within the Political Bureau of various
commissions - the so-called "quintets," "sextets,"
"septets" and "novenaries." Here is, for instance, a
resolution of the Political Bureau of October 3, 1946:

Stalin's Proposal:

1 . 'ITie Political Bureau Commission for Foreign
Affairs ('Sextet") is to concern itself in the future, in

Hi^Ninc. Salins l^t Years in Power

131

addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of
internal construction and domestic policy.

2. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of
the Slate Commission of Economic Planning of the
USSR, Comrade Voznesensky, and is to be known
as a Septet.

Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin.

Xft'hzt a tenninology of a card player! ^ughter in the
hall.) It is clear that the creation within the Political
Bureau of this type of commissions - "quintets,"
"sextets," "septeis" and "novenaries" - was against the
principle of collective leadership. Ihe result of this was
that some members of the Political Bureau were in this
way kept away from participation in reaching the most
important state matters.

As Edvard Radzinsky, a ferociously hostile biographer of Stalin, admits,
Kbnishchev was lying. Subcommittees within the Politburo were simply
a of dividing up the work to be done. Ihis was nothing new, and not
Slalin's innovation.

■

57. Stalin Suspected Yoroshilov an ''English

Agent"

Khrushchev:

Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with
the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voioshilov was
an English agent. (Laughter in the hall.) It's true -> an
English agent.

In his memoirs Khrushchev relates many nunor? that he said were
known only to "a few of us". In this case there is no other documenta-
don of it.

For example, it is not in Mikoian's memoirs, which have a lot of false
"memories", like Stalin's telling him Benes had assured him about Tuk-
hachevsky' guilt - an event which never occurxed.'^^ So even if Mikoian

Ibid, p.553.

132

Khrushchev lied

had "remembered" this, one might legitimately question it. In fact, he did
not

58. Andreev; 59. Molotov; 60. Mikoian

These all have to do with the CC Plenum of October 16, 1952 that took
place immediately after the 19*** Party Congress.

Andreev

Khrushchev:

By unilateral decision, Stalin had also separated one
other man from the work of the Political Bureau -
Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most
unbridled acts of willfulness.

Strictly speaking, we don't know precisely what Stalin said, because no
official transcript has ever been published (according to Mikoian, none
was made). Neither has the transcript of the IQ'** Part}' Congress ever
been published."^ Immediately after Stalin's death the Part)' leadership
did their best to change the major decisions taken at both 'these sessions
and to obliterate any memoi)' of them.

Therefore we do not have any official reason why Andreev was not it
tained in the newly renamed Presidium (formerly the Politburo). But %t
have enough information from other sources to see that Khnjshche\' b
not telling the truth.

Andreev lost his position in the Council of Ministers on March 15, 1953.
ten days after Stalin's deatli.''^^ If it had been an "unbridled act of wilJhil-
ness" not to reappoint Andreev to the Presidium of the CC of the CPSl.
why did Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria remove him also from the
Soviet of Ministers? (He was appointed to the Presidium of the Supnm
Soviet, a far less demanding position)

According to the only part of Stalin's Speech at the CC Plenum of Ocio
ber 16 1952 that we have, he actually did not nominate Andreev to iht

.\t least, not as a separate publication. I'otmal speeches were all published in Pranliin
October 1952. at the time of the (ion^rcss. Perhaps this is all thea- was.

""^ (!f. the biographical eiitr)' on .Andreev at llrono.ru / hrono.info - http://
www. hrono.ru/bio|;raf / an(lrcev_aa.html

(ihiptcr Nine. Stalin's last Years in I'owcr

133

new Presidium because Andreev was deaf."'*' Konstandn Simonov says
something similar. These are the only accounts of the Plenum that
mention Andreev at all. Both of them affirm that Stalin explicitly ex-
cluded Andreev because of his health.

Despite the lack of any official transcript, therefore, this is good evidence
that Khnishchev lied. Andreev was not excluded out of any '^willfulness"
on Stalin's part.

Molotov and Mikoian

Khnishchev:

Let us consider the first Central Committee plenum after
the 19th Party Congress when Stalin, in his talk at the
plenum, characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov
and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoian and suggested that these
old workers of our party were guilty of some baseless
charges. It is not excluded that had Stalin remained at the
helm for another several months. Comrades Molotov
and Mikoian would probably have not delivered any
.speeches at this Congress.

From \^iiat we know about this Plenum &om a few who were present
and wrote down their notes on it, it is clear that Stalin did criticize
Molotov and Mikoian.

To determine whether Khrushchev is telling the truth here, we need to
examine

• Whether the "charges" Stalin leveled at Molotov and
Mikoian were "baseless" or not; and

• Whether it's true that they would not have spoken at
the 20''' Party Congress if Stalin had lived.

• There are four accounts of Stalin's talk at this Plenum
from people who were in attendance. They are: that
of Mikoian himself (T ak By/o, On. 46); that of the

.According to I..N. Ivfrcmov's notes on the Plenum published in Sovtlskaia Fjosia
Januaiyl3, 2000. At hnp://chss. montclair.edu /cnglish/fuir/n.-st.-arch/stalinuct 16 S2.pdf
and also at http://grachcv62.narod.ru/sHlin/t18/tl8_262htm

Konstaniin M. Simonov, Gla^anh (htbvtka mo^ pokokmia. Moscow: Novosti, 1988. p.
246.

134

Khrushchev UlxI

writer Konstandn Simonov iftla^mi chebveka moego
pokolenia)^ that of Dmitiii Shepilov {Neprimknuvshii^
pp. 225-8.), and that of Leonid Nikolaevich Efremov
{Soveiskaia Rossiia^ jmuzry 13, 2000, p. 6). Mikoian
was, of course, a long-time CC and Politburo
member; the other three were brand-new members of
the CC. Elxcept for a short note by Simonov which
he wrote in March 1953, the rest were written down
years after the event.

Shepilov relates Stalin's criticisms of Molotov in a few paragraphs. I Ic is
far briefer about Stalin's remarks about Mikoian. Shepilov claims that
Mikoian defended himself and attacked Molotov for being close to the
executed Voznesenskii, whom he called "a great criminal." Shepilov did
not consider the charges "baseless", or see any kind of threat in them,
but only Stalin's reasons for not including them in the new Bureau of the
Presidium.

In his first short note on the Plenum made in March 1953 Simonov did
not remark at all on Stalin's criticism of Molotov and Mikoian, but only
noted Stalin's insistence that they be as fearless as Lenin was. In 1979
what Simonov remembered was the vehemence of Stalin's criticism ol
Molotov, and a vague feeling that he and Mikoian were for "capituia
tionism". Simonov agrees that Stalin then criticized Mikoian, but could
not recall why. He says diat both men replied to Stalin's criticisms -
something that in and of itself refutes Khrushchev's claim that Stalin de-
manded "absolute submission". Simonov believed that these ciitidsnu.
whatever their cause, served to justify Molotov's and Mikoian's exclusion
from the new Bureau of the Presidium.

Mikoian's account, also written years later, agrees that Stalin criticized
Molotov for his weakness in foreign policy and both Molotov and him-
self, Mikoian, in domestic policy. But in Mikoian's account Stalin "va
critical yet respectful of them. Mikoian does not mention anything about
feeling threatened. Efremov's account outlines Stalin's criticisms of ilw
two men but it too does not make these criticisms sound threatening
all.

In his whole voluminous memoirs Khrushchev has only a few scntcncs
to say about the October 1952 Plenum, and says nothing about am
"danger" to Mikoian or Molotov.

iNiae- Solio's lasr Years in Power

135

Bjljlli, hfolotov, and Voroshilov too, were all named to the Presidium,
mA VacoshSav — but not Mikoian or Molotov — to the "Bureau of the

P^t^Mt fbout the truthfulness of Khrushchev's allegation? The charges
^ • better word would be "criticisms" — do not appear to have been
■tmekss". They may or may not have been correct. In essence, they re-
itdtd political differences between Stalin and these two Politburo

$BBCAf speaking Khrushchev's statement - that it is "possible" Molotov
mi Mikoian would not have addressed the 20'' Party Congress if Stalin
hid lircd - cannot be either proven or disproven. But it is inconsistent
vidi Stalin's actions at the 19**' Party Congress. Mikoian and Molotov,
iboi^ not in the very highest body (the Bureau of the Presidium), were
idD in the Presidium of 25 members and, as such, would certainly have
been in a position to address the next Congress.

lo his own memoirs Khrushchev does not repeat the story that Molotov
and Mikoian were under any kind of threat.

61. Expansion of the Presidium

Khnishchev:

Stalin evidendy had plans to finish off the old members
of the Political Bureaa He often stated that Polibcal
Bureau members should be replaced by new ones.

His proposal, after the 19th Congress, concerning the
election of 25 persons to the Central Committee
Presidium, was aimed at the removal of the okl Political
Bureau members and the bringing in of less experienced
persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of
ways.

We can assume that this was also a design for the future
annihilation of the old Political Bureau members and, in
this way, a cover for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts
which we are now considering.

KJirushchev lied here, for there is no evidence that his accusation had the
slightest basis in fact. It is not supported at all by the accounts of the Ple-
num that survive. According to Efremov's notes on the October 1952
Central Committee Plenum Stalin was extremely dear in explaining his

136

Khnishchcv

proposal to expand the Presidium beyond the limits of the old PolitI
Efremov, a young man at his first Plenum, may have been espe
struck by Stalin's emphasis on the need for new blood in the Party
ership, for Stalin's explanation takes up a substantial place in his note

Chapter 10.
A Typology of Prevarication

A Typology of Khrushchev's Prevarication

Bcfttfe proceeding to discuss Khrushchev's specific methods of distor-
DOQ, we should understand that the published version before us is itself
Usified

Pubbshed earLer in Ii^stita TsK KPSSy die text of
Khrushchev's report is based upon the text presented by
Khrushchev to the Presidium of the CC CPSU on March
1 [1956], edited and accepted for dissemination to local
party organizations by a decision of the Presidium of the
C.C of March 7, 1956. This text n not identica] to
that which Khnishchev read from the podium of the
Congress. For example, according to the way all the
participants in the Congress remembered it, total silence
reigned in the hall as the repon was read. But audience
reactions were inserted into the text published in Ij^tfia
TsKKPSS: "Commotion in the hall", "Indignation b the
hall", Applause", etc. which, of course, completely
fiiiled to reflect the real atmosphere of the closed
session.

- V.IU. Afiani, Z.K. Vodop'ianova, "Arkheograficheskoe
predislovie" ['Archeographical preface^ in
Aimennakher, K, et al., DokladNS. ¥ihmshchtm o Kul'ie
Uchnosti Stakna na XX S "ezdf KPSS. Dokttmenfy. Moscow:
ROSSPEN, 2002, p. 44. (Emphasis added, GF.)

llicse same "audience reactions" were inserted into the English transla-
tioa Therefore we are examining a text that has been falsified not only in
its content but in its presentation as well. VX'e have left most of the "audi-
ence reacbons" in the quotations from Khrushchev's speech dted in pre-

138

Khrushchev

vious chapters as a continual reminder of the deliberate distortions in
duced into this text."^

I have determined that in the so-called "Secret Speech*' Khrushc
made sixty-one "revelations", or hitherto unknown and derogatory ai
sations, against Stalin or Beria. These statements constitute the substa
of the Speech. It was these assertions that shocked the world when it
made public.

It would, of course, be absurd to say that every one of Khrushch
statements is false. A dramatic example of a "revelation*' Khrushc
made that is true is the following:

It was determined that of the 139 members and
candidates of the party's Central Committee who were
elected at the 17th Congress, 98'*' persons, i.e., 70 per
cent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938).
(Indignation in the hall.) What was the composition of
the delegates to the 17th Congress? It is known that 80
per cent of the voting participants of the 17th Congress
joined the party during the years of conspiracy beCore the
Revolution and during the civil war; this means before
1921. By social origin the basic mass of the delegates to
the Congress were workers (60 per cent of the voting
members).

When I claim that every supposed "revelation" or accusation in Kh
shchev's speech against Stalin and Beria is false, I do not include i
statement above, because Khrushchev is careful not to claim here d
Stalin had them all killed. Had he made this claim explicitly, this sta
ment would be demonstrably false, to be added to the list of other fa
accusations in the Speech.'^'

In his mcmoin;, published first in Ufemag^mi: and then in IxmiIc form, Khnishrkt
admittixJ these "audience reactions" were a lie. "'llie dele^tes listened in absolute silcm
It was sc) i]uiet in the huge hall you could htv a fly buxxing." Lifi, December 11, 1970,|
63; Strobe Talbot (trans. & cd.), Khrushchev Rtmemltm: The Laif TeslamiU . (Boston: Uidi
Brown. 1974), 494.

'<^' In the report published by the official ioumal li^stiia TsK KPSS No. 1 2 (1989). p. 86
the number of delegatcsis given as 97 (44 + 53). not 98. Of course this does not chanp-
the essence of the matter.

I except fur the one I have marked as "Don't Know."

'llie statement just quotc-d is one of my three "S", or "special cases."

(h^ULt Ten. .A TypaUygf of Prcvaficatian

139

Khrushchev does mention a number of the more prominent of the Cen-
inl Committee members executed during the late 1930s. In the case of
one veiy prominent full member of the 1934 Central Committee — Niko-
lai Eizhov - Khrushchev fails to mention the fact that he too was exe-
ni[ed! We will examine the evidence on all the C.C. members Khru-
shchev explicitly names in the Speech.

The Problem of Introducing a New Paradigm

The usual problem a researcher confronts is that of assembling the evi-
dence needed to prove his thesis, and arranging it logically so that his
thesis is proven. But in writing the present essay I scx>n realized that an-
other problem, much larger and more intractable, confronted me.

Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" is not just a series of assertions that can,
in principle, be proven either valid or invalid. It soon became the founda-
tional document for a whole new paradigm of Soviet history. This para-
digm was not entirely new. It confirmed in part, and itself drew upon,
earlier Trotskyist, Menshevik, and Soviet emigre interpretations of Soviet
realit)'.

But because it was rapidly accepted by the worldwide communist move-
ment itself, and was soon followed by a huge wave of "rehabilitations" of
those conviaed of treasonable activity during the Stalin years, the "Khru-
shchev" paradigm attained a degree of widespread acceptance that the
earlier versions never had. It became the dominant paradigm.

.\s a result, to attack the veracity of Khrushchev's speech is to attack the
foundation of what I will call the "anti-Stalin" paradigm. Here are a cou-
ple of illustrations of what I mean.

• I gave a talk summarizing a few of the results of my
research on Khrushchev's speech at an annual
conference of a Marxist academic group. During the
Q&A period one long-time Marxist said to me in an
accusatory tone: "You are rehabilitating Stalinf"

• Another question was: "What about Trotsky?"
Khrushchev does not mention Trotsky in the speech.

• When a colleague mentioned my research project on
Khrushchev's speech to an editor of a prominent
Marxist journal, his derisive response was: "Does he

140

Khrushchev lied

claim there was no GULAG?" (Khrushchev never
mentions the GULAG in his speech).

• A sympathetic and helpful reader of an earlier draft
suggested that I should write a history of the
repressions of the 1930s instead.

• At first I could not understand remarks like this. But
I came to realize that these responses were not
directed towards my talk. Instead, they were
responding to what they felt my talk implied. They
reflected the fact that Khrushchev's speech is not
only the foundational document of the "anti-Stalin
paradigm" of Soviet history. It is also a synecdoche
for that paradigm: it represents that paradigm as the
part represents the whole. To prove, as I attempt to
do, that the statements made in Khrushchev's speech
are false is taken to be a claim that all the other
components of this paradigm, most of which
Khrushchev never mentions, are also false.

It's reasonable to expect a paper or book to prove what it sets out lo
prove. It's not reasonable to expect a paper or book on a single topic (o
refute a whole historical paradigm, disproving in the process an unde-
fined - in fact, an infinite - number of fact claims that are not part of the
paper.

The present book, therefore, confronts a strange rhetorical situation. It
evokes, if not a "totalitarian", at least a "totalizing" response. Khru-
shchev's "secret speech" represents the "anti-Stalin paradigm" to such an
extent that any reference to it conjures up the entire paradigm. Some
times the response that results is one of indignation: How can I presume
to smuggle in a refutation of the whole "and-Stalin" paradigm when I am
actually disproving only a part of it? But to others the paper is simply a
disappointment. It fails to deal with the GULAG, or Trotsky, or Buk-
haiin, or the Katyn massacre, or something else that does not feature at
all in Khrushchev's speech, and so the paper is a failure and a disap-
pointment, no matter how thoroughly it manages to prove the falsity- ot
what Khrushchev did say.

I agree that Khrushchev's speech is the foundational document of the
"anti-Stalin" paradigm. Moreover, the fact that Khrushchev's speech l<; a
tissue of fabrications virtually from beginning to end also has implica-

rToL A Typology of Prcvancadon

141

mg for further research. Given this deg^ of falsehood at the very be-
Ifpiog of 5vhat purported to be an exposure of "Stalin's crimes*', it's
ifaat the stoiy ends here. One is justlGed in suspecting that at
Im 9ome of the other "revelations" over which Khrushchev presided
m^piove to be £ilse as well.

And dien the "anti-Stalin" paradigm is well and truly in play. For Roi
lUvcdev's iM History Judge (1971) and Robert Conquest's The Gnat Ter-
,m. Sta&i's Pufgf <^ the Thirties (1968), the two major syntheses of Khni-
ikiteT-cca "revelations/' are precisely the fonnative popularizations of
dK "and-Sialin" paradigm. They summarize what their authors gleaned
Cnm the Soviet press, "rehabilitation** announcements, and public and
pdvite nianoirs. (For the account of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn see the
DOlt)'^ Both Medvedev and Conquest took these "revelations" - includ-
0^ Khrushchev's Secret Speech, but gping far beyond it - at face value,
IB '^e." If Khrushchev's speech were proven false, what about these
odier matoials?

My attempt lo test the accuracy of the accusations made by Khrushchev
in his speech, and my resulting conclusions that vinually all of them are
fidsc, docs not comprise a direct attempt on my part to destroy the "anti-
Sudin" patadi^. However, it does at least remove one of the main sup-
porting pillars on which the whole edifice of this paradigm stands. Once
convinced that Khrushchev's speech is little more than a long, carefully-
plumed and elaborate lie, no student can ever view Soviet history of the
Stalin period in the same way again.

Statementfi of f aa can only be evaluated on the level of their factuality —
whether, given the evidence we have, such statements are the most accu-
late conchjsions that can be drawn. No paradi^ can be "disproven" by
the disproving of one, or any particular number, of assertions of fact.

■•^ Solzhcnitsyn's vaiious accounts, most famously in Tbr C^LAG y4nl>^A^ in its
vaiious editions, arc not, stnctly speaking, histoiical works. Solzhenitsyn iclicd on rumor
and unpublished ntcmoirs almost exckjsively. Critical Hiterragation of sources is virtually
unknown to him. Solzhenitsyn also made a gn:at many deliberately false statements,
including many about his own life, h'urthennore, it is clear that he did not compose aU of
ThfGULJiGAniiptli>g»> 'Vhe extent to which Solzhenitsyn's life has itst-lf been
"constnictcd" and falsified has to be studied to be believed, h'ora very detailed and highly
dununcnted account of all the problems with Solzhenitsyn and his work see AJeksandr V.
Osit<yvs\iiu, Soii^kmer)^: fimsbthame s mi/bm (^"Sohhcm I<arcwcll to the myth") Moscow:
lAuza. 2004.

142

Khrushchev IJcd

I'hose colleagues and critics whom I've mentioned, and no doubt innu-
merable odiers, are - as another colleague put it - "reasonable people in
the grip of an unreasonable narrative." That unreasonable narrative is the
"cult of personality" around Stalin in its Khrushchevian disguise.

Although he claimed to be critiquing and exorcizing what is better trans-
lated as the "cult of the great man" {kul't lichnosti)^ what Khrushcha'
really did was to reinforce it in an inverted fom. He tried to replace tlie
"all-knowing, all-good" Stalin of the "cult" with another Stalin who wtis
equally all-powerful but malevolent. In this Khrushchev resembled Troi-
sky, who also focused on what he claimed were the personal failings of
his arch rival and explained Stalin's rise to leadership, policies, opposi-
tions, and repressions, by attributing them to Stalin's combination of
cunning, ruthlessness, and moral defects.

In an outline of Noam Chomsky's criticism of the mass media Mark
Grimsley has written:

A statement that fits an accepted world view requires
litde explanation and can therefore be outlined in a few
words. In order to have any chance of being persuasive,
a statement that challenges an accepted world view needs
more than a sound bite."'^^

This also applies to scholarship that challenges a "received", widely ac-
cepted, historical paradigm.

Under such conditions, "equality is inequality." It is not only that it take;
far greater time, effort, and space on the page to refute a falsehood than
it does to state it. It is that the scholar whose work challenges the cjusting
paradigm has two tasks, while the scholar whose research fits neativ into
the prevailing paradigm has only one. 'Die latter need only make sure his
research follows the accepted canons of method, and his work will be
greeted with approbation. In a certain sense, he is telling his readers uiiai
they already know to be true. Me is "filling in a blank" in the greater
model of an accepted, because acceptable, history.

But the scholar who challenges the prevailing paradigm has a far more
demanding job. His research must not only meet the demands of method
— use of evidence, logic, and so on - incumbent on all scholars. He must
also persuade his readers to question the overall pattern of historical cau-

Mark (•fimsky, "Noam (ihcimsky (1928 -)". .\t http://p<.<)plc.c<»hums.()hi»-
statccdu/^TimsilLvl /h582/2001 /Chomsky .htm

Tai- A 'lypoVjgj/ uf I'a-vahcadon

143

[fldoo vhkh has heretofore given shape to their vision of the past itself.
He dialleng<:s them to take seriously the possibility that their whole
Axlel of histozy may be wrong - a challenge that many will simply dis-
Bias»and some will denounce as outrageous.

So I bve to reiterate what should be obvious but, obviously, is not. I1ie
mbject of this paper is Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" of February 25,
1956 in its published form, llie surprising - to my mind at least, as-
Ipaoding - result of my research is this: that speech is comprised, virtu-
iD^ io its entirety, of falsificadons. My aim in the present book is to dem-
oosicate that result with the best evidence that exists, much of it from
bona Soviet archives.

I ffiteied this project knowing that a few, at least, of Khnishchev*s
sUlonents were untrue, and suspecting that some assiduous research
VDuld find that at least a few more of those statements were also untrue.
I was very surprised - "shocked" is not too strong a word - to find that
vinuaUy ever)' one of Khrushchev's "revelations" is, in fact, &lse.

I cealize that the whole is more than the sum of its parts - that my con-
dusion that all of Khrushchev's "revelations" were false will be greeted
with far more skepticism than would a more modest result that, say, half,
or iwo-thirds, of his '"revelations" were false. And I chink this is so be-
cause a Khrushchev that lied about everything does not "fit" into the
prevailing "anti-Stalin" paradigm, in which the Khrushchev who, in
Taubman's words, "somehow retained his humanity," whose speech con-
stitutes a "great deed," is an essential part of that paradigm.

Exposing a Lie is Not the Same as
Establishing the Truth

Analysis of Khrushchev's prevarications su^ests two related but distinct
tasks. By far the easier and shorter job is to show that Khrushchev was
not telling the truth, lliis is the subject of the present book.

llie interested student will naturally want to know more than the mere
fiact that Khrushchev lied. Once convinced that Khrushchev's version of
reality is false, she or he will want to know the truth — ivhaf naUy happttied.

But the present study cannot satisfy that curiosity. A separate investiga-
tion would be necessary in each case - viitually, sixty-one studies for as
many falsehoods. Some would be short, in the main because we do not
have enough evidence to settle the matter.

144

Khrushchev lied

Others of these studies would have to be very lengthy, as there is a great
deal of information, often contradictory, to be gathered and examined
Some, perhaps many, would be inconclusive, since not enough evidence
has been made available to permit us to arrive at a definite solution. In
any case, to study in depth each of the false assertions made by Khru-
shchev with an eye to discovering — as nearly as possible, given the pre-
sent state of the evidence — what really happened, is necessarily beyond
the scope of this essay.

The image of Stalin as "mass murderer" originated, for all practical pur-
poses, during Khrushchev's time. The very first such accusations,
those that laid the foundation for the myth — and it is precisely a myili
with which we are concerned here - are in the "Secret Speech." And of
all Khrushchev's "revelations" those that made by far the greatest im-
pression remain the accusations that Stalin initiated or approved the de-
liberate annihilation of many prominent Bolsheviks.

After the "Secret Speech" the quantity of "crimes" attributed to Stalin
continued to grow. For example, not long afterwards Stalin began to be
blamed for the executions on false charges of prominent Soviet militan
leaders. VCrliile Khrushchev remained in power a pleiade of semi-of6cu]
writers continued to work indefatigably on adding to the list of vicdms ol
supposedly unjust sentences, and many of those persons were "rehabili-
tated" — declared to have been guilty of nothing.

In October 1964 Khrushchev was forced into retirement. By that tune
the image of Stalin as a mass murderer of innocent victims was alread)
firmly established. In the late '60s and early '70s the weighty volumes o!
Soviet dissident Roi Medvedev and British Sovietologist Robert Cuiv
quest with their detailed descriptions of Stalin's so-called "crimes" wm-
published in the West. They relied very heavily upon works publisher]
under Khrushchev. The years of Gorbachev and Eltsin saw the publici
tion of even more such tendentious, blood-curdling "histories".

For this reason careful research on just what Khrushchev said about
massive repressions in his "Secret Speech" may turn out to be even mi^
useful than simply identifying more and more examples of Khnjshchc^ ^

In fact there is gtxxJ a'a.'Min to believe that Khrushchev t(X)k this view, along wi(h
others, from 'I'rotsky. I Ic certainly t(X)k other anti-Stalin stories from 'I'rotsky, such a ihr
notion that Stalin may have been involved in the munlcr of Sergei Kirov on IXxeinbcr I.
1934.

Q^*r I'cA A Typology of I'tcvaricadon

145

in. Such research makes it possible to identify the sources of the myth
ofSulin as ''mass murderer", and beg^n to disclose some of the reasons
ibbmyth was created in the first place.

Historical vs. Judicial Evidence

Tbere's a qualitative difference between history and the legal process -
vhat counts as evidence in a trial, and what counts as evidence in history.

Hm '^habilitation" reports normally relied on detcitnining that some
^pj procedure or other was not observed in the (late) defendant's inves-
ifatfon or trial. Hiey asserted these violations of procedure; determined
dur cherefore the late defendant should not have been convicted; and set
iside the conviction. Sometimes they provided evidence that procedures
had been violated, sometimes they merely claimed this was so.

Since a defendant whose conviction has been set aside, and who has not
been retried, must be considered "innocent", the late defendant is, there-
fore, "innocent." Rehabilitated! For an historian this is all wrong.

A court has to be concerned with a prisoner's rights, some of which con-
ctm the legal process. For example, a defendant's confession to a crime,
jbsent any other evidence, or absent any other evidence that a crime has
been coimnitted. b normally not enough for conviction. The burden of
proof on the prosecution — the defendant is not required to prove his
innocence, though if he is able to do so, he may.

E^ndence obtained through torture is invahd. One reason is to protect the
defendant's rights. Also, if the police were allowed to abuse prisoners in
order to get confessions, they might never do any actual investigation,
and so never solve any cases, though they would no doubt get lots of
convictions t

But history is not a ''trial", where the defendant has various rights. Dead
people have no rights that need to be preserved. Likewise, we are not
interested in whether the defendants got a ''fair trial" (however that is
defined). We are interested in whether they were guilty or not.

V( liether or not they got a "fair trial" may be a separate issue to look into.
But it is not the same thing as guilt or innocence. For example, the ques-
tion of the guilt or innocence of at least one of the "Haymarket martyrs"
legally lynched by the State of Illinois in 1886-7 has recendy been raised
again in some academic articles. But nobody has questioned whether or

146

Khiushchcv I juJ

not they got a "fair trial" — they did not, and were posthumously par-
doned a few years later by the succeeding governor of Illinois.

In the Sacco-Vanzetti case there is now some evidence that Sacco, at
least, may have been guilty. But it is clear that the two men did not have a
"fair trial" by the standards of the day. There has been a lively discussion
about whether or not Julius Rosenberg did pass atomic secrets or plan to
do so if he could. But there can be no doubt that he and his wife Ethel
did not receive a fair trial.

Nor do historians need to be concerned with legal procedure. Whether
you think a defendant has received a "fair trial" or not depends on what-
ever the legal procedures of the day and time were, as opposed to what
procedures were actually observed, all compared with what you yourself
actually think is "fair."

Historians are concerned with gathering and assessing all the evidence vie
have, and reaching a conclusion on that basis. This is not the same thing
as determining whether a given person received a "fair trial" or not. .\
defendant may be guilt}' and still not receive a fair trial. An historian ii
interested in the "guilty or innocent" part. It is possible that no blark
person ever received a "fair trial" in the American South until the 1960$.
But that does not mean that every black defendant was innocent.

This paper is not concerned with whether the defendants received a "fair
trial" according to the standards of the Soviet judicial system of the
1930s. Neither is it concerned with the legal basis of the trials - whether
accelerated trials, under emergency conditions, are "legal" or not. We are
concerned with evidence that goes to the guilt or innocence of the de
fendant.

In aU the cases of defendants mentioned in Khrushchev's speech wc have
ample evidence pointing towards their guilt. But our real point is the fol
lowing. In all these cases, we know what Khrushchev and his ad\'iscr<
knew, because we have their reports. None of those reports demonstrates
the innocence of those accused, as Khrushchev alleged.

In not one single case do I rely on the self-incrimination of anybody u
the sole evidence. Though, frankly, if that were all the evidence ^x'c had
then we'd have to rely on it - there'd be nothing else. Likewise, if "here-
say" evidence were the only evidence we had, then we'd have to rely on
it, with appropriate scepticism and caveats.

Qf^Tea A Typology of Prcvaficatioa

147

Torture and the Historical Problems Related

To It

fvom Scalin's day on no one has denied that many prisoners arrested on
pokdcal chaiges during the 1930s in the USSR were tortured. "Rehabilita-
Doo" courts in Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev times have often "re-
hafadilated" defendants on the basis that they were tortured Nonnally
ihis look the fonn of declaring their convictions invalid. In a judicial pro-
cedure, even in the USSR during Stalin's dme^ evidence obtained from a
defendant by torture was invalid and could not be validly used.

Hie fact that a defendant was tortured does not mean that defendant was
iaoocent It is not evidence that the defendant was innocent. But it is
often eiToneously assumed to be.

loicalit}', ihere are many different possibilities:

• A person may be guilty, be tortured, and confess;

• A person may be guilty, be tortured, and not confess;

• A person may be innocent, be tortured, and confess
(to stop the tonure);

• A person may be innocent, be tortured, and still not
confess.

• A person may be innocent, not be tortured, and still
confess to guilt to another dime. (Examples of this
occur in the Rehabilitation documents).

• A person may have been tortured, but be found guilty
by other evidence, such as testimony of other
defendants or physical evidence. Other testimony,
from other individuals, and other evidence, usually
come into play.

Establishing the fact that someone really has been tortured is not always
easy, llie mere fact that someone claims he confessed because he was
tortured is hardly foolproof, lliere are many reasons why people some-
dmes want to retract a confession of guilt. Claiming one was tortured is a
way of doing this while preserving some dignity. So to be certain a person
«nas tortured there has to be further evidence of the &ct, such as a state-
ment or confession by a person who actually did the tofturii^, or a first-
hand witness.

148

Khrushchev I Jed

When there is no evidence at all that a defendant was tortured objective
scholars have no business concluding that he was tortured. This obvious
point is often overlooked, probably because a "paradigm" that everybody
was tortured, and everybody was innocent, acts powerfully on the minds
of both researchers and readers.

Investigators can have different reasons for torturing a suspect. Con*
vinced that a person is a dangerous aiminal or spy, they may use torture
to force him to yield information that may save lives or property, incul-
pate his confederates, or lead to the solution of previous crimes.

Or, investigators can torture suspects in order to get them to confess to
crimes they never committed — perhaps in order to enhance the reputa-
tion of the investigators themselves. They can use torture to force the
detainee to inculpate other persons, who can then be tortured for the
same purpose. In that way a story about a huge conspiracy can be fabri-
cated out of nothing.

Mikhail Frinovskii, deputy to Nikolai Ezhov, head of the NKVD (Com-
missar of Internal Affairs), in a confessional statement that has been
quoted many times but was only published in its entirely in Februan-
2006, stated that Ezhov and he had instructed some of their subordinates
to do exacdy that."*

But Frinovskii said that this was not always the case. Not all his subordi-
nates confessed to doing that. Also, many defendants were not ancstcd
during Ezhov's tenure. Also, we know that Stalin, and high-level com-
missions sent to investigate allegations of massive abuses like this, tooli
strong, immediate efforts to stop them and arrest those responsible.
Formerly secret internal dooiments make that clear.

In the interrogations I have cited above Ezhov also confessed to tortur-
ing and framing innocent persons on an enormous scale in order to sow
discontent with the Soviet system and thus facilitate the overthrow of the
Soviet government and Party leadership in the event of invasion by Japan
and/ or Germany.

For our purposes all this should just serve to remind us of the need fcr
evidence.

'^'> Sec l-rinovskii's statement published in Lubiaiika 3 No. 33 pp. 33-50; my transblitm at
http://chss.m()ntclair.edu/engiish/ furr/rcsvarch/frinovskycng.html. See aJso the
transcript of N.I. l-^/hov's confession, ibid. No. 37 pp. 52-72; my translation at
http://chs!:.montclair.edu/english/furr/a'S4.*arch/c%hov042639eng.htfnl

OkfttTca A Typulu|>y of l^revaiication

149

• We can't assume a peison was tortured without
evidence that he was.

• We can't assume a peison was guilty or innocent just
because he was tonured, much less on the basis of a
mere allegation that he was tortured.

• Each case has to be decided by itself, according to
the evidence we have.

b most Mses we simply do not have all the evidence that the Soviet in-
fcst^tOR had Neither the post-Stalin Soviet r^mes nor the post-
Soviet Russian regime has ever released it. What has been released has
httn selected according to some criteria. We are almost never told what
diose criteria are. But often it seems that the information was selected to
make it appear as though the subject had been "framed" by the Stalin
gDvemment

Fortunately information often comes from different sources, at different
dmes, and those who released it appear to have acted according to differ-
ing motives. Ihe contradictions among the various bits of evidence are
often very enlightening.

Still, we virtually never have the "whole story", all the evidence the
prosecutors had. But the anti-Stalin bias of the Khrushchev, Gorbachev,
Elkui, and subsequent Russian governments can help us evaluate the
evidence they do release: we may be reasonably certain that they would
have released any evidence inculpating Stalin or his close associates, if it
existed.

During Khrushchev's time (1956-64) and since Gorbachev's time,
roughly 1987 to the present, the Soviet, and then later the Russian state,
have put a lot of resources into an effort to criminalize Slalin. The Reha-
bilitation documents that have been published make this dear. It is hard
to imagine that any evidence tending to show Stalin guilty of (i-aining in-
nocent persons would have been ignored.

By the same token, we may expect that a good deal of the material that
has not been released tends to cast doubt on the "official" anti-Stalin
version. And in fact documents have been released here and there that
tend to exculpate Stalin. Sometimes it appears that this has been done
because of bureaucratic infighting. Usually we simply do not know why it
has been done. Sometimes, too, documents are released several times, the
later versions contradicting the earlier versions in such a way that it is

150

Khrushchev I ii-J

dear that "primary" documents are being fabricated until a final forged
version is declared "official" by its being inserted into an archive.

As always in the writing of history our conclusions must be provisional.
There is no "certainty." Historians are seldom, if ever, in the comfortable
position of dealing with "certainties." As more evidence comes to light in
future, we have to be prepared to adjust or even discard our earlier con-
clusions, if necessary.

We have to be prepared to question our own preconceived ideas and his-
torical paradigms. It's not easy to do this. But if we don't keep the need
to do it in the forefront of our consciousness, we risk looking with favor
on evidence that tends to support our own preconceived ideas, whiJe
looking critically only at evidence that tends to disprove those same pre-
conceived ideas.

A typology of Khrushchevian prevarication

The typology of "revelations" by Khrushchev, and the evidence in each
case, represents my attempt to parse the different kinds of falsification, lo
distinguish the different ways Khrushchev misled his Audience.

The Ameriim Heri/a^ Dictionary of the Rnglish L/joguage defines "lie" as:

1. A false statement deliberately presented as being true; a falsehood.

2. Something meant to deceive or give a wrong impression.

As here, definitions of "lie" normally require that the liar know in ad-
vance that the statement s/he is making is false. This is often, though not
by any means always, hard to demonstrate in historical research. There
fore I have used a broader definition in this article. When I call a siatt
ment by Khrushchev a "lie" I mean either one of two things:

1. Khrushchev must have known the statement in question was take
when he made it.

2. Khrushchev made the statement "in flagrant disregard for the truth.
In this latter case we cannot be certain that Khrushchev knew for ccitain
his statement was false. Rather, he represented the statement as uiir
without any good grounds for doing so.

In every case, however, Khrushchev and his researchers had access to iT
the evidence now available to us, and to a huge amount more - in pnc
tice, to all of the documentation. Therefore it is more than probable thji
Khrushchev did know these statements were false.

i.tupicf Ten. A Typolufry of Prevarication

151

The nocmal practice among scholars is to consider the word "lie" a harsh
(cnn that ought to be used sparingly in serious research. I will do my best
(0 avoid it

More important than issues of propriety are those of analysis. There are
liilferent kinds of falsifications, and to apply any single tenn to them all,
uhcthcr "lie" or another word, fails to bring out the subdeties of the
means of rhetorical misdirection Khrushchev applied.

.\ [)polog)' is an attempt to lump together otherwise different things be-
cause of something they have in common. In this case all the false "reve-
buons" by Khrushchev have in common an intention to deceive, but try
to effect deception in somewhat different ways.

The "Revelations**

No. Khrushchev's "Revelation" Typological Dec

1. "Cult of Personality

2. Lenin's "Testament"

3. Lack of collegiality

4. Stalin "morally and physically annihilated" those who
disagreed with him

5. The practice of mass repressions as a whole

6. The term "enemy of the people"

7. Zinoviev and Kamenev

8. Trotskyites

9. Stalin's "neglect" of the nomis of Party life

10. Politburo Commission

11. Directive of December 1, 1934 signed by Enukidze

12. Khrushchev hints that Stalin was responsible for Kirov's
assassination

13. Telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov to Politburo of Sep-
tember 25, 1936

14. Stalin's Speech to the February-March 1937 Central
Committee Plenum

15. "A number of Central Committee members doubted the
correctness of the policy of mass repression." Especially
Postyshev

16. The case of R.I. Eikhe

17. N.LEzhov

18. The case of la. E. Rudzutak

19. Confessions of A.M. Rozenblium

20. The case of I.D. Kabakov

21- S.V. Kosior, V.Ia. Chubar', P.P. Postyshev, A.V. Kosarev
24.

25. The "Stalin shooting lists"

26. The decision of the January 1938 Central Committee
Plenum

27. "Beiia's gang"

28. The "torture telegram"

29. On Beiia's order Rodos tortured Kosior and Chubar'

30. Stalin "disregarded" warnings about the outbreak of the
war

ClupcaTcn. A'r)'p<)log>'orPn:vancation 153

31. Vorontsov's Letter L

32. The Geiman deserter L

33. The executed military commanders LW

34. Stalin's "depression and passivity" at the outbreak of the L

war

35. Stalin a "poor military commander" L

36. Khar'kov campaign of 1942 L

37. Stalin "planned military operations on a globe" L

38. Stalin "beUttled" Marshal Zhukov's services KW

39. Mass deportations of peoples L

40. 'The Leningrad Affair" L

41. "The Mingrelian Affoir" L

42. Relations with Yugoslavia KW

43. "The Doctors' Plot" L

44. Bern an "agent of foreign intelligence" L
43. Kaminsky about Beria's work for the Mussavetists L

46. The "Kartvelishvili - Lavrent'ev case" L

47. Vengeance on M.S. Kedrov LW

48. Papulia, Sergo Ordzhonikidze's brother L

49. "J.V. Stalin. A Short Biography" L

50. "History of the AUCB(b): A Short Course" L

51. Stalin signed a decree of June 2, 1951 to erect a statue in DK
his own honor

52. The Pabce of Soviets L

53. The Lenin and Stalin prizes L

54. Stalin's proposal to raise taxes on the kolkhozes KW

55. Stalin's insult to Postyshev KW

56. "Disorganization" of the work of the Politburo L

57. Stalin suspected Voroshilov was an "English spy" L

58. "Unbridled arbitrariness" with regard to Andreev L
59.- "Unfounded" accusations against Molotov and Mikoian Lx2

60.

61. Increasing the membership of the Presidium of the C.C. L

The typology

DK - ''Don't Know** - 1 statement (#51). Without studying the original
of the relevant document, we cannot determine whether Khrushchev was
telling the truth when he claimed Stalin personally signed the order for a

154

Khrushchev lied

monument to himself on July 2 1951. Khrushchev certainly distorted the
context by omission.

What would constitute proof of this statement one way or the other is
not certain. For example, a photocopy alone would not be sufficient, as
will be explained when we consider this claim of Khrushchev's.

KW - **Khru8hchev'8 Word (only)" - 4 statements. Khrushchev claims
Stalin said something, but no one else has confirmed it. Even if others
have denied it, it still can't be definitively established as false.

However, these statements probably are lies, since in only one case does
Khrushchev say he was the sole person to hear these remarks of Stalin's.
If the rest of these statements had been made in the presence of others,
surely somebody would have confirmed them, since they all became well
known after the Secret Speech. We can't be certain of this, however,
hence the special "KW" classification.

LW — "Lie, information Withheld*' - 12 statements. These are state-
ments which give a false impression because essential context - other
information - is omitted. Khrushchev himself may, or may not, have
known this context, but those who did the research and reported to him
certainly knew it, on the principle that what we know today, and much
more, was certainly knowable then. It's more than unlikely his researches
would have dared to withhold this information from Khrushchev.

S -> "Special case" - 3 instances. These are very broad statements that,
when examined carefully, do not really make any specific accusation
against Stalin, but rather imply an accusation, and so create a &lsc im-
pression without actually making a specific claim.

L — "Lie" - 41 statements, by far the largest categor}'. These statements
arc either demonstrably false, or made in flagrant disregard of the facti^
In this latter case we can show that Khrushchev did not know whether
thev were true or not.

An example or two from each categor}- (except, of course, the firsL
which has already been cited) should give an idea of the kind of classifica
tion and deception that is involved in each.

KW - Khrushchev's Word

According to KJirushchev Stalin said, in Khrushchev's presence, "I
shake my little finger - and there will be no more Tito. Me will fall." ip
35) Khrushchev implies, though he does not explicitly state, that he

I hjptit Tea. A Tjpolog)' uf Prevarication

155

iheonly witness to these words of Stalin's. If so, there is no way to verify
this incident. No one has con finned this.

.\ second example is the question of Stalin's proposing to raise taxes on
the peasantiy by 40 billion rubles. Khrushchev claimed that in late 1952
or early 1953 Stalin suggested a 40 billion ruble tax increase on the peas-
ifivw \Vc show that either Stalin said this to Khrushchev alone, or Khru-
>hche\' made it up.

Ilie other two examples are Stalin's alleged insult against Marshal Zhu-
kov ind Khrushchev's allegation that Stalin insulted Pavel Postyshev.

If Khnjshchev had been an honest man, one whose statements on all
other occasions had proven to be worthy of believe, then here we might
rely on an unblemished reputation for veracity and presume these state-
ments true. But Khrushchev was only rarely truthful. Therefore it's most
hkely that what he said on his own witness alone is false. But we cannot
be completely certain; hence this classificadon.

LW- Lie, Information Withheld

Khrushchev said "In the same manner were fabricated the "cases"
against eminent party and state workers — Kossior, Chubar, Postyshev,
Kosarev and others." (Nos 21-24)

The situation is not nearly as clear as Khrushchev claims it was. Some
very incriminating informadon is now available to us concerning Ko-
sarev, and much more is available about Kossior, Chubar', and Posty-
shev. For example, Postyshev was rebuked, removed, and finally arrested
and convicted of massive, unfounded repressions against Party members
in his area. Khrushchev was at the January 1938 C. C. Plenum at which
Post)'shev reported and was severely cridcized.

Khnjshchev had to know that Molotov had visited Postyshev in prison,
where Postyshev had confessed his guilt to Molotov. Likewise Khru-
shchev had to know that Postyshev, and many others, had inculpated
Kossior and Chubar', and that Kaganovich said he had seen a whole
notebook of Chubar's confessions. A recendy published document has
shown that all four of these men confessed at trial, although other defen-
dants retracted their confessions at trial. Khrushchev had to know this
too.

A fifth example is Rozenblium's story about how Zakovskii fabricated
confessions. Khrushchev implies, though without affirming it in so many
words, that Stalin was behind this. In fiict we have good evidence that

156

Khrushcht-v llol

Zakovskii was acting under Hzhov*s orders as part of a conspiracy. Wc
have documentary proof that Stalin strongly condemned Zakovskii for
torturing suspects.

It should be noted that some cases of "lie, information withheld" (L\V)
shade over into the category of "lie" (L). Examples of this are Nos 33
and 47. In the case of the "executed military commanders" (No. 33)
Khrushchev expressed himself so vaguely that it's impossible to know
exacdy what, if anything, he was asserting for the same reason it is im-
possible to say for sure that he was lying. There is ample published c\t
dence that Marshal Tukhachevsky and the commanders condemned to-
gether with him in June 1937 were really guilty of the charges against
them. So it is hard to classify this statement of Khrushchev's, but we
have put it into the category of "lie, information withheld."

"The cruel vengeance on M.S. Kedrov" (No. 47) is another such exam-
ple. It is easy to see that Kedrov was not shot "on Beria's order", mean-
ing "at his instigation." The initiating document did not originate viith
Beria. After confirmation with Bochkov, Prosecutor of the USSR Beiia,
as Commissar of Internal Affairs, received the decision to shoot Kedrov.
So that it would also be incorrect to say that Beria had nothing to do with
Kedrov's execution, and he certainly must have issued an "order."

In both cases we have to make do with crumbs of declassified evidence,
on the basis of which it is quite impossible to gain a full understanding ot
those events. Still, the information we do have is sufficient to establish
the fact that Khrushchev lied at least in some aspects of these cases (and
possibly a great deal more). So both cases are both "lies" (L) and also
"lies, information withheld" (L\X^, or a combination of the two.

S — Special Case

Khrushchev discusses mass repressions generally (No. 5) before gcttuig
into specifics. He neglects to mention that he himself was heavily in-
volved in mass repressions, as Part)' First Secretary of Moscow ohJaii'
(province) and city committees during 1935-38 and then, after Januan
1938, of the Ukraine (1 938-49).

The studies that are available to us today suggest that Khrushchex' nuf
well have repressed more people than any other single Party leader. Cer-
tainly he was among the leaders in repression, lliis context is entirch
missing from the Secret Speech. I classify this here as S, "special case**
rather than as LW, "lie, information withheld," because Khrushchev- docs

(ibprcr Ti-a A 'I'ypology of Prwarication

157

not explicitly blame Stalin or Beria for all this repression, though that is
the impcession he no doubt intended to leave his audience with.

Another example of this category is Khrushchev's statement about Zino-
\xv and Kamenev:

In his "testament" Lenin warned that '*Zinoviev's and
Kamenev's October episode was of course not an
accident." But Lenin did not pose the question of their
airest and certainly not their shooting, (p. 9)

The statement sidesteps the whole question of Zinoviev's and Kame-
nev's innocence or guilt in plotting to overthrow the Soviet government
and indirect involvement in Kirov's assassination. These were the charges
brought against them in the first public "show trial" in Moscow in Au-
gust 1936, and to which they confessed. These confessions together with
all the rest of the investigation material were available to Khrushchev.

Die very small portion of this information available to us today suggests
that Zinoviev and Kamenev were guilty of what they confessed to. Even
Khrushchev did not declare them innocent, as he did a number of other
high-ranking Party leaders of whose guilt we have a good deal of evi-
dence today. Instead Khrushchev just sets down their shooting to Stalin's
"arbitrariness." But if indeed they were guilty, as the evidence suggests,
then their executions were anything but "arbitrary."

The final example of category "S" is Khrushchev's reference to No. 10:

a party commission under the control of the Central
Committee Presidium. . . charged with investigating what
made possible the mass repressions against the majority
of the Central Committee members and candidates
elected at the 17th Congress ..."

Khrushchev claimed that this commission "established many facts per-
taining to the fabrication of cases against Communists, to false accusa-
tions, to glaring abuses of socialist legality, which resulted in the death of
innocent people."

In reality, this "Pospelov Commission," whose text has been pub-
Lshed,^''^ did not "establish" these facts. This tendentious study followed
a predetermined agenda to reach conclusions convenient to Khrushchev,
but in most cases unsupported by any evidence. Furthermore the Com-

I -or example in DokJad Khnubtbem (cited above), pp. 185-230.

Chapter 11.
The Results of Khrushchev's "Revelations";
Falsified Rehabilitations

Falsified Rehabilitations

Tivel - Postyshev - Kosarev - Rudzutak -
Kabakov - Eikhe

In his Speech Khrushchev announced that "a party commission under
(he control of the Central Committee Presidium" had determined that

. . .many party, Soviet and economic activists, who were
branded in 1937-1938 as 'enemies*, were actually never
enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest
Communists.

}^e then went on to discuss a number of specific cases whose innocence,
he said, had been established.

.\fter the collapse of the USSR the documents of this commission
headed by Petr Pospelov were published. So were the rehabilitation re-
ports signed by Chief Prosecutor of the USSR Rudenko on which
Pospelov relied '^^ Verbatim quotations and other similarities show that
the rehabilitation reports were the factual basis for the Pospelov Report,
which draws directly from them.

The Pospelov Report has been discussed a few times in a very credulous
vein that has hiled to expose the falsifications it contains. Some of these
are very obvious ones. For example, one section of die report concludes
that all the so-called "blocs*' and "centers** of oppositional activity were

VjMttatsiA Kak Efo Byh. Dokwaenty Prr^rdiMma Ts KPSS I Dniffe Matma/y. V i-x
lomakh. T. 1. Mart 1953- FevraT 1956 (rehabilitation. I low It Happened Documents
d the Pa^sidium of the CC CPSU and Other Materials. In 3 volumes. Volume 1. March
l953-I-cbruaiy 1956.") Moscow MDI-, 2000. 1 Icmfter KKEB 1. ITic Pospelov Report is
on pp. 31 7-348; online at http://www.alexanderyakovlL'v.org/almanah/inside/almanah-
doc/55752

160

Khrushchev 1

fabricated by NKVD investigators. We know this is not so, since Ti
sky's own papers mention a "bloc" of his supporters with the Rights.'^

But the rehabilitation reports have never been subject to any scrub
Previous studies of the rehabilitations referred to in Khrushcht
Speech, such as those by Rogovin and Naumov, have been little m
than summaries of Khrushchev's own memoirs and have creduloi
accepted Khrushchev's own self-aggrandizing accounts.'*'

In the pages that follow we discuss rehabilitation reports on a few of
Party figures who feature in Khrushchev's Speech and compare tl
contents with what we know from other sources published since the c
of the USSR. We conclude that the rehabilitation reports in quest
were not compiled to discover the truth about the guilt or innocence
the defendants. They could not have been, because they did not re\i
even all the materials we now have about these individuals. Who kno
what else is in their investigative and judicial files that we do not km
about?

So why were the rehabilitation reports prepared? As concerns the p
sons who figure in Khrushchev's Speech, all Central Committee me
bers, the only logical explanation is that their purpose was to provi
Khrushchev with plausible documentation for his claims that they w(
all innocent.

This can't have been the reason for the thousands of rehabilitation i
ports on lesser officials. Party members of lesser rank, and of private!
dividuals. Most, if not all, of these were prepared as a result of petido
by the relatives of the defendants, and few of these have been published

«™ RKEB 1, 322-3. Sec- J. ,\rch Cictty, " Trotsky in l lxilc: 'l"hc l uundini; of the l-ounh
International," SwitI StuiHes 38, No. 1 (fanuary 1986), p. 28 & notes 18-21, p. 34: W-m
Hrouc, "'J'rotsky ct le bl(K de$ oppositions de 1932," Cabiers Leon Tnlslg 5 (januat)'-
March 1980), pp. 5-37.

Naumov, \'.\'. "K i.storii sckrctnogo doklada N.S. Khrushcheva na XX s'Vzd KI':vS.
Nomia i Novtishaia Isloriia No. 4 (1 996); also at

http://vivovoco.rsl.ru/V\7PAPi:iLS/HIS-|X)RY/AN riS'r.l I'lAf; Rr)gc»vin, Vadim.
"Prilo/henie I: V/. istorii tayoblachcniia stalinskikh prestuplcniy." Partita rautrtBauifkh.
.\ls<) at http://wcb.mit.edu/pcoplc/fjk/Rogovin/voluine5/pi.htmI R(if^>vin naivdy
repeats Khrushchev's self-serving version of events. Naumov is a bit motv critica] of
Khrushchev's and Mikotan's memoir accounts, but ni'vcr questions the validil}* (>f the
prcxcss itself, startini; with the rehabilitation reports.

LtupUT l-Jcvcn. 'Ilic Results of Khrushchev's '^Revelations"

161

But ei'cn in these cases we cannot be confident that proper investigations
to deicnnine guilt or innocence were in fact carried out. One example is
that of Alexandr lul'evich Tivel'-Levit.

Tiver

Gett)' got to see Tivef's unpublished party file and briefly summaiized
Tivel's case as it is reflected in that file. In May 1957 the Supreme Court
of the USSR overturned Tivel"s 1937 conviction and expulsion from the
Part). But there is no evidence that any serious study of TiveF's case was
n er carried out, the Supreme Court merely stating that his conviction
"had been based on contradictory and dubious materials."'"'

In fact we now have a good deal of information about Tivel'. That is be-
cause, as it turns out, he was hardly a "Soviet Everyman," as Getty
termed him. '^ Tivel* had coauthored an official history of the first ten
years of the Comintern. Tivel' was referred to by name as the interpreter
in the transcript of the 17''' Party Congress when, on February 2, 1934,
Obno, a representative of the Japanese Communist Party, spoke.

.Alexander Barmine, a Soviet official who fled to the West, wrote that
Tivel' had been Zinoviev's secretary. Radek called him *'my collaborator"
and testified that Tivel' was connected with a Zinovievist group. He was
named as a conspirator by both luri Piatakov and Grigorii Sokol'nikov,
two of the major defendants in the 1937 Trial. Sokol'riikov said Tivel'
had approached him, Sokol'nikov, as a member of a Trotskyist group
that was planning to assassinate Stalin.

Sokolnikov: In 1935 Tivel came to me and informed me
that he was connected with the Zaks-Gladnyev terrorist
group. Tivel asked for instructions about the further
activities of this group. . ..

The President: On whose life was this group preparing to make
an attempt?

Sokolnikov: Tivel told me then that they had instructions to pre-
pare for a terrorist act against Stalin... I was personally con-
nected with Tivel, Tivel was personally connected with the Zaks-

!«■ Getty, J. Arch and Olcg V. Naumov, TbeReadfo Temr. SlaBii and the St^-DeHnictioH of
the Bolihm'kt. 1932-1939. New Ilavcn: Yale University Press, 1999, p. 5; Tivel' is discussed
on pp. 1-5.

Getty & Naumov, p. I.

162

Khfushchcv 1 Jul

Gladnyev group. Whether Hvel himself was a member of this
group, I do not know'**

There is quite a bit more. Zaks-Gladnev, who had been editor of Ltniii-
ffvdskaia Pmi/da while Zinoviev headed the Leningrad Party, was Zino-
viev's brother-in-law. Victor Serge wrote about meeting with Zinovie\' in
1927 at Zaks' apartment after the unsuccessful Trotskyist demonstration
against the Party leadership - Bukharin and Stalin at that dme - and
Adolf Yoffe's suidde protest (Yoffe was a devoted Trotsk)ite), where
they planned an underground opposition.

Since Sokolnikov and Piatakov discussed Tiver in their trial tesdmon)'
they no doubt also mentioned him, and possibly at greater length, in pre-
trial investigative interrogations."*^ When they named him at trial Tivel'
was not only still alive at the time - he had not yet been arrested, al-
though he had evidently been expelled from the Party in August 1936.
Perhaps his name came up in connection with the Zinoviev-Kamenet-
Trial of that same month. Tivel"s name was mentioned by Ezhov in the
face-to-face confrontation between Bukharin and Kulikov, one of Buk-
haxin's accusers, in December 1936."*^

According to Getty, Tivef's rehabilitation was the result of appeals from
his widow, who wanted the blot of "child of an enemy of the people"
removed from her son. From the little documentation that has been
made available so far it is clear that despite his rehabilitation there u-as i
good deal of evidence implicating Tivel' in the network of conspiraac
alleged during the late 1930s. This is even more obviously true in the cas<
of the far more prominent Bolsheviks whose examples are dted In
Khrushchev in his Speech.

Postyshev

Khrushchev claimed in his Speech that at the February- March 1937 PIr
num "many members*' of the Central Committee "questioned the nghi-

Rq><)rt of (]ourt Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite (lenirt. ..
V'crbatifn Rqiort. Moscow: People's (Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.K., 1937, p|)-
162-3,165.

iiM know these pre-trial interrogations exist Ix-cause a ver^- short section of an
intemigaiion of Sokol'nikov was published in 1 991 in RtMS/atsia: Pttilitheskii Pnlsitri iO
X • SOxff. ((Moscow, 1991), pp. 228-9.

"Stenogramma ochnykh stavok v TsK VKP(b). Dekabr' 1936 goda." Vopnylikm
No. 3, 2002, pp. 3-31. at p. 6.

i.lup(cr lilcvcn. 'llic Results of Khrushchev's "Rcvcladons"

163

ntss" of "mass repressions/* and that 'Tostyshev most ably expressed
ihese doubts." This assertion could not be checked until the correspond-
ing section of the transcript of that Plenum was published in mid-1995. '"^

The statement turns out to be a deliberate lie. In reality neither Pavel Po-
sn-shev nor a single other member questioned the repressions.

But Khrushchev's deception is far greater than this. Postyshev himself
MS guilty of massive repressions. Stalin called Postyshev's actions "a
massacre ... shooting" of innocent Party members in his area. This was
(he reason that Postyshev himself was removed from his Party post, re-
moved as candidate member of the Politburo, expelled from the Central
(iommittee, then from the Party, arrested, tried, and executed (See our
more detailed analysis of what Khrushchev said about Postyshev, and the
nidence we have amassed, in Chapter Three).

To diis day the Russian government continues to forbid the publication
of, or even access to, Postyshev's case file.'^^ Without access to such in-
vestigative materials as the statements and confessions made by Posty-
shev himself, by those who accused him and those whom he accused,
and the transcript of his trial, we cannot possibly have a full account of
what really happened This is the case with all the figures who Khru-
shchev claimed were executed though innocent.

Therefore, we can't know the whole story either in the case of Postyshev
or that of any of the others. What we can do is to compare the rehabilita-
aon reports which have now been published, with what we know about
Post)'shev from other sources that have become public.

The Pospelov Report section on Postyshev's rehabilitation is far shorter
even than the brief rehabilitation report, and is taken wholly from it, with

In yopnjy Istam, 5/6, 1995. 'ITic Postyshev t^uotabon Khiushchev cited dishonestly is
on p. 4.

■^^ One reason given for this is the passage of a strange law according to which the next
of kin of those tried and executed must give their pcimission before such materials can be
made public. Postyshev's son Ix'onid, a noted economist, has given some interviews in
which he warmly recalls his father and takes for granted that he was innocent.
Rehabilitation was advantageous for the family of those "rehabilitated", since there were
various fonnal and informal ways in which family members of those executed for treason
suffered disciiminadon. It seems that in most cases it was family members who petitioned
for the rehabilitation of their executed reladvcs, though in Postyshev's case Khrushchev
may have initiated it himself.

164

Khrushchev lioi

a personal attack on Stalin added.'"" Khrushchev certainly saw these re-
ports, as they were all sent to the Presidium members. A few are signed
by them, and a few more are even addressed personally to Khrushchev.'^
We'll concentrate on the more detailed rehabilitation report here.

One thing immediately becomes apparent: Postyshev's rehabilitation re-
port*'^' says nothing at all about his involvement in massive extra-legal
executions of Party members, concerning which we do have a great deal
of documentation. Raising this issue would not have induced sympathy
towards Postyshev and hostility towards Stalin.

It is significant that nothing about this occurs in the report, since to really
exculpate Postyshev it would have to be included. Any bona fide re\'ie\k
of Postyshev's case would naturally have to re-examine the issue of iruss
murderl Had it been included, Khrushchev could have simply disre-
garded this information. But this would have left a paper trail. One of
Khrushchev's political opponents like Molotov or Kaganovich might
have wanted to read the rehabilitation report and seen through the fak-
ery.

Khrushchev himself was present at the January 1938 Central Comminee
Plenum at which Postyshev was criticized, and expelled from the C.C.,
for this repression. Khrushchev certainly knew all about what Postyshn
had done and the reasons for his expulsion from the C.C. No doubt he
voted for it himself.

From the evidence it is clear that both the Pospelov Report and the re-
habilitation report itself are faked. They were a put-up job to provide an
excuse for declaring Postyshev innocent, rather than any genuine artcmpi
to review his case. Khrushchev certainly knew this. No one would have
dared to do this without Khrushchev's order.

It is remarkable that in the case of Postyshev's rehabilitation as well as in
most, or all, of the others, those members of the Presidium who had

"»R/CEfl 1.325.

.Si|rncd by Presidium members: pp. 203, 207, 21 7. 220, 227. 229. 231 , 233, 236, 23"
251, 260, 261, 263. .Addressed to Khrushchev: p. 192, In some cases the rtponii wm-
not specifically addressed to Khrushchev but notes on them make it dear that tha wini
direcdy to him. See p. 188, 191, 208, 233, 236, 237, 25 1, 264. A few were either sent fiN
II) Malcnkov <v Hui(pnin, or theirs aa* the copii-s that were found in the archives and
printed.

RKEB 1,218-220. Dated May 19. 1955.

(.hjptcr l-Jm-a 'llic Results of Khrushchev's "Revelations'

165

been on the Politbuio in 1938 - Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoian, and
Voroshilov - must have known this just as Khrushchev did*'*

li is quite possible that Postyshev was only txied on one, or a limited
number, of capital offenses - for example, for being involved in a Right-
Trots k}ite conspiracy. It is common in the USA as well for a defendant
not to be tiled consecutively for every capital offense. It is likely that Po-
st^shex' never stood trial on other capital offenses - after all, a person can
only be executed once.

But in that case, in order to "completely rehabilitate" him, all that would
be necessary would be to have his conviction on the ofifense of which
he was convicted set aside. If that conviction could be set aside, he
would then be "innocent", meaning: his only conviction had quashed. It
loob as though this is what happened. It is probably the case of many, if
not all, of those "rehabilitated" in the reports used by the Pospelov Re-
port.

The report confinns that Postyshev confessed both to participation in a
Right-l'rotskyite conspiracy and to espionage for Poland, but that some
of those those whom Postyshev named as his accompUces either failed to
name him in their own confessions or named Postyshev as one of the
targets of their own conspiracies."^

Some of the material in this report reads very strangely.

• Popov confessed that he, Balitskii and lakir

"attempted to use Postshev in their anti-Soviet plans
but were not successful." This is interesting! If
Postyshev were "innocent", he would have reported
such attempts to recruit him to a conspiracy. If he
had done so, this fact would surely have been noted

Aside from the Presidium members already mentioned (Khrushchev, Bulganin,
Molutov, Kaganovich, Mikoian) the only other person who was a C.C member before
1939 and also in 1956 was Shvemik,a close ally of Khrushchev's. Mar>ihal Scmion
Hudionni)' was a candidate member in 1934, 1939 and 1956; and A.P. /avcniagin was a
candidate member in 1934, evidently in 1 939 as well, and 1956. Bulganin was a candidate
member in 1934.

»2 Wc know from a letter of Judge lll'rikh to Stalin on March 16 1939 that Postyshev was
among those who confessed at trial. Urrikh is quoted at

hctp://sialin.memo.fu/imagps/intro1.htm . Sec the facsimile of the actual lener is at
hnp://stalin.mcfno.iu/imagcs/ulrih-39.ipg or, a more readable copy,
http:/ / chss.montclaii.edu/english / fan/ icscarch/ ulrih-39.ipg

166

Khrushchev

in his favor. But if there's no evidence he did so, how
can he be "innocent"?

• lona lakir, one of the militai)' commanders tried and
executed in the Tukhachevskii case, was named by
Postyshev as one of his co-conspirators but "did not
name Postyshev in any of his confessions." Was lakir
spedfically asked about Postyshev? If not, the fact he
did not mention Postyshev may not be important at
all. Why is this detail not included?

• "Kosior S.V. at the beginning of the investigation
named Postyshev as one of the participants of the
military conspiracy in the Ukraine, then recanted this
confession, then afterwards reaffirmed it." This
hardly exculpates Postyshev. A confession does not
prove guilt, any more than a recantation disproves it.

• "In Kosior's case file there is a statement by N.K.
Antipov in which he affirms that there were very
abnormal personal relations between Kosior and
Postyshev and that Postyshev was not a member of
the general center of counterrevolutionar)'
organizations in the Ukraine."

• After March 1937 Postyshev was transferred from
the Ukraine to the post of Oblast' (province)
secretary' in Kuibyshev. The fact that he was not in
the leadership of the Ukrainian conspiracies does not
prove him "innocent" of anything.

• "At the preliminar)' investigation Postyshev
confessed that he carried out his espionage contacts
with Japanese intelligence through B.N. MePnikov
and B.I. Kozlovskii, members of the eastern division
of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR. As a verification has established, although
B.N. Mel'nikov admitted guilt in contact with
Japanese intelligence, he gave no confession about
Postyshev, and B.I. Kozlovskii was not even arrested.
In this way Postyshev's 'confessions' about his
counterrevolutionary activities in the Ukraine and
connections to Japanese intelligence were not

t hjficcrl'Jmti. 'Ilic Results of Khiushchcv's "Revelations'

167

confinned, and as has been established at the present
dmc they were falsified by the organs of the NKVD."

On the contrary: If Postyshev confessed to being a Japanese agent,
named Mel'iukov, and Mel'nikov himself confessed to being a Japanese
agent, this tends to conHrm rather than to rebut Postyshev's guilt regard-
less o( whether Mel'nikov mentioned him or noti

Qe are infomied that investigator P.I Tserpento confessed to the NKVD
that one specific interrogation transcript was written by himself and an-
other interrogator, Vizel', on the instructions of G.N. Lulov - presuma-
bly their superior - and that Lulov had, evidently, warned Postyshev to
confirm its contents. We are told that Tserpento himself was involved in
(aliiiiiing cases, and confessed to collaborating in falsifying a single inter-
rogation of Postyshev. However, there's no indication of the contents of
this specific interrogation, and we are specifically informed that there is
only a single interrogation in question here.

The final statement of the Postyshev rehabilitation report says merely:

The Prosecutor's office considers it possible to institute
a protest against the sentence passed against Postyshev
by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the
USSR with the object of closing his case and a
posthumous rehabilitation. We request your agreement.

lliis rehabilitation note (zapiska) is dated May 19, 1955. Two months
later, on July 18 1955 in the rehabilitation report of Ukhanov we are told:

It has been established by a process of verification that
the investigation on the case of Ukhanov was carried out
by the former associates of the NKVD of the USSR,
Lulov and Tserpento, who were later exposed as
criminals who had wormed their way into working for
the organs of State Security and who were sentenced to
be shot for a series of crimes, including that of falsifying
investigations.

From Lulov's criminal case file it is clear that he
stemmed from a socially foreign milieu: Lulov's brother
Mendel' was a big capitalist who lived in Palestine. In
Lulov's case file is his note to Zinoviev in which Lulov
expresses his approval of one of Zinoviev's speeches.
From Tserpento's case file it is clear that in 1934 he was
a participant in a counter-revolutionary Trotskyite group

168

Khrushchev

at Saratov University. At that time Tserpento was
recruited as a non-public agent-observer by the organs of
the NKVD. In 1937 Tserpento was transferred to a
government position in the central apparatus of the
NKVD of the USSR.

In the confessions of Tserpento and Lulov are contained
many facts that testify to the fact that, in interrogating
arrested persons^ they forced them to name innocent
persons and in particular forced from them false
accusations against leading Party and Soviet workers. In
falsifying criminal cases Tserpento and Lulov did not
stop at compelling false testimony in relations to certain
leaders of the government and Party. In this way
Tserpento and Lulov falsified many investigative cases,
including the case against Postyshev, now posthumously
completely rehabilitated, and other persons.'^^

Lulov and Tserpento, in short, are accused of having been supporter
the Rights (Lulov - Zinoviev) and of Trotsky (Tserpento) respecm
VCliat this means about Postyshev we will see below. But it also confi
the existence of Trotskyite conspiracies, something that the Pospt
Report denied outright fewer than nine months later.

The Ukhanov report goes on to quote verbatim from an interrogaii
statement by Ezhov's right-hand man in the NKVD Mikhail Frinovj
In it Frinovskii details how E2hov directed massive fabrications of c
fessions with the help of torture in order to cover up his own leaders
in an anti-govemment Right-Trotskyite conspiracy of his own. 01
selectively quoted, this document has only recently been published
Russia for the fir^t time (February 2006).'"^

All of this tells us some important things.

• One interrogation of Postyshev*s was composed by
the interrogators before Postyshev was tried and
executed.

i« RKEB I 233^). Ilic tnrirc l\>styshcv rehabilitation report is at

http://chss.inontclair.edu/english/ (urr/ a'Scarch/pustyshevrehab.html

>M RKEB 1, 234. I lie Russian text of the l- rinuvskii statement Ls at

http:/ /chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/ research/ frinovskyru.html ; the English ai

http://chss.montcliir.edu/english / lurr/ research / frinovskyeng.htm]

Qtipta l-Jcvcn. 'Iltc Rcsulis of Khrushchev's "Revelations'

169

• Frinovskii, Ezhov's right-hand man, is quoted as
describing a method of fiilsifying confessions and
framing people very similar to that all^edly used by
Lulov and Tserpento against Postyshev.

• This means Postyshev's case was reviewed under
Beria, after he replaced Ezhov in late Novonber
1938, but evidently before Postyshev was tried and
executed on February 26, 1939."* His interrogator
Tserpento and his commander Lulov were tried and
executed for falsifying cases, so this was under Beiia
too.

• The issue of massive repression of Party leaders did
not even arise in Postyshev*s rehabilitation report.
Yet Postyshev was "completely rehabilitated" two
months after the original rehabilitation report.

• A number of those implicated by Postyshev in his
own confessions either implicated him in turn
(Kosior) or failed to name him but did not necessarily
clear him either (lakir, Antipov, Mernikov).

• Some of those who confessed to plotting against
Postyshev did, by the same token, confirm the
existence of conspiracies.

• If Postyshev really had been in a conspiracy this
would not have been known beyond a very restricted
number of people. So the fact that other conspirators
confessed to plotting against Postyshev does not
exculpate him in the least.

Conclusion

There's only one theory that can account for all these issues: the rehabili-
tation report on Postyshev is a fraud. None of the important charges
against Postyshev were really investigated, and so he was not reaUy

'I'scipcnto is quoted as saying that his statements could easily be veiifiL-d by calling
iV>styshev and Hubntiv - another arrestee - and talking with them (RKEB 1 219). It's
possible too that Postyshev had already been executed and 'I'scrpcnto just did not know
ihat.

170

Khrushchev I i

cleared of any of them. The puq>ose of the report was not to veii
whether Postyshev was really guilty or not. It was to provide Khr
shchev's phony research with a fig-leaf to justify his blaming Stalin f<
Postyshev's execution.

The Pospelov Report, which bases itself on these rehabilitation reports,
a fraud too. Its passage on Postyshev is much less detailed, blames Stall
more directly, and was clearly drafted for polemic rather than analytic
purposes.

Kosarev

We have a rehabilitation report on Alexandr Kosarev. But there is n
section devoted to him in the Pospelov Report; in the draft of the Speec
by Pospelov and Aristov;''^ or in the draft of Khrushchev's additions.''
Therefore it was added by Khrushchev himself, and constitutes the he
evidence possible that Khrushchev worked not only from the Pospelo'
Report and the Pospelov- Aristov draft, but from the rehabilitation re
ports themselves.

We know much less about Kosarev's fate than ^bout Post}'she\''s, bu
only because the Russian authorities have not released anything. The n
habilitation report on him, dated August 4, 1954, sets down Beria's aimi
of Kosarev, dated November 28 1938, to a personal grudge. At first Ko
sarev refused to confess to any treasonable activities, but was beaten until
he signed a false confession on December 5 in which he admitted to be-
ing a part of the Right-Trotskyite conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet
government.

Ever}'thing is blamed on Beria, who is said to have hated Kosarn* be
cause Kosarev despised Becia for distorting the history of the Bolshoik
Party in Georgia and for oppressing old Georgian Bolsheviks. Beria took
his first opportunity as head of the NKVD to arrest Kosarev and b

■MRXEB 1,166-168

197 "pr<K-kt doklada '() kul'tc lichnosti I cgci postlcdstviiakh', prcdstavlcnni)- I'.N.
P()spclo\7m 1 A H. Aristovym. 18 fcvralia 1956 g." DokladNS. KAnsbeheva 0 KuTlf
Lichiwsti S/aS/ia M XX S"e^ KPSS. DokumtHty. luJ K. Aimcrmakhcr ctal. Mo^owr
R()SSF1:N,2002. pp. 120-1 33; also in RKEB 1. 353-364.

iw "D»p()lncniia N.S. Khrushchcva k procktu doklada '() kul'tc lichnusti i c-gi)
poslcdscviiakh"'. DokhH Kbnub(ha>a, pp. 134-150; also in RXEB 1, 365-379.

(.luptcr l-JcvL-n. 'Ilic Results of Khrushchev's "Revelations'

171

wife. Kdhen Kosarev refused to "confess", Beria had him beaten into a
false confession.

Boia allegedly had Bogdan Kobulov, one of his right-hand men, and the
main investigator Lev Shvartsman beat Valentina Pikina, a former co-
»t>Hcer of Kosarev's in the Komsomol, though Pikina still refused to
falsely accuse Kosarev. We are told that Kosarev confessed at his trial
only because Beria and Kobulov assured him that by so doing his life
ttould be spared. Beria then refused to pass on Kosarev's appeal to the
court, and Kosarev was shot

Khrushchev had already had Beiia and seven of his closest associates,
including Kobulov, shot in 1953. Investigator Shvartsman, who along
vah Kosarev's widow provided virtually all the information in the reha-
biUtadon report, was to be executed under Khrushchev in 1955. So the
report tells a Beria "horror story" similar to many others Khrushchev was
spreading. Beria is said to have done all this just out of revenge, without
any political motive at alL

lliis itself is suspicious, since we know from other documents that there
were political charges against Kosarev. We review them briefly below
(#24), and in somewhat more detail in the body of this study. The reha-
bilitation report does not even mention them, much less refute them.

Rogovin cites an account in which in March 1938 Kosarev met with a
former Leningrad Komsomol leader named Setgei Utkin, who had com-
plained that the NKVD had forced him to make false accusations. Ko-
sarev then denounced Utkin to Ezhov and Utkin was sent to a camp for
16 years. A close relationship between Kosarev and Ezhov is also at-
tested by Anatoly Babulin, a nephew of Ezhov's whose statement was
recendy published.

According to Rogovin, who based his summary on Gorbachev-era publi-
cations, Kosarev was really arrested right after a plenum of the Komso-
mol Central Committee which met November 19-22 1938 and at which
most of the Politburo of the Party appeared and spoke: Stalin, Molotov,
Kaganovich, Andreev, Zhdanov, Malenkov and Shkiriatov. Kosarev and
others had dismissed and persecuted a certain Mishakova, an instructor
of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, who had denounced a
number of Komsomol figures in Chuvashiia.

The memoirs of Akakii Mgeladze, a former Komsomol and, later, Geor-
gian Party leader were published in 2001 .They were written in the 1960s
and concern his meetings with Stalin. Mgelad2e recalled that sometime

172

Khrushchev ] x-d

around 1950 he had asked Stalin about Kosarev, whom he had greatly
admired. Mgeladze told Stalin that he could not believe the chaiges
against Kosarev, and wondered if a mistake had been made.

Stalin listened quietly, and replied to Mgeladze that everybody made mis-
takes, including himself (Stalin). But, Stalin continued, the Politburo had
discussed the Kosarev case twice, and had assigned Andreev and Zhda-
nov to verify the charges against him and to check the NKVD reports.
Mgeladze then states that he himself had read the transcript of the Kom-
somol Plenum, including Andreev's and Zhdanov's speeches and Shkiiia-
tov's report, and had found them entirely convincing in their evidence
against Kosarev.

Obviously there were serious political charges made against Kosarei*.
They probably included involvement with Ezhov, who also confessed to
being the head of a Right-Trotskyite conspiracy himself. The transcript of
the Komsomol Plenum, NKVD investigation reports, and probably
much other evidence too, existed in Khrushchev's day, and probably still
does. It has never been open to researchers.

In his memoirs, published after he was deposed in 1964, Khnishche\'
mentions Kosarev, Mishakova and the charges against Kosarev. He sa}*;
nothing there about any "revenge" by Beria at aU.^*" Yet Rudenko's re-
port of August 1954 makes no mention of any of these matters, and e\'c-
rything is blamed on Beria's desire for revenge!

Whatever the truth may be, we can be sure that this isn't it. And this is
the rehabilitation report Khrushchev based his speech on.

Rudzutak

I An Rudzutak was arrested in May 1937, at the same time as I'uk
hachevsky and the other military leaders, and was accused of being in-
volved with their conspiracy.^"* When Stalin spoke to the Expanded Ses-
sion of the Military Soviet about the Right-Trotskyite-Tukhachevsky con-

Khru.shchcv, N.S. Vrr/ma, Unify, Vlasl' (^Wm*:, People, Power). Moscow: "Moskovskji
Novosti', 1999. I, Ch. II, p. 119. .Available at

hrtp://kunik1943.fni].ru/kursk/arch/b(X)ks/fnefno/hnjschev_ns/ll.html

™ Rud/utak and 'I'ukhachevsky wc*rc named in the same Politburo resolution accusing;
them of participation in an anti-Soviet Ri^ht-'rrotsk)'ite conspiracy and espionage for
Germany, on May 24 1937, and expelled by the (Icntnl (Committee Plenum on Mav 25-26
1937 (1 .ubianka 2, Nos. 86 & 87, p. 190).

i.hjpieriili-vcn. 'the Results of Khrushchev's "Kcvelaauns"

173

$pinq, he named Rudzutak as one of the thirteen persons identified to

tbidjte-^"'

llie rehabilitation repon, dated December 24, 1955, says nothing at all
ibout this.^*^ We are told that Rudzutak confirmed **anti-Soviet activity"
in his preliminary confession but that these confession statements are
'contradictory, not concrete (i.e. spedGc), and unconvincing", and (hat at
[ml Rudzutak recanted them, saying that they were "imagined." Nothing
ir all is said about the involvement with the military conspiracy.

The corresponding shon section on Rudzutak in the Pospelov Repon^'
is based endrcly on this rehabilitadon report, adding that "a medculous
\(nficadon carried out in 1955 determined that the case against Rudzutak
falsified and he was condemned on the basis of slanderous materi-
als." .As we show below, this is false. The rehabilitadon repon on Rudzu-
tak is a whitewash.

A large number of defendants inculpated Rudzutak. The Rehabilitadon
trport dispenses with these in various ways:

• Some (Magalif, Eikhe, and others) named Rudzutak in their confes-
sions but later recanted thdr confessions.

The fact that a confession is recanted does not make that recantadon
tnore "true" than the original confession.

• Some (Alksnis, German, ''and other Soviet and Party
workers of Latvian nadonality") named Rudzutak,
but their invest^don had been carried out "with the
most serious violations of l^ality" and so were
discounted.

• The rehabilitadon repon on lakov Alksnis^ was not
prepared undl three weeks later. It says that Alksnis
confessed and confirmed his confession at his trial,
but says that he did so because he had been tortured,
though no details, such as names of investigator —
torturers, etc., are given in support of this statement.

»< Stalin's speech is in IsfetbmA No.3, 1994; Lubianka 2, No. 92, pp. 202-209 and is
iqifintcd widely, eg. http://grachcv62.nafod.ni/sfalin/tl4/t14.48.htfn

MRKEB 1.294-5.

»»WCEB 1.328-329.

» RKEB 1, 300-1 Januaty 14 1956.

174

Khrushchev I

• Some (Chubar', Knocin, Gamamik and Bauman) had
already been declared innocent, "consequendy they
could not have had anti-Soviet ties with Rudzutak."

• According to the rehabilitation report on Chubar'
himself (251-2) Chubar' had confessed to
participating in a Right-Trotskyite conspiracy, and
was named by a number of others such as Antipov,
who himself was named by Rykov. Chubar also
confessed to espionage for Germany. Chubar' also
confessed fully at trial, a point we have documented
in the body of this book.

• The confessions of Bukharin and Rykov stated only
that Rudzutak was a "Rightist" and sympathized with
them but was afraid to say so openly.

• The confessions of Krestinsky, Rozengol'ts, Grin'ko,
Postnikov, Antipov, Zhukov and others are
"extremely contradictory and lacking in
concreteness", and "therefore cannot be accepted as
evidence of Rudzutak's guilt."

lliere are a few rhetorical techniques used here that we should note.

• The fact that a confession is recanted does not mean
the recantation is "true" and the confession "false."
In this case we simply do not know which, if either,
statement is true.

• Nor do we know whether Rudzutak recanted all of
his confessions, or only a part of them. We actually
know that in other cases, like that of Airforce
General-Lieutenant Rychagov and former NKVD
chief lagoda, defendants admitted to conspirac}' to
overthrow the government and to sabotage, but
vigorously denied claims that they had spied for
Germany.^'^ Bukharin too confessed to certain
specific serious crimes but firmly denied others.

^ I'or Rychapw sec RKEB \, 165. hor lagoJa, sec his final statement at the March 1938
"Bukharin" Moscow 'I'rial; linglish text at The ffrat pu/y triaL Ivditcxl, ami uith mxi^ln
Robert C 'I'uckcr and Stephen I*. (lohcn. \X^th an introJ. by Robert (^ Tucker. New

jpiLT l-Jcvcfi. 'Ilic Results of Khtushchcv's "Revelations'

175

• Chubar' and the other three men had been
"rehabilitated", which usually means that their
convictions had been set aside for procedural
reasons. It is not the same thing as a finding of
"innocence", though it was in fact accepted as such.

• There is no basis for dismissing such confessions on
the basis of "contradictions." It is to be expected that
confessions from many different defendants will have
"contradictions" among them. This is far from
meaning that they are worthless as evidence. On the
contrary: identical confessions from different persons
would be highly suspicious.

ludzutak is named by Grinlco and Rozengol'ts, and many times by
Cresdnskii, in the transcript of the March 1938 "Bukhaiin" trial The
ehabilitation report simply ignores this testimony.

n recently published confessions Rozengol'ts is named both by Ezhov
limself and by his associate and relative A.M. Tamarin as having been
nvotved with Ezhov himself in his own Rightist conspiracy. This fact
lends to add credence to Rozengol'ts' incrimination of Rudzutak and of
3thets too

Rudzutak is also named in Rukhimovich's confession of February 8, 1938
(Lubianka 2, No. 290). There's no question that Ezhov and his men were
fabcicating confessions and forcing defendants to sign them by torturing
them, as Frinovskii's recently-published statement confirms. There is eye-
witness testimony that Rukhimovich was beaten (Lubianka 2, 656-7),
chough not by one of Ezhov's men, many of whom were later punished
for fabricating confessions.^ However, the fact that someone was

York: Cirossct & Dunlap, 1965, p. 675. Russian text at
htip:/ / magister.msk.ni/library/trotsky/ trotlsud.htm

^ 'Ilic eye-witness account says Rukhimovich was bcau.-n by Mcshik, later an associate of
Hcria's and executed with others in December 1953. 'Hie rehabilitation report on
Rudzutak names lartscv as a fabricator of one of Rudxutak's confessions, and nok.-s that
larTs<.-v was later executed for such falsifications (p. 295). lartsev was arrcstt-d in June
1939 and executed along with Uzhov and many of l-'xhov's NKV'D mc-n - under Bcria.
'lliis would mean the accusation against Mcshik, and therefore against Heria, is false. Sec
Nikita Pcvov and K.V. Skorkin, Kto mkmdilNKVD 1934-1941. Sprandmik (Moscow,
1999). At http://www.mcmo.ru/history/nkvd/kto/biogr/gb572.htm

176

Khrushchev liaJ

beaten does not mean their statements, or confessions, were either true
or false.

Kabakov

There is no rehabilitation report on Ivan Kabakov, who was simply in-
cluded in the list of 36 along with Eikhe and Evdokimov, and no attempi
to confront the charges against him. From the materials now available to
us today (No. 19), and of course available, along with much more, to
Khrushchev in 1956, there is a lot of testimony against Kabakov.

Rykov and Zubarev, both defendants in the March 1938 "Bukharin"
Trial, named Kabakov as a conspirator. No one claims these defendants
were subject to torture or threats of any kind. Tliis well-known testimony
is simply ignored by the Pospelov Report and Khrushchev. The Amcn-
can mining engineer John I Jtclepage expressed his conviction that Kaba-
kov must have been involved in some kind of sabotage. American
scholar John Harris has seen, and quotes from, Kabakov's ddo^ or inves-
tigative file. Harris cites no indication that Kabakov's confessions war
other than genuine.

Eikhe

Robert I. Eikhe was the first person Khrushchev named as unjustly re-
pressed by Stalin. We have saved Eikhe's case for last because it rcveab
more than the other cases.

Our section on him (No. 16) details what we know about Eikhe's aircsi
and trial. As with other defendants neither the Soviet nor Russian au-
thorities have released the investigative tile and trial information to re
searchers. But it is clear that Eikhe himself was involved in large-sale
repressions of innocent people, in concert with the NKVD. He was mo>i
likely punished for this, among other offenses. I1ie fact that he worked
so closely with Ezhov in these repressions would lead any investigator lo
wonder whether the two were conspiratorially linked - though we canno:
be certain without more evidence.

At the end of the section of his speech on Eikhe, Khrushchev says:

It has been defmitely established now that Eikhe's case
was fabricated; he has been posthumously rehabilitated

Tliis statement is false. Khrushchev delivered his Speech on February 23.
1956. According to the rehabilitation materials Eikhe was not rehabili
tated until March 6. Although Khrushchev devotes more space to Eikhe

Lhipia l-Jcvcn. 'Ilic Results of Khrushchev's "Revelations'

177

than to any other repressed Party offidai there was no rehabilitation re-
port about Eikhe. He was one of 36 repressed Party officials all recom-
meodcd br rehabilitation en masse on March 2 1956.^^ This document
)s merely a list; there are no details about any specific individual.

The main part, and the only substantive section, of Khrushchev's Speech
devoted to Eikhe consists of a long quotation from his letter to Stalin
dated October 27, 1939. Without question, this is one of the most emo-
tionally charged sections of the Speech. Eikhe vehemendy protests his
innocence, recounts how he has been tortured into signing confessions
of Clinics he never committed, and repeatedly affirms his loyalty to the
Pam and Co Stalin personally.

The impression given is one of a wholly devoted communist going to his
death on trumped-up charges. It is damning testimony. Since the full text
vk'as finally published in 2002, we can also tell this: as read by Khrushchev
ihe letter was heavily falsified by significant omission.

llie parts of Eikhe's "letter to Stalin" of October 27 1939 published in
the Pospelov Report are not always the same parts Khrushchev cited in
his Speech. Both documents contain significant ellipses irom the full text
of what is apparendy the original letter. I say "apparendy*', because the
published text is acknowledged by its editors to be a copy.

There are no archival identifiers at the end of the document, just the note
diat the original is in the "Eikhe's archival invesdgadve file." That has no
archival idendfiers either. That means that the Russian government does
not want researchers to know where the Eikhe invesdgadve materials are
- if, indeed, they still exist.

Even the compilers and editors of this official volume were not permit-
ted to see the original, or Eikhe's original file!^"* We don't know why, but
a study of the sections of Eikhe's letter that are not included in either the
Pospelov Report or Khrushchev's Speech suggests some possible an-
swers.^

RtabibaUia Kak Eto Byh. TtvraT 1956 - Nacbab 80-kb gtdov. lul. Artisov ct al. Moscow
Matcrik, 2003, pp. 16-18. Hereafter RKEB 2. Sec pp. 18-19 for the Presidium resolution
rehabilitating them.

wPis'mo R.I. iukhc I.V. Stalinu" fl'Cttcr of R.I. Mikhc toJ.V. Stalinj. DokM Khnabcbeva
225-229.

^ 'Ilic following remarks do not pretend to be a comprehensive study of this very
important document.

178

Khniishchcv

A translation of the full text of Eikhe's letter is appended to this cha
It is annotated to make it clear which sections are quoted in K
shchev's Speech, which parts are in the Pospelov Report, and which |
are quoted in both of them. Most important for our purposes, the
tions omitted from both the Speech and the Pospelov Report are I
lighted.

It is immediately clear that it would not have been useful for K
shchev's purposes to make the full text of this letter public.

• Eikhe refers to a letter he wrote to "Commissar L.P.
Beria" — meaning he wrote it long after his arrest,
which took place on April 29, 1938. Beria did not
become Commissar until late November 1938,
replacing Ezhov.

• Eikhe says that "Commissar Kobulov" had agreed
with Eikhe that he could not have invented all the
stories of treasonable activity he had confessed to.
Kobulov was one of the seven KGB men who were
judicially murdered in December 1953 for having
been close to Beria. This passage would tend to make
Kobulov, and hence Beria, look like responsible men,
and so Khrushchev could not permit it to become
public.

• Eikhe's letter reveals that he had been accused of
conspiracy by a great many other Party officials. He
calls all these accusations "provocations" and gives
various explanations for them. This naturally suggests
that his arrest was warranted. A person named as a
co-conspirator by many other conspirators may, in
fact, be guilty. Anyone would conclude that the
whole investigative file must be examined to
determine whether Eikhe was telling the truth or not.
Such an examination would have shown that it was
Khrushchev who was not telling the truth.

• Eikhe blames two NKVD investigators for torturing
(beating) him: Ushakov and Nikolaev-Zhurid. We
know something about the activities of these two
men. They acted under Ezhov's orders and were
arrested, tried and executed for fabricating

(ilupat l-Jcvin 'Ilic Results of Khnishchcv's "Revelations"

179

confessions and torturing arrestees. Both Ushakov
and Nikolaev [-Zhurid] wer so closely associated with
Ezhov that they were tried and executed at virtually
the same time.^'"

• The arrests and investigations of NKVD men who
tortured prisoners and fabricated confessions was
carried out by Beria. Khrushchev had been the
leading figure in the judidal murder of Beria in 1953,
and never missed a chance to blame Beria for
anything he could. Since in his Speech Khrushchev
tries to blame Beria for Eikhe's plight - and for much
else Beria did not do - it would not have been in
Khrushchev's interest to release the text of Eikhe's
letter.

• Likewise, Eikhe's letter makes it clear that some kind
of proper investigatorial, i.e. judicial, procedure was
now in place. He had been allowed to write to Beria,
viho was now the head of the NKVD (People's
Commissar for Internal Affairs). NKVD investigator
Kobulov, one of Beria's men, had expressed some
degree of agreement with his, Eikhe's, professions of
innocence or, at least, was trying to figure out what
was true and what was not. And of course Eikhe had
been permitted to write this letter to Stalin, which
Khrushchev implies was delivered to its recipient.

• All this implies that Beria, and Stalin as well, were
trying to cany out a serious investigation, sort out the
rights and wrongs. This is what Khrushchev's
audience would have expected of Stalin, at least. But
it goes diiecdy contrary to the whole purpose of
Khrushchev's Speech, which was to claim that Stalin
and Beria did not act responsibly.

21" |>ctrov and Skorkin, op.cit,

http.7/www.mcmo.ni/histoiy/nkvd/kto/biogr/gb355.htm. Both Nikulacvand Ushakov
arc un the same "list" of January 16, 1940 as lizhov; see "Stalinskie rassticl'nyc spiski" |=
"Stalin Shooting lists") http://stalin.memo.fu/spiski/pg12117.htni and ff.

180

Khrushchev I;

• Eikhe makes it clear that conspiracies did exist, and
names a number of prominent CC members as
having been implicated in them or in false
accusations against himself. The whole thrust of
Khrushchev's Speech is to cast doubt on all
conspiracies.

• * Eikhe states that both Evdokimov and Frinovskii
implicated him as involved with Ezhov in
conspiratorial activities. Eikhe blames Ezhov and
Ushakov for having him beaten into false
confessions. Eikhe claimed he had no conspiratorial
des with Ezhov, though Frinovskii had said he did.

• Eikhe calls Ezhov an "arrested and exposed counter-
revolutionary", raising the issue of Ezhov's own
conspiracy. This is a fact only revealed very recently
when a single confession statement each by both
Ezhov and Frinovskii have been published (February
2006).

There's no reason to doubt that Eikhe was beaten into false confessior
by Ezhov's men, for Frinovskii and Ezhov admit to doing just that i
many people. But in this case that fact does not necessarily suggest inno
cence on the part of Eikhe. Frinovskii admits that he and Ezhov fabn
cated cases against their own men, and had them shot as well, in order u
avert any chance that they would "turn" on them when questioned b;
Beria.

Reproducing Eikhe's whole letter - to say nothing of the whole Eikhi
investigation file - would have "muddied the waters" considcrablv- li
would have raised the issue of Ezhov's conspiracy, a story which would
have interfered with Khrushchev's goal of blaming everything on Stalin.
It would have introduced the names of many other high -raking Parti
members, revealing that all these cases had to be looked into bef ore ihc
genuine confessions could be separated from the false ones.

• It would have introduced Evdokimov, named by
both Frinovskii and Ezhov as a close co-conspirator
of theirs. But Evdokimov's name is on the same
"rehabilitation" of March 2, 1956 list as Eikhe's!

t KipiarJcvcii. llic Results of Khrushchev's "Rcvclabuns"

181

• Eikhe also names CC members Pramnek, Pakhomov,
Mezhlauk, and Kosior. He says that Pramnek and
Pakhomov have falsely implicated him.

A denial of guilt such as Eikhe's letter to Stalin is no more credible in
iisdf than an admission of guilt. Yet the only exculpatory information
ned by- cither Klirushchcv or the Pospelov Report were the carefully
selected excerpts from Eikhe's letter.

Vllien the fiill text of this letter is put side by side with the other infoima-
Qon about Eikhe's role in mass repressions the conclusion is inescapable:
Pospelov and Khrushchev did their best to cover up any evidence that
tended to suggest Eikhe's guilt. By doing this they forestalled any serious
invesbgation into Eikhe's case, and by extension into Ezhov's conspiracy.

i Jche also claims that Stalin had said all CC members were pennitted to
'acquaint themselves with the special files of the Politburo". Exactly
Mvhat u-as in these oso^ fk^ki^zs probably not clear to the CC members
of 1956. But they would have asked whether they themselves had such
permission!

I( would have made it impossible for Khrushchev to deny to the CC
members the right to review the investigation materials on these and
odier persons - if they had believed they were entitled to do so. And we
can be confident that they did not have this right, because even Politburo
members like Molotov and Kaganovich had not seen these investigative
mateiials. Presumably this was because Khrushchev denied them access.
It is impossible to imagine otherwise how Khrushchev and his supporters
could have gotten away with some of the &lse accusations they made
against the "anti-party group" in 1957.

In sum Eikhe's letter as a whole was very damaging to Khrushchev's
case. Its contents tend to exculpate both Stalin and Beria and to conGnn
the existence of a serious conspiracy among at least some CC members,
as well as among others. Khrushchev could only dte it if he had made
certain beforehand that nobody but his own supporters could see it.

](t ](t :(t :(t :(t

Our examination of these three rehabilitation reports leads us to some
conclusions that are important for our study of Khrushchev's Speech.

• The reports ignore a great deal of evidence against
the persons "rehabilitated."

Khnishc

They do not subject any of the evidence to a close
analysis. Any contradictions among different
confessions are considered sufficient to dismiss all of
them.

Until all the investigative materials are made available
to researchers we can't know exactly what happened.
For our present purposes this isn't necessary. What
we can tell is this:

The rehabilitation reports do not establish the
innocence of the persons "rehabilitated."

These reports did not attempt to determine the truth,
but to provide a documentary basis to declare the
persons "innocent".

We have what Khrushchev had; what Pospelov had;
and what Rudenko reported to them. The inescapable
conclusion of our analysis of this material is that
Khrushchev had instructed Rudenko to prepare
"whitewashes" - documents that declared the
accused innocent, tricked out with as much air of
plausibility as necessary.

When juxtaposed to what else wc know about the
charges against the defendants, the rehabilitation
reports of Postyshev, Kosarev, and Rudzutak cannot
stand up to scrutiny. Such a conclusion is consistent
with the fact that Khrushchev lied in many other
instances in his Speech, as we can now prove.

(.hipti-rl-ilcvcn. 'llic Results of Khrushchev's "Revelations"

183

Eikhe's Letter to Stalin
of October 27, 1939

Text from Doklod Khmshcheva o Kutte Lichnosti StaUna na XX S'ezde Kl^SS.
Dokumenly. Ed. K. Aimermakher et al. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002, pp.

225-228.

Bold - Khrushchev's Speech
Iti^ics ■ Pospelov Report

Bold Italics - both Khrushchev's Speech and the Pospelov Report
Ri-gular Text - omitted from both.
I>crficr»f R.I. Eikhe toJ.V. Stahn

October 27 1939
Top Secret

To Secretary of the CC ACP(b) J.V. Stahn

On October 25 of this year I was infaaned that the investigatioo in
my case has been concluded and I was given access to the maten-
ils of this investigation. Had I been guilty of only one hundred tb of
the crimes with which I am chaiget^ I would not have dMred to
send you this pre-cxecution dechtation; howevej^ J have not been
guU^ o/ even one of die thirds with which I am charged and my
heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness, I have never in my
h£e told you a ward of Alsehood, and now. Ending my two feet in
Ae grave, I am also not lying. My whole case is a typical example
(^provocation, slander and violation of the elementary basis of
revolutionary legah'ty. I realized as early as September or October 1937
that some kind of foul provocation was being organized against me. In
official transcripts of an interrogation of accused persons sent from
Krasnoyarsk region in the course of exchange with other regions, includ-
ing the Novosibirsk NKVD (in the transcript of the accused Shirshov or
Orlov) the following clearly provocational question was written: "Haven't
you heard about Eikhe's connection to the conspiratorial organization?"
and the answer "The person who recruited me told me that as a youth
you were already a member of a counterrevolutionary organization and
you'll 6nd out about that later."

Tliis foul provocational trick seemed to me so stupid and clumsy that I
did not even consider it necessary to inform the CC CPSU and you about
it. But if I had been an enemy, I really could have used this stupid provo-

184

Khrushchev ] icJ

cation to construct a pretty good coverup for myself. Vdiat this provoca-
tion meant in my own case only became clear to me long after my arrest,
and I have written Commissar Beria about it.

The second source of this provocation is the Novosibirsk prison where,
since there is no isolation, enemies who have been exposed and who
were arrested at my order remained together, and made plans to spite me
and openly agreed that "now we must incriminate those who are incrimi-
nating us." According to Gorbach, chief of the NKVD office, this w^s
said by Van'ian, whose arrest I actively pursued in the Commissariat of
Transportation. The coaAssioas which weicmMdepartofmyElcia
not anfy Mbsuid but caatMW m number of instances of shnder to-
wM/d die Central Committee of die AU-Union Communist Pattf
(Bolsheviks) and toward the Council of People's Commissars, be-
cause coaect resolutions of the Central Coauaittee of the AU-Uniaa
Commum'st Party (Bolsheviks) and of the Council of People's
Commissars which were not made on m/^ initiative and without
participation are presented as hostile acts of counterreyohitionuj
organi2ations made at my suggestion. This is the case with the con
fessions of Printsev, Liashenko, Neliubin, Levits and 'others. In addition
during the investigation there was full opportunity to establish the provo
cational nature of this slander on the spot with documents and &cts.

AU this is most clear from the confessions about my alleged sahota^ in h>lkJxt^ buiia-
in^ specifically that at regional con fennces and at plenums of the regional conmitlao;
the ACP(b) I argued for the creation of gigantic kolkho^: AU these speeches of mint
wen transcribed and published, but not a single concrete fact or a single quotation ju<
cited in accusation a^inst me. And no one ever will be able to prove it, becaust lU
whole time I worked in Siberia I promulgated the Party's line with determination -jrj
without meny. The kolkhosy in W. Siberia were strong and, when compared to lt<
other grain- producing regions of the Soviet Union, were the best kolkho:^.

You and the CC ACP(b) know how Syrtsov and his cadres who rcmainetl
in Siberia warred against me. They formed in 1930 a group thai the C(.
ACP(b) smashed and condemned as an unprincipled gang, yet I am ac
cused of supporting this group and of being in the leadership of it aticr
Syrtsov's departure from Siberia. Especially striking is the material ab«ui
my founding a c.r. Lat\'ian nat. organization in Siberia. One of my pnna
pal accusers is the Lithuanian, not Latvian (as far as I know, since I can
neither speak nor read Latvian) Turlo, who came to Siberia to work in
1935. But Turlo's confessions about the existence of a c.r. nationalist or
ganization start with 1924 (this is very important if one is to see «iih

liupta IX-vciL 'ihe Results of Khni$hchcv'$ '*Rcvcktiun$"

18S

provocadonal methods the investigation into my case was con-
ducted). In addition to which Turlo does not even state from whom he
heard of the existence of the Lat nat counteirevolutionary organization
since 1924. According to Turlo's transcript he is a Lithuanian and joined
(he Latvian nation. c.r. organization with the goal of separating territory
trom (he USSR and uniting it to Latvia. In the confessions of Turlo and
Tftdzcn it is said that a Latvian newspaper in Siberia praised bourgeois
Latiia but did not give a single quotation nor identify a sin^e issue. I
must speak separately about the accusations of ties with the German con-
sul and of espionage.

The confessions concerning banquets at the consul's and my supposed
moral conupbon of the Party activists are given by the accused Vaganov,
tt ho arrived in Siberia in 1932 or 1933. They begin with 1923 (this is the
result cf the same provocation as in Turlo's confessions), the description
of banquetinania, moral corruption, etc., again without indication of any-
one from whom he learned this. The truth is this: when I was chairman
of die area executive committee and there was no representative of the
Coinniissariat of Foreign Affairs, I would attend receptions at the con-
sul's twice a year (on the day of ratification of the Weimar constitution
and on the day the Treaty of Rapallo was signed). But I did this on the
reconunendation of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. I did not host
banquets in return and the inappropriateness and incorrectness of such
behavior was even indicated to me. I never went hunting with the consul
and permitted no moral corruption of the activists. The housekeeper who
li\'cd with us, the workers of the economic section of the area executive
committee, and the chauffeurs who drove with me in my auto can con-
finn the accuracy of my words. The clumsiness of these accusations is
also obvious from the fact that, if I had been a German spy, then Ger-
nian intelligence would have been obliged to categorically forbid any
public association with the consul, in order to maintain my cover. But I
have never been either a c.r. or a spy. Every spy, naturally, must strive to
acquaint himself with the most secret decisions and directives. You have
told the members of the Central Committee many times in my presence
that every CC member has the right to acquaint himself with the special
files ["osobye papki" - GF) of the P.B., but I have never consulted the
special files, and Poskrebyshev can confinn that.

In his own confessions GaiUt, former commander of the Siberian Military
District, confirms the provocation about my spying, and I am forced to
describe to you how these confessions were fabricated.

186

Khrushchev Ik-d

In May 1938 Major Ushakov was reading me an excecpt from Gailit's
confessions that on a free day Gailit had seen me walking together with
the German consul and he, Gailit, understood that I was transmitting lo
the consul sec information I had received frcxn him. When I pointed out
to Ushakov that beginning in 1935 a commissar and NKVD intelligence
accompanied me, they tried to add in that I had escaped them by car. But
when it was made clear to them that I do not know how to drive, ihev
left me alone. Now in my case file a transcript of Gailit has been inserted
from which that part has been excised.

Pramnek confesses that he established c.r. ties with me during the Janu-
ary 1938 plenum of the CC ACP(b). This is a bald-faced lie. I have ne>'cr
spoken with Pramnek about anything, and during the January plenum of
the CC ACP(b), after he finished his report right there in front of the
tribunal in a group of secretaries of regional committees, who demanded
to be given a time when they could come to the PCA to decide a number
of quesdons, the following conversation took place. Pramnek asked me
when he could come to the PCA and I gave him an appointment for the
next day after 12 o'clock at night, but he did not come. Pramnek lies that
I was sick then, it can be established through the secretaries and the
commissar of the NKVD that, starting the 1 1th of January, the day I got
out of the hospital, I was in the Commissariat every day until 3-4 o'clod
in the morning. The monstrous nature of this slander is also clear ftan
the fact that an experienced conspirator such as I fearlessly established
contact through Mezhlauk's word a month after Mezhlauk's arrest.

N.I. Pakhomov confesses that even at the time of the June 1937 plenum
of the CC ACP(b) he and Pramnek were discussing how to make use oi
me as Commissar of Agriculture for the c.r. organizabon. I only learned
of my proposed appointment from you at the end of the October 193^
plenum and after the end of the plenum I remember that not all meni-
bers of the Pb knew about this proposal. How is it possible to belic\e the
kind of pro vocational slander that is in Pakhomov's and Pramnek's con-
fessions?

Evdokimov says he found out about my participation in the conspina in
August 1938 and that Ezhov told him he was taking steps to prcsen cmv
life.

In June 1938 Ushakov inflicted cruel torment on me so that I would con
fess to an attempt to kill Ezhov, and these confessions of mine uy»
formulated by Nikolaev with Ezhov's knowledge. Could Ezhov have

I hipitr I'Jirvcn. 'fhc Kcsult:i of Khrushchev's "Revelations'

187

icicd in this way if there were even one word of truth in what Evdoki-
mov says?

I w-as at Ezhov's dacha together with Evdokimov, but Ezhov never
called me either fhend or supporter and did not embrace me. Malenkov
and Poskrebyshcv, who were there too, can confirm this.

In his confessions Frinovskii opens yet another source of provocation in
my case. He confesses that, supposedly, he found out about my participa-
tion in the conspiracy from Ezhov in April 1937, and that Mironov (chief
of the NKVD in Novosibirsk) was asking Ezhov in a letter at that time
that he, Mironov, "could come out on Eikhe" concerning the conspiracy,
a a participant in the conspiratorial oiganizaiion. Mironov only arrived
in Siberia at the end of March 1937, and without any materials had al-
ready received Ezhov's preliminar)' sanction on whom to conduct a
provocation. Anybody can understand that what Frinovskii confesses is
no attempt to protect me, but is rather the organi2acton of a provocation
against me. Above I have stressed, in the confessions of Turlo and Va-
ganov, the year with which they begin their confessions regardless of the
clumsiness. // should have been pointed out to Ushakov, who a>cjs chief investigator
on my case, that the false confessions beaten out of me were contradicted by the confes-
sions in Siberia, and my confessions were bein^ transmitted try telephone to Novosi-
birsk.

This was done with blatant cy nicism and in my presence Lieutenant Prokof ev ordered
a telephone call to Novosibirsk. Now I have come to the most disgtMceiiil
put of my life und to my leally giMve guilt MgMinst the puty And
ggginstyou. This is my coaAssioa of countetrevohitionMiy activity.
Commissar Kobulov told me that no one could just think all of this up and really I
never could have thought it up. Hctt is what bMppeaed: Not b^iog able to
endure tbe tottuiea to which I was submitted by Ushakov and Ni-
kolaev and espedalfy by the /btmer xpho utilized the knowledge
that my broken vertebra have not propedy mended and have
saused me great pain, I have been Arced to accuse myself and oth-
ers.

Tbe greater part of my confession has been suggested or dictated
by Ushakov, and the remainder is my reconstruction of NKVD ma-
tehals ftom Western Siberia for which I assumed all responsibility.
If some part of the story which Ushakov Abricated and which J
sj^ned did not propedy hang together; I was Arced to sign another
variation. The same thing was done to Rukhimavich, who was at

188

Khrushchev lied

£at deaigDMted ms m member of the leserve net Mnd whose nunc
jMtet WM8 tcmoved wilhoat telling me Mnytbing about the sMme
was also done with the leader of die reserve ne^ supposed^ created
bf Bukbarin in 1935. At Brst I wrote mj name in and then I was
instructed to insert V.I. Mezhlauk. There were odier aimiUr inci-
dents,

I must pause especially on the pro vocational legend of the treason of the
Lat\'ian SPC in 1918. This legend was wholly invented by Ushakov and
Nikolacv. There never was any tendancy favoring separation from Russia
among the Latv Soc Dems and I and the whole generation of worker? oi
my age were educated in Russian literature and in revolutionary and Bol-
shevik legal and underground publications. The question of a separate
state soviet body such as a Latvian soviet soc. republic seemed so wild to
me as to many others that at the 6ist congress of Soviets in Riga I took a
stand against it and I was not alone. The decision concerning the estab-
lishment of a soviet republic was only taken after it had been announced
that that was the decision of the CC RCP(b).

I only worked for about two weeks in soviet Latvia and at the end ot
November of 1918 I left to do provision work in the Ukraine and u'as
there until the collapse of soviet power in Latvia. Riga fell because it was
in fact almost surrounded by the VCTiites. In Estonia the Whites were \ic
torious and occupied Balk. The ^X'hites also took Vil'no and Mitava and
were advancing on Dvinsk. In this connection it had already been pro-
posed in March 1919 to evacuate Riga, but it held out until Nfay IS 1919.

I have never been at any c.r. meetings with either Kosior or Mezhlauk.
Those meetings indicated in my confessions took place in the presence ot
a number of other people who could also be questioned. My confession
of c.r. ties with Ezhov is the blackest spot on my conscience. I gave thm
false amjtssions when the investi^tor had reduced me to the point of losing msaouj-
ness hy interrogating me for 16 hours. When he stated, as an ultimatum, thai I shouU
choose between two handles (one of a pen and the other of a rubber truncheon) ihm I.
believing they had brought me to the new prison in order to shoot me, once again dim-
onstrated the greatest cowardice and gave slanderous confessions. I did not can
crimes I took upon myself as long as they shot me as soon as possible. But to subjui
myself again to beatings for that arrested and exposed c.r. Ezhov, who had
doomed me who had never done anything criminal, was beyond my slm^tk

ufibt lUcvcn. 'llic Results of Khrushchev's "Kcvdatiuns'

189

Ilus is the truth about my case and about myself. Each step of my life
ind work can be verified and no on will ever find anything other than
dnotion to the Party and to you.

Itm Msking and begging you that you Mgain exMmine my CMse, nnd

Ais not for the puipose of sprang me but in order to unmask the
fikptovocMticn which, Jike m snake, has wound itself axound many
peaoas ia part also because of my cowardice and cnminal sJander.
I h»yt never betrayed you or the party. I know that I perish because
of the file, base work of the enemies of the party and of the people,
who have fkba'cated the provocation against me. My dnam has been
M remains the wish to die for the party and forjou.

Eikhe

The genuine statement is located
in Eikhe's archival investigative file

"Rehabilitation by list"

MEMORANDUM OF I.A. SEROV AND R.A. RUDENKO TO THE
CC CPSU CONCERINING THE REVIEW OF THE CASES AND

THE REI-£ABILITATION OF MEMBERS AND CANDIDATE
MEMBERS OF THE CC AUCP(b) CHOSEN AT THE IT' " CON-
GRESS OF THE AUCP(b)

Manh2J956
CC CPSU

Having reviewed the cases of those members and candidate members of
the CC AUCP(b) elected at the 17* Party Congress who were convicted
the Committee for State Security [KGB] of the Council of Minister of
the USSR and the Procuracy of the USSR have determined that the ma-
jority of these cases were falsified by the investigative organs, and that the
so-called confessions of guilt of the persons arrested were obtained as the
result of serious beatings and provocations.

Having reported this, we believe it expedient to propose that the Militan
Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR review and posthumous!)'
rehabilitate the illegally condemned persons listed below:

1. Kosior Stanislav Vikent'evich - former vice-chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars of the USSR, member of the CPSU from 1907.

2. Eikhe Robert Indrikovich - former People's Commissar for Agricul-
ture of the USSR, member of the CPSU from 1905.

3. Bubnov Andrei Sergeevich - former People's Commissar for Educa
tion of the RSFSR [the Russian Republic], member of the CPSU from
1903.

4. Evdokimov Efim Georgievich - former secretary of the Azov- Black
Sea Regional Committee of the Party, member of the CPSU from 1918.

6. Kabakov Ivan Dmitrievich — former secretary of the Sverdlovsk obk:'
committee of the Party, member of the CPSU from 1914.

• •

14. Rukhimovich Moisei L'vovich — former People's Commissar for the
Defense Industry of the RSFSR, member of the CPSU from 1913.

(.hipin l-ilcvm 'the Results of Khrushchev's "Revelations'

191

The cases concerning the accusations of other members and candidate
members of the CC AUCP(b), members of the Commission of Party
Control, of Soviet Control, and of the Central Review Commission, who
were elected at the l?*^ Party Congress, will also be reviewed and re-
ported to the CC CPSU.

We request a decision.

Chairman of the Committee for State Security
Of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

I. Serov

The General Procurer [Prosecutor] of the USSR

R, Rudenko

llie rehabilitation decree from the Presidium of the CC CPSU followed
without delay:

ManhS19S6

No. 3.II.54 - Concerning the Posthiunous rehabilitation of illegally
condemned membets of the CC AUCP(b) elected at the 17th Party
Congress.

To conBrm the proposal of the Chairman of the Committee for State
Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR com. Serov and the
General Procuror of the USSR com. Rudenko concerning the review of
the cases and posthumous rehabilitation of the illegally condemned
members of the CC AUCP(b) and candidate members of the CC
.AUCP(b), elected at the l?**" Congress of the Party: Kosior S.V., Eikhe

R.I., Dubnov A.S., Evdokimov E.G Kabakov I.D., ...Rukhimovich

Chapter 12.
Conclusion: The Enduring Legacy
of Khrushchev's Deception

For decades it's been assumed that Khrushchev attacked Stalin for ihc
reasons he set forth in the "Secret Speech." But now that we have estab-
hshed that Khrushchev's accusations, or "revelations", against Salin in
the Speech are false, the question returns with even greater force: Whai
was really going on?

Why Did Khrushchev Attack Stalin?

Why did Khrushchev attack Stalin? VChat were his real motives? The rea
sons he stated cannot be the true ones. The "revelations" Khrushcho
made are false, and Khrushchev either knew this (in most cases), or did
not care.

Khrushchev had some kind of real motives, but it was precisely those
that he remained silent about in his Speech at the 20'*' Part}' Congresj
and, for that matter, for the rest of his life. In other words, "behind" thr
"Secret Speech" known to the world there is a second, and real "seem
speech" — one that remained "secret," undelivered. My purpose in th
essay is to raise this question rather than to answer it. Ill simply menoon
a few possibilities and areas for further inquiry, some obvious, others Ie5>
so.

Surely Khrushchev wanted to forestall anybody's dragging up his om
role in the unjustified mass repressions of the 1930s by shifting the blamt
onto Stalin and initiating "rehabilitations." He probably surmised that the
"rehabilitations' would make him popular in much of the Party ebtc, iiTf-
spective of whether those "rehabilitated" had been guilty or not. liven,
perhaps, in Moscow and the Ukraine, where his reputation as architect ot
mass repressions was well earned and widely known, shifting the blanK
onto the dead Stalin while vindicating those repressed and, just as impor
tantly, their surviving families, would mitigate the animosity many mm
have held for him.

I. hjpk.t Twelve, (.unclusion: 'ITic linduring Ixgacy of Khrushchev's Deception 193

Khauhchev's Speech has hitherto been taken at face value. The research
published here proves that it is an error to do so. That leaves us with a
number of questions. Why did Khrushchev give his speech? Why did he
go to such lengths - phony research, hiding genuine documents, - and
make such political saciitices, in order to deliver a speech that was, for all
piacdcal puq>oses, nothing but falsehoods?

The Chinese Communist Party came up with one answer. They believed
that Khnishchev and his allies wanted to lead the USSR onto a sharply
different political trajectory than they believed it had taken under Stalin.
\\c have briefly alluded to some economic and political policies instituted
under Khrushchev that the CCP leadership saw as an abandonment of
basic Mandst-Leninist principles.

Diere has to be some truth in this theoty. But a base for such ideas al-
ready existed in the USSR. The origins of these policies, now idendfied
with Khrushchev and his epigones Brezhnev and the rest, lie in the im-
mediate post-Stalin period, long before Khrushchev came to dominate
the Soviet leadership. In fact, many of them can be traced back to the late
1940s and early 1950s, the "late Stalin" period.

It is difficult to discern to what extent Stalin himself supported or op-
posed these policies. In his last years he was less and less active po-
litically. Periodically it seems as though Stalin did try to assert a different
padi towards communism, — in his last book Economic Problans of Socialism
in /he USSR (1952), for example, and at the 19^ Party Congress in Octo-
ber 1952. Later, Mikoian wrote that Stalin's late views were "an incredibly
leftist deviation".^'! But immediately after Stalin died the "collective lead-
ership" all agreed on dropping all mention of Stalin's book and on dump-
ing the new system of Party governance.

Khrushchev used his attack on Stalin and Beria as a weapon against the
others in the "collective leadership", especially Malenkov, Molotov, and
Kaganovich. This course was fraught with risk, however. How could he
have known that they would not accuse him equally, or even more so?
Pan of the reason must have been that Khrushchev was able to rely on
allies like Pospelov, who help>ed him "purge" the archives of documenta-
tion of his own participation in mass repressions

Khrushchev may have also realized that with Beria gone he alone had a

211 "Neveroiatno Icvatskii i^agib." Mikoian, Tak Byh, Ch. 46: "On the t^vc of and During
(he 19'>< Paity (Congress: Stalin's 1 ^st I^ys."

194

Khrushchev lied

"program": a plan and the initiative to carry it out. We can see in retro-
spect that the other Presidium members were amazingly passive during
this period. Perhaps they had always relied on Stalin to take the initiative,
to make important decisions. Or perhaps that seeming passivity hid a
struggle of political ideas confined to the leadership body.

Historian luri Zhukov has set forth a third theory. In his view Khru-
shchev's aim was to decisively close the door on democratic reforms with
which Stalin was associated and which Stalin's former allies in the Presid-
ium (until October 1952 called the Politburo), especially Malenkov, were
still trying to promote. Those reforms aimed at removing the Party from
control over politics, the economy and culture and putting these in the
hands of the elected Soviets. This would have been a virtual "pere-
stroika", or "restructuring", but within the limits of socialism as opposed
to the full-blown restoration of predatory capitaUsm to which Gorba-
chev's later "peres troika" led.

Zhukov details a number of moments in the struggle between Stalin and
his allies, who wanted to remove the party from the levers of power, and
the rest of the Politburo, who fiimly opposed this. In May 1953, shortly
after Stalin's death, the executive branch of the Soviet government, the
Council (Soviet) of Ministers, passed resolutions depriving leading Part)
figures of their "envelopes", or extra pay, reducing their income to a
level or two lower than their corresponding government figures.
According to Zhukov, Malenkov promoted this reform. It is consistent
with the project of turning power over to the Soviet government and
downgrading the role of the Party, getting the Party out of the running of
the country, economy and culture. Significandy, it was done before the
illegal repression of Lavrentii Beria who, we now know, supported this
same project.

In late June 1953 Beria was repressed, either by arrest and imprisonmeni
or by outright murder. In August Khrushchev managed - how, we do
not know - to reinstate the "envelopes" of special bonuses to high-
ranking Party functionaries and even to get them the three months back
pay they had missed, lliree weeks later, at the very end of a CentnJ
Committee Plenum, the post of First Secretary of the Part)' was rein
stated (until 1934 it had been called 'General Secretary') and Khrushdio
was elected to it. It is hard not to see this as the Party mmnkJalunisn-
ward for "their man."

Zhukov concludes:

(Jupia Twelve. (Conclusion: 'fhe linduiing l>cgacy of Khnishchcv's iX*ccption 195

It is my firm conviction that the mie meaning of the 30*** Con-
gress lies precisely in this return of the Party apparatus to power.
It was the necessity to hide this fact . . . that necessitated distract-
ing attention from contemporary events and concentrating them
on the past with the aid of the "secret report** [Secret Speech -
GF)2«2

llie first two explanations, the anti-revisionist or "Chinese** and the
"power struggle** explanations, surely contain elements of truth. In my
\iew, however, Zhukov's theory best accounts for the facts at hand while
also cemaining consistent with the contents of the Secret Speech and the
faci that, as we have discovered, it is virtually entirely false.

Stalin and his supporters had championed a plan of democratization of
the USSR, through contested elections. Their plan seems to have been to
move the locus of power in the USSR from Party leaders like Khru-
shchex' to elected government representatives. Doing this would also
have laid the groundwork for restoring the Party as an organization of
dedicated persons struggling for communism rather than for careers or
persona] gain.^'^ Khrushchev appears to have had the support of the
ParT)' First Secretaries, who were determined to sabotage this project and
perpetuate their owrt positions of privilege.

Kluushchev pursued policies, both internal and external, that contempo-
rary observers recognized as a sharp break from those identified with
Stalin's leadership. In fact similar poUcy changes not identical to those
initiated or championed later by Khrushchev but broadly congruent with
them were begun immediately after Stalin*s death, when Khrushchev
himself was still just another member, and not the most important one,
of the Presidium of the Central Committee. ^'^ Among the "reforms"

2'^ lU. N. /hukov,"Krutoi povorot...nay.ad" C*A shaqi turn ... backwards"), XX
MiUaiafy kaiifemUii k 40 UtHK XX s"r(da KPSS. Gorifaehev-Foiid. 22fevraSa 1996 gida.
Moscow. April-85, 1996, pp. 31-39; quotation on p. 39. lliis was the only presentation to
which Gorbachev himself personally responded in sharp disagreement. Also at
hnp;//www.gorby.iu/actjviiy/confcrcncc/show_553/vicw_24755/

1 have outlined this hypothesis at some length in "Stalin and the Smiggle for
IX'mocratic Reform", Otbural Logk 2005. At http://clogic.cservcr.org/2005/2005.html

Indeed the "post-Stalin 'Hiaw"' can \x said to have begun during Stalin's lifetime, at
least as far as cdturc was concerned, 'lliis idea is developed by the late historian Vadim
Koxhinov, in Chapter 8 of ?j>ssiia: Vtk XX (19}9 1964). (Moscow: l-XSMO / Algoritm,
2005), "On the so^alled 'lliaw'". pp. 309-344.

196

Khnishchcv 1 j

most often cited that went directly contrary to Stalin's long-held polid
were

• A shift towards "market"-oriented reforms;

• A concomitant shift away from heavy industry and
the manufacture of the means of production, towards
consumer-goods production;

• In international politics, a shift away from the
traditional Marxist-Leninist concept that war with
imperialism was inevitable as long as imperialism
exists, to the avoidance of any direct warfare with
imperialism at all costs;

• A de-emphasis on the working class as the vanguard
of social revolution in order to emphasi2e building
alliances with other classes;

• A new notion that capitalism itself could be
overcome without revolution by "peaceful
competition" and through parliamentary means;

• An abandonment of Stalin's plans for moving on to
the next stage of socialism and towards true
communism.

Khrushchev could not have taken power, nor his "Secret Speech" bcei
conceived, researched, delivered and had the success it did, without pro
found changes in Soviet society and the Communist Party of the Soviei
Union.2'5

The Khrushchev Conspiracy?

Elsewhere Zhukov has argued that it was the First Secretaries, led by
Robert Eikhe, who seem to have initiated the mass repressions of IQ}"^-
1938.2'^ Khrushchev, one of these powerful First Secretaries, was himselt
very heavily involved in large-scale repression, including the execution of
thousands of people.

2'* Before 1952 the party's name was the All-Union (Communist Part)' (Holshcviks).

2"* I have briefly summari/ed and discussed /.hukov's theory, citing all his relevant b(N)b
and articles, in the two-part series "Stalin and the Stru^rgle fur HemiKratic Rcf()nn".in
Cidliiral Ugk for 2005. At http://cl()gic.eserver.ot)>/2005/2005.html

Q^lct Ywdvc. Conclusion: 'llic Enduiing I ^cgacy of Khiushchcv's l^cpdon 197

,lin^ of these First Secretaries were themselves later tried and executed.
Some of them, like Kabakov, were accused of being part of a conspiracy.
Olbm, like Postyshev, were accused, at least initially, of mass, unwar-
BDled repression of Party members. Eikhe also seems to fall into this
ffonp. Later many of these men were also charged with being part of
ndous conspiracies themselves. Khrushchev was one of the few First
SeatMiies during the years 1937-38 not only to escape such charges, but
to have been promoted

Might it be that Khrushchev was part of such a conspiracy - but was one
ofifae h^hest-ranking members to have remained undetected? We can't
pcDvc cr disprove this hypothesis. But it would explain all the evidence
we now have.

Klinishchev's Speech has been described as aiming at the rehabilitation
of Bukhatin. Some of the figures in the 1938 ''Bukharin" Moscow Trial
were in fact rehabilitated. So it would have been logical to include Buk-
haiio. But this was not done. Khrushchev himself wrote that he wanted
to rehabilitate Bukharin, but did not because of opposition from some of
die focei^ communist leaders. Mikoian wrote that the documents had
already been signed, but that it was Khrushchev who ren^ed.^'''

Of all the figures in the three big Moscow Trials, why would Khrushchev
waiit to rehabilitate Bukhacin spedfically? He must have felt strong loy-
ally towards Bukharin more than he did towards others. Perhaps this loy-
alty was only to Bukharin's ideas. But it is not the only possible explana-
Don.

Since Khrushchev's day, but especially since the formal rehabilitation
under Gorbachev in 1988, Bukharin's "innocence" has been taken for
granted. In a recently published article Vladimir L. Bobrov and I have
shown that there is no reason to think this is true.^'> The evidence we
have - only a small fitaction of what the Soviet government had in the

Khrushchev^ N.S., Vrv/nia, Liiuti, Vlait". Vojpummmia. {"Tifncs, l*e<>plc. Power
Memoirs"). (Moscow, 1999), Book 2, P« 3. p. 192. .Anastas Mikoian, Tak Bjh fl'Sat's
How It Was"). Moscowr. X'aiprius, 1999. Chapter 49, "Khnishchc-v u Vlasti" (Khrushchev
in power) , print version p. 6 1 1 .

(iiovcr I'urr and Vladimir I. Bubrov, "Nikolai Bukhaiin's Kirsi SlatcmtfK of

(Confession in the I.ubianka". CKkKnULMgcTOOl . At

hitp://ck>gic.cserver.org/2007/I*urr_Bobrov.p<]r This article was first published in the
Russian historical ioumal Kho I (M), 200S, 38-S2. 1 have put the Russian version online at
http://chss.inontcbii.edu/ img|ish/iuir/rt:s<afch/(u rmbobiov_bukhariii_klio07.pdf

198

Khrushchev 1 jliJ

1930s - overwhelmingly suggests that Bukharin was in fact involved in a
wide-ranging conspiracy. In another study recently published in Rus-
sian^ we have demonstrated that the Gorbachev-era decree of rehabili-
tation of Bukharin by the Plenum of the Soviet Supreme Court, issued on
February 4, 1988, contains deliberate falsifications.

According to this theory Bukharin told the truth in his confession at the
March 1938 Moscow Trial. But we know that Bukharin did not tell the
whole truth. Getty has suggested that Bukharin did not begin to confess
until after Tukhachevsky had confessed, and the imprisoned Bukharin
could have reasonably known about that - at which time he named I'uk-
hachevsky.

Evidence exists that Bukharin knew of other conspirators whom he did
not name. Frinovskii claimed Ezhov himself was one of them.^'This
appears credible in the light of the evidence about Ezhov that we now
have at our disposal. Could Khrushchev also have been one of these -
whether known to Bukharin or not? If he had been, he would have been
a highly-placed conspirator, and therefore very secret.

From what we can tell now, Khrushchev "repressed" a huge number of
people - perhaps more than any other individual aside from Ezhov and
his men, and perhaps Robert Eikhe. Perhaps that was because he u%
First Secretary' in Moscow (city and province) until January 1938, and
thereafter First Secretary in the Ukraine. These are two large areas. Given
a party-based conspiracy, or suspicion of one, it would be logical that it
would have been strong in Moscow, while the Ukraine had always had its
share of nationalist opposition.

Frinovskii stated flatly that he and Ezhov "repressed" - tortured, fabn
cated phony confessions of, and judicially murdered — a great many peo-
ple in order to appear more loyal than the loyal and thereby to cover up
their own conspiratorial activities. This admission by Frinovskii is not
only credible; it is the only explanation that makes any sense. Ezhov him-
self cited the additional motive of spreading dissatisfaction with the So-
viet system in order to facilitate rebellions in the event of forcigti invas-

^'^ "Rcabilitatsionnoe moshcnichcstvo", in Cirovcr I'urranil Vladimir Htibniv, IPfZ
Pramstdie S/aSna. Obzbo/ovamiii ne fiod&z^/! {Moscow. I'iksmo, 2010). (ilava 2, 64-84,

2» LMoMka 3, p. 47.

Q^Mnlwdvc. (Conclusion: 'lite iinduring I'C^cy of Khrushchev's IX-ccpdon 199

Itipfxafs that Postyshev and Eikhe, two First Secretaries who represssd
nay innocent people, acted from Like motives, and we know Eikhe, at
least, worked closely with Ezhov in so doing. May not other First Secre-
llbcs have also acted in this way? Specifically, may not Khrushchev have
o^iiii2ed massive frameups, kangaroo trials, and execudons, in order to
cover his own participation?

Alternative explanations are: (1) several hundred thousand people were in
bci guilty of conspiracy; or (2) these people were simply massacred be-
duse ''Sialin was paranoid" — i.e. wanted to kill anyone who mgh/ be a
duger sometime in the future. But we know that it was Khrushchev,
not Stalin and the Politburo, who took the inidadve in demanding higher
iimits" of numbers of persons to be repressed. And no one has ever
daimed Khrushchev was ''paranoid.*^

Anti-communists, Trotskyites, and adherents to the "totalitarian" para-
digm have normally embraced the **paranoid" explanation, even though it
tall)' "explains" nothing but is, rather, an excuse for a lack of an explana-
tion. But we know now that this is not so. Not Stalin, but the CC mem-
bos - and, specifically, the First Secretaries - initiated the mass repres-
sions and executions.

Ftinovskii explicidy claims that Bukharin knew Ezhov was a part of the
Hight-Trotskyite" conspiracy but refused to name Ezhov in his confes-
sions or at trial. Frinovskii claims this was because Ezhov had told Buk-
huin that he would be spared in return for his silence. This is possible —
diough it is an explanation that does no credit to Bukharin who was, after
aO, a Bolshevik, veteran of the very bloody days of the October revolu-
tion of 1917 in Moscow.

Underground revolutionaries sometimes went to execution tather than
inform on all their comrades. Why not concede that Bukharin might have
refused to name Ezhov for this reason alone? We know that Bukharin
had not, in fact, told the 'Vhole truth" in any of his statements previous
to his trial. Why not - unless he were still not ''disarmed", were still fight-
ing against Stalin? Bukharin's cringing professions to "love" SlaUn

^' See Kzhov's inteiroiption-confcssion of .August 4 t939 in Nikita Pctrov, Mark Janscn.
"StaBnshi Jatomtts"- Nikolai E^. Moscow: ROSSPIIN, 2009. pp. 367-379. l-nglish
ttanslatioa at http://chss.inoatdair.ctlu/cng^h/fiirr/rcscarch/czhov080439cng.hlml

200

Khrushchev I Jul

"wisely"^ are embarrassing to read, lliey cannot have been sincere, and
Stalin could hardly have believed them any more than we can today.

We have seen that Bukharin only named Tukhachevsk}^ after he could
have known the latter was under arrest and had confessed. If Bukhaiin,
for whatever motive, went to his execution without naming Ezhov as a
co-conspirator - as Frinovskii later claimed - why should he not have
protected other co-conspirators as well?

We can't know for certain whether Khrushchev were one of these hidden
conspirators, or that Bukharin knew about him. But we do know that
anti-government conspirators continued to exist in the USSR after 1937-
38,^ and that some of them were in high positions. We know too thai
Khrushchev remained loyal to Bukharin even long after the latter u'as
dead.

The hypothesis that Khrushchev may have been a secret member of one
branch of the many- branched "Right-Trotskyite conspiracy" is enhanced
by the fact that he was certainly involved in a number of other conspira-
cies that we do know of.

• On March 5 1953, with Stalin not yet dead, the old
Politburo members met and abolished the enlarged
Presidium which had been approved at the 19*'' Party
Congress the previous October. This was virtually a
coup d'etat within the Party, neither voted on, nor even
discussed, by the Presidium or Central Committee.

• Khrushchev was the moving force behind the
conspiracy to "repress" - to arrest, perhaps murder -
Lavrentii Beria. We know that this arrest was not
planned much in advance, because Malenkov's draft
speech for the Presidium meeting at which the arrest
(or murder) occurred has been published. That draft
speech calls only for Beria's removal as head of the
combined MVD-MGB and as Vice-Chairrnan of the

^ Hukharin's letter t(> Stalin of December 10, 1937, was published in two major Kussun
historical journals in the same year, i'or the passage cited, see "Poslednoe pis'mo," V^u
2, 1993, p. 52 col. 2; "'Pnisti menia, Koba...' Neixvestn<K- pis'mo N. Hukharina," Mai
0, 1993, p. 23 col. 2. It is translated in Getty & Naumov, Road it Temr, pp. 556 ff;qu(Ki>j
passage on p. 557.

^ I'or one example see (irigory 'I'okacv, Comrade X. I x)ndon: I larvill Press, 1936.

lAfferl^dv- Condition: lYic Knduhng l4:^cy of Khrushchev's Deception 201

Council of Ministers, and Beria's appointment as
Minister of the Petroleum Industry.

• Since Khrushchev was able to deny other members
of the Presidium access to the documents studied by
the Pospclov Report and rehabilitation commissions,
he had to head another conspiracy of persons who
would feed information to him but not to others.

Hub coDspiracy had to include Pospelor, who wrote the Report. It had to
itdude Rudenko as well, because he signed all the major rehabilitation
Rports. Research on how the rehabilitation and Pospelov Commission
reports were prepared has yet to be done. Presumably the other members
of the rehabilitation commissions, plus the researchers and archivists who
located the documents for these reports and for Pospelov, were sworn to
lOcnce, or were in fact part of the conspiracy too.

We do know the names and a little about some of the people who, sup>
poscdly, reviewed the investigation materials. For example we know a
ctfiain Boris Viktorov was one of the jurists involved in the rehabilita-
lioDs. Viktorov at least one article about his work, in Pravda on April 29,
I9B6, the purpose of which was to reaffirm the innocence of Marshal
Tukhachevsky and the other military commanders convicted with him on
June 11, 1937. In 1990 Viktorov published a book claiming to give details
about many other repressions.

His account is certainly a dishonest coveiup. Viktorov asserts their inno-
cence, but cannot demonstrate it. He quotes a disputed document and
ignores some damning evidence that he himself certainly would have
seen and that had not been made public when he wrote but which we
now have. So Viktorov at least was part of the "conspiracy" to provide
Khrushchev with phony evidence that those discussed in the Speech
were, in fact, innocent.

There is general agreement that after he took power Khrushchev had the
archives searched and many documents removed and doubtless de-
stroyed.^^ llie same scholars agree that these docuroenis probably had to

a* lU. N. /hukov, "Zhupcl Staiina. . . Chast' 3". KomsomNhtta Pravda Nov. 12 2002;
Nikila X^iXoSyPavfipntdudaieT KCBIvoh Serm. Moscow: Matciik, 2005, pp. 1S7-162; Mark
lUngc and R. Binncr, Kak ttmr a<^ "BaTshim". Stkntiip fsrika^ No. 00447 1 tekhmdogfia m
vspolitema. Moscow: AIRO-XX, 2003, p. 16. I'or convenience I have rqxatcd these
references in my ttiscussion of No. 28, the "'t orture Tclcgrafn".

202

Khnishchcv i jcd

do with Khrushchev's own role in the massive repressions of the late
1930s. Now that we know Khrushchev falsiHed virtually every statemcni
in his Secret Speech, and that the rehabilitation reports and Pospelov
Report are heavily falsified too, it seems likely that Khrushchev had other
documents removed as well.

This is a big job, and would have taken a lot of archivists, who would
have to have been supervised. It seems too big a job to have been super-
vised by Rudenko and Pospelov alone. A large number of researches
and officials, including of course Party officials loyal to Khrushchev but
as yet unknown to us, would have had to be involved. Naturally those
people would have known what evidence Khrushchev was hiding or de-
stroying.

Aleksandr S. Shcherbakov

In January 1938 Khrushchev had been removed as First Secretary' of the
Moscow City and Oblast' Party and sent to be First Secretary in the
Ukraine. Replacing him in Moscow was Alexandr Sergeevich Shcherba-
kov.

In his memoirs Khrushchev shows real hatred for Shcherbakov, though
the reasons Khrushchev cites are vague ones. The recent biography ol'
Shcherbakov by A.N. Ponomarev published by the Central Moscow .Ar-
chive examines Khrushchev's hostility in some detail. According to
study Khrushchev's hatred for Shcherbakov can be traced to the latter's
refusal to permit Khrushchev to inflate harvest figures by double-
counting seed grain as harvest grain.^

More threatening to Khrushchev was Shcherbakov's role in the appeals
process whereby 90% of appeals by Party members expelled by Khru
shchev in 1937-38, when Khrushchev headed the Moscow Oblast' and
City Committees, were reinstated, more than 12,000 for the year 193'
alone. What Ponomarev leaves unsaid is that a great many of those Pait)
members had been executed, their appeals brought forward by their fanu
Ues.22^

A.N. I'unumarcv. /^ksandr Sbthetiakov, StramUf bioffofti. M: Ixd. Cilavarkhivj Wtvskw.
2004. p. 49.

^ IVinumaiuv spc-cifically gives the example of "troika" NKN'D dccisif)ns appLditl inJ
hcanl in .April 1939. Of the 690 protests, the jud|$.*s reviewed 130 in .April 1939 and
reinstated all but 14 - about 90%.

(.hipta 'I'wdvc. (Conclusion: 'Ilic Hnduring Ixgacy of Khrushchev's Deception 203

Khnishchev was, of course, a member of the trvika that decided upon
these massive repressions, though he was sometimes represented by a
deput}'. All of the other Moscow troika membas were executed for ilL^al
repressions. It's logical to conclude that Khrushchev himself felt ex-
tremely vulnerable. Few, if any, other First Secretaries (Khrushchev was
by 1939 in the Ukraine) had been responsible for as many expulsions and
executions - as much "repression" - as he had been.

Ponomarev dtes other evidence of Shcherbakov's coolness towards
Khrushchev as well At the IS*** Party Congress in 1939 Shcherbakov
gave a report in which he pointedly failed to mention his predecessor
Khnishchev even once. Geocgii Popov, second secretary under both
Khrushchev and Shcherbakov, pointedly did praise Khrushchev in his
speech - a fact that highlighted Shcherbakov's silence.^

Using testimony from Shcherbakov's family as well as evidence from
Moscow archives Ponomarev takes pains to refute a number of accusa-
tions against Shcherbakov that Khrushchev made in his memoirs — for
example, his all^tion that Shcherbakov was a serious alcoholic.^ Ac-
cording to his children, Shcherbakov seldom drank at alL^ Ponomarev
details Khrushchev's two-faced behavior towards Shcherbakov's family
after the latter's defath. Khrushchev was ficiendly to them while Stalin
lived But once in power Khrushchev deprived them of their dacha and
cancelled all memorials to Shcherbakov.

Certainly, Khrushchev was a snake; to use the language Khrushchev him-
self used against the dead Shcherbakov, he had a "poisonous, serpent-like
character."^' Anastas Mikoian, though a close political ally, denounced
Khrushchev as very dishonest and disloyal towards people, and also dis-

^ Ponomarev, pp. 51 -2. Popov was not spared Khrushchev's wrath in larcr years and
wfDtc about Khrushchev in strongly negative terms in his memoir. Sec Taranov, 'Vartiinii
gHbematw Moskvf Gnt^ Popov. Moscow: Izd. Glavarkhiva Moskvy, 2004.

13 Khrushchev. N.S. Vnmia. Uiuff. Vlasf. Kn. 2. Chast' III, p. 41.

^ Ponomaa'v, pp. 204-5. 'llic allegation seems dubious on other grounds as well Inuring
the war Shcherbakov was a candidate member of the Politburo, acted as Stalin's
rcplaccment on the Defense (Committee, was Political Commissar of the Red Army, and
in charj^' of all the organs of war propaganda. Under Stalin's eye he had to work long
hours, impaiimcnt of his abilities through drink would simply not have been tolerated.

^ 'Ilicsc are the words Khrushchev uses about Shcherbakov at op.dl. p. 39.

204

Khnishchcv I Jed

honest in his recounting of historical facts.^' But why was Khnishchev
so vindictive towards Shcherbakov and his family? Why did he dearly
hate Shcherbakov so much?

In his memoirs Khrushchev does not mention that Shcherbakov had
been instrumental in unmasking A.V. Snegov as a conspirator in 1937.
Khrushchev later became very friendly with Snegov, got him released
from a labor camp, gave him an important post, consulted with Snegov
and dted him in his Secret Speech. According to Khrushchev's son-in-
law Alexei Adzhubei Snegov became a friend and confidant of Khiu-
shchev's.252

Why would Khrushchev have been so partial to Snegov that he person-
ally interceded to get Snegov released from a camp in 1954 and then
promoted and favored him so much? A good guess might be that Khru
shchev must have been a friend of Snegov's long ago, before Snegov was
arrested. Perhaps Khrushchev managed things so that Snegov avoided
execution, even though there seems to have been much evidence against
him, and he was in "Category One.'*

Given that Khrushchev and Snegov must have been close, that Snegov
was convicted of being involved in a conspiracy, and that Khrushchci*
went to the trouble of "rescuing" and favoring Snegov - never a high-
ranking Party member, certainly never a powerful person - is it not logi-
cal to suppose that Snegov knew something about Khrushchc\r Ol
course, Khrushchev could have had Snegov killed, no doubt. But if thej
were old comrades it would make sense for Khrushchev to do what he i
did, and honor Snegov.

Contemporar}' scholars have established that Khrushchev rushed to
cover up evidence of his own role in massive repressions. During Stalin <
time many Party leaders and NKVD men were tried and even executed \
for such abuses. It follows that Khrushchev would have lived in fear for •
many years lest his role in massive unjustified repressions becomf ,
known. His fear would have been all the greater if, as we suspect, he wk

^ P()n(imarcv, p. 207 n. 32, citin^^ Mikoian, Tak bylo. I have verified these (juiitatidn::
with the distal vcision of Mikciian's mcmoiis.

Shcherbakov discusses confessions against Snegov in a letter to /hdanov of June 18.

1937. See No. 206, p. 363 in Sovtlskoc KMkoimistvo. Perrfnska. 1928-194 /. Moscow: !

R( )SS1>I :N, 1 999. Adxhubei, Krysheaie lIBu^i (Moscow: Inierbuk, 1 991), pp. 1 62-16' |

After Khrushchev's ouster Snvguv was in fact disciplined by the Party for spreading; {

'i'rotiikyist idi-aK. Sec RJCEB 2, Section 6, No. 23, pp. 521 -525. |

Chipin'rwdvc. (Conclusion: 'Vhc Hnduring Ixgacy of Khnishchcv's Deception 205

involved in some kind of Right-Trotskyite conspiracy himself and had
simply avoided discovery.

Shcherbakov was not only in a position to know about Khrushchev's role
in mass repressions better than almost anyone else.^^ He was also influ-
ential enough that his word would cany weight with Stalin and the Polit-
buro. In May 1941 Shcherbakov was made one of the secretaries of the
Central Committee, a position more powerful than Khrushchev's own.

Shcherbakov died in May 1945 at the age of only 44 years. He had suf-
fered a heart attack on December 10, 1944, and since then had been con-
valescing at home. On May 9, 1945 his doctors permitted him to get out
of bed to go to Moscow to rejoice in the hard-won victory over Nazi
Germany. This brought on a final heart attack from which he died on
May 10.

Why did Shcherbakov's doctors let a man with a heart condition out of
bed at all, when the basic treatment is complete bed rest'' ^ One of
Shcherbakov's doctors, Ednger, confessed to his interrogator M.T. Lik-
hachev that he had "done everything he could to shorten Shcherbakov's
life" as he considered Shcherbakov to be an anti-Semite.^^ Under ques-
tioning by Abakumov, Minister of State Security (head of the MGB), Et-
ingcr vvithdrew his confession, but thereafter repeated them again. Not
long thereafter he died in prison.

4^s First Secretary in the Ukraine Khrushchev had carried out mass repression in the
Ukraine as wcU as in Moscow. Hut he remained for 12 years, until 1949. I le had plenty of
time to cover his tracks there, and to leave the Ukrainian party in safe hands.

^ l\)nomaiev, p. 275 and p. 277 n. 20. states that the doctors "did not object" to
Shcherbakov making the trip that killed him. 'Iliat is, Ponomarcv raises, and so
acknowledges, the question of the doaors' decision, incompetent if not criminal. But he
ihcs not pursue it.

^HA.I.A. Mbnger, Eto hoo^o^ho ^pfyt'. Vojpmrnmaima. Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2001, pi 87.
.'\t http://w>vw.sakharov-

ccnter.ru/ asfcd/auth/auth_pages.xtmpl?Key= 101 53&pagc=78&print=ycs Riumin's
letter to Sidin of July 2 1951, from which these details ultimately come, is printed in
translation in Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. V\i\imo\,StaBH'sLastCrim: The Pht Agpinst
fbt Jewish Doetoa, 1948-1953. NY: Harper Collins. 2003, pp. 115-118. ITie book itself is
terribly unreliable. But the documenta may well be genuine, as they come from Naumov
who, as a prominent archivist, could certainly have had access to them. I le has never
made available the Russian originals. Ponomarev examines the accusations of anti-
Semitism against Shcherbakov and concludes that they are all false; see pp. 212-3; 218 ff.;
227-8.

206

Khrushchev I JlyJ

This was all part of what later became the "Doctors' Plot," a very murk)'
business elements of which were certainly fabricated. Etinger's confes-
sion may have been forced, and he may have been innocent of causing
Shcherbakov's death from mistreatment. Still, even the doctors in the
"Doctors' Plot" who had actually treated Andrei Zhdanov in 1948 agreed
that they had mistreated him and by so doing caused his death. They had
not only pennitted their patient to get out of bed and walk around; they
called in a cardiologist to take his EKG and, when she reported that
Zhdanov had had a heart attack, told her she was wrong and refused ei-
ther to believe her or even to let her enter her findings into the report on
Zhdanov's health. Some "mistake"! In fact, their behavior meets all die
requirements of a "conspiracy" - though whether their conspiracy was to
kill Party leaders, as later charged, or simply to "cover up" for one an-
other, is far from clear.

Moreover, there was a history of this kind of thing. At the M^rch 1938
Moscow Trial of Bukharin, Rykov and others two medical doctors, Plet-
nev and Levin, had confessed to a conspiracy to bring about the deaths
of the writer Maxim Gorkii, Valerian V. Kuibyshev, a Politburo member,
and Vyachcslav Mcnzhinsky, head of the OGPU, to whom lagoda was
second-in-command and whom lagoda wanted out of the way as soon as
possible. We now have confirmation of these charges from pre\'ioush
unpublished pretrial interrogations of lagoda as well as from several
"face-to-face confrontations", or ochnye stavki, between lagoda and doc-
tors Levin and Pletnev, as well as between Kriuchkov and Levin.

We now also have two pretrial interrogations of Avel' Enukidze. 'Ilin
confirm lagoda's confessions generally. Dr. Levin even admits to direct
contact with Enukidze. The present author has done a study of Dr. Plet-
nev's "rehabilitation" and the so-called "research" based on it. This stud\-
concludes that Pletnev's "rehabilitation" too was falsified. Plcmev admit-
ted guilt and never retracted that admission.^^

^ 'Vhc materials frfim lagcnla's interrogations and face-to-facc confrontations art- in
Genii kh lagoda. Narkout vnulrtitHikhHel SSSR, Geiierafniy kamsiargpaiibrsttftiinoi bc^pdsmOi.
Sbonuk dokjimailw. Kaxan', 1997, pp. 218-223. I'hc first of the tMvo transcripts of
interrogations of I enukidze, that of May 30, 1937, is publishcxl here tcKi (pp. 508-517). In
it the NKVn investigator refers to an earlier interrogation of I'inukid/.c fnifn Apiil 27,
1937, which has now been published in Lubianka 2 No. 60, pp. 144-1 56. 'Iliis lust
publication, by the lakovlev fund, has a semi-official status and therefore amfinns iht
genuine nature of the Rrst publicatifm. On contacts between Ix:vin and Ivnukid/c $a- iki
p. 222.

(k^Twdvc. Conclusion: 'llic I^nduring I xgacy of Khrushchev's Deception

207

bjime 1957 one of the defendants in the *^ukharin Tdal" Akbal Ik-
■Dov, was "rehabilitated." Tlie only evidence dted that Ikramov had
kea wrongly accused was the fact that those who accused hini» including
BuUiaiin, had also accused others who had previously also been declared
^Bkabilitated."^^^ No claim was made that either Ikramov, who had con-
feicdat trial, nor any of those who had accused him, acted under com-
pikioa.

December 1957 several other defendants had been similarly "rehabili-
Wcd" lliough the rest of the defendants were not "rehabilitated" undl
1988^ under Gorbachev, this was only a formality. At a national conven-
KM of historians held in 1962 Pospelov was asked what should be said in

schools about the accused. He replied that "neither Bukharin nor
Rvkov, of course, were spies or terrorists."^^* However, Pospelov also
leAised the inquiring historians in the audience any access to the docu-
Doilacy evidence they had asked fori

Bukhaiin had confessed to being a terrorist, but not personally to espio-
nage, only through his co-conspirators, while Rykov had refijsed to admit
he was a spy but agreed that he had tried to overthrow the government.
In effect, therefore, Pospelov made explicit in 1962 what Khrushchev
bd only implied earlier the claim — false, as we can now prove — that the
Moscow Trials were a firameup, the testimony false.

In his Secret Speech Khrushchev declared the "Doctors* Plot" a fabrica-
tion. But he lied about it completely. He claimed it had been faked by
Bcria when in fact it was Beria's investigation that had discovered it was a
falte in the first place. He also blamed Dr. Timashuk for slaning the
"pbt". But Timashuk had nothing whatsoever to do with it. All the pri-

^•RKEBZp. 135.

^ K(rxM«^iMr smshdume o merakb ttbuhshtima po^tovki naucbn^-ptda^chtikikh kadrw po
iaofichesfcim aaukam, 18-21 Mutria 1962 g. Moscow: Nauka, 1964, p. 298. lUri
I'd'shdnskii, a well-known Russian Trotskyist scholar, claims that Pospelov said this
"summafixcd the official results of the secret it'searchcs underiakcii by the appropriate
oigans of the CC CPSU." Sec lU. Ci. I'cl'shtinskii, Ka^voty ihnkhatiirfm. Kammaitarii k
vaspominamem AM. LdniKM (BMkMnimu "Ne^ttfj/staonoe' s prrlo^hemam. Moscow: Izd.
Gumanitamui litvratuiy, 1993, p. 92. 'I'hcrc ts no reason to think this is tnic> since the full
conti.'xt of Fospdov's statement is this: "I can sutc that it is sulficicnt to study carefully
the documents of the 22nd Party Coni^-ss to say that ncithcrr Hukhaiin nor Rykov, of
course, were spies or terrorists." We know that utter fabrications were stated as faa at the
22nd Party C^ongR-ss - Shck-pin's misreading of lona I/\kii''s letter, discussed below, is an
example - so there is no reason to think Pospelov was telling the truth here.

208

Khrushchev I ii-d

maiy evidence we have attests to these facts.

In any case, Shcherbakov's death could not have been but welcome to
Khrushchev. So much of what Khrushchev claimed to have revealed
about the Stalin years has proven false that it would be imprudent to
simply "believe** him in this case. In the light of the evidence we now
have concerning the "doctors* plots" alleged in the 1938 Moscow Trial it
would be a mistake to foreclose the possibility that some, at least, of the
postwar "doctors' plots" might have had some basis in reality.

Finally, there is a long-recogni7ed myster)' of why medical care was not
summoned for the gravely ill Stalin until a day or more after it had been
discovered that he had had a stroke. >Xliatever the details of this affair
Khrushchev was involved in it.

* *

Implications: The influence on Soviet society

Khrushchev's personal motives aside, of greater interest and importance
are the implications for Soviet society and politics suggested by the
Speech.

The fact that the "Secret Speech" is not just untruthful in spots but
rather is composed of falsehoods from beginning to end requires a pro
found readjustment of our historical and political frameworks.

The fact that the research and "rehabilitation" commission that pro\idcd
Khrushchev with the information he used in his speech, the Rospelov
Commission, did not carr)' out honest research has implications for any
and all other commissions of historical investigation set up under Khni
shchev and answerable to him.

For example, many commissions of "rehabilitation*' were set up under
Khrushchev in order to "study" the cases of individuals, overwhelming!}
communists, who had been convicted and either executed or imprisoned
in the GULAG for long periods. In almost all the cases we know of the«
commissions exculpated the accused and declared them "rehabilitated"-

O^pferTwdvc (londusion; 'Ilic I£nduring l^egacy of Khrushchev's Dca.'ption 209

imoccnt, for all practical purposes. Those so "rehabilitated'* were de-
ducd to have been 'Victims of Stalinist repression."

Kovc^ei, in few cases was any evidence presented sufficient to establish
AeioDocence of the "rehabilitated" person. On the conftarf. in some
uses there is good reason to believe that the "rehabilitated" persons may
■othivc been innocent at all.

Foe example, at the June 1957 Central Committee Plenum at which
Khnishchev and his supporters expelled the "Stalinists" Malenkov,
M(rfotov, and Kaganovich for having plotted to have Khrushchev re-
DOFed as First Secretary, Marshal Zhukov read from a falsified letter
fpjm Komandarm (General) lona lakir. lakir had been tried and executed
viih Marshal Tukhachevskii in June 1937 fcv plotting with the Gennans
ind oppositionists within the USSR, for a coi^ dttlat.

Mushal Zhukov quoted it as follows:

On June 29 1937 on the eve of his own death he (Takir -
OF) wrote a letter to Stalin in which he says: 'Dear, close
comrade Stalin! I dare address you in this way because I
have told everything and it seems to me that I am that
honorable warrior, devoted to Party, state and people,
that I was for many years. AU my conscious life has been
passed in selfless, honorable work in the sight of the
Party and its leaders. I die with words of love to you, the
Party, the countiy, with a fervent belief in the victory of
communism.'

On this declaration we find the following resolution:
"Into my archive. St. A scoundrel and prosdtute. Stalin.
A precisely accurate description. Molotov. For a villain,
swine, and b***, there is only one punishment — the
death penalty. Kaganovich.

- Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Moscow, 1998,
p. 39.2"

Tliis text was falsified by the omission of the part of lakir's letter in
which he confinns his guilt and repents. Here is the text from the
"Shvemik Report" on the Tukhachevskii case given to Khrushchev in
19ft4, shortly before his ouster, but not published until 1994. The sen-

2» Moktw, Makuhuf, Ki^mfifk 1957. Moscow, 1998, p. 39

210

Khrushchev lied

tences omitted in Zhukov's 1957 reading are in boldface here:

"Dear, close com. Stalin. I dare address you in this way
because I have told everything and and it seems to me
that I am once mote that honorable warrior, devoted to
Party, state and people, that I was for many years. All my
conscious life has been passed in selfless, honorable
work in the sight of the Party and its leaders. - then I
fell into a nightmare, into the irreparable horror of
treason. . . The investigation is finished. The
indictment of treason to the state has been
presented to me, I have admitted my guilt, I have
repented completely. I have unlimited faith in the
justice and appropriateness of the decision of the
court and the government Now each of my words is
honest, I die with words of love to you, the Pa/ty, the
country, with a fervent belief in the victory of
communism.'

On lakir's declaration we find the following resolution:
"Into my archive. St." "A scoundrel and prostitute. I.
Stjalin]". "A precisely accurate description. K.
Voroshilov." "Moloto\'". "For a villain, swine, and
bastard there is only one punishment - the death penalt) .
Kaganovich."2*'

Aside from relatively inconsequential errors in Zhukov's account - laku >
letter was written on June 9 1937, not June 29 - there are important falsi
fications. In this letter lakir repeatedly confirmed his guilt. Voroshilov.
as well as Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich wrote on the letter, » detail
Zhukov omitted. In 1957 Voroshilov had backed away from the plot lo
remove Khrushchev. The latter, though criticizing the old Marshal sc
verely, spared him the punishment meted out to the others, 'lliis sm:
falsified letter was read out at the 22'"' Party Congress in November l%l

2« RKEB 2 (2003), 688; Voenno-hlmthtskii Arkhiv, \'ypusk 1. Moscow, 1997, p. 194
ill Votunjt Arkhiyji R«tf/No. 1, 1993, p. 50. This was the first publication of the "Shvitnik
Report." But this journal, whose sole issue is surrounded in myster)', is vcr)- hard to finJ
There was evidently never another issue, and this one, while dated 1 993, may not b\'(
actually been published until the following year.

[^NaTwclvc. (lonclu^on: "llic IZnduring Legacy of Khrushchev's iX-ccpdon 211

|^AkianderShelepin.2«i

b 1957 none of the accused - Malenkov^ Molotov, and Kaganovich —
goB^ihuied about Zhukov's &lsificadon of lakir's letter, lliecefore we
nBBt assume that they did not have access to it, even though they were
Btsidium members themselves. It is possible that Zhukov himself may
KM have known that he was reading a falsified document. But Khru-
shdicv's "researchers" had to have known - they provided the textl They
voiild never have dared do this behind Khrushchev's back, llierefore
Khnishchev knew too.^

(We should note too that even in the version of lakir's letter published in
1997 there is an ellipsb - the three dots, in Russian a tnetoehie — after the
void ''treason." Something is still omitted frc»n lakir's letter, of which
(boefoce the genuine and complete text is still being withheld from us by
die Russian government.)

Therefore, none of the ''rehabilitation" decisions, in which a great many
iqKcssed communists were declared innocent, can be taken at face value.
But therefore the same is tnie of other documents created for Khru-
shchev's use.

One such set of documents is known as the ''Colonel Pavlov" reports. A
tecent work by Oleg Khlevniuk calls them "the main source of our
knowledge about the scale of repression."^'** These have provided the
main sources for estimating the number of people "repressed" during the

At the 22nd Party CongKss in 1961, during which Khnishchev and his suppoftcrs
leveled an even more virulent attack on Stalin than in 1956, Alexander Shclcpin repeatc-d
this same distortion, reading aloud lakir's letter while omitting the parts in which lakir
confinncd his guib (Sokolov, B.V. Mikhail TukhA^iukii. ZH^'I Smtrt' 'KratKog) Afanbata'
Satotcnsk, 1999; also at http://niilitera.lib.tu/biu/sokolov/09.himl ; Lcskov, Valentin.
StaBni ZagpnrTtikiaitepskoff, Mo^ow: Vechc, 2003, n. 171 p. 461. 'Vhe actual tran$cript
of Shclcpin's Speech to the 22nd Party (longrcss of the CI^U is printed in Pravda,
October 27, 1961. Sbdepin's dishoni-st misquotaiion of lakir's Ictier is at p. 10, cols 3-4.
It is also in the official transcript: XXII i"t^dKimmiimttiihtskoi Partii Sovtttko^ Snti^ 17-
31 oJdialma 1961 gtda, Slaiafraptbtska ottbiet. Moscow: Cos. Izd. Pobtichcskoi litcratuiy,
1962,399^.

Matthew Lcnue too concludes that Khrushchev kept important drxumcnts secret
ftum Molotov and cMhcfs. Sec "Ke KifwMtinkraiiHSmfetHul«ry (Nc-w Mavcn: Yale U.P.
2010) 592. 1 am picpaiing a detailed review of this extfcmdy flawLxl book.

TbtHiUofyoftbt Gut^. Yale U.P. 2004,p. 287.

212

Khrushchev I JliI

1930$.^'*^ But since they were prepared for Khrushchev we cannot as-
sume they were honestly done. Maybe it was in Khrushchev's interest to
exaggerate - or, for that matter, minimize - the number of those exe-
cuted? Or maybe Pavlov, like Pospelov, thought he should do one or the
other? Given the fraudulent nature of other studies done for Khiushcho'
we can no longer simply assume that the "Colonel Pavlov" reports are
accurate.

In terms of scholarship, almost all research on the Stalin years published
during the past half-century relies heavily on Khrushchev-era Soviet pub-
lications.^^^ It also includes many or most of the non-emigre sources cited
in the numerous works by Robert Conquest such as The Gnat Temr,
Stephen Cohen's famous biography of Bukhaiin^^, and many other
works. Cohen drew his evidence for his 6nal chapter on the 1930s from
Khrushchev-era sources and the Speech itself, with the result that almosi
every statement of fact in this chapter has turned out to be false. No such
works can be accepted unless and undl the assertions made in them can
be verified independently.

This goes for the supposedly "primary-source" documents as well Khru-
shchev and others cited dishonesdy from many such sources. Unless and
until scholars can see the originals, and their whole texis, it is invalid (o
assume that Khrushchev, or a Khrushchev-era book, article, or speaka,
quoted them honestly.^'*'

'Vhcy arc a main source in the now-tamous article by (letty, Rittenipom and /(.-msknv .
"Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Prewar Years: A I'irst Approach on the Hjsb
of Archival I widcnce." AHR October 1993. 1017-1049.

C'arcful students have long ijucstioncd the historical worth of some of these works,
like that ofRoi Medvcdev's Le/ Histoty y«/^ (Russian title: K stuii ii/orii) w .Alexander
Sol/heniisyn's The GULAG Anbipelqgo.

^ Hukharin and the ll<ilshevik Revolution (1 973).

An article by myself and Vladimir Hobrov proves, by citing documents frum (hi-
formerly secret Soviet archives, that every statement made by tlohen in the final cKifHn
of his biography of Hukharin is false. /\l were based on Khrushchev-era sourci-s, wiih a
few emigre rumors thrown in. See "V krivoi /.erkale Mantistalinskoi paradigvyu" in 19}'.
Pramiulit StaSH. Ob^bahvanim at podk^hit'. (Moscow: l-lksmo 2010) 195-333. An
vertiion of this article is scheduled to appear in the 2010 issue of CiJtirat Logt, which is
scheduled to appear in 201 1 .

■iylvTwdvc. Conclusion: 'IIk KnJuiing legacy of Khiushchcv's Dcccpbua 213

Political Implications

Ik *^Seaet Speech" threw the world communist movement into crisis.
Ktdie dflim was that all the damage done was necessary, prophylactic,
ilil evil part of the past, largely unknown to the communists of the world
tad even of die USSR, had to be exposed, a potentially fatal cancer in the
tod^ of wodd communism had to be mercilessly excised, so that the
DOVtment could correct itself and once again move towards its uldmate

b die years that followed it became more and more apparent that the
USSR was not moving towards a classless society, but rather in the oppo-
mt direction. Even so, those who stuck with the Soviet-led movement
did so because they still held to the original ideal. Millions of people
uouod the world hoped and believed that a movement that could afford
to tike such huge losses, to admit such crimes had been committed in its
name, to ruthlessly expose them — as Khrushchev claimed to have done -
m^t have the integrity and fortitude to correct itself and move, with
whitrver pobtical zigs and zags necessary, towards a communist (iiture.
Ibis picture is no longer tenable.

Khrushchev was nqt trying to "right the ship of communism." A total
tnshing of the truth like the '*Secret Speech'* is incompatible with Marx-
ism, or with idealistic motives of any kind. Nothing positive, democratic,
or liberating can be built on a foundation of falsehood. Instead of reviv-
ing a communist movement, and Bolshevik Party, that had strayed from
its true course through grievous errors, Khrushchev was kiUing it off.

Khrushchev himself is "revealed" not as an honest communist but in-
stead as a political leader seeking personal advantage while hiding behind
an official persona of idealism and probity, a type familiar in capitalist
countries. Taking into account his murder of Beria and the men executed
as "Beria's gang" in 1953, he seems worse still — a political thug. Khru-
shchev was guilty ia ftalitf of the kinds of crimes he deHbeniteiy and falietjf
accused Stalin of in the "Secret Speech/'

Hie fraudulent nature of Khrushchev's Speech forces us to revise our
view of those "Stalinists" who tried and failed to have Khrushchev re-
moved from leadership in 1957 and who were dismissed and, at length,
expelled from the Party. With all their sins and failings the interviews of
the aged Molotov and Kaganovich (as retold by Felix Chuev) reveal men
devoted to Lenin, Stalin, and the ideal of communism to the end who
often commented incisively on the capitalist developments within the late

214

Khrushchev Uul

USSR. Molotov predicted the overthrow of socialism by capitalist forces
within the Party even as, in his 80s and 90s, he sought reinstatement in it.

Yet their acceptance of the main outlines of Khrushchev's attack on Sta-
lin suggests that they had their own doubts about some of the policies
followed during Stalin's time. To one degree or another they shared
Khrushchev's political views. Furthermore, they did not know the details
of the repressions of the 1930s and thereafter, and were utterly unpre-
pared to refute anything Khrushchev and his supporters said about them
- until it was far too late.

Perhaps the only positive step the post-Stalin Soviet leadership made was
in critici2ing, and partially dismantling, the disgusting "cult of personal-
ity" they themselves had built up around the Ggure of Stalin. Even here
Khrushchev himself deserves no credit. He had opposed Malenko\''j
much earlier attempts - within days of Stalin'i death - to criticize the
"cult." And Malenkov had the honesty to blame, not Stalin, but those
around him, himself included, for being too weak to stop the "cult",
which Stalin finally grew accustomed to but never endorsed and \iewed
with distaste.

•

Khrushchev himself lost no time in attempting to build up around him-
self an even bigger "cult" than that around Stalin. He was criticized for
doing so even by his supporters in 1956 and 1957, and his self-
aggrandizement and arrogance was the main accusation made by the Pre-
sidium leadership that unseated him in October 1964.^''*

The fraudulent nature of Khrushchev's Speech demands that we rethink
the Stalin years and Stalin himself. Stripped both of the idol-worshipping
"cult" around him and of Khrushchev's calumnies the figure of Stalia
and the shape of the policies he tiied to put into practice, reassert them
selves as the central issue, the ^eatest question mark in Soviet and
Comintern history. Stalin's successes and failures must be not just a-
studied; they have yet to be discovered and acknowledged.

Trotsky

It also demands a reconsideration of Trotsky and of Trotskyism. In its
essentials Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in the "Secret Speech"

2'** 'llic transcript of the ( )ctobcr 1 964 Plenum at which Khrushchev was anx>vctl lus
been published in Istoiitheskii ArkN»\, 1993, pp. 3-19.

( ihaptiT 'I wcl vc. C^ondusion: 'ITic Knduring I xgacy of Khrushchev's IXxcpdun 2 1 5

echoed Trotsky's earlier demonization of Stalin. But in 1956 Trotskyism
vis a marginal force, its murdered leader most often dismissed as a
mcgalomaniacal failure.

Khnishchev's speech breathed new life into Trotsky's all-but-dead carica-
ture of Stalia Communists and anti-communists alike b^an to view
Trotsky as a "prophet". Had he not said things very similar to what
Khrushchev had just "revealed" to be true? They dusted off Trotsky's
litde-read works. Trotsky's reputation, and that of his followers, soared.
That the "Secret Speech" constituted an unacknowledged "rehabilitation"
of Trotsky was recognized by Trotsky's widow Sedova who, within a day
of the Speech, applied to the Presidium of the 20'** Party Congress for full
rehabilitation for both her late husband and her son.^^^ But now, no
longer "confirmed" by Khrushchev's testimony, Trotsky's highly partisan
portrait of Stalin and Soviet society and politics during his time needs to
be revisited with a critical eye.

Unresolved weaknesses in the Soviet system

of socialism

It is easy and of course justified to criticize Khrushchev himself. He
chose to undermine the CPSU and the international communist move-
ment by deliberately lying about Stalin and Soviet history. Whatever we
conclude about the historical conditions that produced Khrushchev and
his era, nothing can absolve him of the responsibility for his own acts.

But Khrushchev could not have been promoted to the Polit-
buro/Presidium if his concept of socialism had been worlds different
from that shared by many other Party leaders. Khrushchev's rise is no
dDubt partly explained by his extraordinary energy and initiative, qualities
that the rest of the Presidium members showed little of. But he could not
have triumphed if he had been seen by Stalin and the Party elite as a
rightist, or bad, communist. The concept of what was meant in the Bol-
shevik Party by "socialism" had evolved since the Revolution.

Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, the major figures associated with
Stalin for decades, did acquiesce, however grudgingly, to Khrushchev's
"Secret Speech". It is clear that they themselves did not have access to

249 Dokia/i Khn/shcbem, p. 610. 1 have put a facsimile of Scdova's letter on the web at
http:// chss.mon tclair.edu/cnglish/ furr/ rescarch/scdovalt(022856.jpg

216

Khrushchev IJliJ

the documents prepared for Khrushchev by his allies. Their remarks a
the time and afterwards show that they did not suspect that what Khru
shchev said was false. Moreover, they accepted the political implications
of the Speech.

Had Malenkov managed somehow to fend off Khrushchev and kept the
leadership of the CPSU, the "Secret Speech" would never have been de-
livered, and the history of the Communist movement, and therefore
much of the history of the world, might have developed very differently.
In like manner many people have reasoned that the Soviet Union might
well still exist if lurii Andropov had lived a normal life span as its leader
and Mikhail Gorbachev never taken office. But the "role of the individual
in history" does not grant unlimited choice even to the strongest leaden.
Andropov's USSR was just as much in crisis as was Gorbachev's - or as
was the USSR in 1953.

Khrushchev was able to take power, deliver the bombshell of the "Secret
Speech" with all its fabrications, and then "make it stick": to win cfver the
Soviet elite, along with most of the Soviet population and - though not
after huge losses - most of the communists around the world. These
facts themselves demand explanation. And the roots of that outcome
have to be sought in the previous period of Soviet history, the period of
Stalin's leadership, and of Lenin's before him, and in the very conditions
that led to the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik victory.

There are historical and ideological roots to Khrushchev's Speech, and
these must also be sought in Soviet history. Stalin tried hard to apply
Lenin's analysis to the conditions he found in Russia and the world
communist movement. Lenin, in turn, had tried to apply the insights of
Marx and Engels. Lenin had tried to find answers to the critical probleiib
of building socialism in Russia in the works of the founders of modem
communism.

Stalin, never claiming any innovations for himself, had tried to foliou-
Lenin's guidelines as closely as he could. Meanwhile Trotsky and Buk-
harin, as well as other oppositionists, found support for their proposed
policies in Lenin's works too. And Khrushchev, like his epigones up to
and including Gorbachev, cited Lenin's words to justify, and give a Len-
inist or "left" cover to, every policy he chose.

'ITierefore, something in Lenin's works, and in those of Lenin's great
teachers Marx and Engels, facilitated the errors that his honest successor
Stalin honestly made, and that his dishonest successor Khrushche\' wL<i

ilcT TwcK'c. (Conclusion: 'Ilic linduring lx'{pcy of Khrushchev's Dcccpbon 217

to use to cover up his own betrayal.

that is a subject for further research and a different book.

January 2005 - February 2007. Radsed December 2010.

Appendix - Quotations from
Primary and Other Sources

1. Cult.

Khrushchev:

^'Comrades! In the report of the Central Committee of
the party at the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches
by delegates to the Congress, as also foimerly during the
plenary CC/CPSU [Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union] sessions, quite a
lot has been said about the cult of the individual and
about its harmful consequences. After Stalin's death the
Central Committee of the party began to implement a
policy of explaining concisely and consistendy that it is
impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-
Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a
superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to
those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows
everything, sees everything, thinks for ever}'one, can do
anything, is infallible in his behavior. Such a belief about
a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated
among us for many years.

The objective of the present report is not a thorough
evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. ...

A t present, we are concerned with a question which has
immense importance for the party now and for the
future — with how the cult of the person of Stalin has
been gradually growing, the cult which became at a
certain specific stage the source of a whole series of
exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party
principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legalit)'."

1 . Stalin's Opposition to the Cult

June 1926:

Appemiii

"I must say in all conscience, comrades, that I do not
deserve a good half of the flattering things that have
been said here about me. I am, it appears, a hero of the
October Revolution, the leader of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, the leader of the Communist
International, a legendary warrior-knight and all the rest
of it. This is absurd, comrades, and quite unnecessary
exa^eration. It is the sort of thing that is usually said at
the graveside of a departed revolutionary. But I have no
intention of dying yet. . .

"I really was, and still am, one of the pupils of the
advanced workers of the Tiflis railway workshops." Q. V.
Stalin: W^orkt, Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 182).

ciober 1927:

"And what is Stalin? Stalin is only a minor figure." Q. V.
Stalin: W^orks, Volume 10; Moscow; 1954; p. 177).

ecember 1929:

'Tour congratulations and greetings I place to the credit
of the great Party of the working class which bore me
and reared me in its own image and likeness. And just
because I place them to the credit of our glorious
Leninist Party, I make bold to tender you my Bolshevik
thanks." (J. V. Stalin: \^orks. Volume 12; Moscow; 1955;
p. 146).

iril 1930:

"There are some who think that the article T)izzy with
Success' was the result of Stalin's personal initiative.
That, of course, is nonsense. It is not in order that
personal initiative in a matter like this be taken by
anyone, whoever he might be, that we have a Central
Committee." Q. V. Stalin: U^orkr, ibid; p. 218).

gpst 1930:

"You speak of your 'devotion' to me. Perhaps this is a
phrase that came out accidentally. Perhaps. . . But if it is
not a chance phrase, I would advise you to discard the
'principle* of devotion to persons. It is not the Bolshevik
way. Be devoted to the working class, its Party, its state.

220

Khrushchev

That is a Gne and useful thing. But do not confuse it
with devotion to persons, this vain and useless bauble of
weak-minded intellectuals." ("Letter to Comiade
Shatunovsky." Warks^ Volume 13; Moscow; 1955; p. 20).

December 1931:

"As for myself, I am just a pupil of Lenin's, and the aim
of my life is to be a worthy pupil of his. . .

"Marxism docs not deny at all the role played by
outstanding individuals or that history is made by people.
But. . . great people are worth anything at aU only to the
extent that they are able correctly to understand these
conditions, to understand how to change them. If they
fail to understand these conditions and want to alter
them according to the promptings of their imagination,
they will find themselves in the situation of Don
Quixote...

"Individual persons cannot decide. Decisions of
individuals are always, or nearly always, one-sided
decisions... In every collective body, there are people
whose opinion must be reckoned with . . . From the
experience of three revolutions we know that out of
every 100 decisions taken by individual persons without
being tested and corrected collectively, approximately 9f
arc one-sided...

"Never under any circumstances would our workers now
tolerate power in the hands of one person. With us
personages of the greatest authority are reduced to
nonentities, become mere ciphers, as soon as the masses
of the workers lose confidence in them." Q. V. Stalin:
ibid.; p. 107-08, 109, 113).

February 1933:

"I have received your letter ceding me your second
Order as a reward for my work.

"I thank you very much for your warm words and
comradely present. I know what you are depriving
yourself of in my favour and appreciate your sendmenis.

"Nevertheless, I cannot accept your second Order. I
cannot and must not accept it, not only because it can
only belong to you, as you alone have earned it, but also
because I have been amply rewarded as it is by the
attention and respect of comrades and, consequently,
have no light to rob you.

"Orders were instituted not for those who are well
known as it is, but mainly for heroic people who are little
known and who need to be made known to all.

'3esides, I must tell you that I already have two Orders.
That is more than one needs, I assure you." Q. V. Stalin:
ibid.; p. 241).

May 1933:

"Robins: I consider it a great honour to have an
opportunity of paying you a visit.

"Stalin: There is nothing particular in that. You are
exaggerating.

"Robins: What is most interesting to me is that
throughout Russia I have found the names Lenin-Stalin,
Lenin-Stalin, Lenin-Stalin, linked together.

"Stalin: That, too, is an exaggeration. How can I be
compared to Lenin?" (J. V. Stalin: ibid.; p. 267)

February 1938:

"I am absolutely against the publication of 'Stories of the
Childhood of Stalin',

"The book abounds with a mass of inexactitudes of fact,
of alterations, of exaggerations and of unmerited
praise. . .

"But. . . the important thing resides in the fact that the
book has a tendency to engrave on the minds of Soviet
children (and people in general) the personality cult of
leaders, of infallible heroes. This is dangerous and
detrimental. The theory of 'heroes' and the 'crowd' is not
a Bolshevik, but a Social-Revolutionary theory. . .

"I suggest we bum this booL" Q. V. Stalin: ibid; p. 327).

February 1946:

222

Khrushchev I

"llic ear is pained too by the sound of the dithyrambs in
Stalin's honor - it is simply embarrassing to read/'
("Answer to Comrade Razin", Works Vol. 16).

Dimitrov's diary

Dimitrov: [Proposes toast with fulsome praise of Stalin,
ending with the words] There can be no speaking of
Lenin without linking him with Stalin!

Stalin: I respect Comrade Dimitrov very much. We are
friends and will remain friends. But I must disagree with
him. He has even expressed himself here in an un-
Marxist fashion. What the victory of the cause requires is
the correct conditions, and then leaders will always be
found, (p. 66; November 7, 1937)

Dimitrov: ...This is a collective work, with Com[rade]
Nfan[uilsky] as chief editor.

Stalin (regarding the passage in the appeal praising Stalin,
especially:

"Long live our Stalin!
Stalin means peace!
Stalin means Communism!
Stalin is our victoryl")

— Manuilsky is a toady!

He was a Trotskyite! We criticized him for keeping quiet
and not speaking out when the purges of Trotskyite
bandits were going on, and now he has started toadying!

There is something suspicious here.

- That article of his is Pravda — "Stalin and the World
Communist Movement" — is harmful and provocative.

J.V. [Stalin] would not allow "under the banner of Marx-
Rngeh-Lenm-S/aJin" to remain in the appeal, but insisted
on simply "Marx-Engels-Lenin." (pp. 104-105, April 26
1939)

Stalin refused to permit an exhibition about him in honor of his 55-
birthday, December 1934:

"... on a letter from the AU-Union Society of Old
Bolsheviks, in which it was proposed to conduct a
campaign of propaganda dedicated to his 55'** birthday,
he urrote the following resolution: 'I am opposed, since
such undertakings lead to the strengthening of a 'cult of
personality', which is harmful and incompatible with the
spirit of our party.*"

\Tn, 1937, Chapter 41, citing Voprosy Istorii KPSS. No. 3, 1990, p.

criticized playwrite Afinogenov for using the term "Vozhd"'
I about him:

"Having read, in 1933, the MS of the play The Lie by
A.N. Afinogenov Stalin wrote an extensive letter to the
playwrite, in the notes to which he remarked: 'P.S. Your
going on about "the leader" (yo^hd) is not helpful. This is
bad and, if you will permit me, indecent. It's not a
question of "a leader", but of the collective leader - the
CC of the Party. I.St[alin]" What did Stalin have in
mind One of the heroes of the play, the assistant
Commissar Riadovoy, while arguing with the former
oppositionist Nakatov affirmed with feeling: 'I speak of
our Central Committee.. I speak of the leader who leads
us, who has torn away the masks from many highly-
educated leaders who had unlimited possibilites and yet
showed themselves to be bankrupt. I speak of the person
whose strength is composed of the granite-like trust of
hundreds of millions. His name on the tongues of men
the world over sounds like a symbol of the fortress of
the Bolshevik cause. And this leader is
unconquerable..." Stalin edited and corrected this tirade
with his own hand, making this key correction: 'I speak
of our Central Committee which leads us, having torn
away the mask from many highly-educated leaders who
had unlimited possibilities and yet showed themselves to
be bankrupt. I speak of the Central Committee of the
party of communists of the land of the Soviets, the
strength of which is composed of the granite-like trust of
hundreds of miDions. Its banner on the tongues of men
the world over sounds like a symbol of the fortress of

224

Khrushchev I.

the Bolshevik cause. And this collective leader is
unconquerable. ..."

On January' 27 1937 having seen a screening of the film
**The Great Citizen" (the subject of this film by director
F.M. Ermler resembles the story of the murder of S.Nf.
Kirov), Stalin wrote a letter to B.Z. Shumiatskii, director
of Soviet cinematography^ in which he gave the
following well-known specific directive: "You must
exclude any mention of Stalin. Instead of Stalin should
be substituted the CC of the party." {Surovaia drama
naroda. Uchenye i publitsisty o prirode stalini^a. Sost. lU. P.
Senokosov. Moscow. Politizdat, 1989.).

"In 1 936 was published a biographical sketch of the life
of Sergo Ordzhonikidze compiled by M.D.
Orakhelashvili. Stalin read this book and left many
notatonis on its pages. In the sketch, for example, the
July crisis of 1917 is retold like this: 'In this difficult
period for the proletarian, when many faltered in the face
of the approaching danger, comrade Stalin stood firmly
at his post of the leadership of the CC and the Petrograd
party organization. [Lenin was in hiding - L.M.]. Com.
Ordzhonikidze was constandy with him, leading an
energetic, wholehearted struggle for the I^eninist slogans
of the party.' {}hid, p. 33). These words were underlined
by Stalin, and at the edge of the pages he wrote with a
red pencil: 'And what about the CC? and the party?' In
another place the VI Congress of the RSDLP (summer
of 1917) was discussed, about how Lenin, in hiding in
Razliv, 'gave directives on the questions that stood on
the Congress' agenda. In order to receive Lenin's
directives com. Ordzhonikidze, on Stalin's orders, twice
went to Lenin's hut.' Stalin again posed his question:
'And the CC - where is it?"

- L. Maksimenkov, in Al'manakh Vostok' 12 (24), December 2004. .Mit
quoted in lulia Ivanova, The Dreaming Doors.

Stalin refused Mero of the Soviet Union (May 1945):

On the day after the parade, by order of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR J. V. Stalin was awarded

Appendix

225

the dtle of Hero of the Soviet Union. Malenkov took the
initiative in this affair, but Stalin refused this high honor
and even spoke sharply with Kalinin, who had signed the
order "I", he said, ''took no part in military actions, did
no heroic deeds; I am only a leader."

V.F. Alliluev, 'Chronicle of a family': Alliluev - Stalin.
Moscow, 1995, p. 195.

Jther accounts confirm this:

...A conversation followed concerning the awarding to
Stalin of the Hero of the Soviet Union after the war.
Stalin said that he did not fit the criteria of Hero of the
Soviet Union, which was awarded only for the
demonstration of personal courage.

*I did not demonstrate such courage' - said Stalin. And
he did not accept the Star. They only drew him with this
star in portraits. When he died, the leader of the awards
section gave him the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet
Union. They pinned it on a pillow and carried it at the
funeral."

Stalin wore only one little star Hero of Socialist Labor -
added Molotov.

Fdix Chuev, p. 140; Conversations with Moiotov. From the Diary o/F. Chuev.
[oscow, 1994, p. 254.

Khrushchev quote "hero vs masses" - exactly what
Stalin had wntten

hrushchev:

"While ascribing great importance to the role of the
leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same
time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the
cult of the individual, inexorably combated the foreign-
to-Marxism views about a "hero" and a "crowd," and
countered all efforts to oppose a "hero** to the masses
and to the people." (p. 2)

e Stalin's quotes above.

226

Khrushchev 1

2. Malenkov*s Attempt To Call a CC
Plenum Concerning the "Cult" April 1953

Zhukov, Tainy Knmlia. 617-621, in April 1953 Malenkov had wanted
call an extraordinary session of the Central Committee to discuss the <
of personality of Stalin. On pp. 618-9 Zhukov quotes from Malenko
draft report and draft resolution

"Guided by these principled considerations the
Presidium of the CC CPSU submits to the Plenum of the
CC CPSU the follouing draft resolution for its
consideration:

11ie Central Committee of the CPSU considers that in
our printed and oral propaganda there exists an
abnormal situation that expresses itself in that our
propagandists stray into an un-Marxist understanding of
the role of the individual in history, and into the
propagating of a cult of the individual.

[It is well known that comrade Stalin firmly condemned
such a cult of the individual, and called it a Socialist
Revolutionar)' error.] In this connection the Central
Committee of the CPSU considers it obligatory to
condemn and to definitively put an end to the un-
Marxist, essentially Socialist-Revolutionary tendencies in
our propaganda, which flow from the line of the cult of
the individual and of diminishing the significance and
role of the political line worked out by the party,
diminishing the significance and role of a consolidated,
monolithic, united, collective leadership of the party and
government.*

Many of those present know that com. Stalin often
spoke out in this spirit and firmly condemned the un-
Marxist, Socialist- Revolutionary understanding of the
role of the individual in history."

- Zhukov, Taini Kremlia, pp. 618-9; sentence in brackets is quoted as pan
of this same draft resolution in M.P. Odesskii, D.M Fel'dman, "Cult of
the Individual (Materials for a Hyper-reference)", in OstftJjodilel'tioe Dii;;
heniie v Rossi i, 2003 (Saratov University), at
h ttp:/ /www. sgu.ru/files/nodes/9873/09.pdf

227

towfiqg 10 these two scholais these remarks are from Pospelov's notes
li die March 10 1953 Presidium discussion, less than a week after Sta-
V^ikath(March5).

Mlhr'^ was not penmitted to call a CC Plenum, though it is not
bovD who voted for and against it. Zhukov believes Khrushchev was
DOtt likdy opposed

3. July 1953 Plenum - Bern Attacked for
Allegedly Opposing "Culf*

kt the July 1953 Central Committee Plenum attacking Beria Mikoian,
hiEra major ally of Khrushchev's, strongly blamed Becia for beginning
the attack on Stalin's *cult':

Another question is his [Beda's] two-facedness. In the
first days [after Stalin's death - GF] he spoke up strongly
about the cult of personality. We understood that there
were excesses in this matter even during comrade Stalin's
lifetime. Comrade Stalin shaiply criticized us. The fact
that they have created a cult around me, said Comrade
Stalin, the SRs have done that. We could not correct this
matter at that dme, and so it went on. We must approach
the question of the individual in a Marxist fashion. But
Beria spoke up strongly. It turned out that he wanted to
destroy the cult of Comrade Stalin and create his own
cult.

- Lamntii herio. f9S3,p. 168

Andreev (p. 207) also spoke up to blame Beda for raising the issue of the
"cult", claiming it was simply not a problem. Kaganovich did likewise

{ibid. p. 283).

Clearly they all knew that it had really been Malenkovl

Maksimenkov too discusses Malenkov's March 1953 attack on ''cults of
peisonality" as "self-criticism," since Malenkov himself had engaged in it.
In the dishonest criticisms leveled at Beria during the July 1953 Central
Committee Plenum devoted to attacking him, Andreev blamed Bena for
raising the issue of the "cult"!

4. Who fostered the "Cult"?

Roi Medvedev points out that

228

Khrushchev li

"The first issue of 'Pravda' for 1934 carried a huge two-
page article by Radek, heaping orgiastic praise on Stalin.
The former Trotskyite, who had led the opposition to
Stalin for many years, now called him 'I^nin's best pupil,
the model of the Leninist Party, bone of its bone, blood
of its blood'. . . He *is as far-sighted as Lenin*, and so on
and on. This seems to have been the first large article in
the press specifically devoted to the adulation of Stalin,
and it was quickly reissued as a pamphlet in 225,000
copies, an enormous figure for the time."

- R. A. Medvedev: Lst History Judge: The Origins and Consecjuences of Sttilinia
I^ndon; 1972; p. 148. Quoted from Bland, pp. 8-9.) Radek's article
published as a 32-page pamphlet: Zodchii sotsialislichesko^ o
xi^i^x/m (Architect of socialist society) Moscow: Partiinoe izdatel'st\'i
1934).

BUKHARIN: I recall one such incident. Following the
instructions of Kliment Ef removich [Voroshilov] I wrote
an article on the exhibition about the Red Army. There
Voroshilov, Stalin and others were discussed. When
Stalin said, "NX'hat are you writing there?" Someone
retorted: "How could he not write something of the
kind?" I explained all these things very simply. I knew
that there's no reason to create a cult of Stalin, but as far
as I am concerned^ it is expedient.

SOSNOVSKY: And in my case you thought it essential.

BUKHARIN: For the very simple reason that you are a
former Oppositionist. I see nothing wrong in this.

- VopfVjyls/oriiNo. 3, 2002, p. 28

5. Khrushchev and Mikoian

Khrushchev himself was one of those most guilty of building up the
"cult.'* (Bland, 9-11)

"It was Khrushchev who introduced the term 'vozhd' (leader', coire-
sponding to the German word 'Fiihrer'). At the Moscow Part}' Confer-
ence in January 1932, Khrushchev finished his speech by saying:

"The Moscow Bolsheviks, rallied around the Leninist Central Commitier
as never before, and around the vo^hd' of our Party, Comrade Stalin, are
cheerfully and confidendy marching toward new victories in the baides

229

Ibf socialism, for world proletarian revolution/' {^jAochiua Moskua^ 26
jioutfy 1932, dted in: L. Pistrak: The Grand Tacluum: Khnuhd)ev's Rise to
Amc London; 1961; p. 159).

Altbe 17ch Patty Conference in January 1934 it was Khrushchev, and
fdnishchev alone, who called Stalin . . Vozhd' of genius." ("nash^o
gmeal'nogo vozhdia tovatishcha Stalina") (XVII S'ezd Vsesoiuznoi
K£Niununisticheskoi Pactii (B.); p. 145, dted in: L. Pistrak: ibid.; p. 160).
Tnosoipt of Khrushchev's speech at
http://www.hK)no.ru/ vkpb_ 17 /6_4.hlinl

In August 1936 during the treason trial of Lev Kamenev and Grigorii
Zinoviev Khrushchev, in his capadty as Moscow Party Secretary, said:

'^eiablc pygmiesl lliey lifted their hands against the greatest of all
oieo,... our wise Vozhd', Comrade Stalin!.. . Thou, Comrade Stalin, hast
faised the great banner of Marxism-Leninism high over the entire world
and carried it forward. We assure thee, Comrade Stalin, that the Moscow
Bolshevik ozganisation — the &ithful supporter of the Sfelinist Central
Committee - will increase Stalinist vigilance still more, will extirpate the
Tiotskyite-Zinovievite remnants, and close the ranks of the Party and
non*Pazty Bolsheviks even more around the Stalinist Central Committee
and the great Stalin." (Pravda, 23 August 1936, dted in: L. Pistrak: ibid.;
p. 162. The entire speech is reprinted in N. G. Tomilina, ed. Nih'ta Ser^-
rich Khrushchev. Dva Tsveta VrenemL Dokumenty /i^ Uchno^ Jon da N.S. KJ)rU'
ihdxv, Tom 1 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond «£)emokratiia», 2009), pp.
440-456. )

At the Eighth AU-Union Congress of Soviets in November 1936 it was
again Khrushchev who proposed that the new Soviet Constitution, which
was before the Congress for approval, should be called the 'Stalinist Con-
stitution' because

"...it was written from beginning to end by Comrade Stalin himself."
(Pravda, 30 November 1936, dted in: L. Pistiak: ibid.; p. 161).

It has to be noted that Vyacheslav Molotov, then Prime Minister, and
Andrey Zhdanov, then Party Secretary in Leningrad, did not mention any
spedal role by Stalin in the drafting of the Constitution.

In the same speech Khrushchev coined the term 'Stalinism':

"Our Constitution is the Mancism-Leninism-Stalinism that has conquered
one sixth of the globe." (Ibid.).

230

Khrushchev I Jul

Khrushchev's speech in Moscow to an audience of 200,000 at the time of
the treason trial of Georgii Piatakov(23) and Karl Radek in January 1937
was in a similar vein:

"By lifting their hands against comrade Stalin they lifted them against all
the best that humanity possesses. For Staliti is hope; he is expectation; he
is the beacon that guides all progressive mankind. Stalin is our banner!
Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!" (Pravda, 31 January 1937), cited in:
L. Pistrak: ibid; p. 162. Entire speech at Tomilina ed., Nikita Ser^mb
Khrushchev T. 1 pp. 465-8; this exact passage at top of p. 467).

Stalin was described by Khrushchev in March 1939 as "...our great gen-
ius, our beloved Stalin," {Visti VTsVK, 3 March 1939, cited in: L. Pistrak:
ibid.;p. 164).

at the 18th Congress of the Party in March 1939 as

"...the greatest genius of humanity, teacher and Vozhd', who leads us
towards Communism, our very own Stalin" {XVllI S^a^d Vsmin^m
Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b.J), p. 174, dted in: L. Pistrak: ibid., p. 164).

and in May 1945 as "...great Marshal of the Victory." {Pravda Ukrain), 13
May 1945, cited in: L. Pistrak: ibid.; p. 164)."

Mikoian

On the occasion of the celebration of Stalin's fiftieth birthday in Decem-
ber 1929, Anastas Mikoian accompanied his congratulations with the
demand

"...that we, meeting the rightful demand of the masses, begin finally to
work on his biography and make it available to the Party and to all work-
ing people in our countr)'." ij^stia^ 21 December 1929, cited in: L. Pis-
trak: ibid.; p. 164).

Ten years later, on the occasion of Stalin's sixtieth birthday in December
1939, Mikoian was still urging the creation of a "...scientific biography"
of Stalin. {Pravda, 21 December 1939, cited in: L. Pistrak: ibid.; p. 158)."

Stalin's suspicions of cult - Tuominen, Feuchtwanger (Bland, 12)

That Stalin himself was not unaware of the fact that concealed revision-
ists were the main force behind the 'cult of personality' was reported by
the Finnish revisionist Tuominen in 1935, who describes how, when he
was informed that busts of him had been given prominent places in Mm
cow's leading art gallery, the Tretyakov, Stalin exclaimed:

231

IWt downiight sabotagel" (A. Tuominen: op. dt.; p. 164).

M 12-13 (fen Tuominen) - BiU Bland. 'Hlie Cult of the Individual,"
■pc//www.in]ttanslations.org/Biitain/StalinBB.htm Bland has collected
idi more evidence of Stalin's opposition to the "cult.'*

HkGomaD writer Leon Feuchtwanger (24) in 1936 confinns that Stalin
mfeded that the 'cult of personality' was being fostered by Svreckers'
lidi ifae aim of discrediting him:

ni is manifestly irksome to Stalin to be worshipped as he is, and from
ioe to time he makes fiin of it... Of all the men I know who have
power, Stalin is the most unpretentious. I spoke frankly to him about the
idpr and excessive cult made of him, and he replied with equal can-
ilour. .. He thinks it is possible even that Svoeckers' may be behind it in
m attempt to discredit him." (L. Feuchtwanger Moscw 1937; London;
«37;p.93.94-95).

Slilin refused to allow the establishment of an Order of Stalin, which was
proposed first in 1945 by five Politburo members, and again on his 70''
bicifaday in 1949. It was established only after his death.

In the Politburo of the CC ACP(b)

We present for consideration by the Politburo the
following resolutions:

1. To award com. Stalin with the order of "Victory";

2. To award com. Stalin the title of '*Hero of the Soviet
Union."

3. To establish an Order of Stalin;

4. To erect a Stalin Arch of Victory on the autoroute
Moscow-Minsk at the entrance to Moscow.

We propose that the corresponding decrees be taken at
the XII session of the Supreme Soviet.

22.VI.45

V. Molotov

L. Beria

G. Malenkov

K. Voroshilov

A. Mikoian

232

Khrushchev f j

- V.A. Durov, "Orden Stalina Stalin ne utverdil", Rodina No. 4, 2005.
http://chss.montclair.edu/english/fuir/research/durovorden.pdf

The last two proposals were not taken. Writing in pencil on the left-ha
comer reads "My archive. J. Stalin."

Stalin rejected renaming Moscow after

himself

In 1937-38 a proposal was made to rename Moscow "Stalinodar" ("g
of Stalin").

However, this renaming never happened. M.I. Kalinin
informed the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR and RSFSR that J. V. Stalin expressed his
categorical opposition to this proposal...

Moscow remained Moscow.

- B.A. Starkov, "Kak Moskva chut' ne stala Stalinodarom." I^sfiiu TsK
KPSS. 1990. No.l2, pp. 126-127. At

http://chss.montclair.edu/english/fu1r/research/st4linodar.pdf

2. Lenin's "Testament"

Khrushchev:

"In December 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress, Vladimi; W'ld
wrote: "After taking over the position of Secretary General, Giinndc
Stalin accumulated in his hands immeasurable power and I am not certain
whether he will be always able to use this power with the required care."

This letter — a political document of tremendous importance, knoun ui
the party history as Lenin's "testament" - was distributed among the
delegates to the 20th Party Congress. You have read it and will undoubt-
edly read it again more than once. You might reflect on Lenin's plain
words, in which expression is given to Vladimir Il'ich's anxict)' conccm-
ing the party, the people, the state, and the future direction of pany pol-
icy.

Vladimir Il'ich said:

"Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be frech
tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communks
becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding thr
position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose thai

233

the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be re-
moved from this posibon and by which another man would be
selected for it, a man who, above all, would differ &om Stalin in
only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater
kindness and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a
less capricious temper, etc."

Hiis document of Lenin's was made known to the delegates at the 13th
Party Congress, who discussed the question of transferring Stalin from
ibe position of Secretary General. The delegates declared themselves in
hrm cf retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he would heed the chd-
al remarks of VUdimir Il'ich and would be able to overcome the defects
which caused Lenin serious anxiety.

Comrades! The Party Congress should become acquainted with two new
doaiments, which confirm Stalin's character as already outlined by
Vladimir Il'ich Lenin in his "testament." These documents are a letter
from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaia to [Leo B.] Kamenev, who
was at that time head of the PoUtical Bureau, and a personal letter from
Vbdimir Il'ich Lenin to Stalin.

I will now read these documents:

"LEV BORISOVICHI

"Because of a short letter which I had written in words dictated to me by
Vkdimir IJ'ich by permission of the doctors, Staiin allowed himself yes-
leiday an unusually rude outburst directed at me. This is not my first day
in the party. During all these 30 years I have never heard from any com-
rade one word of rudeness. The business of the party and of Il'ich are
not less dear to me than to Stalin. I need at present the maximum of self-
controL What one can and what one cannot discuss with Il'ich I know
better than any doctor, because I know what makes him nervous and
what does not, in any case I know better than Stalin. I am turning to you
and to Giigorii [E. Zinoviev) as much closer comrades of V. I. and I beg
you to protect me from rude interference with my private life and from
vile invectives and threats. I have no doubt as to what will be the unani-
mous decision of the Control Commission, with which Stalin sees fit to
threaten me; however, I have neither the strength nor the time to waste
on this foolish quarrel. And I am a living person and my nerves are
strained to the utmost.

"N. KRUPSKAIA"

234

Khrushchev li

Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on December 23, 1922. Afi
two and a half months, in March 1923, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin sent Stal
the following letter

"TO COMRADE STALIN:

"COPIES FOR: KAMENEV AND ZINOVIEV."

"Dear Comrade Stalin!

"You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to the telephor
and a rude reprimand of her. Despite the fact that she told you that si
agreed to forget what was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenc
heard about it from her. I have no intention to forget so easily that whic
is being done against me; and I need not stress here that I consider :
directed against me that which is being done against my wife. I ask yoi
therefore, that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to retracun
your words and apologizing or whether you prefer the severance of rd]
rions between us.

"SINCERELY: LENIN

"MARCH 5, 1923"

(Commotion in the hall.)

Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak elo
quently for tliemselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner duiuig
Lenin's life, could thus behave toward Nadezhda Konstaniinovna Kmp-
skaia - whom the party knows well and values highly as a loyal fncnd of
Lenin and as an active tighter for the cause of the party since its creation
- we can easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negauvc
characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years acquired
an absolutely insufferable character.*'

Trotsky denies Lenin wrote a "Testament", 1925

"In several parts of his book Eastman says that the
Central Committee concealed' from the Party a number
of exceptionally important documents written by Lenin
in the last period of his life (it is a matter of letters on the
national question, the so-called Svill', and others); there
can be no other name for this than slander against the
Central Comriitee of our Party. From what Eastman says
it may be inferred that Vladimir Il'ich intended those
letters, which bore the character of advice on internal
organisation, for the press. In point of fact, that is

235

absolutely untrue ... .It goes without saying that all those
letters and proposals . . . were brought to the knowledge
of the delegates at the 12th and 13th Congresses, and
always, of course, exercised due influence upon the
Party's decisions; and if not all of those letters were
published, it was because the author did not intend them
for the press. Vladimir I rich did not leave any Svill',
and the very character of his attitude towards the
Pajty, as well as the character of the Party itself,
precluded any possibility of such a Svill*. What is
usually referred to as a Svill* in the imigii and
foreign bourgeois and Menshevik press (in a
manner garbled beyond recognition) is one of
Vladimir Il'ich's letters containing advice on
organizational matters. The 13th Congress of the
Party paid the closest attention to that letter, as to all of
the others, and drew from it the conclusions appropriate
to the conditions and circumstances of the time. All talk
about concealing or violating a Svill' is a malicious
invention and is wholly directed against the actual
desires of Vladimir Il*ich and the interests of the
Party he founded".

D.Trotsky: 'Concerning Eastman's Book Since Lenin Died^ in: Bobhe-
16; 1 Sep, 1925; p. 68, my translation; emphasis GF. Cf the text in
tsky, Leon, 'Two Statements 'By Trotsky'". T/6if Ch<^lm^ of the Ltfi
wi/ion (1923-25), p. 310.25"

December 1922 the Plenum of the Central Committee took the deci-
I to entrust to Stalin the responsibility to isolate Lenin, 1922:

DECISION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST
PARTY (Bolshevik)

18 December 1922

ic 'I'rotskyist cdituni uf this vulumc put quutation marks aruund '1 rutsky's name here
jicare that he wrote and signed these documents even though they did nut express
uc thoughts. 'I'he editors do not seem to a-aliye that this makes 'I'rotsky look like the
of unprincipled self-promoter his political opponents accused him of bcingi

236

Khrushchev I

In the case of the request of c(omrade) Lenin about the
Plenum's decision on the question of foreign trade, with
the agreement of Stalin and the doctors, to communicate
to him [Lenin] the text of the resolution with the
addition that both the resolution and the makeup of the
commission were taken unanimously.

Not in any event to transmit [to Lenin] c(omrade)
Yaroslavsky's report and to keep it in order to transmit it
when permitted by the doctors, in agreement with
c(omrade) Stalin.

To entrust c(omrade) Stalin with personal responsibility
for the isolation of Vladimir Il'ich [Lenin] with respect
both to personal contact with workers and to
correspondence.

- l:^estua TsKKPSS No. 12, 1989, p. 191. Also at

http:/ /www.hrono.ru/libris/ stalin/ 1 6-62.html

According to Volkogonov (and others),

"On the morning of December 24 (1922) Stalin,
Kamenev and Bukharin discussed the situation. They
decided they did not have the right to enforce silence
upon their Leader [Lenin]. But care, precautions, the
maximum possible quiet were essential. They took the
following decision:

'1. Vladimir Ilich has the right to dictate 5-10 minutes
every day, but not to conduct a correspondence, and
Vladimir Ilich must not expect answers from these notes.
Meetings are forbidden.

2. Neither friends nor domestic persons must
communicate to Vladimir Ilich anything political, so as
not to give him cause for reflections and upset."

- Volkogonov, Dmitri, S/alia. Vol. I. M., 1992, Ch. 2, par. 136; atedit
http://militera.lib.ru/bio/volkogonov_dv/02.hcml

Stalin*s reply to Lenin concerning Krupskaia

March 7, 1923.

Appenfii

237

Comrade LeninI

About five weeks ago I had a talk with com. N. Konst.
[Natalia Konstantinova - Krupskaia's name and
patronymic], whom I consider not only your wife, but
also my old Party comrade, and told her (on the
telephone) approximately the following:

The doctors have forbidden us to give Il'ich polit.
information, and consider this regimen the most
important means of treating him. Meanwhile you, N.K.,
as it tums out, are violating this regime. We must not
play with Il'ich's life', etc.

My explanations with N.K. have confirmed that there is
nothing in this but empty misunderstandings, and indeed
there could not have been.

However, if you consider that I must "take back" the
above words which I spoke for the sake of keeping our
"relationship," I can take then back. But I do not
understand what the problem here is, what my **fault" is,
and what precisely is expected of me."

ibid., p. 193. Also at http://www.hrono.ru/libris/stalin/16-47.html I
lave made a facsimile of the original letter handwritten by Stalin on
^larch 7, 1923 available on the internet at

ittp://chss.montclair.edu/english/fuiT/ research/ siBltolenin03071923.jpg

According to Lenin's sister, Stalin's letter was not given to Lenin because
is health was getting worse, and Lenin never knew that Stalin had writ-
?n it:

. .and so V.I. never did know of his letter, in which
Stalin excused himself."

M. Ul'ianova. l:^estiia TsKKPSS. No. 12, 1989, p. 195.

ccording to M. Volodicheva, one of Lenin's secretaries during his 5nal
!ness, when given Lenin's letter Stalin acted like this:

"I handed the letter to him personally. I asked Stalin to
write a letter to Vladimir Ilich right away, as he was
awaiting his answer and was upset. Stalin read through
the letter while standing, right there, in my presence. His
face remained calm. He was silent a time, thought a bit,
and then said the following words, pronouncing each

word clearly, pausing between them: 'It is not Lenin but
his illness that is speaking. I am not a medical doctor, I
am a political person. I am Stalin. I f my wife, who is a
Party member, acted wrongly and was disciplined, I
would not consider it right for me to interfere in the
matter. And Krupskaia is a Party member. But since
Vladimir Il'ich insists, I am prepared to excuse myself to
Krupskaia for rudeness."

- M. Volodicheva, cited by A. Bek, Moskovskie Now/// April 23, 1989.

In one of his talks with the writer Felix Chuev L.M. Kaganovich touci
upon the subject of the mutual relations between Stalin and Lenin:

"Well, in Lenin's time there were some things that were
very unpleasant. Concerning Lenin's letter, Stalin once
told me: 'But what could I do in this situation? The
Politburo assigned me to make sure that he [Lenin] was
not burdened, that the doctors' orders were carried out,
not to give him paper, not to give him newspapers, and
what could I do - violate the Politburo's decision? I just
couldn't do that. And they attacked me.' He told me this
personally with great bitterness, great bitterness. With
such heartfelt bitterness."

- Chuev, F. Tak^ovoril Kaganovich. Moscow, 1992, p. 191. Also in Felix
Chuev, Ka^novich, Shepihv. Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2001, p. 263.

For Maria Il'inichn Ul'ianova's letters, published in I^es/i/a TsK KP5S
No. 12, 1989, pp. 195-199, see

http:/ / chss.montclair.edu/english/furT/research/ulianova.html

Another of Lenin's assistants, Lidia Fotieva, remarked:

Nadezhda Konstantinova did not always conduct herself
as she ought to have done. She could have discussed this
with Vladimir Il'ich. She was accustomed to share
everything with him. And even in those cases when she
ought not to have done so . . . For example, why did she
tell Vladimir Il'ich that Stalin was crude to her on the
phone?

- Cited by A. Bek, Moskovskie Novosti April 23, 1989.
Lenin asked Stalin to give him poison on demand:

iptnln

239

On Saturday March 17 c. Ul'ianova (N.K.)
communicated to me in a very conspiratorial manner the
request of VI. irich to Stalin that I, Stalin, should assume
the duty of obtaining and giving to VI. U'ich an amount
of sodium cyanide. In this conversation with me N.K.
said, among other things, that "VI. U'ich is suffering
unimaginable pain", that "it is unthinkable to go on
living like this", and she stubbornly insisted that I "not
refuse Il'ich's request". In view of N.FC's especial
insistence and the fact that V. U'ich demanded my
agreement (during this conversation with me V.I. twice
called N.K. to come to see him, demanding with great
emotion Stalin's agreement), I considered it impossible
to refuse and replied: "I ask V. U'ich to calm himself and
be assured that, when it becomes necessary, I will cany
out his demand without hesitation." V. U'ich did in fact
become calm.

However, I must state that I do not have the strength to
cany out V. Il'ich's request, and am forced to reject this
commission, regardless of how humanitarian and
necessary it may be. I will so inform the meeting of the
members of the P.Buro of the CC.

J. Stalin

Remark: The note is on an official form of Secretary of
the Central Committee of the RCP(b) J. V. Stalin and is
dated March 21, 1923. In the upper pan of the sheet are
the signatures of those who read it: G. Zinoviev, V.
Molotov, N. Bukharin, L Kamenev, L. Trotsky, M.
Tomsky. The last considered it essential to express his
opinion: 'Head. I consider St's 'indecision' conect. We
must discuss this stricdy among the members of the Pol.
Euro. Without secretaries (I mean the technical ones).

TiitriiVolkogonov, Stalin. Russian edition, vol. 2, between pages 384
385. I have put an exact facsimile of the originals of these documents

://chss.montclair.edu/english/fun/research/stalinleninpoison23.pdf

240

Khrushchev I

3. "CoUegiaUty" In Work.

At several points in his speech Khrushchev complains about Stalin's 1
of coUegialit)' and violation of collective leadership.

"We have to consider seriously and analyze correctly this matter in or
that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form whate
of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tol
ate coUegiality in leadership and in work, and who practiced brutal v
lence, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also tow
that which seemed, to his capricious and despotic character, contiai}'
his concepts.

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient cooperati
with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute si
mission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to pre
his viewpoint and the correcmess of his position was doomed to remo
from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical anni
lation." (5-6)

"In practice, Stalin ignored the norms of party life and trampled on t
Leninist principle of collective party leadership."

Marshal Zhukov:

"After J. V. Stalin's death appeared the tale about how he
used to take military and strategic decisions unilaterally.
This was not the case at all. I have already said above
that if you reported questions to the Supreme
Commander with a knowledge of your business, he took
them into account. And I know of cases when he turned
against his own previous opinion and changed decisions
he had taken previously.*'

- Zhukov, G.K- Vospominaniia i ra^mysh/eniia. V. 2 tt. Moscow: OLALA-
PRESS, 2002, p. 163. Also at

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukov1/17.html

"By the way, as I was convinced during the war,J.V.
Stalin was not at all the kind af man before whom one
could not post sharp questions and with whom one
could not argue, and even firmly defend one's own point
of view. If someone says differently [e.g. Khrushchev -
GF] then I tell you directly - their affirmations are not
truthftil."

, 229. Also at

niilitera.lib.ru/ memo/russian/ zhukovl/OQ.html

' again:

"His style of work, as a rule, was businesslike. Everyone
could express his own opinion without being nervous.
The Supreme Commander treated everyone the same
way - stricdy and officially. He knew how to listen
attentively when you reported to him with knowledge of
your topic. He himself was laconic, and did not like
verbosity in others."

338. Also at

nilitera.lib.ru/ memo/ russian/ zhukovl/ 1 l.html

Mikoian:

"I must say that each one of us had the full ability to
express himself and defend his opinion or proposal. We
frankly discussed the most complicated and contested
questions (as for myself, I can speak on this point with
the fullest responsibility), and met on Stalin's part in
most cases with understanding, a reasoned and patient
attitude even when our statements were obviously
disagreeable to him.

He was also attentive to the proposals by the generals.
Stalin listened carefully to what was said to him and to
counsel, listened to disagreements with interest,
extracting intelligendy from them that bit of truth that
helped him later to formulate his final, most appropriate
decisions which were bom in this way, as a result of
collective discussion. More than this: it commonly
happened that, convinced by our evidence, Stalin
changed his own preliminary viewpoint on one or
another question."

n, Tak byio. Moscow: Vagrius, 1999. Chapter 37, p. 464.

... the companionable atmosphere of management work
did not lessen Stalin's role. On the contrary, we almost
always attributed out own proposals, formalized under
Stalin's signature, entirely to Stalin, without revealing that

242

Khnishchcv

their author was not Stalin but some other comrade. And
he (Stalin] signed, sometimes making amendments,
sometimes not, sometimes not even reading it, since he
trusted us.

- Mikoian, Tak hyloy Chapter 41.

Benediktov, long-time high official in Agriculture:

Contrary to a widespread view, all questions in those
years, including those involving the transfer of leading
party, state and militar}' figures, were decided in a
collegia! manner in the Politburo. At the Politburo
sessions themselves arguments and discussions often
flared up, different, sometimes contradictory opinions
were expressed within the framework, naturally, of party
directives. There was no quiet, untroubled unanimity -
Stalin and his colleagues could not abide that. I am quite
justified in saying this because I was present at Politburo
sessions many times. Yes, as a rule Stalin's viewpoint
came out on top. But this occurred because he was more
objective, thought through problems in a more all-round
way, saw further and deeper than others.

- I. A. Benediktov, "O Staline I Khrushcheve", Molodaia Gvardiia No. 4,
1989. At http://stalinism.newmail.ru/benedikt.htm

Marshal Shtemenko:

"General of the army S.M. Shtemenko who was closely-
associated by his work with J. V. Stalin during the war
years, writes: 'I must say that Stalin did not decide, and in
general did not like to decide, important military
questions unilaterally. He well understood the necessity
of collective work in this complex field. He recognized
the authorities in this or that military problem, took their
opinions into account, and gave each man his due. In
December 1943 after the Teheran Conference, when wc
needed to work out plans for future militar}' actions, the
report at the joint session of the Politburo of the CC of
the AUCP(b), the Supreme Defense Committee, and the
General Staff concerning the course of the war at the
front and its future course was made by A.M. Vasilevskii
and A.l. Antonov, while N. A Voznesenskii reported on

243

question of the war economy, and J. V. Stalin took upon
himself the analysis of problems of an intetnadonal
character."

I.M. Shtemenko, The General Staff During the War Years. Book 2. Mos-
u', 1981, p. 275. Cited from B. Solov*ev and V. Sukhdeev, Polkovodets
in. M 2003, at http://militera.lib.ru/research/suhodeev_w/04.html

nitri Shepilov:

"Stalin looked very good and for some reason was very
cheerful. He joked, laughed, and was very democratic.

- Shepilov has just told me that it is hard to lead Pravda.
Of course it's hard. I thought, maybe we should
nominate two editors?

Here everyone began to disagree noisily:

- No, there'll be a dual leadership. . . There'll be no or-
der, no one will know whom to ask.

- Well, I see that the people do not support me. Where
the people go, there too go I."

Immknuvshii^ M. 2001, pp. 236-7. Also at

»:// www.pseudology. org/ ShepilovDT/ 1 1 . htm

-ushchev himself admitted this quality in Stalin:

"I remained in my opinion. And here was something
interesting (which was also characteristic of Stalin): this
man, in a flairup of anger, could do a lot of harm. But
when you demonstrated to him that you were right and if
you adduced good facts, he would understand in the end
that this was a man who was defending a useful cause,
and would support you. . . . Yes, there were cases when
you could Hrmly disagree with him and if he was
convinced you were right, then he would yield his own
point of view and take the point of view of his
interlocutor. Of course this is a positive quality.

then Khrushchev hastened to add:

"But, unfortunately, you could count the number of
times this happened on your fingers."

rushchev had evidently already forgotten that he had just called this
ity of Stalin's "characteristic")

244

Khrushchev

- Khrushchev, N.S. Vnnid, Uudi, Vlast\ Book 2, Part 3. Moscow: Mo;
ovskie novosd, 1999, Chapter 3, pp. 43-4 (Russian edition). Also at
http://hronos.kni.ru/libris/lib_h/hrush34.htinl

In fact it was Khrushchev himself who refused to lead collectively
was removed in large part for that in 1964.

[From Suslov's speech]"Com. Khrushchev, having
concentrated in his hands the posts of First secretary of
the CC of the party and Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, has by no means always correctly used the
rights and obligations entrusted to him. Breaking with
the I^ninist principles of collectivity in leadership, he has
begun to strive towards unilaterally deciding the most
important questions of party and state work, has begun
to neglect the opinions of the collective of part}' and
government leaders, has stopped considering the views
and advice of his comrades. More recently he has
decided even the most important questions in an
essentially individual manner, crudely insisting upon his
own subjective, often completely incorrect point of view.
He believes himself to be without error, has appropriated
to himself a monopolistic claim to the truth. To all
comrades who have expressed their opinions and made
remarks unpleasing to com. Khrushchev, he has
arrogantly given all kinds of demeaning and insulting
nicknames that lower their personal dignity. ... As a
result of com. Khrushchev's incorrect behavior the
Presidium of the CC has become less and less an organ
of collective, creative discussion and decision-making.
Collective leadership has in fact become impossible.

It has become more and more clear that com.
Khrushchev is striving for an exaltation of his own
personality and the ignoring of the Presidium and the CC
CPSU. These incorrect actions of com. Khrushchev can
be interpreted as his striving to advance a cult of his wm
personalit}'..."

- "Kak snimali N.S. Khrushcheva." Jstoricheskii Arkhiv^o. 1, 1993, pp."
10.

[

Stalin's Four Attempts to Resign as First
Secretary, then as Secretary, of the Party

August 19, 1924

To the Plenum of the CC RCP

One and a half years of working in the Politburo with
comrades Zinoviev and Kamanev after the retirement
and then the death of Lenin have made perfectly clear to
me the impossibility of honest, sincere political work
with these comrades within the framework of one small
collective. In view of which I request to be considered as
having resigned from the Pol[itical] Buro of the CC.

I request a medical leave for about two months.

At the expiration of this period I request to be sent to
Turukhansk region or to the lakutsk oblast', or to
somewhere abroad in any kind of work that will attract
little attention.

I would ask the Plenum [of the CC. - GF] to decide all
these questions in my absence and without explanations
from my side, because I consider it hannful for our work
to give explanations aside from those remarks that I have
already made in the first paragraph of this letter.

I would ask comrade Kuibyshev to distribute copies of
this letter to the members of the CC.

With com[munist] greet[ings], J.Stalin.

19.VIII.24

1994. XsT. C 72-73.

December 27, 1926

To the Plenum of the CC (to com. Rykov). I ask that I
be relieved of the post of GenSec [General Secretary] of
the CC. I declare that I can work no longer in this
position, I do not have the strength to work any more in
this position. J. Stalin.

27.XII.26

246

Khrushchev

- RoiliM. 1994. Nil. C. 72-73.

December 19, 1927

Fragment of the transcript of the CC Plenum.

Stalin: Comrades! For three years I have been asking the
CC to free me from the obligations of General Secretary
of the CC. Each time the Plenum has refused me. I
admit that until recendy condidons did exist such that
the Party had need of me in this post as a person more
or less severe, one who acted as a certain kind of
antidote to the dangers posed by the Opposition. I admit
that this necessity existed, despite comrade Lenin's well-
known letter, to keep me at the post of General
Secretary. But those condidons exist no longer. They
have vanished, since the Opposidon is now smashed. It
seems that the Opposition has never before suffered
such a defeat since they have not only been smashed, but
have been expelled from the Party. It follows that now
no bases exist any longer that could be considered
correct when the Plenum refused to honor my request
and free me of the duties of General Secretary.
Meanwhile you have comrade Lenin's directive which wc
are obliged to consider and which, in my opinion, it is
necessary to put into effect. I admit that the Party was
compelled to disregard this directive until recendy,
compelled by well-known conditions of inter-Party
development. But I repeat that these conditions have
now vanished and it is time, in my view, to take comrade
Lenin's directive to the leadership. Therefore I request
the Plenum to free me of the post of General Secretar)'
of the CC. I assure you, comrades, that the Part)' can
only gain from doing this.

Dogadov: Vote without discussion.

Voroshilov: I propose that we reject the announcement
we just heard.

Rykov: We will vote without discussion. . . . We vote now
on Stalin's proposal that he be freed from the General

Secretaryship. Who is for this proposal? Who is against?
Who abstains? One.

The proposal of comrade Stalin is rejected with one
abstention.

Stalin: Then I introduce another proposal. Perhaps the
CC will consider it expedient to abolish the position of
Gensec In our Party's history there have been times
when no such post existed.

Voroshilov: We had Lenin with us then.

Stalin: We had no post of Gensec before the lO***
Congress.

Voice: Until the 11* Congress.

Stalin: Yes, it seems that until the ll'*' Congress we did
not have this position. That was before Lenin stopped
working. If Lenin concluded that it was necessary to put
forward the question of founding the position of
Gensec, then I assume he was prompted by the special
circumstances that appeared with us bfore the 10'^
Congress, 'when a more or less strong, well-organi2ed
Opposition within the Party was founded. But now we
no longer have these conditions in the Party, because the
Opposition is smashed to a man. Therefore we could
proceed to the abolition of this position. Many people
associate a conception of some kind of special rights of
the Gensec with this position. I must say from my
experience, and comrades will confirm this, that there
ought not to be any special rights distinguishing the
Gensec from the rights of other members of the
Secretariat.

Voice: And the duties?

Stalin: And there are no more duties than other members
of the Secretariat have. I see it this way: There's the
Politburo, the highest organ of the CC; there's the
Secretariat, the executive organ consisting of Gve
persons, and all these five members of the Secretariat are
equal. That's the way the work has been carried out in
practice, and the Gensec has not had any special rights

Khnish*

or obligations. The result, therefore, is that the position
of Gensec, in the sense of special rights, has never
existed with us in practice, there has been only a
collegium called the Secretariat of the CC. I do not know
why we need to keep this dead position any longer. I
don't even mention the fact that this position, called
Gensec, has occasioned in some places a series of
distortions. At the same time that at the top no special
rights or duties are associated with the position of
Gensec, in some places there have been some
distortions, and in all the oblasts there is now a struggle
over that position among comrades who call themselves
secretaries, for example, in the national CCs. Quite a few
Gensecs have developed, and with them in the localities
special rights have been associated. Why is this
necessary?

Shmidt: We can dismiss them in these localities.

Stalin. I think the Party would benefit if we did away
with the post of Gensec, and that would give me the
chance to be free from this post. This would be aU the
easier to do since according to the Party's constitution
there is no post of Gensec,

Rykov: I propose not to give comrade Stalin the
possibility of being free from this position. As concerns
the Gensecs in the oblast and local organs, that should
be changed, but without changing the situation in the
CC. The position of General Secretary was created by
the proposal of Vladimir Il'ich. In all the time since,
during Vladimir Il'ich 's life and since, this position has
justified itself politically and completely in both the
organi2ational and political sense. In the creation of this
organ and in naming comrade Stalin to the post of
Gensec the whole Opposition also took part, all those
whom we have now expelled from the Party. Tliat is
how completely without doubt it was for everyone in the
Party (whether the position of Gensec was needed and
who should be the General Secretary). By which has
been exhausted, in my opinion, both the question of the
"testament" (for that point has been decided) and

\|ipi1Mlu

exhausted by the Opposition at the same time just as it
has been decided by us as well. The whole Party knows
this. What has changed now after the IS*** Congress and
why is it necessary to set aside the position of Gensec?

Stalin. The Opposition has been smashed.

(A long discussion followed, after which:)

Voices: Correctl Votel

Rykov: There is a proposal to vote.

Voices: Yes, yes!

Rykov: We are voting. Who is for comrade Stalin's
proposal to abolish the post of General Secretary? Who
is opposed? Who abstains? No.

Stalin: Comrades, during the first vote about freeing me
from the dudes of secretary I did not vote, I forgot to
vote. I ask that my vote be counted as "Against."

Voice from a seat. That does not mean much.

Quoted from G. Chemiavskii. "Prizhok iz partiinykh dzhunglei."
difW (Baltimore,.MD) at http://kackad.com/kackad/.'^p=855

October 16. 1952

I the memoirs of Akakii Mgeladze we read:

... At the first Plenum of the CC of the CPSU called
after the XIX Congress of the Party (I had been elected
member of the CC and took part in the work of this
Plenum), Stalin really did present the question that he
should be freed either of the post of General Secretary
of the CC CPSU, or of the post of Chairman of the
Coundl of Ministers of the USSR. He referred to his ag^,
overwork, said that other cadres had cropped up there
were and people to replace him, for example, N.I.
Bulganin could be appointed as Chairman of the Council
of Ministers, but the CC members did not grant his
request, all insisted that comrade Stalin remain at both
positions.

250

Khrushchev

-A.I. Mgeladze, Staiin. Kakim ia v^al, Stntnnitsy nedavno^ prosUogk h
2001, p. 118. Also see Chapter 9, where Stalin's speech to this Plenur
recalled by L.N. Efremov is discussed.

4. Stalin ^^Morally and Physically Annihilate(
Leaders Who Opposed Him.

Khrushchev:

"Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and
patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his
concepts and demanding absolute submission to his
opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to
prove his viewpoint and the correctness of his position
was doomed to removal from the leading collective and
to subsequent moral and physical annihilation."

5. Mass Repressions generally

Khrushchev:

"It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice o
mass repression through the Government apparatus was bom, (vti
against the enemies of Leninism - Trotskyites, Zinovie\'ires, Buk
harinites, long since politically defeated by the party - and subsequendi
also against many honest Communists,..."

Khrushchev killed more than others:

From the Interview of V.P. Pronin, Chairman of the Moscow Soviet m
1939-45, from Voenno-hforicheskJi Zhuma/ No. 10, 1991.

"Question: And Khrushchev? What memories remain
with you about him?

Answer. [. . .] He actively aided the repressions. A sword
of Damocles hung above his head. In 1920 Khrushche\'
had voted for the Trotskyist position. And therefore,
obviously, he feared the consequences, and he himself
'batded' with especial zeal against carelessness, loss of
political alermess, political blindness, etc. Khrushchev
sanctioned the repressions of a large number of Party
and Soviet workers. Under him almost all of the 23
secretaries of the raikoms of the city were arrested. And

251

almost all the secretanes of the raikoms of the [Moscow]
province [obbst*]. All the secretanes of the Moscow
Committee and the Moscow City Committee of the
party were repressed: Katsenelenbogen, Margolin,
Kogan, Korytniy. All the managers of the sections,
including Khrushchev's own assistant Even after he was
in the Ukraine Khrushchev insisted, in the Politburo in
1938, upon the repression of the second tier of
leadership of the Moscow City Committee of the Party.

We, at that time young [Party] workers, were astonished.
How could Khrushchev instruct us about 'alertness', if
everybody around him turned out to be enemies of the
people? He was the only one in the Moscow Committee
who remained unharmed.

Question: Do you believe that the scale of repressions in
Moscow was Khrushchev's personal "contribution"?

Answer To a significant degree. After the autumn of
1938, the arrival of Shcherbakov to the leadership of the
[Moscow] City Committee, not one of the [Party]
workers of the Moscow Soviet, the Moscow [Party]
Committee, the Moscow City [Party] Committee, or the
regional committees was repressed. I know that in July
1940, when the question arose of removing Shcherbakov
from work for the poor work of the aviation factories,
they accused him also of very rarely, and even then very
unwillingly, giving his agreement to repressions. On the
contrary; in my presence at a meeting of the secretaries
of the City Committee and on Shcherbakov's motion the
head of the investigative section of the NKVD was
expelled from the Part)' for unfounded arrests.

in Vladimir Alliluev, Khrvnika odnoi sent '/; AllilMiy, Stalin. Moscow,
ia gvardiia, 2002, p. 172.

chev promoted repression:

"We must annihilate all these scoundrels. In annihilating
one, two, dozens, we do the work for millions. Therefore
our hand must not tremble, we must walk across the
corpses of the enemy for the people's benefit."

252

Khnjshchcv ]

- Khrushchev, August 14, 1937. Vadim Kozhinov, Russia. 20"' Cenlury.
1939-1964. Ch. 8. at http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_k/ko2hin20vl l.|
Mark lUnge and S.A. Kokin state that Khrushchev made this remark i
plenum of the Moscow City Soviet; 'Xlhem^ irufy vraga na bJago naroda".
1. Moscow: ROSSPEN 2010), p. 13.

Historian lUrii Zhukov claims he has seen the document in which Kh
shchev asks for permission to raise "Categot}' one" to 20,000 - a nt
ber, with no names.

"luri Nikolaevich, we have Zona Leonidovna
Serebriakova on the line. Why do you, when you evaluate
Stalin, not take into account the "lists to be shot", in
which are documented, by the mark of his own pencil,
the thousands of people sent off to their deaths?

Zoria Leonidovna, and how is one to take into account
those lists, where there are not even names, but simply
the words: 'Permit me to shoot 20,000 people.* And the
signature: 'Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich.' I will tell you
where this document is."

- Komomolskaia Pravda December 3 2002.

"...Half of the first harvest took place in the Moscow
province [oblast*], by no means the largest in the
countr)'. On the 'troika' formed here were, as specified,
the first secretar)' of the Moscow obkom of the Party
N.S. Khrushchev. Next to his name and signature wc
always find the name and signature of Redens, head of
the UNKVD for the Moscow oblast' and relative of N.
AUilueva, Stalin's second wife. Today Redens is
numbered among the lists of 'victims of Stalin's
willfulness.' And here is what Khrushchev and Redens
represented... well, it's better if I cite their request to the
Politburo: To shoot: 2,000 kulaks, 6,500 criminals, and
to exile: 5869 kulaks, 26,936 criminals.' And this was
only one swing of the sickle!"

- Zhukov, Komsomolskaia Pravda Nov. 19, 2002:

Khrushchev asked for authority to repress huge numbers of people in
Moscow, including killing thousands.

"CC ACP(b) - to comrade Stalin J.V.

253

I report that we have counted a total of 41,305 criminal
and kulak elements who have served their sentences and
settled in Moscow city and province.

Of those there are 33,436 criminal elements. Materials at
hand give us the basis to put 6,500 criminals in Cat^ory
1 (to be shot - GF], and 26,396 in Category 2 [to be
exiled- GF]. Of this number, for orientation purposes in
the city of Moscow there are 1,500 in Category 1 and
5,272 in Category 2.

We have calculated there are 7,869 kulaks who have
served their sentences and setded in Moscow city and
oblast' Materials at hand give us the basis to put 2,000
from this group into Category 1 and 5,869 in Cat^ory 2.

We request that a commission be confirmed, consisting
of comrades Redens, head of the UNKVD for the
Moscow oblast'; Maslov, assistant prosecutory of the
Moscow oblast', and Khrushchev, N.S. - Secretary of
the Moscow Committee and Moscow City Committee,
with the right, when necessary, to be replaced by A.A.
Volkov - second secretary of the Moscow City
Committee.

Secretary of the M[oscow] C[ommittee] of the ACP(b) -

(N. Khrushchev)". July 10, 1937.

Wjune 4, 1992; republished in Molotov, Maienkov, Kaganovich. 1957. p.
,n.22

ty (Excesses, 127) cites Khrushchev's request for 41,000 people in
1 categories:

In Moscow, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev knew that
he needed to repress exactly 41,805 kulaks and criminals.
Nearly all of the submissions from the forty provinces
and republics responding to Stalin's telegram were in
such exact figures."

te: from Zhukov, totals are 41305; Getty writes 41,805. This must be
1 the same document cited above, so Getty copied wrong - GF]

srding to Getty, after conferences in Moscow, the categories of peo-
subject to this repression were greatly expanded, and "the target
bers submitted previously by the local authorities were revised, most

254

Khrushchev I

often downward." (p. 128) That is, the "Center" - Stalin and the Po
buro - tried to limit these repressions.

Taubman's large (876 pp.) work Khrushchev: The Main and His Em (h
Norton, 2003), does not even mention Khrushchev's repressions in Mi
cow, though they were greater in number than those in any other rcgioi

As for the Ukrainian repression directed personally by Khrushchev, hi
is what he says:

"Yet the same Khrushchev presided over the purges,
which apparently accelerated after his arrival. In 1938
alone, 106,119 people are said to have been arrested;
between 1938 and 1940 the total was 165,565. According
to Molotov, hardly objective but extremely well
informed, Khrushchev 'sent 54,000 people to the next
world as a member of the [Ukrainian] troika.'
Khrushchev's speeches dripped venom, and at least one
case has come to light in which he scrawled, 'Arrest,'
across the top of a document that doomed a high official
of the Ukrainian Komsomol."

-Taubman, 116.

An example of Khrushchev's complaining to Stalin about "Moscow's"
that is, Stalin and the Politburo's - lowering the numbers of people fo
repression is this note from Khrushchev to Stalin:

"Dear losif VissaiionovichtThe Ukraine sends [requests
for ] 17,000 - 18,000 [persons to be] represed ever)'
month. And Moscow confirms no more than 2,000 -
3,000. I request that you take prompt measures. Your
devoted N. Khrushchev."

- cited from Kosolapov, Shvo Tovarishchu Stalinu. M: Eksmo, 2002, p. 355
Although this note is widely quoted, I have not been able to fiiid an ar
chival citation for this statement.

Khrushchev's appointment to the post of First Secrctan-
of the CC of the Communist Party (b) of the Ukraine
brought a qualitative increase in repression, testimony of
which we find in a fragment from his speech at the 14*
Congress of the Communist Party of the republic. "We
will do everything, he said, in order to fulfill with honor
the task and commands of the CC ACP(b) and of

ndix

255

comrade Stalin - to make the Ukraine an impregnable
fortress for enemies [of the people - GF].

... In his speech to the 20''* Congress of the Party N.S.
Khrushchev deliberately avoided any mention of events
in the Ukraine and cited facts concerning the repressions
in other r^ons. But as they say, "You can't hide a
needle in a sack." We must consider as purely objective
the evaluation of his role in organizing mass repressions
in the Ukraine given, for example, in the speech of the
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the republic
Uspensky at the Congress of the CP(b)U: "I, like
many other comrades speaking here - said the
Commissar - must acknowledge that the rout of enemies
of the people in the Ukraine began for real just a few
months ago, when we received to lead us that
experienced Bolshevik, pupil and comrade-in-arms of
great Stalin, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev."

luz'min. "K repressiiam prichasten. Strikhi k politicheskomu por-
N.S. Khrushchev. Vo!;mi(hdenie Nadei^hdy. No. 2, 1997. At
Vmemory.irkutsk.ru/pub/fr2.htm Also quoted in N.F. Bugai,
Vknuny v *Osoboi papke' Staiina. Moscow. Nauka, 2006, pp. ISl-Z.

details about the huge number of persons "repressed" by Khru-
rv in Moscow, 1936-37:

"N.S. Khrushchev, working as first secretary of the
M[oscow] C[ommittee] and the M[oscow] C[ity]
C[ommittee] of the ACP(b) in 1936-1937, and from 1937
as first secretary of the CC of the CP(b)U (Communist
Party of the Ukraine, Bolshevik), personally gave his as-
sent to the arrests of a significant number of Party and
Soviet workers. In the archive of the KGB there are
documentary materials that attest to Khrushchev's
participation in carrying out massive repressions in
Moscow, Moscow oblast', and in the Ukraine in the
prewar years. In particular he personally sent documents
with proposals for the arrests of leading workers of the
Moscow Soviet and Moscow Oblast' Committee of the
Party. In all, during 1936-1937 55,741 persons were

256

Khrushchev I

repressed by the organs of the Moscow and Moscow
oblast* NKVD.

From Januai}' 1938 Khrushchev headed the Party
organization of the Ukraine. In 1938 106,1 19 persons
were arrested in the Ukraine. Repressions did not stop
during the following years. In 1939 about 12,000 persons
were arrested, and in 1940 - about 50,000 persons. In all,
during the years 1938-1940 167,565 persons were
arrested in the Ukraine.

The NKVD explained the increase in repressions in
1938 in the Ukraine in that, in connection with the
arrival of Khrushchev, counter-revolutionary activity' of
the Right-Trotskyite underground grew especially
quickly. Khrushchev personally sanctioned the
repression of several hundred persons who were
suspected of organizing terrorist acts [= assassination
attennpts] against himself.

In the summer of 1938 with Khrushchev's, sanction a
large group of leading Party, Soviet, and economic
workers were arrested, among them the vice-chair of the
Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR,
government ministers [narkomy], assistant ministers,
secretaries of the oblast* committees of the Party. All
were sentenced to execution or to long terms of
imprisonment. According to lists sent by the NKVD of
the USSR to the Politburo, for 1938 alone permission
was given for the repression of 2,140 persons of the
republican Party and Soviet cadre."

- "Massovye repressii opravdany byt' ne mogut." Is/ochntk No. 1, 1993.
126-7; Reabilitatsia. Kak EtoBjlo. Ill (Moscow, 2004), 146-7.

Khrushchev, Februarj' 1, 1956:

Question of com. Khrushchev [to Rodos]: Tell us in
relation to corns. Postyshev, Kosior, you declared them
enemies.

Com. Khrushchev:

The guilty parties aie higher. Semi-ciiminal elements
were brought into leading these investigations. Stalin is
to blame.

Acistov: Comrade Khrushchev, do we have the courage
to tell the truth?

jAiistov: Eikhe refused to confess to the last, and they
shot him nevertheless.

Com. Khrushchev: Ezhov, in all probability, was
innocent, an honest man.

Com. Mikoian: The Decree about the struggle against
terror was taken on December 1 1934.

[...]

Com. Khrushchev: lagoda, in all probability, was an
innocent [chis/iy = 'dean*] man. Ezhov [also].

RKEB 1 308-9, p. 308-9.

6. "Enemy of the people*'.

hnjshchev: *

Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This term
automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors
of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this term
made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating
all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any
way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected
of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations. This
concept "enemy of the people" actually eliminated the possibility
of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views
known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character.
In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against
all norms of current legal science, was the "confession" of the
accused himself; and, as subsequent probing proved, "confes-
sions" were acquired through physical pressures against the ac-
cused. This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality and
to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past
had defended the party line, became victims.

We must assert that, in regard to those persons who in their time
had opposed the party line, there were often no sufficiently seri-

258

Khnishchcv

ous reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula "er
of the people" was specifically introduced for the purpos
physically annihilating such individuals."

Jean-Paul Marat used the term "rennemi du people" in the first issue
his journal L'Ami du Peuple of 1793. See

http:/ /membres.multimania.fr/jpmarat/ amidpaf.htinl#ennenu

It is also famously the name of a play by Ibsen.

Maxim Gorky, in the story "Khersones Tavricheskii",! 897.

"...and in the conspiracy I will not act against the
community, nor against any of the citizens who has not
been declared an enemy of the people."

-Text at http://www.archaeolog)'.ru/ONLINE/Gorid/gorky.himl.
Lifshits, "Preslovutiy Doklad Khrushcheva", at

http:// www.m-s-k.newmail.ni/pub/1.htm (retrieved July 5, 2004) gii
the print citation as Gor'kii, M. Sobranie sochinenU. V 30-ti t. 2hy p. 266.

Used by Lenin:

Lenin, "The land campaign and 'Iskra"s plan", 1903:

"Serious support by the workers of the Zemstvo appeals
should consist not in agreement about the conditions on
which the Zemstvo representatives can speak in the
name of the people, but by striking a blow at the enemies
of the people."

- http://www.marxists.org/ russ kij /lenin / works /9- 1 9.htm

Lenin, "The beginning of the revolution in Russia," 1905.

"We Social-Democrats can and must proceed
independently of the revolutionaries of the bourgeois
democracy, guaranteeing the class independence of the
proletariat, but we must go hand in hand with them
during the uprising, while striking direct blows against
Tsarism, in opposing the army, in attacking the Bastilles
of the cursed enemy of the whole Russian people."

- http://www.marxists.org/russkij/lenin/1905/01/12a.htm

Lenin, May 9, 1918:

"To declare all owners of grain who have surpluses and
do not bring them to the export points, and also all the

259

grain supplies of all those who raise it for distilling
spirits, as enemies of the people; to turn them over to
the Revolutionary court and submit them from now on
to prison sentences of not less than 10 years,
conBscation of all property, and exile from their
community [obshchina] for life, and in addition to
subject distillers to forced social labor."

Lenin, Cmplete W^orks v. 36, p. 318 (Russian edition). Quoted at
ttp://\vww.kursach.com/biblio/001 0024/ 103_1, htm The Decree was
Jven with minor changes. Dekrety Sovetskoi vlastu Ed. G.D. Obichina et al.
. 1 17 marta - 10 iulia 1918 g. Moscow: Gospoliiizdat, 1959, p. 265.

ecree of the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's
Dinmissars of August 7, 1932:

"...People who infringe upon social property must be
considered enemies of the people, in view of which a
determined struggle against plunderers of sodal
possessions is the first duty of the organs of Soviet
power."

Tnige(iiia Sovetskoi Denvni. Koilektm:(atsia I mskulachivanie. Dokumeaty I
^erialy. 1927-1939. Tom 3, Koaets 1930-1933. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001.
}. 160, p. 453. Also at the Russian Wikisource page

p:// tinyurl.com/law-of-aug-7-32

irushchev*s use of the term:

"3. Enemies of the people have managed to do a lot of
damage in the area of assignment of cadres. The military
soviet has set as the main task to uproot completely the
remenants of hostile elements by carefully studying each
commander and political worker at the time of
promotion, and to boldly promote verified, devoted and
upcoming cadres. . ."

joted by Volkogonov, Stalin. Vol. 1, Ch. 7, at note 608. . For full text
1 context, see below, under "Commanders Killed."

Trotskyites, Bukharinists, bourgeois nationalists and
other evil enemies of the people, suborners of the
restoration of capitalism, have made desperate attempts
to destroy from within the Leninist unity of the Party's

260

Khrushchev 1

ranks - and they have all broken their heads on this
unity.

- cited by lU.V. Hmerianov. Khrushchev. Smut*ian v KremU. Moscow: '
che, 2005, p. 32.

6a. ^^Convincing and Educating^'.

Khrushchev:

"An entirely different relationship with people
characterized Stalin. Lenin's traits - patient work with
people, stubborn and painstaking education of them, the
ability to induce people to follow him without using
compulsion, but rather through the ideological influence
on them of the whole collective -were entirely foreign to
Stalin. He discarded the Leninist method of convincing
and educating, he abandoned the method of ideological
struggle for that of administrative violence, mass
repressions and terror. " (pp. 7-8)

See below.

7. Zinoviev & Kamenev.

Khrushchev:

"In his "testament" Lenin warned that "Zinoviev's and
Kamenev's October episode was of course not an
accident." But Lenin did not pose the question of their
arrest and certainly not their shooting." (p. 9)

Stalin to Kaganovich, about testimony at the Zinoviev-Kamenev "TmJ
of the 16", August 1936.

. . . Second. From Reingol'd's confessions it is clear that
Kamenev, through his wife Glebova, was feeling out the
French ambassador [Herve] Alphand concerning
possible relations of the French government with / a
future "government" of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc.
I think that Kamenev also felt out the English, German
and American ambassadors. That means that Kamenev
must have disclosed to these foreigners the plans of ilic
plot and of the murders of the leaders of the Bolshevik
Party. That also means that Kamenev had already

\p|icndix

261

disclosed to them these plans, or else the foreigners
would not have agreed to have discussions with him
about a future Zinoviev-Trocskyite "government." This
is the attempt of Kamenev and his friends to conclude a
direct bloc with the bourgeois governments against the
Soviet government. This explains the secret of the well-
known advance obituaries of the American
correspondents. Obviously, Glebova is well informed
about all this sordid material. We must bring Glebova to
Moscow and submit her to a series of meticulous
interrogations. She might reveal many interesting things.

Stalin i Kaganovich, Penpiska 1931-1936 [Stalin-Kaganovich Corre-
ipondence, 1931-1936] (Russian), No. 763, pp. 642-3

3,M. Dmitriev's confession, concerning this event:

I remember the following cases:

1. The case of Tat'iana KAMENEVA, She was the wife
of LE. KAMENEV. We had information that Tat'iana
KAMENEVA, on instructions from L.B. KAMENEV,
went to the French ambassador in Moscow AL'FAND
with a proposal to set up a meeting with L.B.
KAMENEV for countrevolutionary discussions
concerning help by the French government to
underground Trotskyites inside the USSR.

I and CHERTOK interrogated Tat'iana KAMENEVA
"steered away*' from this accusation, making it possible
for her to avoid testimony about this fact during the

investigation.

Lubianka 2, Doc. 356, p. 586. "L.E. Kamenev" is a typographical error
>r L.B. Kamenev. The Kameneva referred to here is the same person as
le Glebova of the previous quotation.

8. Trotskyites

hrushchev:

"Or, let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At
present, after a sufficiently long historical period, we can
speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete
calm and can analyze this matter with sufficient

262

Khnishchc

objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose
origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois
society. Part of them belonged to the party intelligentsia
and a certain part were recruited from among the
workers. We can name many individuals who, in their
time, joined the Trotskyites; however, these same
individuals took an active part in the workers' movement
before the Revolution, during the Socialist October
Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the
victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them
broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist
positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people?"

Stalin on Trotskyites at February-March 1937 C.C. Plenum, March 3:

"5. It should be explained to our Party comrades that the
Trotskyites, who represent the active elements in the
diversionist, wrecking and espionage work of the foreign
intelligence services, have already long ceased to be a
political trend in the working class, that they have already
long ceased to serve any idea compatible with the
interests of the working cbss, that they have turned into
a gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies, assassins, without
principles and ideas, working for the foreign intelligence
services.

It should be explained that in the struggle against
contemporary Trotskyism, not the old methods, the
methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods,
methods for smashing and uprooting it."

- J.V. Stalin, Mastering Bolshevism. NY: Workers Library' Publishers, 193
pp. 26-7; cited from http://www.marx2mao/Stalin/MB37.html

Stalin, concluding speech of Plenum on March 5:

"But here is the question - how to carry out in practice
the task of smashing and uprooting the German-
Japanese agents of Trotskyism. Does this mean that we
should strike and uproot not only the real Trotskyites,
but also those who wavered at some time toward
Trotskyism, and then long ago came away from
Trotskyism; not only those who are really Trotskyite
agents for wrecking, but also those who happened once

dll

263

upon a time to go along a street where some Trotskyite
or other had once passed? At any rate, such voices were
heard here at the plenum. Can we consider such an
inteipretation of the resolution to be correct? No, we
cannot consider it to be correct.

On this question, as on all other questions, there must be
an individual, differentiated approach. You must not
measure everyone with the same yardstick. Such a
sweeping approach can only harm the cause of struggle
against the real Trotskyite wreckers and spies.

Among our responsible comrades there are a certain
number of former Trotskyites who left Trotskyism long
ago, and now fight against Trotskyism not worse but
better than some of our respected comrades who never
chanced to waver toward Trotskyism. It would be
foolish to vilify such comrades now.

Among our comrades there are also those who always
stood against Trotskyism ideologically, but in spite of
this kept up personal contacts with individual
Trotskyites, which they did not delay in liquidating as
soon as the actual visage of Trotskyism became clear to
them. It is, of course, not a good thing that they did not
break off their personal friendly connections with
individual Trotskyites at once, but belatedly. But it would
be silly to lump such comrades together with the
Trotskyites."

pp. 43-4.

Khrushchev's own words - exactly what Stalin advocated at the
[arch 1937 Plenum:

"After all, around Trotsky were people whose origin
cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois society. Part
of them belonged to the party intelligentsia and a certain
part were recruited from among the workers. We can
name many individuals who, in their time, joined the
Trotskyites; however, these same individuals took an
active part in the workers' movement before the
Revolution, during the Socialist October Revolution
itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this

264

Khrushchev Ij

greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with
Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions." (p. 9; see
above)

Further on in the "Secret Speech, in a passage it will be convenient
consider here, Khrushchev returned to the question of Trotskyites in t
USSR in the 1930s.

'*We should recall that in 1927, on the eve of the 15th
Party Congress, only some 4,000 votes were cast for the
Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition while there were
724,000 for the party line. During the 10 years which
passed between the 1 5th Party Congress and the
February-March Central Committee plenum. Trotskyism
was completely disarmed; many former Trotskyites had
changed their former views and worked in the various
sectors building socialism. It is clear that in the situation
of socialist victory there was no basis for mass terror in
the country."

Stalin, at the February- March 1937 Central Committee Plenum:

"Call to mind the last discussion on Trotskyism in our
Part)' in 1927.. . Out of 854,000 Party members, 730,000
members voted at that time. Among them, 724,000 Part}'
members voted for the Bolsheviks, for the Central
Committee of the Part)-, against the Trotskyites, and
4,000 Party members, or about one-half of one per cent,
voted for the Trotskyites, while 2,600 members of the
Party refrained from voting.... Add to this the fact that
many out of this number became disillusioned with
Trotskyism and left it, and you get a conception of the
insignificance of the Trotskyite forces."

- J.V. Stalin, Mastering Boishemm. NY: Workers Library Publishers, 1937.
pp. 59-60. At http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/MB37.html (Emphasis
added in both cases - GF)

Khrushchev may very well have copied this passage out of Stalin's ven
speech!

Sudoplatov on guilt of Trotskyites:

"In the interests of the political conjuncture the activities
of Trotsky and his supporters abroad in the 1930s are

icndix

265

said to have been propaganda only. But this is not so.
'Ilie Troiskyites were also involved in actions. Making
use of the support of persons uath ties to German
military intelligence [the 'Abwehr*] they organized a
revolt against the Republican government in Barcelona
in 1937. From Trotskyist circles in the French and
German special intelligence services came "indicative"
information concerning the actions of the Communist
Parties in supporting the Soviet Union. Concerning the
connections of the leaders of the Trotskyist revolt in
Barcelona in 1937 we were informed by Schulze-
Boysen. .. Afterward, after his arrest, the Gestapo
accused him of transmitting this information to us, and
this fact figured in his death sentence by the Hiderite
court in his case.

Concerning other examples of the Abwehr's use of their
ties to the Trotskyites for searching out leaders of the
Communist Party of France who were in hiding in 1941
our resident in Paris, VasUevsky, appointed in 1940 to
the post of plenipotentiary for the Executive Committee
of the Comintern, reported to us."

glish translation from Gen. Pavel Sudoplatov, The InteUi^nce Service
he Kremlin^ Moscow 1996, p. 58:

relevant paragraph from the Nazi military court, verifying Sudopla-
contention:

An fang 1938, wahrend des Spanienkri^es, erfuhr der
Angeklagte dienstlich, daB unter Mitwirkung des
deutschen Geheimdienstes im Gebiet von Barcelona ein
Austand g^en die dortige rote Regierung vorbereitet
werde. Diese Nachricht wurde von ihm gemeinsam mit
der von Pdllnitz der sowjeliussischen Botschaft in Paris
zugeleitet.

sh translation:

"At the beginning of 1938, during the Spanish Civil War,
the accused learned in his official capacity that a
rebellion against the local red government in the territory
of Barcelona was being prepared with the co-operation
of the German Secret Service. This information, together

266

Khnishchcv

with that of Pollnitz, was transmitted by him to the
Soviet Russian embassy in Paris."

("Pollnitz" was Gisella von Pollnitz, a recent recruit to the "Red Orel
tra" ^ote KapeUe) anti-Nazi Soviet spy ring who worked for Un
Press and who "shoved the report through the mailbox of the So
embassy." Shareen Blair Brysac, Resisting Hitler Mildred Hamack ana
Red Orchestra. Oxford Universit)' Press, 2000, p. 237).

- Haase, N. Das Reichskriegsgericht und der Widerstand gegen nationalstx^lish
Herrschaft. Berlin, 1993, S. 105. See also G rover Furr. "Evidence of !.<
Trotsky's CoUaboradon with Germany and Japan." Cultural Logic TSiW.
http://clogic.eserver.org/2009/FurT.pdf

9. Stalin neglected Party

Khrushchev:

"Was it a normal situation when over 13 years elapsed between the 18
and 19th Party Congresses, years during which our part)' and our count
had experienced so many important events?"

"At the February (1947) Plenum of the CC A[ndrei]
Zhdanov spoke about the decision to convoke a regular,
19''' Congress of the ACP(b) at the end of 1947 or in any
case during 1948. Besides that, in the interests of
enlivening inner-party life, he proposed adopting a
simplified order of convoking party conferences,
carrying them out every year with compulsory renewal of
the totals of the membership of the Plenum of the CC
not less than by one-sixth."

- Pyzhikov, A.V. "Leningradskaia gruppa: Put' vo vlasti (1946-1949 ."
Svobodnaia Mysf3, 2001, p. 96.

Khrushchev:

"It should be sufficient to mention that during all the
years of the Patriotic War not a single Central
Committee plenum took place. It is true that there vvas
an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in
October 1941, when Central Committee members from
the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited
two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain.
Stalin did not even want to meet and talk to the Central

Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized
Stalin was in the first months of the war and how
haughtily and disdainfully he treated the Central
Committee members."

CIS Nikolaevsky's note to the original Nev Leader edition of this speech:

'if one were to trust official Soviet sources, this
statement by Khrushchev would not be true: According
to the collection, The Communist Party of the Soviet
Union in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses,
Conferences and Centra] Committee Plenums (published
by the MarxEngels-Lenin-Stalin Institute of the Party
Central Committee in 1954), one Central Committee
plenum was held during the war (january 27, 1944),
when it was decided to give the various Union Republics
the right to have their own foreign ministries and it was
also decided to replace the Internationale by the new
Soviet national anthem."

^laevsky goes on to add: *^ut it is likely that Khrushchev is correct,
there was no Central Committee plenum in 1944 and a fraud was
etrated: The plenum was announced as having occurred although it
X had." (note 10)

Nikolaevsky was wrong. It was Khrushchev, not Stalin, who "perpe-
d a fraud."

' Russian edition of Khrushchev's Speech, note 8:

By a decree of the Politburo of the CC ACP(b) of
October 2, 1941 there was given the notice of the
convocation of a Plenum of the CC ACP(b) on October
10, 1941, with the agenda: "1. The military situation of
our country. 2. Party and state work for the defense of
the country." By a decree of the Politburo of the CC
ACP9(b) of October 9, 1941 the convocation of the
Plenum was put off "in view of the recendy declared
state of emergency at the fronts and the inexpediency of
recalling leading comrades from the fronts ." During the
war years there was only one Plenum of the CC, which
took place on January 27, 1944.

sions of the January 1944 Plenum of the CC are described in a 1985
it textbook. See P.N. Bobylev et al., Velikiaia Otechestvennaia Voina.

268

Khrushchev I

V^opwyy iOtvety. Moscow: PoUtizdat, 1985, at
http:// www.biografia.ni/cgi-
bin/quotes.pl?oaction=show&name=voyna083

10. Ref. to ^^a party commission under the
control of the Central Committee Presidium
fabrication of materials during repressions

Khrushchev:

"The commission has become acquainted with a large
quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and with
other documents and has established many facts
pertaining to the fabrication of cases against
Communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses of
socialist legality, which resulted in the death of innocent
people. It became apparent that many party, Soviet and
economic activists, who were branded in 1937-1938 as
"enemies," were actually never enemies, 6pies, wreckers,
etc., but were always honest Communists; they were only
so stigmatized and, often, no longer able to bear barbaric
tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the
investigative judges -falsifiers) with all kinds of grave and
unlikely crimes."

« • •

"It was determined that of the 139 members and
candidates of the party's Central Committee who were
elected at the 17 th Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 per cent,
were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938).
(Indignation in the hall.) . . . The same fate met not only
the Central Committee members but also the majority of
the delegates to the 17th Party Congress. Of 1,966
delegates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108
persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionan'
crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority."

- See under Ezhov, below {i^\T).

269

11, December 1, 1934 "directive** signed by

Enulddze

■ushchev:

"On the evening of December 1, 1934 on Stalin's
initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau -
which was passed two days later, casually). .

1989 critical edition of the Russian text of Khrushchev's speech (ed.
makher, K., ed. Doklad N.S. Khrushcheva o Kul'le Lichnosti Stalina na
s"e!(deKPSS. Dokumenty. Moscow: ROSSPEN 2002) states, in n. 11:

'Iliis concerns the decree of the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet Union of December 1, 1934
"On the correct method of handling cases concerning
the preparation or commission of acts of terrorism,"
which was later called "the Law of December 1, 1934"
and was in force until 1956. The Decree in question was
not introduced for confirmation by a session of the
Central Executive Committee of the USSR, as demanded
in the Soviet Constitution.

•

eproduction of the original copy from the Volkogonov Papers
e at:

I /chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/research / 1 2_0 l_34_law.pdf

. Khrushchev Implies Stalin's involvement
in Kirov's murder

shchev:

"It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances
surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are
inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful
examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the
killer of Kirov, Nikolayev was assisted by someone from
among the people whose duty it was to protect the
person of Kirov. A month and a half before the killing,
Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious
behavior but he was released and not even searched. It is
an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the
Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for

an interrogation, on December 2, 1934, he was killed in a
car "accident" in which no other occupants of the car
were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top
functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very
light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can
assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces
of the organizers of Kirov's killing."

Sudoplatov:

"No documents or evidence e.xist to support the theory
of the participation of Stalin or of the apparat of the
NKVD in Kirov's assassination.... Kirov was not an
alternative to Stalin. He was one of the staunchest
Stalinists. Khrushchev's version was later approved and
used by Gorbachev as a part of his anti-Stalin
campaign."

- Ra^edka i K>p/w/' Moscow, 1996, pp. 60-61.
AUa Kirilina:

". . .Today under the conditions of 'all is permitted' and
so-called pluralism articles appear whose authors do not
bother with searching out documents and are not
burdened by the effort of arriving at an objective
understanding of what happened on December 1, 1934.
Their main goal is to declare yet again that 'Stalin
murdered Kirov,' though they have neither primar)' nor
secondary evidence for this statement, but instead make
broad use of myths, legends, and rumor."

- Nei^esfniy Kimv. Moscow, 2001, p. 304. On p. 335 of this work Kinlu
reveals that Trotsky was the origin of the rumors that Stalin had had Kj
rov killed. This in turn implies that Khrushchev and Pospelov were copy-
ing from Trotsky here.

Arch Getty:

"On Kirov, and in no particular order:

1. Over the years, there were three, and perhaps four,
"blue ribbon" investigations of the Kirov killing. Each
was commissioned by the Politburo's General Sccretai)'
and each, in true Soviet fashion, started with a desired
conclusion in advance. Stalin wanted to pin it on

xndix

271

Zinoviev and Trotsky; Khrushchev and Gorbachev
\uanted to pin it on Stalin and all of them handpicked
their investigators accordingly. Having been able to
acquaint myself with archival materials from these
efforts, it is clear that none of the three investigations
produced the desired conclusions. In particular, the
Khrushchev and Gorbachev-era efforts involved massive
combing of archives and interviews and failed to
conclude that Stalin was behind the killing. Stalin's effort,
of course, concluded that the opposition did it and was
the basis for the Moscow trials. But aside from the
incredible confessions of the accused, there was no
evidence to support this a priori conclusion either."

the M-RUSSIA disussion list, August 24. 2000. See
):/ / tinyurl.com/hjput

13. Stalin's and Zhdanov's telegram to the
Politburo of September 25 1936.

rushchev:

We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that
Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of
People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has
definitely proved himself to be incapable of
unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The
OGPU is four years behind in this matter. This is
noted by all party workers and by the majority of the
representatives of the NKVD.

This Stalinist formulation that the "NKVD is four years
behind" in applying mass repression and that there is a
necessity for "catching up" with the neglected work

272

Khrushcl

directly pushed the NKVD workers on the path of mass
arrests and executions."

Here is the full text of the telegram, a small fragment of which
shchev read out in the "Secret Speech."

CC of the VKP(b). Moscow.

To Comrades Kaganovich, Molotov, and other members
of the Politburo.

First, We consider it absolutely essential and urgent that
com. Ezhov be appointed to the post of People's
Commissar of Internal Affairs. lagoda has clearly not
turned out to be up to his job in the matter of exposing
the Trotskyite-Zinvoiente bloc. The OGPU was four
years late in this matter. All the party workers and most
of the oblast' representatives of the NKVD say this.
Agranov can remain as Ezhov's deputy at the NKVD.

Second. We consider it essential and urgent that Rykov
be removed as People's Commissar of Communications
and lagoda be appointed to the post as People's .
Commissar of Communications. We do not think this
matter requires any explanation, since it is clear as it is.

Third. We consider it absolutely urgent that Lobov be
removed and com. Ivanov, secretary of the Northern
Region committee, be appointed to the post of People's
Commissar of the Timber Industry. Ivanov knowls
forestry, he is an efficient man. Lobov as People's
Commissar is not up to the job and every year fails in it.
We propose to leave Lobov as first assistant to Ivanov as
People's Commissar for the Timber Industry.

Fourth. As concerns the PCC (Party Control
Commission), Ezhov can remain as Chairman of the
PCC at the same time provided that he devotes nine-
tenths of his time to the NKVD, and lakov A. lakovlev
could be promoted to Ezhov's first assistant at the PCC.

Fifth. Ezhov is in agreement with our proposals.

Stalin, Zhdanov

No. 44. 25/IX.36

Appcmlis

273

• Stalin iKaganovich. Penpiska 1931-1936^. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001,
No. 827, pp. 682-3. Also at

http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/ 1 93_dok/ 1 9360925staLhtfnl and
http://www.alexanderyakovlev.ocg/almanah/inside/aljnanah-doc/56532
.A slightly different Iransbtion is in the English version of this book. The
Slalin-Kiigatiovich Correspondence. Ed. R.W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, and
E A. Rees. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003. No. 169. pp.
359-60.

lliurston:

\X'hat did the four years refer to? Western writers usually
answer that the phrase meant the Riutin Memorandum.
But in December 1936 Ezhov mentioned, once again in
a speech to a Central Committee plenum, 'the formation
at the end of 1932 of a Zinovievite-Trotskyite bloc on
the basis of terror."' [n. 83, p. 244 to this passages cites
an archival document. The partial transcript of the
December 1936 CC Plenum printed in VI 1/95, pp. 5-6
mentions these same points, but without the word
"bloc", and without the direct quotation here.], (p. 35)

Jansen & Petrov:

The "four years" referred to the formation in 1932 of a
Trotskiist-Zinovievist bloc, which had been discovered
no earlier than in June-July 1936... (p. 54)

14. Stalin's report at the February-March 1937

CC Plenum.

Khrushchev:

Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee
plenum in 1937, "Deficiencies of party work and
methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and of
other two- facers,'* contained an attempt at theoretical
justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext
that as we march forward toward socialism class war
must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history
and Lenin taught him this.

Lenin, saying something like what Stalin said:

274

Khrushchev li

The annihilation of classes is a matter of long, hard, and
stubborn class stsruggle, that after the overthrow of the
power of capital, after the smashing of the bourgeois
state, after the establishment of the dictatorship of the
proletariat does not disappear (as the Philistines of the
old socialism and old social-democracy imagine), but
only changes its forms, becoming, in many respects, even
more ferocious.

- I.*:nin,V.I. "Privet vengerskim rabochim. 27 maia 1919 g." Complete
Works (Russian: Poinoe Sohrame Sochinenii, v. 38, p. 387. Stalin quoted this
passage in his April 1929 speech "On the Right Deviation in the Bolshe-
vik Party." At http://www.hrono.ru/libris/stalin/12-9.himl

At the February-March 1937 Plenum of the CC of the ACP(b) Stalin di
make the report with the title Khrushchev cited. But there is nothing i
that report that alleges that the class struggle must sharpen "as we marcl
forward toward socialism."

Concerning this distortion by Khrushchev in his Secret Speech Richsn
Kosolapov writes:

In reality the aforesaid thesis, endlessly repeated as
"Stalinist", is neither in Stalin's report nor in his
concluding speech. It is true that Stalin pointed out the
need to "destroy and cast aside the rotten theory that
with every advance we make the class struggle here of
necessity would die down more and more, and that in
proportion as we achieve successes the class enemy
would become more and more tractable." Stalin also
stressed that "while one end of the class struggle has its
operation within the bounds of the U.S.S.R., its other
stretches to the bounds of the bourgeois states
surrounding us." But he never set forth any "theory of
sharpening" in the second half of the 1930s, that is when
in the USSR the absolute predominance of socialist
forms of the economy had been guaranteed and the
Constitution of victorious socialism had been passed..."

- R.K. Kosolapov, "Uverenno torit' tropy v budushchee. Doklad '0
resheniiakh XX i XXII s"ezdov KPSS po voprosu kul'te lichnosti i
ego posledstviiakh"'. (2003). At

http:/ / www.cea.ru/~shenin/ news/ news20.htm

275

7 of Stalin's report of March 3, 1937, and published in Pnwda on
29, 1937.

7. We must destroy and cast aside the rotten theory that
with every advance we make the class str\i^le here of
necessity would die down more and more, and that in
proportion as we achieve successes the class enemy
would become more and more tractable.

This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous one for
it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and makes it
possible for the class enemy to rally for the struggle
against the Soviet government.

On the contrary, the further forward we advance, the
greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the
fury of the remnants of the broken exploiting classes,

/ page 30 /

the sooner will they resort to sharper forms of stru^le,
the more wiU they seek to harm the Soviet state and the
more will they clutch at the most desperate means of
struggle, as the last resort of doomed people.

It should be borne in mind that the remnants of the
broken classes in the U.S.S.R. are not alone. They have
the direct support of our enemies beyond die bounds of
the U.S.S.R. It would be a mistake to think that the
sphere of the class str\i^le is limited to the bounds of
the U.S.S.R. While one end of the class struggle has its
operation within the bounds of the U.S.S.R., its other
stretches to the bounds of the bourgeois states
surrounding us. The remnants of the broken classes
cannot but be aware of this. And precisely because they
are, they will continue their desperate assaults in the
future.

This is what history teaches us. This is what Leninism
teaches us.

We must remember all this and be on our guard."

h Stalin, Mastering holshevum. NY: Workers Library Pubs, 1937,
). http: / / www.marx2mao.com/ Stalin/MB37 .html.

276

Khrushchev

Stalin's proposal for political education, and for each higher Party of
choosing replacements for himself:

The task is to raise the ideological level and political
vigor of these command cadres and to introduce among
them fresh forces awaiting promotion, and thus expand
the ranks of our leading forces.

What does this require?

First and foremost, we must make the proposal to our
Party leaders beginning with secretaries of our Party
units to the secretaries of regional and republican Party
organizations to select, during a definite period, two
individuals, two Party functionaries each capable of
being able to act as their effective deputies.

The question may be asked: Where are we to get these
two deputies fcx each one, if we have no such people, no
workers who correspond to these requirements? 'Iliis is
incorrect, comrades. We have tens of thousands of
capable and talented people. It only needs to know them
and to promote them in time so that they should not
remain in their old places too long and begin to rot. Seek
and ye shall find.

Further, four-month Party courses must be established
in each regional center to give secretaries of units Party
training and to re-equip them. The secretaries of all
primary Party organizations (units) should be sent to
these courses and then when they finish them and return
home their deputies and the most capable members of
the primary Party organizations should be sent to these
courses.

Further, to re-equip politically the first secretaries of the
district organizations, eight-month Lenin courses must
be established in the U.S.S.R., in, say, ten of the most
important centers.

The first secretaries of district and regional Party
organizations should be sent to these courses, and then
when they fmish them and return home their deputies
and the most capable members of the district and
regional organizations sent there.

Further, six-month courses for the study of history and
the Part/s policy under the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union must be set up to
achieve the ideological re-equipment and political
improvement of secretaries of the town Party
ocganizations. The first and second secretaries of town
Party ocganizations should be sent to these courses and
then when they have finished them and return home the
most capable members of the town Party organizations
should be sent there.

Finally, a six-month conference on questions of internal
and international policy under the Central Committee of
the C.P.S.U. must be established.

The first secretaries of divisional and provincial
organizations and the Central Committees of the
national Communist Parties should be sent here. These
comrades should provide not one but several persons
really capable of replacing the leaders of the Central
Committee of our Party. This should and must be done.

;eph Stalin, Mastering Bolshevism. NY: Workers Library Pubs, 1937,
6-38. At http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/MB37.html

n also made another report at the February-March CC Plenum. It
the concluding report, on March 5.

"But here is the question: how to carry out in practice
the task of smashing and uprooting the Gemian-
Japanese agents of Trotskyism. Does this mean that we
should strike and uproot not only the real Trotskyites,
but also those who wavered at some time toward
Trotskyism, and then long ago came away from
Trotskyism; not only those who are really Trotskyite
agents for wrecking, but also those who happened once
upon a time to go along a street where some Trotskyite
or other had once passed? At any rate, such voices were
heard here at the plenum. Can we consider such an
interpretation of the resolution to be correct?

No, we cannot consider it to be correct. On this
question, as on all other questions, there muBt be an
individual, differentiated approach. You must not

278

Khrushi

measure everyone with the same yardstick. Such a
sweeping approach can only harm the cause of struggle
against the real Trotskyite wreckers and spies.

Among our comrades there are also those who always
stood against Trotskyism ideologically, but in spite of
this kept up personal contacts with individual Trotsky

/page 44 /

-ites, which they did not delay in liquidating as soon as
the actual visage of I'rotskyism became clear to them. It
is, of course, not a good thing that they did not break off
their personal friendly connections with individual
Trotsk)ites at once, but belatedly. But it would be silly to
lump such comrades together with the Trotskyites."
[Emphasis added, GF]

Further on in the report Stalin made the same point again, explici
ing against a mass approach (pp. 58-9):

'7. Finally, still another question. I have in view the
question of the formal and heartless bureaucratic attitude
of some of our Party comrades toward the fate of
individual Party members, toward the question of
expelling members from the Party, or the question of
restoring the rights of Party membership to those who
have been expelled.

The fact is that some of our Party leaders suffer from
lack of attention to people, to Party members, to
workers. Furthermore, they do not study the Party
members, do not know what is close to their hearts, and
how they are growing, do not know workers in general.
They have, therefore, not an individual approach to
Party members,

/page 59 /

to Party workers. And just because they have not an
individual approach when appraising Party members and
Party workers, they usually act at random, either praising
them wholesale, without measure, or crushing them, also
wholesale, and without measure, expelling thousands and
tens of thousands firom the Party.

Such leaders try, in general, to think in tens of thousands,
not to worry about "units", about individual Party
members, about their fate. They think it a mere bagatelle
to expel thousands and tens of thousands of people firom
the Party, comforting themselves by the fact that our
Party is 2,000,000 strong, and that tens of thousands of
people expelled cannot change anything in the position
of the Party.

But, only people who in essence are profoundly anti-
Party can have such an approach to members of the
Party."

>h Stalin, Maslering hobhevism. NY: Workers Library Pubs, 1937,
63. At http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/MB37,html Note that
edition it is erroneously dated March 3, not March 5, but is cor-
citled "Concluding Speech."

s report of the commission on the investigation of Bukhaxin and
, February 27, 1937. (See Getty & Naumov, 409-11; Russian text in
y Iston'il /94, 12-13, for whole text).

& Naumov on this report:

"It was quite unusual for Stalin himself to give such
reports; this is the first and only time in party history that
he did so. This text was truly a hidden transcript; it was
never published with any of the versions of the
stenographic report and was never transferred to the
party archives with other materials of the plenum... The
transcript of this ambiguous and contradictory decision
on Bukhaxin never even found its way into the heavily
edited and limited-circulation stenographic report, which
showed the plenum beginning on 27 Feburary — four
days after it actually started." (411)

280

Khnishi

In his pathbreaking study of archival sources historian lUrii Zhul
the unpublished resolution of the February>March 1937 CC Pier
comments on it.

Just as far from a Svitch-hunt' as were Stalin's final
words was the resolution based upon Stalin's report. The
Plenum's participants voted in favor of it unanimously
and without any comment, as had become customary
during the previous few years. The words "treasonous
and espionage-sabotage activity of Trotskyist fascists"
were mentioned only once and only in the preamble.
They served only as a pretext for the presentation of
serious shortcomings in the work of Party organizations
and of their leaders. The resolution specified the
following:

1 . Party organizations had been carried away with
economic activity and had retreated in their Party-
political leading activity, 'had subordinated to themselves
and had effaced the local oigans of the People's
Commissariat for Agriculture, replacing them with
themselves, and had turned themselves into narrow
economic chiefs.'

2. 'Our Party leaders have turned themselves away from
Party-political work toward economic and especially
agricultural campaigns, thereby gradually transferring the
main base of their work from the city to the oblast. They
have begun to look upon the city with its working class
not as the leading political and cultural strength of the
oblast, but as one of many sectors of the oblast.'

3. 'Our Party leaders have begun to lose the taste for
ideological work, for work on the Party-political
upbringing of the Party and non-Party masses.'

4. They have also begun to lose the taste for criticism of
our shortcomings and of self-criticism of Party
leaders...'

5. Iliey have also also begun to retreat from direct
responsibility to the masses of Party members . . . they
have taken upon themselves to replace elections with co*

281

optadon. . . in this manner a bureaucratic centralism has
resulted/

6. In cadre work, which the resolution also focused on,
'it is necessary to deal with workers not in a formal,
bureaucratic manner, but according to the real situation,
that is, first of all, from the political point of view
(whether they are politically trustworthy) and, second,
from the point of view of their work (whether they are
suitable for the work they have been assigned).'

7. Leaders of Party organi2ations 'suffer from a lack of
the necessary attention to people, to Party members, to
workers . . . As a result of such a soulless relationship to
people. Party members, and Party workers dissatisfaction
and hostility is artificially created in one part of the
Party.'

8. Finally the resolution mentions that, despite their lack
of education. Party leaders do not want to raise their
educational level, to study, to retrain themselves.

Naturally, the resolution echoes with the demand for the
immediate removal of the real shortcomings in Party
work outlined in this manner. In points one through
eight, to condemn the practice of usurpation and
effacement of the local organs; to immediately return
exclusively to Party-political work and transfer it above
all to the dty; to give more attention to the press. In
points nine through fourteen, to reject decisively 'the
practice of turning the Plenums of the oblast
committees, regional committees. Party conferences, city
activists, etc., into means for parades and
demonstrations, and of vociferous praise for Party
leaders'; to restore the accountability of Party organs to
the Plenums, to stop the practice of co-optation in Party
organizations. In points Bfteen through eighteen the
fundamentally new approach to cadre work is discussed,
and in points nineteen through twenty-five the
instruction and retraining of Party leaders.'

282

Khrushchev I.

- lUrii Zhukov. J not Stalin. Politkheskie rr/onTry 1/ SSSR v 1933-1937 ^. M
cow: Vagrius, 2003, pp. 360-363 and notes on p. 506, referring to
archives at RGASPI F.17 Op. 2 D. 612. Vyp. Ill L. 49 ob.-50.

15. ^^Many Members questioned mass
repression". Especially Postyshev.

Khrushchev:

"At the February-March Central Committee plenum in
1937 many members actually questioned the rightness of
the established course regarding mass repressions under
the pretext of combating "two-facedness."

Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts.
Me said:

"I have philosophised that the severe years of fighting
have passed. Party members who have lost their
backbones have broken down or have joined the camp
of the enemy; healthy elements have fought for the
party. These were the years of industriali2ation and
collectivization. I never thought it possible that after this
severe era had passed Karpov and people like him would
find themselves in the camp of the enemy. (Karpov was
a worker in the Ukrainian Central Committee whom
Postyshev knew well.) And now, according to the
testimony, it appears that Karpov was recruited in 1 934
by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in
1934 an honest party member who had trod the long
road of unrelenting fight against enemies for the part)'
and for socialism would now be in the camp of the
enemies. I do not believe it. . . I cannot imagine how it
would be possible to travel with the party during the
difficult years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites.
It is an odd thing..."

Khrushchev seriously and deliberately distorted what Postyshe\' acrmlh
said in his speech to the Februarj'-March CC Plenum. The text of Po5t\
shev's remarks has now been published in Voprosy Istoni nos. 5-6, 1995.
pp. 3-8. This part is on p. 4.

283

I Mvill now pause for a bit on my errors in the Kiev oblast
Party committee. How is it that I did not personally
notice people who sat very close to me . Why could I not
notice them, since I worked with them for a fairly long
period?

...Here is Kaipov. I trusted him very much. Kaipov was
in Party work continuously for ten years. I took him with
me to the Ukraine because he was an old Ukrainian
worker, spoke Ukrainian, knows the Ukraine, had lived
all the time in the Uki^e and was bom in the Ukraine.
And not only I myself, but a great many comrades knew
him as a decent person.

What led me astray? In 1923-24 Karpov fought with the
Trotskyites before my eyes. He also fought them in Kiev.
. ..I have philosophized in this manner: that the
severe years of fighting have passed, in which there
were such developments that people either have broken
down, or remained firmly on their feet, or have foined
the camp of the enemy - the years of
industrialization and collectivization, there was a
fierce struggle between the Party and the enemies in this
period. I never thought it possible that after this severe
era had passed one would then go to the camp of the
enemy. And now it turns out that from 1934 he has
fallen into the hands of the enemies and has become an
enemy. Of couree one can either believe or not believe
this. I personally think that it would be terribly hard
after all these years for a person who had trod the long
road of unrelenting fight against enemies for the
party and for socialism would now be in the camp of
the enemies. It is very difficult to believe this.
(Molotov. Hard to believe that he only became an enemy
in 1934? Most likely he became one earlier.) Of course,
earlier. I cannot imagine how it would be possible to
travel with the party during the difficult years and
then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites. It is an odd thing.
There was some kind of worm inside him all the time.
When this worm appeared - in 1926 or 1924, or 1930,
it's hard to say, but obviously some kind of worm there

284

Khrushchev I

was, something that did some kind of work on him so
that he at length fell into the herd of enemies.

llie words Khrushchev quoted in his "Secret Speech" are in boldface
here. Postyshev*s whole speech from the text of Voprosy Isiorii No. 5,
1995, is here:

http://chss.montclair.edu/english/ furr/research/postyshevspmai043'7
df

Khrushchev's own hacsh speech is in VI no.8, 1995, pp. 19-25. It is
available at

http://chss.montcl air. edu / englis h/ furr/research/ khrushche vspmarOS:
pdf

Postyshev was the harshest in mass expulsions, and was expelled for tl
at the January 1938 CC. Getty & Naumov discuss this at length on \
498-512. Getty quotes at length how Postyshev was raked over the ca
at this Plenum for excessive repression.

Zhukov's analysis:

At the January 1938 Plenum the main report was done
by Malenkov. He said that the first secretaries were
brandishing not even lists of those condemned by the
"troikas", but just two lines with an indication of the
number of those condemned. He openly accused the
first secretar)' of the Kuibyshev obkom of the party P.P.
Postyshev: you have imprisoned the entire Party and
Soviet apparatus of the oh/as/] At which Postyshev
replied in the same vein, that "I arrested, am arresting,
and will arrest, until I annihilate all enemies and spies!
But he was in a dangerous solitude: two hours after this
polemic he was demonstratively dismissed from his post
as candidate member of the Politburo, and none of the
members of the Plenum stood up to defend him.

- Komsomolskaia Pravda Nov. 19, 2002.

llie document confirming Postyshev's expulsion and arrest is rcpnn(rti
in Getty & Naumov, pp. 514-6. Khrushchev was one of those who spoLf
up forcefully against Postyshev (G&N 512). For Khrushchev's apponi
ment to replace Postyshev as candidate member of Politburo, Stdmlut
Po/ifbiun>. , .p. 167.

Rogovin's excerpt from Januac)' 1938 CC Plenum on Posl>'shev:

285

On the character of Postyshev's speech, which was in
&ct converted into his inteirogation, the following
fragment of the transcript will give an idea:

Postyshev: The leadership there (in the Kuybyshev
oblast), both that of the party and of the Soviets, was
enemies, beginning from the oblast leadership and
ending with that of the raions.

Nfikoian: Everybody?

Postyshev: How can you be surprised? .... I added it up
and it comes out that enemies have been sitting there for
12 years. On the Soviet side the same enemy leadership
has been sitting there. There they sat and selected their
cadres. For example, in our oblast executive committee
we had the most obdurate enemies right down to the
technical workers, enemies who confessed to their
wrecking activity and behaved insolendy, beginning with
the chairman of the oblast executive committee, with his
assistant, consultants, secretaries - all were enemies.
Absolutely all the sections of the oblast executive
committee were soiled with enemies. . . . Now take the
chairmen of the raion executive committees — aU were
enemies. Sixty chairmen of raiispolkoms - all enemies.
The overwhelming majority of second secretaries — I'm
not even speaking of first secretaries - are enemies, and
not only enemies, but there were also many spies among
them: Poles, Latvians, they selected all kinds of died-in-
the-wool swine...

Bulganin: Were there at least some honest people
there... It turned out that there was not a single honest
person.

Postyshev: I am talking abut the leadership, the heads.
From the leading body, of the secretaries of the raion
committees, the chairmen of the raiispolkoms, there was
almost not a single honest man. And how can you be
surprised?

Molotov: Aren't you exaggerating, comrade Postyshev?

Postyshev: No, I'm not exa^erating. Here, take the
oblast executive committee. People are in prison. We

286

Khrushchev

have investigative materials, and they confess, they
themselves confess their enemy and espionage work.

Molotov: We must verify the materials.

Nlikoian: It turns out that there are enemies below, in
ever}' raion committee.

Beria: Is it possible that all members of the plenums of
the raion committees were enemies?

Kaganovich: lliere is no basis to say that they are all
swindlers.

Stalin evaluated Postyshev's methods this way: "This is
the massacre of the organization. They are very easy on
themselves, but they^re shooting ever^'body in the raion
organizations. . .. This means stirring up the party masses
against the CC, it can't be understood any other way."

- Rogpvin, Partiia njssinliannykh. Ch. 2, Section III: 'The Januar)* Plen
The Case of Postyshev." At http://trst-narod.ru/rogovin/t5/iii.htni.
Fuller text at Stalinskoe Politbiuro v 30-e gpdy^ pp. 161-4. See the text of
session with Postyshev from Stalinskoe Politbiuro. . . at
http:/ / chss.montclair.edu/ english/ Emit/ research/postyshev0138.pdf

According to Russian historian, writer, and military figure Vladimir
pov, Postyshev confirmed his confession to Molotov:

In my conversations with Molotov at his dacha we had a
conversation about the repressions. Once I asked:

— Is it possible that you never had any doubts? After all,
they were arresting people whom you knew well by their
work even before the revolution, and then also in the
Civil War.

- Doubts did arise, once I spoke to Stalin about this, and
he answered: "Go to the Ljsbianka and check on this
yourself, take Voroshilov here with you. Voroshilov was
then in the office. We both went right away, lliose were
exactly the days when we had fresh doubts about the
arrest of Postyshev. We drove to Ezhov. He ordered
Postyshev's file to be brought out. We looked through
the transcripts of interrogations. Postyshev admitted his
guilt. I said to Ezhov: "I want to have a talk with
Postyshev himself." He was brought. He was pale, had

codix

287

lost weight, and generally lcx>ked depressed. I asked him:
Were his confessions written down accurately in the
transcripts of interrogation? He answered: They are
written correctly. I asked again - "That means, you admit
that you are guilty?" He was silent, and somehow
reluctantly answered: "Since I signed them, that means, I
admit it, what is there to say. . ." That's how it was. How
could we not believe it, when the man himself said it?"

irpov, Vladimir Vasil'evich. Marshal Zhukov, ego sonatnikii iprotivmki v
voiny I mira. Book 1. Chapter 6, "The Tukhachevsky Affair.". At
:/ / militera.lib.ru/bio/kaipov/ 06.html

er from Andreev to Stalin of January 31, 1938 about Postyshev's law-
and arbitrary repressions:

2) Since August about 3,000 members have been
expelled from the party, a significant part of whom were
expelled without any basis whatsoever as "enemies of the
people" or their confederates. At the plenum of the
oblast committee the secretaries of the raion committees
brought forward facts, when Postyshev became arbitrary
and demanded the expulsion and arrest of honest party
members either for the slightest criticism at party
meetings of the leadership of the oblast committee [i.e.
Postyshev himself] or even without any basis at all. In
general this whole tone came from the oblast committee.

3) Since all these matters look like a provocation, we had
to arrest a few of the most suspicious, zealout
deviationists from the oblast and dty committees, the
former second secretary Filimonov, the obcom workers
Sirotinskii, Alakin, Fomenko, and others. At the very
first interrogations they all confessed that they were
members of a Right-Trotskyite organization up to the
present. Surrounding Postyshev and enjoying his full
confidence, they developed their disorganizational and
procational work of dissolving the party organizations
and mass expulsions of party members. We also had to
arrest Pashkovskii, Postyshev's assistant. He confessed
that he had concealed the fact that he had been a Social-
Revolutionary in the past, had been recruited to the

288

Khrushchev li

Right-Trotskyite organization in 1933 in Kiev, and
obviously was a Polish spy. He was one of the most
active of those in Postyshev's circle in the matter of
arbitrariness and disorganization in Kuybyshev. We are
untangling matters further, in order to unmask this gang.

4) The oblast committee plenum has not met a single
time since the elections in June, the oblast committee
direcdy forbade plenums of the raion committees in
Kuybyshev to meet, there were also no activists.

- Sovefskoe rukovodstw. Penpiska. 1928-1941. ed. A.V. Koshonkin et al,
Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999, p. 387. Full text at

http:/ / chss.montclair.edu/ english/ fiirr/research/ andreevrepostj-shevOl

16. Eikhe

Khrushchev:

The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessar)'
to inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases"
against the members of the party's Central Committee
elected at the 17th Party Congress. An example of vile
provocation, of odious falsification and of criminal
violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the
former candidate for the Central Committee Political
Bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the part)'
and of the Soviet Government, Comrade Eikhe, who
was a party member since 1905."

- Eikhe's letter to Stalin of October 27 1939: selections in the Pospeiov
report, at http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/inside/almanah-
doc/55752. Published in fijll in Ayermakher, K., ed. DokhdNS.
Khrushcheva o Kul'te Lichnosti Stalina na XX s"es^ KPSS. Dokumenly. Mos-
cow: ROSSPEN 2002, pp. 225-229.

We now have a statement by Frinovskii, Ezhov's right-hand man, froni
April 1939, in which he discusses Ezhov's and Evdokimov's invoK emcnt
in the Rightist conspiracy. He mentions Eikhe in this connection.

Evdokimov mentioned Eikhe in 1935 to Frinovskii:

At one of our meetings in 1935 Evdokimov, in his
apartment, told me about a number of people who had

appendix

been invited to work in Piatigorsk by him. He named
Pivovarov, and a large group of Chekists: Boiar, Diatkin,
and Shatsky. Here too he told me about his connections
with Khataevich, praising him as someone who knew the
countryside well; with Eikhe, and about a part of the
Leningrad group. . .

Lubianka 3, p. 40

After one of the sessions of the [October 1937 Central
Committee] Plenum, in the evening, Evdokimov, I and
Ezhov were at Ezhov's dacha. When we arrived there,
Eikhe was already there, but Eikhe did not have any
conversations with us. \X'hat took place with Eikhe
before our arrival at Ezhov's — Ezhov did not tell me.
After dinner Eikhe went away, and we remained and
talked almost till morning."

[jibianka 3, p. 44

rii Zhukov:

It was June 29 [1937 - GF], the Plenum was already
concluding, when a note arrived at the Politburo from
the first secretary of the Novosibirsk oblast committee
R. I. Eikhe, in which he applied to the Politburo with a
request to give him extraordinary powers on a temporary
basis in his territory. He wrote that in Novosibirsk oblast
a might)' anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary organization,
huge in numbers, had been uncovered, one which the
organs of the NKVD had not succeeded in completely
liquidating. It was, he said, necessary to create a "troika"
with the following composition: the First Secretary of
the Party obkom [i.e. Eikhe himself - GF], the oblast
procurator [prosecutor - GF], and the head of the oblast
directorate of the NKVD, with the powers to taker
operational decisions about the exile of anti-Soviet
elements and the carrying out of death sentences on the
more dangerous of the numbers of these people. That is,
in fact, a military field court, without defense, without
witnesses, with the right of immediate execution of
sentences. Eikhe's request was rationalized by the fact
that, in the face of such a powerful counterrevolutionary

290

KhrushchL-v I

organization elections to the Supreme Soviet could bring
about an undesirable political result.

- lUcii Zhukov. "Stalin. Inoi Vzgliad. Beseda s avtorom knigi 'Inoi Sta-
lin"'. N(jsh sovnmennik. 2004, No. 12. Text at

http://nash-sovremennik.ru/p.php?y=2004^cn=12flcid=4

Zhukov first developed these ideas in his now-famous series "Zhu
Stalina" ("The scarecrow of Stalin") in Komsomolskaia Pravda in Novcm
2002. This subject is covered in the article of November 16, 2002.

This series is now widely reprinted on the Internet; for example,

http://www.x-libii.ni/elib/smi 958/00000001. him (emphasis adc

GF).

Zhukov again:

Well, Ezhov received the first [meeting with Stalin] with
happiness: it was his appointment in April
1938."concurrently" as the People's Commissar of Water
Transportation. The second warning was in August: for
four hours Stalin and Molotov tried to convince Ezhov
to agree to the candidacy of L.P. Beria as his first
assistant [see Lubianka 2, 545, for this decree — GF]. And
the third, final act of this long procedure was on
November 23. Ezhov was again summoned to Stalin,
where Molotov and Voroshilov were already present. I
have held in my hands the document which Ezhov
wrote, obviously at their dictation. It is written on three
pages, all of different sizes, that is they snatched up the
first sheets of paper they could find at hand and shoved
them at Ezhov, just so that he wouldn't stop writing.
Tlie following rationale for his dismissal was arrived at:
obviously, he resisted, protested. But it was necessary to
somehow wrest from him a decision to leave "according
to his own wishes." There was written a draft of a
decree, which sounds like a guarantee: "To keep
comrade Ezhov in the position of secretary' of the CC
ACP(b), Chainnan of the Commission of Party Control
and People's Commissar for Water Transportation."
Finally the announcement was written and signed: "N.
Ezhov." With this the ending of the "Ezhovshchina"
began. The Politburo sent on the spot telegrams with the

direct text: Stop repressions, dissolve the "troikas."
Having seized the initiative, the Stalin group had already
at the end of 1938 achieved the promulgation of the first
judicial processes against NKVD workers accused of
falsification and fabrication of cases, according to which
they tried, exiled, and executed thousands of people for
almost a whole year. That is how they managed to stop
the Great Terror."

ov. 20, 2002.

& Petrov, p. 91:

"Consider the objections raised at the time of the July
1937 Moscow conference by the Western Siberian
NKVD chief, Mironov, to Ezhov against the First Party
secretary, Robert Eikhe. Mironov reported to Ezhov —
according to his testimony after arrest — that Eikhe
"interfeied in NKVD affairs." He had ofdered die
chiefs of the Kuzbass NKVD town branches to
arrest Party members, although in most cases
evidence was missing. Mironov thought his position
difficult: either he had to liberate part of the
prisoners and clash with Eikhe, or the NKVD
organs were forced to **create fictitious cases." When
Mironov suggested to orally instruct the NKVD organs
concerned only to carry out orders approved by him,
Ezhov answered: "Eikhe knows what he is doing. He is
responsible for the Party organization; it is useless to
fight with him. You better report to me the moot points
arising, and I will settle them. . . Comply with Eikhe's
instructions, and don*t strain your relations with him."
N(ironov added that it was Eikhe's habit to "suddenly
come to the NKVD apparatus, attend interrogations,
interfere in the investigation, and then exert pres/ 92 /
sure in this or that direction, thereby muddling the
investigation."

But Ezhov stuck to his opinion.^ [ n. 38, p. 237, is to
archival documents no longer available: 38. Ibid., [fm
previous note - 'TsA FSB, f 3-os, op. 4, d, 6, 1. 61."]

292

Khrushchev Ij

Archival investigation case of Frinovskii, N-15301, t. 7,
11. 36-37.]

p. 107:

Regional Party leaders feared that class enemies would
take advantage of the freedom offered at the elections.
At the June 1937 Plenum the Kazakh government leader,
U. D. Isaev, warned: "We will clash here with a situation
of direct class struggle. Even now, mullahs, Trotskiist,
and every kind of other counterrevolutionary elements
are preparing for the elections." At the October 1937
Plenum the Moscow Party leader, A. I. Ugarov, again
pointed to intensifying utterances of hostile activity. By
now, however, his Western Siberian colleague R. I. Eikhe
was able to establish that, on the contrary, thanks to the
crushing of the organi2ed counterrevolutionary base the
situation had much improved. Stalin agreed: "People are
glad to have freed themselves of the wreckers." "•'^ For
safety's sake, during the same month it was decided to
ban contested elections and introduce uncontested single
candidacies.

[both nn. 108 and 109 are to archival documents no
longer available: "108. RTsKhlDNI, f 17, op. 2, d. 617,
1. 167. 109. Ibid., d. 626, 11. 40-41, 62.'1

17. Ezhov

Although it breaks the order of the original somewhat, it is oonvcnicni lo
examine what Khrushchev says about Ezhov here, since it is closcK
linked to Eikhe.

Khrushchev:

We are justly accusing Yczhov for the degenerate
practices of 1937. But we have to answer these
questions: Could Yezhov have arrested Kossior, for
instance, without the knowledge of Stalin? Was there an
exchange of opinions or a Political Bureau decision
concerning this? No, there was not, as there was none
regarding other cases of this type. Could Yezhov have
decided such important matters as the fate of such
eminent party figures? No, it would be a display of

naivete to consider this the work of Yezhov alone. It is
dear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that
without his orders and his sanction Yezhov could not
have done this.

Frinovskii's statement of April 11 1939:

Before the arrest of Bukharin and Rykov Ezhov,
speaking with me openly, started to talk about the plans
for Chekist work in connection with the current situation
and the imminent arrests of Bukharin and Rykov. Ezhov
said that this would be a great loss to the Rights, after
that regardless of our own wishes, upon the instructions
of the Central Committee large-scale measures might be
taken against the cadres of the Right, and that in
connection with this his and my main task must be to
direct the investigation in such a way so that, as much as
possible, to preserve the Rightist cadre. Then he outlined
his plan for this matter. Basically this plan consisted of
the following: "We must put our own men, in the main,
in the apparatus of the Secret Political department (SPO)
and to select as investigators those who might be either
completely tied to us or in whose records there are some
kind of sins and they would know that they had these
sins in their records, and on the basis of these sins we
can hold them completely in our hands. We must
connect them ourselves to the investigation and direct
them." "And this consists in the following", said Ezhov,
"not to write down everything that a person under arrest
says, but the investigator must bdng all the outlines, the
rough drafts to the chief of the department, and in
relation to those arrested persons who in the past
occupied an important position and those who occupy a
leading position in the organization of the Rights, it is
necessary to write these people down in a special list and
to report to him each time. It would be good, said
Ezhov, to take into the apparatus people who have
already been tied to the organization. "Here, for
example, Evdokimov spoke to you about people, and I
know some of them. It will be necessary in the first place
to draw them into the central apparatus. In general it will

Khnjsh<

be necessary to familiarize ourselves with capable people
and from a businesslike point of view among those who
are already working in the central apparatus, to somehow
bring them close to ourselves and then to recruit them,
because without these people it will be impossible for us
to arrange our work, and it is necessary to somehow
show the Central Committee some work."

In carrying out this suggestion of Ezhov's we chose a
firm course in preserving Yagoda's cadres in leading
posts in the NKVD. It is essential to mention that we
only managed to do this with difficulty, since in various
local organs [of the NKVD] there were materiak on the
majority of these people about their participation in the
conspiracy and in anti-Soviet work generally. - p. 42

After the October 1937 Central Committee Plenum I
and Evdokimov met for the first time at Ezhov's dacha.
At that time Evdokimov started the conversation.
Turning to Hzhov he asked "\Xliat's the matter with
you, you promised to straighten out Yagoda's position
and instead the case is getting more and more serious
and now is coming very close to us. Obviously, you are
leading this affair poorly." Ezhov was silent at first, and
then stated that "really, the situation is difficult, so now
we will take steps to reduce the scope of the operations,
but obviously, we have to deal with the head of the
Rights." Evdokimov swore, spit, and said: "Can't you get
me into the NKVD, I'll be able to help more than the
rest." Ezhov said: "It would be good, but the Central
Committee will scarcely agree to transfer you to the
NKVD. I think that the situation is not altogether
hopeless, but you need to have a talk with Dagin, you
have influence on him, it's necessary for him to develop
the work in the operations department, and we need to
be prepared to carry out terrorist acts." - p. 43

. . . And here Evdokimov and Ezhov together talks about
the possible limiting of the operations but, as this was
considered impossible, they agreed to deflect the blow
from their own cadre and to try to direct to against

honest cadres who were devoted to the Central
Committee. That was Ezhov's instruction. — p. 44

After the arrests of die members of the center of Rights
Ezhov and Evdokimov in essence became the center,
and organized:

1) the preservation, as far as possible, of the anti-Soviet
cadre of the Rights from destruction; 2) the direction of
the blows against honest party cadre who were dedicated
to the Central Committee of the ACP(b); 3) preservation
of the rebel cadre in the North Caucasus and in other
krais and oblasts of the USSR, with the plan to use them
at the time of international complications; 4) a reinforced
preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the
party and government; 5) the assumption of power of
the Rights with Ezhov at their head. - p. 45

'jnka i, also at:

/chss.montclair.edu/ english/ fiirr/ research/ fdnovskyeng.html

Investigative Work

The investigative apparatus in all departments of the
NKVD was divided into "investigator-bonebreakers",
"bonebreakers", and "ordinary" investigators.

[NOTE:Jansen & Petrov translate this word,
kolotshchiki^ as 'butchers'. Thugs' would be a modem
English equivalent, meaning someone whose job is to
beat people up.- GF^

What did these groups represent and who were they?

"Investigator-bonebreakers" were chosen basically from
among the conspirators or persons who were
compromised. They had unsupervised recourse to
beating arrested persons and in a very short time
obtained "confessions" and knew how to write up
transcripts in a grammatical and elegant fashion.

In this category belong: Nikolayev, Agas, Ushakov,
Listengurt, Evgen'ev, Zhupakhin, Minaev, Davydov,

Khrushchev IJcd

Artman, Geiman, Litvin, Leplevsky, Karelin, Kenon,
lamnitsky, and others.

Since the quandt)' of those under arrest who confessed
due to such methods grew daily and there was a great
need for investigators who knew how to compose
interrogations, the so-called "investigator-bonebreakers"
began, each on his own, to create groups of simple
"bonebreakers."

The group of "bonebreakers" consisted of technical
workers. These men did not know the evidence
concerning the suspect, but were sent to the Lefortovo
[prison in Moscow], summoned the accused, and set to
beating him. The beatings continued up to the moment
that the accused agreed to give a confession.

The remaining group of investigators took care of
interrogations of those accused of less serious crimes
and were left to themselves, without leadership from
anyone.

The further process of investigation was as follows: the
investigator conducted the interrogation and instead of a
transcript put together notes. After several such inter-

/46/

rogations a draft transcript was put together by the
investigator. 'Ilie draft went for "correction" to the chief
of the appropriate department, and from him, still
unsigned, for "review" to former People's Commissar
Ezhov and in rare cases to myself. Ezhov looked
through the transcript, made changes and additions. In
most cases those under arrest did not agree with the
editing of the transcript and stated that they had not said
that during the investigation and refused to sign it.

Then the investigators would remind the arrested part)'
about the "bonebreakers", and the person under
investigation would sign the transcript. Ezhov produced
the "correction" and "editing" of transcripts, in most
cases, never having seen with his own eyes the person
under arrest and if he did see him, then only during a

momentary inspection of the cells or investigative
rooms.

With such methods the investigations supplied the
names.

In my opinion I would speak the truth if I declared, in
general, that very often the confessions were given by
the investigators, and not by those under investigation.

Did the leadership of the People's Commissariat, that is I
and Ezhov, know about this? We knew.

How did we react? Honesdy speaking — not at all, and
Ezhov even encouraged it. No one bothered to find out
to which of the accused physical pressure was applied.
And since the majority of the persons who were
employing these methods were themselves enemies of
the people and conspirators, then clearly false
accusations too place, we took false accusations and
arrested and shot innocent people who had been
slandered by enemies of the people from among those
under arrest and by enemies of the people among the
investigators. Real investigation was wiped out— pp. 45-6.

The preparation of the trial of Rykov, Bukharin,
Krestinsky, Yagoda and others

An active participant in investigations generally, Ezhov
kept himself aloof from the preparation of this trial.
Before the trial the face-to-face confrontations of the
suspects, interrogations, and refining, in which Ezhov
did not participate. He spoke for a long time with
Yagoda, and that talk concerned, in the main, of assuring
Yagoda that he would not be shot.

Ezhov had conversations several times with Bukharin
and Rykov and also in order to calm them assured them

that under no circumstances would they be shot

Here Ezhov unquestionably was ruled by the necessity of
covering up his own ties with the arrested leaders of the
Right who were going into the public trial."- pp. 47-8.

Deceiving the party and government

\Xlien Ezhov arrived in the NKVD, in all meetings, in
conversations with operational workers, he righdy
chdcized the insdtudonal narrow-mindedness and
isolation from the party, stressed that he would instill a
party spirit into the workers, that he did not hide and
would never hide anything, ever from the party and from
Stalin. In reality he was deceiving the party both in
serious, major matters and in small things. Ezhov had
these talks for no other purpose than to put to sleep any
sense of watchfulness in the honest NKVD workers. -
p. 49

- Original at

http://chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/ research/ &inovskyeng.html

Ezhov's interrogation of April 26 1939:

ANSWER: I must admit that, although I gave a truthful
confession about my espionage work on behalf of
Poland, in fact I hid from the investigadon my espionage
des with the Germans. - p. 52

Having discussed with EGOROV the current situadon,
we came to the conclusion that the Party and the popular
masses were going with the leadership of the ACP(b)
and the soil for the coup had not been prepared
Therefore we decided that it was necessary to remove
STALIN or MOLOTOV, under the flag of some kind of
anti-Soviet organization or other, with the purpose of
creating the conditions for my future accession to power.
After that, once I had assumed a position of more
power, the possibility of further, more decisive changes
in the policies of the Party and the Soviet government, in
conformity to the interests of Germany, would be
created.

I asked EGOROV to transmit to the Germans, through
KOSTRING, our plans and to ask the opinion of
government circles in Germany about this.

QUESTION: VCTiat kind of answer did you receive?

295

ANSWER: Soon afterwards, from the words of
KOSTRING, EGOROV reported to me that
govremment circles in Germany agreed with our
suggestion.

QUESTION: What did you undertake in order to effect
your traitorous plans?

ANSWER: I decided to organize a conspiracy in the
NKVD and to attract into it people through whom I
would be able to cany out terrorist acts against the
leaders of the Party and government.

QUESTION: Was it only after the conversation with
EGOROV that you decided to put together a
conspiratorial organization within the NKVD?

ANSWER: No. In fact the matter was like this. Long
before this conversation with EGOROV, at the time of
my being named Commissar of Internal Affairs, I took
with me into the NKVD a group of workers who were
closely tied to me through counterrevolutionary work. In
this way my confession that I set about organizing a
conspiracy should be understood only in the sense that
in connection with my conversations with
GAMMERSHTEIN and my establishing contact with
the military conspirators it became necessary to develop
more widely, to accelerate, within the NKVD the setting
up of the conspiratorial organization within the NKVD
itself. - p. 64

As concerning EVDOKIMOV and FRINOVSKII, the
latter was completed introduced to the details of the
conspiracy by me, and knew absolutely everything,
induing about my ties with the group of military
conspirators in the Red Army and in military circles in
Germany. - p. 65

... I informed KOSTRING about the further arrests
among the military workers and declared to him that it
was beyond my ability to prevent these arrests. In
particular I reported about the arrest of EGOROV,
which could cause the collapse of the whole conspiracy.
KOSTRING was very much upset by this situation. He

Khrushchev

put to me sharply the question of whether it was not at
this time essential to undertake some kind of measures
towards a seizure of power, or you would be smashed
one at a time. - p. 67.

ANSWER: I did not meet any more personally with
KOSTRJNG. After that communications between us
were realized through KHOZIAINOV.

QUESTION: Did KHOZIAINOV know about the
terrorist acts you were preparing against the leaders of
the Party and government?

ANSWER: Yes, he knew. Concerning them
KHOZIAINOV had been informed not only by me, but
by German intelligence, since during the first meeting
after the establishment of contact between us
KHOZIAINOV transmitted to me a directive from the
Germans: to accelerate as quickly as possible the
completion of terrorist acts.

Besides that KHOZIAINOV transmitted to me the
directives of German intelligence that, in connection
with my dismissal from work in the NKVD and the
naming of BERIA as People's Commissar for Internal
Affairs German intelligence considered it essential to
effect the murder of some one of the members of the
Politburo and, in this way, to provoke a new leaderahip
in the NKVD [i.e., Beria's dismissal - GF].

In this same period within the NKVD itself there began
arrests of the active participants of the conspiracy I was
heading, and there and then we arrived at the conclusion
that it was essential to organize an action on November
7 1938.

QUESTION: Who is 'W?

ANSWER: I - EZHOV, FRINOVSKII, DAGIN and
EVDOKIMOV. - p. 67.

.. .In one of the meetings in my office in the
Commissariat of Water I communicated to LAZEBNY
that there were compromising materials on him in the
NKVD, that his arrest and doom was threatening.

I told LAZEBNY: *^llere's no way out for you, you're
doomed, but you can save a large group of people by
sacrificing yourself." During the corresponding
questiong of LAZEBNY I informed him that the
murder of STALIN would save the situation in the
country. LAZEBNY gave me his consent. - p. 69

)nginal at

p://di ss.montclair.edu/ english/ fiirr/ research/ ezhov042639.html

ison for Ezhov's indictment: J ansen & Petrov, p. 108 ff.
p. 108:

L^ality was of no concern to Ezhov's NKVD. In
January 1939, after his fall, a cocnmission consisting of
Andreev, Beriia, and Malenkov accused Ezhov of having
used illegal investigation methods: "In a most flagrant
way, investigation methods were distorted, mass beatings
were indiscriminately applied to prisoners, in order to
extort false testimony and 'confessions.' " During
twenty^four hours an investigator often had to obtain
several dozen confessions, and investigators kept each
other informed about the the testimony obtained so that
corresponding facts, circumstances, or names could be
suggested to other prisoners. "As a result, this sort of
investigation very often led to organized slander of
totally innocent people." Very often, confessions were
obtained by means of "straight provocation"; prisoners
were persuaded to give false testimony about their
"espionage activity" in order to help the Party and the
government to "discredit foreign states" and in exchange
for the promise of release. According to Andreev et al.,
"the NKVD leadership in the person of comrade Ezhov
not only did not cut short such arbitrariness and excesses
in arresting and conducting investigation, but sometimes
themselves encouraged it." All opposition was
suppressed.'

[note 112, p. 241, is to archival documents no longer
available: "112. TsA FSB, f 3-os, op. 6, d. 1, U. 1-2.*']

109-110:

Khrushchev

The functioning of the troikas was also shaq)ly criticized.
Andreev et al. reported that there had been "serious
slips" in their work, as well as in that of the so-called
Grand Collegium [boPshaia koUegiia], where during a
single evening session from 600 to 2,000 cases were
often examined. (They were referring to the examination
in Moscow of albums in the national operations; before
being signed by the People's Commissar of Internal
Affairs and the Procurator, the albums were examined by
a number of department chiefs of the central NKVD
apparatus.) llie work of the regional troikas was not
controlled by the NKVD at all. Approximately 200,000
people were sentenced to two years by the so-called
militia troikas, "the existence of which was not legal."
The NKVD Special Board "did not meet in its legal
composition even once.""'

As an executive of the Tiumen' operational sector of the
NKVD testified later, arrests were usually made
arbitrarily — people were arrested for belonging to
groups that did not actually exist — and the troika duly
fell in line with the operational group:

At a troika meeting, the crimes of the defendants were
not examined. In some days during an hour I reported to
the troika cases involving 50-60 persons." In a later
interview the Tiumen' executive gave a more detailed
account of how the operational group carried out the
troika's "first category" sentences. Those sentenced to
death were executed in the basement in a special room
with covered walls, with a shot in the back of the head,
followed by a second shot in the temple. The corpses
were then taken away to a ccmeter)' outside town. In
Tobol'sk, to which the person involved was transferred
in 1938, they executed and buried right in prison; for
lack of space, the corpses were piled up."^ llie assistant
chief of the Saratov police administration gave similar
testimony: "The basic instruction was to produce as
many cases as possible, to formulate them as quickly as
possible, with maximum simplification of investigation.
As for the quota of cases, [the NKVD chief] demanded

303

[the inclusion of] all those sentenced and all those that
had been picked up, even if at the moment of their
seizure they had not committed any sort of concrete
crime"*

/no/

After airest, Ezhov's deputy, Frinovskii, explained that
the main NKVD investigators had been the "butchers"
[sledovatelikolorshchiki], mainly selected from
"conspirators or compromised people." "Unchecked,
they applied beatings to prisoners, obtained 'testimony'
in the shortest possible time." With Ezhov approving, it
was the investigator rather than the prisoner who
determined the testimony. Afterward, the protocols were
"edited" by Ezhov and Frinovskii, usually without seeing
the prisoner or only in passing. According to Frinovskii,
Ezhov encouraged the use of physical force during
interrogations: he personally supervised the
interrogations and instructed the investigators to use
"methods of physical influencing" if the results were
unsatisfactory. During interrogations he was sometimes
drunk.

As one of the investigators later explained, if somebody
was arrested on Ezhov's orders, they were convinced of
his guiJt in advance, even if all evidence was lacking.
They "tried to obtain a confession from that individual
using all possible means."" ^ Under arrest, the former
Moscow NKVD deputy chief A. P. Rad2ivilovskii
quoted Ezhov as saying that if evidence was lacking, one
should "beat the necessary testimony out of [the
prisoners]." According to Radzivilovskii, testimony "as a
rule was obtained as a result of the torttiring of
prisoners, which was widely practiced both in the central
and the provincial NKVD apparatuses.""'

After arrest both the chief of the Moscow Lefortovo
investigation prison and his deputy testified that Ezhov
had personally participated in beating prisoners during
interrogation."' His deputy, Frinovskii, had done the
same thing.'^ Shepilov recollects how after Stalin's death

304

Khnisl

Khrushchev told his colleagues that one day, while
visiting Ezhov*s Central Committee office, he saw spots
of clotted blood on the skirt and cuffs of Ezhov's
blouse. When asked what was up, Ezhov answered, with
a shade of ecstasy, that one might be proud of such
spots, for it was the blood of enemies of the
revolution.'^'"

[Notes are on p. 241:

113. Ibid., U. 2-3. [TsA FSB, f. 3-os, op. 6, d. 1, U. 1-2.]

114. GoPdberg, "Slovo i delo po-sovetski."

115. Hagenloh, "Socially Harmful Elements," p. 301.

116. TsA FSB, Archival investigation case of Frinovskii ,
N-15301,t. 2, U. 32-35.

117. B. A. Starkov, "Narkom Ezhov," in J. A. Getty and
R. T. Manning, eds., Stalinist Terror Neof Penpectives
(Cambridge, Eng., 1993), pp. 21-39, esp. p. 33; Pravda,
29 April 1988.

118. "M. N. Tukhachevskii i Voenno-fashistskii
zagovor,' " Voenno-istmcheskii arkhiv^ no. 2 (Moscow,
1998): 3-81, esp. pp. 55-56.

119. Ibid., p. 50; see also, V. Shentalinskii, "Okhota v
revzapovednike," Novyi mir \998y no. 12: 170-96, esp. p.
180.

120. Papkov, Stalinskii terror v Sibiri, p. 269;
"Tukhachevskii," Voenno-is/oriiheskii arkhii/y no. 1
(Moscow, 1997): 149-255, esp. p. 179.

121. D. Shepilov, "Vospominaniia," Voprvsy istorii 1998,
no. 4: 3-25, esp. p. 6. [NB: This passage is in Shepilov's
memoirs in book format, Nepnmknuifshiy, M. Vagrius,
2001, p. 43 -OF]

Stalin blamed Ezhov

Jansen & Petrov, p. 210:

Only months after his fall, Stalin explained to the aircnifi
designer A. lakovlev: Ezhov was a scoundrel! He ruined
our best cadres. He had morally degenerated. You call
him at the People's Commissariat, and you are told that

Jix

he went out to the Central Committee. You call him at
the Central Committee, and you are told that he went
out for work. You send for him at home, and it turns out
that he is lying in bed, dead drunk. He ruined many
innocent people. That is why we have shot him.^^

lakovlev's memoirs:

[Stalin] - Well, how is Balandin?

- [lakovlev] He*s working, comrade Stalin, as if nothing
had happened.

- Yes, they imprisoned him for nothing.

Evidently Stalin read astonishment in my look - how
then could innocent people be imprisoned? — and
without any questions on my part he said:

- Yes, it happens that way. A sensible man, one who
works hard, is envied, and they undermine him. And if,
in addition, he is bold, speaks his mind - this evokes
unease and attracts to him the attention of suspicious
Chekists, who do not understand their business, but who
willingly rrlake use of all kinds of rumors and gossip. . ..
(Chapter 20).

lev, A.S. The Purpose of Life. Moscow, 1973, Ch. 20.

& Petrov:

Because he especially referred to 1938, Stalin suggested
that in his opinion in that year, unLke 1937, the terror
had gotten out of control and endangered the country's
stability."*^ At the end of his life, Stalin told his bodyguard
that "the drunkard Ezhov" had been recommended for
the NKVD by Malenkov: ">Xliile in a state of
intoxication, he signed lists for the arrest of often
innocent people that had been palmed off on him."^

In interviews in the 1970s, Molotov reasoned along
similar lines. According to him, Ezhov had enjoyed a
good reputation, until he "morally degenerated." Stalin
had ordered him to "reinforce the pressure," and Ezhov
"was given strong instructions." He "b^an to chop
according to plan," but he "overdid it": "Stopping him
was impossible." Extremely selective in his memory.

306

Khrushchev I.

Molotov gave the impression that Ezhov had fixed the
quotas on his own and that therefore he had been shot.
He did not agree that Ezhov had only carried out Stalin's
instructions: "It is absurd to say that Stalin did not know
about it, but of course it is also incorrect to say that he is
responsible for it all.""'^ Another former Stalin adjutant
who justified the purges was Kaganovich. There was
sabotage and all that, he admitted, and "to go against the
public opinion was impossible then." Only Ezhov
"overdid it"; he even "organized competitions to see
who could unmask the most enemies of the people." As
a result, "many innocent people perished, and nobody
will justify this."**

[nn. 42-46, p. 261:

42. A. lakovlev, Tse/\hi^i^ 2d ed. (Moscow, 1970), p.
509.

43. Reference to 1938 in A. lakovlev, Tse/' i^his^m: ZapiskJ
aviakonstrukiora (Moscow, 1966), p. 179.

44. RTsKhlDNI, f. 558, op. 4, d. 672, 1. 10.

45. F. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Mohloi/ym (Moscow, 1991),
pp. 398-400, 402, 438.

46. F. Chuev, Tak ^voril Kaganovich (Moscow, 1992), p.
89.]

18. Rudzutak

Khrushchev:

"Comrade Rudzutak, candidate-member of the Political
Bureau, member of the party since 1905, who spent 10
years in a Tsarist hard-labor camp, completely retracted
in court the confession which was forced from him. . . .
After careful examination of the case in 1955, it was
established that the accusation against Rudzutak was
false and that it was based on slanderous materials.
Rudzutak has been rehabilitated posthumously."

The arrests of Rudzutak and Tukhachevsky were ordered in the same
Politburo decision of May 24 1937.

No. 136

307

Resolution of the Politburo concerning Rudzutak and Tukachevsky

May 24, 1937

309. On Rudzutak and Tukhachevsky.

Set for a vote of the members and candidate members of
the CC ACP(b) the following resolution:

The CC ACP(b) has received information that exposes
member of the CC ACP(b) Rudzutak and candidate
member of the CC ACP(b) Tukhachevsky in
participation in an anti-Soviet Trotskyist-Right
conspiratorial bloc and in espionage work against the
USSR in the interest of fascist Germany. In connection
with this the Politburo of the CC ACP(b) presents for
vote of the members and candidates of the CC ACP(b) a
resolution concerning the expulsion from the Party of
Rudzutak and Tukhachevsky and giving their cases over
to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

. Slatinskoe Polithiuro v 30-e ^dy. Ed. O.V. Khlevniuk et al. Moscow:
AIRO-XX, 1995, p. 156.

Rudzutak named by Stalin in Speech to Expanded Session of the Military
Council attached to the People's Commisar for Defense June 2, 1937:

*Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin - these are, so to speak, the
political leadership. To them I also add Rudzutak, who
also stood at the head and worked very craftily, confused
everything, but all in all turned out to be a German spy;
Karakhan; Enukidze."

'Xet us continue. I have enumerated 13 people, and
repeat their names: Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin, Enukidze,
Karakhan, Rudzutak, lagoda, Tukhachevsky, lakir,
Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, Gamamik."

"Bukharin. We do not have evidence that he informed
[the Germans] himself, but he had very close
connections with Enukidze, Karakhan, and Rudzutak,
they advised him..."

"Rudzutak. I have already said that he does not admit he
is a spy, but we have all the evidence. We know to whom
he gave his information. There is a certain experienced
female intelligence agent in Germany, in Berlin. When

308

Khrushchev IJc

you may happen to visit Berlin, Josephina Genzi, maybe
one of you knows her. She is a beautiful woman. An
experienced intelligence agent. She recruited Karakhan.
Recruited through sexual encounters [lit. 'on the female
side' - GF]. She recruited Enukidze. She helped recruit
Tukhachevsky. And she holds Rudzutak in her hands."

"This is the nucleus, and what does it show? Did any of
these men vote for Trotsky. Rudzutak never voted for
Trotsky, and yet he turned out to be a secret agent. . . .
ITiere's the worth of your point of view of 'who voted
for whom."'

Rudzutak is named many times by defendants at the March 1938 "Buk-
harin" Trial, many times by Krestinsky alone. According to Krcstinsky
Rudzutak was one of the central figures of the antigovemment conspir-
acy.

KRES'HNSKY: I learnt from Pyatakov, when he spoke
to me about this in February 1935, that an organization
had been formed, which united the Rights, Trotskyites
and military men, and which set itself the aim of
preparing for a military coup. I also knew that the
leading centre included Rykov, Bukharin, Rudzutak and
Yagoda from the Rights, Tukhachevsky and Gamamik
from the military, and Pyatakov from the Trots kyites.. ..

In the beginning of 1935 Pyatakov informed me that an
understanding had been reached, named the composition
of the centre of which I spoke yesterda)', and told mc
that myself and Rosengoltz, while not joining the centre,
would work under its direction, mainly in connection
with the planning and preparing of the future
government machinery. Here was a division of labour.
We were told that we would be connected in this work
with Rudzutak from the Rights, and with Tukhachevsky.
My impression was that only Rudzutak was mentioned
But Rosengol'ts took an active part in this and he
subsequently spoke to me of his meetings with Rykov. In
general, it was Rykov and Rudzutak from the Rights, and
Tukhachevsky from the military' group. There was no
such thing as my knowing of the connections with

Appendix

309

Tukhachevsky and Rosengol'ts's not knowing of them;
but, as pait of the division of labour, he took upon
himself mainly the connections with the Rights, although
I was the one who used to see Rudzucak, and, as far as
Tukhachevsky was concerned, it was mainly I, but he
also.

^^eport of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet"Bbi- of Rights and Trot-
skyiles" Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.K.
Moscow, March 2-13, 19 38... Verbatim Report. (Moscow: People's Conunis-
sariai of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1938) , pp. 184; 279-80. (1938 Trial)

Rudzutak is named in that Trial several times by Rozengol'ts, who is him-
self named by Ezhov:

Question: What did you undertake to do in order to accomplish the
Geimans' task?

.\nswer I promised Kandelaki my support and in fact I did negotiate
M-ith Rozengol'ts about the desirability of concluding such an agreement.
.\s a re-/ 64 /suit the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade rendered
a positive decision concerning this agreement.

• "Transcript of the Interrogation of the Prisoner Ezhov Nikolai Ivano-
vich of April 26 1939," Luhianka. Stalin i NKVD - NKGB - GUKR
"SMERSH': 1939 -mart 1946. Moscow, 2006, pp. 63-4. Translation at
http://chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/research/ezhovG42639eng.html

This also confirms his association with the Tukhachevsky military con-
spirators, with whom Rudzutak was accused of being involved with.
Rozengol'ts is named many times as a major Rightist conspirator, and as
the person who personally recruited him, by Tamaiin, in a recently pub-
lished interrogation-confession.

Rudzutak was named by Rukhimovich in the latter's confession of Janu-
ary 31, 1938:

Question: What do you know about the activities of this
Latvian organization?

Answer I have already confessed that it was BAUMAN
and MEZf ILAUK who maintained contact with the
Latvians. Therefore they are the ones who should give
you the details about the personnel and activities of this
organization. All I know is that RUDZUTAK and
ALKSNIS headed this organization. The organization

310

Khrushchev

was nrmly connected with the Latvian and Gennan
intelligence services and had a rather large number of
counterrevolutionary cadre. In particular the armed units
of the military Latvian organization were to have been
used in the plan for the 'palace coup.'

- Lubianka 3, No. 290, p.484.

19. Rozenblium

Khrushchev:

The way in which the former NKVD workers
manufactured various fictitious "anti-Soviet centers" and
"blocs" with the help of provocatory methods is seen
from the confession of Comrade Rozenblum, party
member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937 by the
Leningrad NKVD.

During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case
Rozenblum revealed the following fact: When
Rozenblum was arrested in 1937, he was subjected to
terrible torture during which he was ordered to confess
false information concerning himself and other persons.
He was then brought to the office of Zakovskii, who
offered him freedom on condition that he make before
the court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the
NKVD concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion
in a terroristic center in Leningrad." (Movement in the
hall.) With unbelievable cynicism, Zakovskii told about
the vile "mechanism" for the crafty creation of
fabricated "anii- Soviet plots."

"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rozenblum,
"Zakovskii gave me several possible variants of the
organization of this center and of its branches. After
he detailed the organization to me, Zakovskii told
me that the NKVD would prepare the case of this
center, remarking that the trial would be public.
Before the court were to be brought 4 or 5 members
of this center Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozcm,
Shaposhnikova (Chudov's wife) and others together

1-ndix

311

with 2 or 3 membexs ficom the branches of this
center. . .

". . .The case of the Leningrad center has to be built
solidly, and for this reason witnesses are needed.
Social origin (of course, in the past) and the party
standing of the witness will play more than a small
role.

'"You, yourself/ said Zakovskii, Svill not need to
invent anything. The NKVD will prepare for you a
ready outline for every branch of the center; you will
have to study it carefully and to remember well all
questions and answers which the Court might ask.
This case will be ready in four-five months, or
perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be
preparing yourself so that you will not compromise
the investigation and yourself. Your future will
depend on how the trial goes and on ils results. If
you begin to lie and to testify falsely, blame yourself.
If you manage to endure it, you will save your head
and we will feed and clothe you at the Government's
cost until your death.'"

This is the kind of vile things which were then
practiced."

the whole method of beating confessions out of people, innocent or
y, see part 16. above, on Ezhov, and quotations from Frinovskii's
ment.

;n and Petrov quote Ezhov as having Zakovskii shot in August 1938
;t him out of the way, so he could not testify against him (Ezhov).

Frinovskii had returned to Moscow on 25 August, just
after Beriia's appointment, and he was invited straight to
the NKVD and stayed with Ezhov for more than an
hour. After arrest he testified: "I had never seen Ezhov
in such a depressed state. Things are rotten,' he said,
passing right away to the question that Beriia had been
appointed contrary to his wish." On 27-28 August
Frinovskii met with Evdokimov, who insisted that
before Beriia arrived he must take care of any unfinished
cases (nedodelki) that might compromise them. He told

312

Khrushchev I Jii

Fiinovskii: "Check to see whether Zakovskii and all
lagoda people have been executed, because after Beriia's
arrival the investigation of these cases may be renewed
and they may turn against us." Fiinovskii then
ascertained that a group of Chekists, including Zakovskii
and Ivlironov, had been shot on 26-27 August (actually
they were shot on 29 August).

- Jansen Sc Petrov, p. 151. This is the same document as the Fiinovskii
statement published recendy (2006) and which I put on the Internet at
http:/ / chss.montclair.edu/ english/ furr/ research /frinovsky eng. himl

Zakovskii was part of Ezhov's conspiracy, along with Fiinovskii and oth-
ers.

Zakovskii was explicidy blamed for torturing people "as a rule" in Stalin's
telegram of Jan. 10, 1939. See below for the discussion of this documcni
and the reference to Zakovskii. Khrushchev had this, because he quoted
it. But he didn't quote the part involving Zakovskii, no doubt because it
would have undermined his insinuation here that Zakovskii was acting in
accordance with Stalin's wishes.

20. Kabakov

Khrushchev:

"Even more widely was the falsi ficadon of cases
practiced in the provinces. The NKVD headquarteis of
the Sverdlov Oblast "discovered" the so-called "Ural
uprising staff -an organ of the bloc of rightists,
Trotskyites, Socialist Revoludonaries, church leaders -
whose chief supposedly was the Secretary' of the
Sverdlov Oblast Party Committee and member of the
Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks), Kabakov, who had been a party member
since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show
that in almost all krais, oblasts [provinces] and republics
there supposedly existed "rightist Trotskyite, espionage-
terror and diversionary'- sabotage organizadons and
centers" and that the heads of such organizadons as a
rule -for no known reason -were Brst secretaries of
oblast or republic Communist party committees or
central committees."

idix

313

I Minoian rehabilitation materials, 1955:

Mirzoian further confessed that in 1930-1933, while he
was in the Urals, he was supposedly in touch with one of
the leaders of the Rights — Kabakov — and continued his
counterrevolutionary activity, and in 1933-1938, on the
orders of Rykov and Bukhaiin, he supposedly headed
the Right-Trotskyite underground in Kazakhstan.

IB 1, No. 52, p. 280.

kov was dismissed from both the CC and the Party itself by a reso-
I circulated to the CC on May 17-19, 1937 and confirmed at the
1937 on June 29'^

kov figured in Ezhov's report to the June 1937 CC Plenum on the
pread nature of the conspiracy:

In his report Ezhov sketched an all-embracing
conspiracy against Stalin. Allegedly, already in 1933 on
the initiative of various opposition groups a united
"Center of Centers" had been created with Rykov,
Tomskii, and Bukharin on behalf of the Rightists, SRs,
and Mensheviks; Enukidze on behalf of the Red Army
and NKVD conspirators; Kamenev and Sokol'nikov on
behalf of the Zinovievists; and Piatakov on behalf of the
Trotskiists. The main task of the "Center of Centers" or
"United Center" had been the overthrow of Soviet
power and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR.
Reportedly, the military conspirators led by
Tukhachevskii, as well as lagoda and his NKVD people,
had also been subordinated to the Center. New in
Ezhov's scheme was that in the leadership of every
republic or province there were conspirators too. He
mentioned the regional Party leaders Sheboldaev from
Kursk, Razumov from Irkutsk, Kabakov from
Sverdlovsk, and Rumiantsev from Smolensk — all of
them Central Committee members who had already been
arrested before the Plenum.'"^

104. TsA FSB, f 3, op. 4, d. 20, L 117-22.

:n & Petrov, p. 75 & 233.

314

Khrushchev 1

Kabakov was named as head of a counteirevoludonaiy organization
Urals in a note to the Politburo signed by Obkom Secretary, Stoliar.

On the basis of evidence at hand in the obkom and the
confessions of five arrested workers of the apparatus
specially designated by the CPC [Commission of Party
Control - GF] for this oblast the plenipotentiary of the
CPC Bukharin [note: not the famous Bukhaiin - GF]
and the secretary of the Party college Nosov have been
exposed as enemies of the people, as active participants
in the counterrevolutionary organization headed in the
Urals by Kabakov.

- Lubianka 2, No. 276, 7 Jan. 1938.

Kabakov was named by Zubarev, one of the defendants in the Mar
1938 "Bukharin" Moscow Trial, as known by him to be a member of i
Rightist conspiracy in the Urals as early as 1929. Rykov, one of the ma
defendants along with Bukharin, also named Kabakov as an importa
member of the Rightist conspiracy.

ZUBAREV: . . .>Xlien I consented he at once told me
that I would not be the only one working in the Urals,
that there was already an active member of the counter-
revolutionary organization there, very influential, that he
was already directly connected with the Union centre
through Rykov. He mentioned Kabakov.

ZUBAREV: Rykov referred to A.P. Smimov and stated
that he had heard from him that I was an active member
of the Right organization. I described to him the general
situation in the Urals, the state of our organization and
told him that already at the end of 1929, in December,
Kabakov and I had organized a regional leading group
which co-ordinated the whole work. I told him who
belonged to this group: Kabakov, myself Sovetnikov and
others. I told him of the work I had done on Smimov's
instructions and on his, Rykov 's, instructions conveyed
by Kabakov.

RYKOV: . . . There were a number of members of our
organization in various places, as has been enumerated,
including peole like Kabakov, secretar)'...

-1938 Trial pp. 139; 160.

l<Cabakov was named in the Pospelov report. Section II.

The UNFCVD of the Sverdlovsk oblast 'discovered' a so-
called 'Ural rebellion staff - an organ of the bloc of
Rights, Trotskyites, SRs, Orthodox believers, and the
agency of the ROVS [a White Russian Emigre military
organi2ation - GF], led by the secretary of the
Sverdlovsk obkom Kabakov, member of the CPSU since
1914. This staff supposedly united 200 subgroups,
formed along military lines, 1 5 rebellion organizations
and 56 groups.

RKEB 1, p. 323; DokJad Khrushcheva p. 192.

)hn D. Littlepage discusses sabotage in Urals (See Chapters 9, 10 and 25
:nerally on sabotage, or "wrecking.")

In Kabakov specifically:

p. 99:

"It seemed clear to me at the time that the selection of
this commission and their conduct at Kalata traced
straight back to the Communist high command in
Sverdlovsk, whose members must be charged cither with
criminal negligence or actual participation in the events
which had occurred in these mines. / 100 /

However, the chief secretary of the Communist Party in
the Urals, a man named Kabakoff, had occupied this
post since 1922, all through the period of great activity in
developing the mines and industries of the Urals. For
some reason which was never clear to me he had always
commanded the complete confidence of the Kremlin,
and was considered so powerful that he was privately
described as the 'Bolshevik Viceroy of the Urals.*

If this man's record was examined, there was nothing to
justify the reputation he appeared to have. Under his
long rule, the Ural area, which is one of the richest
mineral regions in Russia and which was given almost
unlimited capital for exploitation, never did produce
anything like what it should have done.

... I told some of my Russian acquaintances at the time
that it seemed to me there was a lot more going on in the

316

Khrushchev I iiiJ

Urals than had yet been revealed, and that it came from
somewhere high up.

All these incidents became clearer, so far as I was
concerned, after the conspiracy trial in January, 1937,
when Piatkoff, together with several of his associates,
confessed in open court that they had engaged in
organized sabotage of mines, railways, and other
industrial enterprises since the beginning of 1931. A few
weeks after this trial had ended and Piatakoff had been
sentenced to be shot, the chief Party Secretary in the
Urals, Kabakoff, who had been a close associate of
PiatakofPs, was anestd on charges of complicity in this
same conspiracy."

- Littlepage, with Demaree Bess. In Search of Smet Gold NY: Marcouii,
Brace & Co., 1938 (1937).

John R. Harris gained access to Kabakov's investigative file. Me states:

As Kabakov put it, "A large number of part)- leaders were im-
perceptably enveloped into the clique [by -means of illegal gifts J
such that within a year or two when they understood the crimi-
nal nature of what they were involved in, they were already be-
holden to us."

The Gnat Urals: regionalism and the evolution of the Soviet system. Ithaca: Cornell
U.P. 1999, p. 163.

21. Kosior; 22. Chubar';
23. Postyshev; 24. Kosarev

Khrushchev:

"Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists
have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of
such "cases," as a result of the fact that all kinds of
slanderous "confessions" were accepted, and as a result
of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and
others. In the same manner were fabricated the "cases"
against eminent party and state workers -Kossior,
Chubar, Postyshev, Kosarev and others."

Kosior and Chubar*:

Ezhov's lecently-published interrogation-confession of April 26 1939
names both Kosior and Chubar' as among those who 'Visited'* the Ger-
man intelligence agent Norden who also recruited Ezhov:

Of the large number of people whom NORDEN
consulted, I specifically remember GAMARNIK,
lAKIR, CHUBAR'. PETROVSKY, KOSIOR,
VEINBERG, and METALIKOV. Norden also
consulted me. - p. 57

Ezhov interrogation-confession of April 26 1939; see
ittp://chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/research/e2hov042639eng.html

According to the Rehabilitation materials of Postyshev prepared for
Chcushchev, Kosior implicated Postyshev, then withdrew his confes-
ions, but then reiterated them again.

Cosior implicated him; then withdrew it; then repeated it. In his own
onfessions Postyshev implicated Kosior, as well as lakir, Chubar', and
thers.

•

Kosior S.V. at the outset of the investigation named
Postyshev among the number of the participants in the
military conspiracy in the Ukraine. Then he recanted his
confessions, but thereafter he confirmed them again. In
Kosior's file there is a statement by Antipov N.K. in
which he asserts that there were completely abnormal
personal relations between Kosior and Postyshev, and
that Postyshev was not in the general center of the
counterrevolutionary organizations in the Ukraine. In
this situation Kosior's confessions about Postyshev give
serious cause for doubting their truthfulness.

RKEB 1. 219 - rehab of Postyshev.

ostyshev implicated Kosior

Postyshev confessed he was guilty in that since 1934 he
had been a member of the counterrevolutionary Right-
Trotskyite organization in the Ukraine, and that together
with Kosior and other particpants in the organization he
carried out sabotage and subversive work.

318

Khrushchev I J

Postyshev confessed he was guilty also in that since 1920
he had been an agent of Japanese intelligence, to which
he gave infonnation constituting state secrets of the
USSR right up to the day of his arrest.

At the preliminary investigation and at trial Postyshev
said that he was guilty. However the facts set forth in the
transcripts of Postyshev's interrogation were not
confirmed during the process of verification.

In the "confessions" of Postyshev it is stated that he was
personally tied, in his counterrevolutionary work, to
Balitsky V.A., Kosior S.V., lakir I. E., Chubar' V.Ia.,
Popov N.N., Musul'bas I.A., and other participants of
the anti-Soviet organization in the Ukraine.

- RKEB 1, 218.

p. 251 - in rehabilitation documents about Chubar'

The accusations against Chubar' of membership in the
Right-Trolskyite organization were based on the indirect
confessions of the arrested persons Aniipov, Kosior,
Pramnek, Sukhomlin, Postyshev, Boldyrev, and others,
who, in identif)'ing him as a member of the
counterrevolutionary organization, referred to Rykov,
Grin'ko, Bubnov and other persons, whose confessions
do not mention Chubar*.

p. 252: same, continued:

ITie accusation against Sukhomlin of membership in the
Right-Trotskyite organization and in Japanese
intelligence were based on the confessions of the
arrested persons Tiagnibeda, Marchak, Shumiatsky,
Ermolenko, and others, who referred to Kosior,
Postyshev, lakir, and other persons.

Chubar' was implicated in the Right-Trotskyite conspiracy by Aniipov.
Kosior, Pramnek, Sukhomlin, Postyshev, Boldyrev, and others.

Kaganovich, interviewed by Felix Chuev:

"The general situation, social opinion was such, that it
was not possible. I defended Kosior and Chubar', but
when I was shown a whole notebook written by Chubar ,

Appendix

319

his confessions in his own handwriting, 1 yielded [lit.
"spread my arms," a sign of acquiescence].

Chuev, Tak ^voril Kaganovich^ pp. 68-9.

Moiotov told Chuev that he himself was present when Antipov, Chubar's
friend, accused Chubar'. Chubar' denied it heatedly and got very angry at
Andpov. Moiotov knew both of them very well. (Chuev, Mohtov: Poiud-
tr^havnyi VlasteJia, pp. 486-7)

According to the Pospelov Report prepared for Khrushchev, Kosior was
afiested on May 3, 1938 - that is, under Ezhov, long before Beria arrived
at the NKVD - and both tortured (no details are given) and subjected to
prolonged interrogations of up to 14 hours at a stretch. Of 54 interroga-
tions of Kosior only 4 were preserved. This is consistent with the re-
cently-revealed statement by Frinovskii.

No. 139

June 16, 1938

60. Concerning com. Chubar V.IA.

1. In view of the fact that the confessions of Kosior,
Eikhe, Tr. Chubai', and beside that, the confessions
of Rudzutak and Antipov, throw suspicion upon
com. V. lA. Chubar*, the Politburo of the CC considers
it impossible for him to remain as a member of the
Politburo of the CC and Deputy Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars of the SSR and
considers it possible to give him work only in the
provinces on a trial basis.

2. To decide the question of concrete work of com.
Chubar' in the course of the next two days.

- SUilinskoe PoJitbiuro v 30-egod),\ p. 167. (emphasis added, GF)

Dmitriev's confession:

LIUSHKOV told me that LEPLEVSKII came to the
Ukraine and made a big fuss over rooting out all of
BALITSKII's people. He arrested a series of leading
workers of the Ukrainian NKVD and accused them of
carrying out counterrevolutionary activity on
BALITSKII's orders, and at the same time conspired
with a number of plotters who were supposed to act
under his instructions. LEPLEVSKII carried out the

320

Khrushchev lie

fight against the Rights in such a way that he always
protected the leadership of the organization from
exposure by any means.

In this case the person in question was KOSIOR S.V.
He, according to LIUSHKOV's words, was in fact in
command of the operative work of the Ukrainian
NKVD...

One time I had the impression and BALITSKII and
LEPLEVSKII were at war with one another and were
personal enemies. LEPLEVSKII told me that all this was
for show only and that in reality he and BALITSKII
were in the same counterrevolutionary underground, led
by KOSIOR, who was one of the most clandestine of
the Rights in the Ukraine.

- Lubianka 2, No. 356, pp. 577-602., at 590-1 (emphasis added, QV).

Kosarev

Kosarev is named by Babulin, Ezhov's live-in nephew, fcUow conspira-
tor, and witness to Ezhov's and Ezhov's wife Evgeniia's ''moral degen-
eration," as someone who visited them frequent, along with other con-
spirators such as Piatakov:

Answer. EZHOV and his wife Evgenia Solomonovna
had a wide circle of acquaintances which whom they
were on friendly relations and simply accepted into their
house. The most frequent guests in EZf lOV's home
were PIATAKOV, the former director of the State Bank
of the USSR NLAR'IASIN, the former manager of the
foreign section of the State Bank SVANIDZE, the
former trade representative in England BOGOMOLOV,
the editor of the Peasant Gazette URITSKY Semion,
KOLTSOV Mikhail, KOSAREV A.V., RYZHOV and
his wife, Ziniaida GLIKINA and Ziniaida KORIXUN.

- Babulin confession, p. 75. At

http://chss.montclair.edu/english/fuiT/research/babulinru.htinl

Working, it seems, with this same confession by Babulin plus other ar-
chival materials no longer available to researchers, Jansen and Pctrov hy-
pothesized some kind of similar relationship between Kosarev & Ezho\''$
wife.

AppoMlix

321

Viktor Babulin added Aleksandr Kosarev and a student
of the Industrial Academy, Nikolai Baryshnikov, as
persons she had had intimate relations with.27 Former
Komsomol leader Kosarev (who had been editor in chief
of Evgeniia's USSR in Construction) had already been
arrested on 28 November 1938 and was shot on 23
February of the following year. He was arrested as a
participant in an alleged Komsomol conspiracy,
however, and there is no evidence that his case was in
any way intertwined with Ezhov's.

- Jansen & Petrov, 185.

Rogovin:

"The Plenum [of the CC of the Komsomol] dismissed
Kosarev £rom his position, as well as four other
secretaries of the CC of the Komsomol, for "callous,
bureaucratic and hostile behavior towards honest
Komsomol workers who had tried to disclose
weaknesses in the work of the CC of the Komsomol,
and for taking revenge on one of the best Komsomol
workers (the case of comrade Mishakova)."

-Rogovin, Partita rassireliannykh. Ch. 26, at
http://trst.narod.tu/rogovin/t5/xxvi.htm

According to Akakii Mgeladze, Stalin. Kaium la Znal. N.p. (Tbilisi?),
n.pub. 2001, Mgeladze, later First Secretary of the Georgian Party but in
the 1930s a leading Komsomol figure, discussed Kosarev with Stalin in
1947 (p. 165). During this discussion Stalin told him:

. . .The question of Kosarev was discussed twice in the
Politburo. Zhdanov and Andreev were assigned to verify
the evidence. They confirmed that the declarations of
Mishakova and others corresponded to reality, and the
materials gathered by the NKVD gave no cause for
doubt

Mgeladze, who clearly believed that Kosarev was either entirely innocent
and had been framed by Beria for personal reasons, or had simply made
some mistake or other, replied:

I read the transcript of the Plenum of the Central
Committee of the VLKSM [abbreviation for the

322

Khrushchev lic

Komsomol, "All-Union Leninist Communist Soviet of
Youth"- GF], at which Kosarev was removed. In the
speeches of both Zhdanov and Andreev, and in
Shkiiiatov's report everything was so thorough that it
was not possible to doubt anything.

According to Mgeladze, Stalin went on to explain that everybody madi
mistakes, and that many mistakes were made in 1937. But Stalin did no
apply this to Kosarev's case. (p. 172)

25. The Lists

See citations in the text of Chapter Four.

26. Resolutions of the January 1938 CC

Plenum

Khrushchev:

"Resolutions of the Januar)' plenum of the Central Committee, All- Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1938 had brought some measure of
improvement to the party organizations. However, widespread repression
also existed in 1938."

Getty & Naumov;

"Thus the mass depredations in the party were to be
blamed (not without some justification) on former part}'
secretaries who for the most part had already been
removed." (496)

"In the months that followed [the January 1938 Plcnuni|,
mass expulsions from the party ceased, large numbers of
expelled members were readmitted, and recruitment of
new members began for the first time since 1933." (497)

Robert Thurston:

Vyshinskii "questioned the whole course of the Terror."
(109) "Without the Gensec's [Stalin's] approval, the
Procuracy would never have taken the steps it did to
protest and curb the Terror."

"Chuianov*s account demonstrates that the NKVD had
been out of control at the r^onal level, if not nationally.
. . . But all the evidence assembled here suggests that the

323

TeiTor had two tracks: on one, Stalin pushed events
forward personally, arranging the show trials and
demanding, in a muddled way, that hundreds of
thousands be arrested in 1937. On another level the
police fabricated cases, tortured people not targeted
in Stalin's directives, and became a power unto
themselves." (112; see Ch. 4 passim. Emphasis added,
GF)

also Zhukov, Tainy Kirmiia^ Ch. 2; Getty & Naumov 501-2; Posty-
's insistence on mass expulsions, Tainy pp. 50-51. For Malenkov's
rt, see T^/zypp. 48- 9. See decree {poslanovUnie) "Ob oshibkakh...'*.)

:diktov:

Stalin, undoubtedly, knew about the capridousness and
illegalities that took place during the course of the
repressions, regretted them, and took concrete measures
towards correcting the excesses that had taken place and
the liberation of honest people who had been
imprisoned. I mention by the way that in those days we
had \itde tolerance for slanderers and denouncers. Many
of them, after they were uncovered, were hosted in the
same camps to which they had sent their victims. The
paradox is that some of them, released during the period
of Khrushchev's "thaw", started to trumpet about
Stalinist illegalities louder than anyone else, and even had
the gall to published their memoirs about them!...

The January Plenum of the CC ACP(b) in 1938 openly
admitted the illegalities committed towards honest
communists and non-party people, and to this end
adopted a special resolution which, by the way, was
published in all the central newspapers. Just as openly, to
the whole country, occurred the discussions at the IS***
Party Congress in 1939 concerning the harni done by
unfounded repressions. Right after the January 1938 CC
Plenum thousands of illegally repressed persons,
including prominent military leaders, began to return
from their places of imprisonment. They were all
officially rehabilitated, and Stalin personally apologized
to some of them."

324

Khrushchev IJit

- 1. A. Benediktov, 'X3 Staline I Khrushcheve**, Molodaia Gvardiia No. 4,
1998, 12-65; cited at http://rksmb.ru/pnnt.phpP143 Benediktov was ei-
ther Minister or First Deputy Minister of Agriculture from 1938 to 1953
(http:/ / www.hrono.ru/biograf/benediktov.html )

Lev Balaian:

All together in 1938 there were adopted six resolutions
of the CC ACB(b) concerning the facts of violations of
socialist legality. Besides those discussed above, they
were . . . [the sLx are then enumerated]. The "troikas" and
"dvoikas" attached to the NKVD were abolished by
order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (L.P.
Beria) on November 26, 1938.

- Balaian, Stalin i Khrvshchev, 28-9/237. All but the first (28 March) are in
Luhianka 2. The date of abolition of troikas was Nov. 17, 1938, by "Ob
arestakh..."

On February 1, 1938 Procurator of the USSR A. la.
Vyshinsky reported toJ.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov that
the Main Military Procuracy had heard, oir the request of
the secretary of the Vologodskii obkom facts concerning
especially dangerous crimes committed by a series of
employees of the Vologoskii UNKVD. It was
established that falsifiers of criminal cases compiled
fabricated transcripts of interrogations of accused
people, who had supposedly confessed to the
commission of the most serious state crimes. ... The
cases fabricated in this way were handed over to the
troika attached to the UNKVD of the Vologodskii
oblast, and more than 100 people were shot. . . . During
the interrogations atrocities were committed, all kinds of
tortures were applied to those interrogated. It got to the
point that during interrogations by these individuals four
of the persons under interrogation had been killed.

The aforesaid case concerning the most serious crimes
against socialist legality was held in closed session of the
Military tribunal of the Leningrad Military District in the
presence of a small group of operative workers of the
Vologoskii directorate of the NKVD and the
Vologodskii procuracy. The accused Vlasov, Lebedev

pcndix

325

and Roskuiiakov, as the initiators and organizers of the
aforesaid outrageous crimes were sentenced to the
supreme penalty - shooting, and the other seven of their
collaborators were sentenced to lengthy terms of
imprisonment. (L. Mlechin, Smtri* Stalina^ p. 215).
Throughout the whole country there were 1 1 ,842 such
Vlasovs, Lebedevs and Roskuriakovs, repressed
scoundrels who even during the period of careless
Gorbachev-era pardoning of almost everyone the
infamous lakovlev Commission did not consider it
possible to rehabilitate. (I. Rashkovets. "Nesudebnye
Organy", in Kasprma, Prokurmkie sucfby, p. 317). It is
precisely on the consciences of these falsifiers of criminal
cases, accused of the commission of baseless massive
arrests and the application of illegal methods of
investigation (i.e. tortures - L.B.), to whom even a half-
century later rehabilitation by the Decree of the Supreme
Court of the USSR of January 16, 1989 had been refused
- on them lies the responsibility for those same
"thousands and thousands of innocently repressed
people" whom Khrushchev, and then his creation and
student Gorbachev generously "hung" on the dead J. V.
StaUn."

daian, Sialin i Khmshchev, Ch. 2. at

)://www.stalin.su/book.php?action=header&id=6 Balaian refers to
coUection Rasprava. PrvkurvnkJe sud^by (Moscow: luridicheskaia litera-

1990), p. 314 for the disbanding of the "troikas" and gives the in-
rect date of November 26, 1938. In fact the decree is dated Novem-
17, 1938 (cf. Lubianka 2. No. 362, pp. 607-1 1.)

hinsky's letter to Stalin is in Sovetskoe Rukovodstvo: Pmpiska 1928-1939.
1999, No. 239, pp. 398-400 and is online at

):// chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/research/vyshinsky_stalinfeb01 3
ml

sen & Petrov, on Uspensky about Ezhov's directions for massive fal-
ration of cases:

. . . the notion that the regional NKVD chiefs silently
opposed Ezhov's plans and that Ezhov forced them to
conduct mass operations under threats of arrest is

326

Khrushchev

contradicted by the testimony of another conference
participant, the Orenburg NKVD chief, A. I. Uspenskii
(given during investigation in April 1 939). In his words,
they "tried to surpass each other with reports about
gigantic numbers of people arrested." Uspenskii is of
course incorrect in speaking of "people arrested," since
the conference dealt with quotas of future arrests in each
region. According to him, Ezhov's instruction amounted
to, "Beat, destroy without sorting out," and he quotes
Ezhov as saying that in connection with the destroying
of the enemies "a certain number of innocent people will
be annihilated too," but this was "inevitable."'^ Two
other sources offer similar wording: Ezhov announced
that "if during this operation an extra thousand people
will be shot, that is not such a big / 85 / deal.

During the conference, Ezhov and Frinovskii talked with
each of the attending NKVD chiefs, discussing the
quotas for arrest and execution put forward by them and
giving instructions for the necessar)' measures* in view of
the preparation and the conduct of the operation.
Mironov informed Ezhov about a "Rightist-Trotskiist
bloc" that had been discovered within the Western
Siberian leadership. When he called the evidence against
some of those arrested unconvincing, Ezhov answered:
"Why don't you arrest them? We are not going to work
for you, imprison them, and then sort it out afterward,
dropping those against whom there is no evidence. Act
more boldly, I have already told you repeatedly." He
added that in certain cases, with Mironov agreeing,
department chiefs could also apply "physical methods of
influencing.'''^ When Uspenskii asked Ezhov what to do
with prisoners older than age seventy, he ordered them
to be shot.

Ezhov approved of the activity of those NKVD chiefs,
who cited "astronomic" numbers of persons repressed,
such as, for instance, the NKVD chief of Western
Siberia, citing a number of 55,000 people arrested,
Dmitriev of Sverdlovsk province — 40,000, Berman of
Belorussia — 60,000, Uspenskii of Orenburg — 40,000,

Liushkov of the Far East — 70,000, Redens of Moscow
province— 50,000.* The Ukninian NKVD chiefs each
cited numbers of people arrested from 30,000 to 40,000.
Having Hstened to the numbers, Ezhov in his concluding
remarks praised those who had "excelled" and
announced that, undoubtedly, excesses had taken place
here and there, such as, for instance, in Kuibyshev,
where on Postyshev's instruction Zhuravlev had
transplanted all active Party members of the province.
But he immediately added that "in such a large-scale
operation mistakes are inevitable." (Jansen & Petrov,
131).

Uspenskii was astonished and alarmed by his drunken
table talk. During the trip, Ezhov drank uninterruptedly,
boasting to Uspenskii that he had the Politburo "in his
hands" and could do literally anything, arrest anyone,
including Politburo members. Q&P 1 33)

s was on the Moscow "troika" with Khrushchev himself.

27. "Beria's gang"

:hev:

Meanwhile, Beria's gang, which ran the organs of state
security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested
and the truth of materials which it falsified.

n,p. 118:

"Khrushchev then suggested that police torture
continued freely and even increased under Beria. Because
part of Khrushchev's purpose in the speech was to show
his archenemy and political opponent after Stalin's death
in the worst possible light, this claim must not be taken
as a definitive statement.

Beria's negative image... has... wrongly overridden the
firsthand evidence of what happened when he replaced
Ezhov. Boris Men'shagin, a defense attorney in
Smolensk, commented that Beria "right away displayed
astonishing liberalism." Arrests "fell away practically to
nothing," as the inmate Alexander Weissberg put it. ... a

328

Khrushchev lie*

new and much improved policy was in place. I W) I
Political repression declined acutely in 1939-41 ....

In late 1938 prison and camp inmates regained the tights,
allowed under lagoda but lost with Ezhov, to have
books and play chess and other games... Investigator
now addressed them using the polite term '*vy" instead
of the condescendingly familiar "ty." . . . torture once
again became the exception, contrary to Khrushchev's
assertion... prisoners like R.V. Ivanov-Razumnik, Mariia
loffe, and Abdurakman Avtorkhanov, among others,
reported that physical methods ceased where they were
being held when Betia assumed control of the police.

Under Bcria, a purge swept through the N KVD,
removing most of Ezhov's lieutenants and many in the
lower ranks as well"

According to the Pospelov report, arrests dropped hugely, by over 90"'*,
in 1939 and 1940 in comparison to 1937 and 1938

Year

1935

1936

1937

1938

1939

1940

.Arrests

114,456

88,873

918,671

629,695

41,627

12^.313

Of whom were
executed

1,229

1,118

353,074

328.618

2.601

l,il63

http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/ almanah/inside/ almanah-
doc/55752; published in many places, including Doklad Khrushcheva, p.
185).

Executions in 1939 and 1940 dropped to far less than 1% of the levels
of mass executions in 1937 and 1938. Beria took over as head of the
NKVD in December, 1938, so this corresponds precisely with Bcria's
period in command.

28. "Torture telegram'*

Khrushchev:

Appendix

When the wave of mass arrests b^n to recede in 1939,
and the leaders of territorial party organizations began to
accuse the NKVD workers of using methods of physical
pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded
telegram on January 10, 1939 to the committee
secretaries of oblasts and krais, to the central committees
of republic Communist parties, to the People's
Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of
NKVD organizations. This telegram stated:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) explains that the
application of methods of physical pressure in
NKVD practice is permissible from 1937 on in
accordance with permission of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks) . . .It is known that all bourgeois
intelligence services use methods of physical
influence against the representatives of the socialist
proletariat and that they use them in their most
* scandalous forms.

The question arises as to why the socialist
intelligence service should be more humanitarian
against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against
the deadly enemies of the working class and of the
kolkhoz workers. The Central Committee of the All-
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that
physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as
an exception applicable to known and obstinate
enemies of the people, as a method both justiBable
and appropriate."

Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks) the most brutal violation of socialist legality,
torture and oppression, which led as we have seen to the
slandering and self-accusation of innocent people.

Getty on the original of this telegram, or a similar one.

In the course of this research, we have located the
famous 1939 Stalin directive on "physical methods" of

330

Khrushchev Ijii

interrogation mentioned by Khruschev in his 1956 Secret
Speech (See I.V.Kurilov, N.N.NIikhailov and
V.P.N aumov, eds., Reabidtatsia: Politicheskie protsessy
30-50-kh godov (Moscow, 1991], 40). It is in TsA FSB,
f.lOO, op. I, por. 6, U. 1-2 (second series). Dated 27 July
(not 10 July [this is an error for 10 January — GF]
according to Khruschev), it is a telegram from Stalin to
party secretaries in all regions. It refers to a still unfound
1937 Central Committee directive authorizing physical
methods in exceptional circumstances. Interestingly, the
1939 telegram was written after N.I. Ezhov's fall, and in
a passage not mentioned by Khruschev it accuses
Ezhov's men of excessive torture, **converting an
exception into a rule."

- Cjetty, "Excesses Are Not Permitted." The Russian Review 61 Oanuao'
2002): 11 3-38, at p. 114, n. 45.

I have put a photocopy of the only known text of the "Torture Telegram
of January 10, 1939" at

http://chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/rescarch/ShT_10_01_39.pdf

Full Text of the "Torture Telegram"

Bold - parts Khrushchev quoted;

I/alics - section omitted by Khrushchev that proves his intent to deceive
his audience.

BY CODE CC VKP(b)

TO THE SECRETARIES OF OBLAST AND
REGIONAI. PARTY COMMITTEES, CCS Oh
NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTIES, PEOPLE'S
COMNflSSARS OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, HEADS
OF NKVD DIRECTORATES

The CC (Central Committee] of the VKP (AU-Union Communist Party|
has learned that in checking up on employees of NKVD directorates sec-
retaries of oblast and regional part)' committees have blamed them for
using physical pressure against persons who have been arrested, as some-
thing cnminal. The CC of the VKP explains that use of physical
pressure in the practice of the NKVD has been permitted since

331

1937 in accordance with permission of the CC of the VKP. Af the

me time it am stated that physical pressure is permitted as an exception ami, in
jMtion, oa/ji in relation to blatant enemies of the people who, taking advantage of the
kmme method of interrogation, stubbornly refuse to give up their co-conspirators; who
nfuse to confess for months; and who strive to slow down the discovery of conspiratm
vbo an still at brge; and so continue their struggle a^nst Soviet power even from
pnson. Experience has shown that this policy has produced results by greatly speeding
up the exposure of enemies of the people. It is true that subsequently in practice the
method of physical pressure was sullied by the scum Zakovsk)/, Litvin, Uspensky, and
others, because they turned it from an exception into a rule and employed it against
honest people who had been accidentally amsted. For these abuses, they have been duly
fmished. But this does not invalidate the method itself, insofar as it is employed cor-
rtiil) in practice. It is well known that all bourgeois intelligence ser-
vices use physical pressure against representatives of the socialist
proletariat and in its most disgraceful forms at that. One won- /
page break / ders why a socialist intelligence service is obliged to
be humane in relation to inveterate agents of the bourgeoisie and
implacable enemies of the working class and collective farmers.
The CC of the VKP considers that the method of physical pressure
must necessarily be continued in future in exceptional cases in re-
lation to manifest and unrepentant enemies of the people, as a
completely correct and expedient method. The CC of the VKP de-
mands that the secretaries of oblast and regional committees [and] of the
CCs of national communist party [evidendy a misprint for "parties" -
GP] act in accordance with this clarification when checking up on em-
ployees of the NKVD.

SECRETARY OF THE CC VKP(b) L STALIN [typed, not signed- GF]
Pated by hand - GF] 10/I.-39 g. 15 hrs]

Additionally printed
two cop. 8.II.1956g.25>

2*' My translation; that by Mark Kramer on the I l-I lOAC list l*cb. 27 2005, at
http://tinyuri.coin/bqp6i, and widely reprinted - for example, at the Marxist Internet
Archive - is inaccurate.

332

Khiushchcv li

The question of such a telegrani was discussed at the June 1957 CC PI
num, more than a year after Khrushchev's "Secret Speech." The enti
discussion is a mystery, for there is no reference at all to the docume
now identified as the "torture telegram" (above). Instead a different, '
two different, documents are under discussion here. The copy from tl
Dagestan Obkom (oblast* committee) of the Party that Aristov refers
here is not the copy we now have. This whole question has never bc(
satisfactorally resolved.

Kaganovich: If I'm not mistaken, I seem to remember
that a document like that was officially sent around to
the Party obkoms [oblast', or province, committees - GFj.
Let's search for it.

Khrushchev: A telegram like that was really sent around.
But I am talking about another document. . . .

Kaganovich:... There's a document that was sent around
to all the Party obkoms.

Voices: That's another document, we all know it.

Khrushchev: But the original is destroyed? '

Molotov: The telegram about the use of physical
measures of action against spies and the like, about
which we are now speaking, was sent around to all
members of the Ceniral Committee and to all d?koms.

Malin: The original is not in the archive of the Central
Committee, it has been destroyed. The telegram exists in
the copy that was sent around to the obkoms.

Aristov: We found it in only one obkom of the Party, in
Dagestan.

- Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, 1957. Stenoffamma iiun*sko^ plenuma TsK
KPSS I drugie dokumenty, Ed. A.N. lakovlev, N. Kovaleva, A. Korotkov, ct
al. Moscow: MDF, 1998, pp. 121-2.)

Both lurii Zhukov ("Zhupel Stalina", Part 3. KomsomoPskaia Pravda, Nov.
12, 2002) and Mark Junge and Rolf Binner {Kak Terror StaiM'shim. Mos-
cow, 2003, p. 16, n. 14) attest to the fact that Khrushchev seems to have
destroyed more documents than anyone else. Benediktoi' had also heard
of this destruction:

Benediktov:

iilix

333

Competent people have told me that Khrushchev gave
orders to destroy a number of important documents
related to the repressions of the 30s and 40s. In the first
place, of course, he wanted to hide his own part in the
illegalities in Moscow and the Ukraine where, currying
favor with the Center, he condemned many innocent
people. At the same time were destroyed documents of
another sort, documents that indisputably proved that
the repressive actions undertaken at the end of the 1930s
against some prominent party and military figures were
justified. It's an understandable tactic: having sheltered
himself, he tried to shift the whole blame for the
illegalities onto Stalin and the "Stalinists", from whom
Khrushchev expected the fundamental threat to his own
power.

fdaiaGvaniiiaNo. 4, 1989, cited at http://rksmb.ru/print.phpPl43

Rodos tortured Chubar' & Kosior on Beria'

orders

shchev:

Not long ago - only several days before the present
Congress - we called to the Central Committee
Presidium session and interrogated the investigative
judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and
interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosarev. He is a vile
person, with the brain of a bird, and morally completely
degenerate. And it was this man who was deciding the
fate of prominent party workers; he was making
judgments also concerning the politics in these matters,
because, having established their "crime," he provided
therewith materials from which important political
implications could be drawn.

The question arises whether a man with such an intellect
could alone make the investigation in a manner to prove
the guilt of people such as Kossior and others. No, he
could not have done it without proper directives. At the
Central Committee Presidium session he told us: "I was
told that Kossior and Chubar were people's enemies and

334

Khrushchev lied

for this reason I, as an investigative judge, had to make
them confess that they are enemies."

(Indignation in the hall.)

He would do this only through long tortures, which he
did, receiving detailed instructions from Bcria. We must
say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he
c)'nically declared: "I thought that I was executing the
orders of the party." In this manner, Stalin's orders
concerning the use of methods of physical pressure
against the arrested were in practice executed.

These and many other facts show that all norms of
correct party solution of problems were invalidated and
everything was dependent upon the willfulness of one
man."

Rodos' interrogations, confessions, and case file have never been
made available to researchers. As we note in the text, Rodos and
other former NKVD men appear to have been scapegoats. If in
fact they had followed CC directives, as the "torture-telegram"
above states, then they had broken no laws even if they did beat
or otherwise torture some defendants.

30. Stalin didn't heed warnings about war

Khrushchev:

The power accumulated in the hands of one person,
Stalin, led to serious consequences during the Great
Patriotic War. . .During the war and after the war, Stalin
put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation
experienced in the first part of the war was the rcsuk of
the "unexpected" attack of the Germans against the
Soviet Union. . . . Stalin took no heed of these warnings.
What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given
to information of this sort, in order not to provoke the
initiation of military operations — everything was
ignored: warnings of certain Army commanders,
declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and even
the open hostility of the enemy.

.Appendix

335

...Is this an example of the alertness of the chief of the party and of the
state at this particularly significant historical moment?"

Vlaishal Golovanov:

We normally lay all responsibility for the suddenness of
Hitler's attack on our country, which was unexpected as
to time, on J.V. Stalin, since he was the head of state,
although S.K. Timoshenko, as People's Commissar of
Defense, and G.K. Zhukov, as Head of the General
Staff, as well as a number of other comrades, also had
direct responsibility. But no one does this. It's just as
proper both to speak of the strat^ic victories that had
worldwide significance, and also to credit them to those
people who stood at the head of those or other
campaigns or of the war as a whole and who were
responsible for their fulfillment This is logical. The
great, world-historical victoty in the Second World War
was won by the country, the party, and the army, all led
by Stalin.

Andrew Kazantsev, in Nakanune^ ]une 22, 2005, at
ttp://www.nakanune.ni/articles/22 ijunja dva blickriga

adim Kozhinov.

But if considered dispassionately, both Stalin's and
Roosevelt's miscalculations have a completely
convincing explanation. The communications of
intelligence services are always contradictory to a greater
or lesser degrees, because they derive from the most
varied, and often deliberately misinfomied — sources.
Not long ago a collection of documents tided 'Hider's
Secrets on Stalin's Table. Intelligence and Counter-
intelligence on the Preparation of German Aggression
against the USSR. March-June 1941' was published. This
work makes it clear that during this period Stalin
received extremely varied intelligence, including
disinformation, particularly, information according to
which Germany (as Stalin also believed) intended to
occupy England before invading the USSR. One of the
leaders of the intelligence services of that time, General
P. A. Sudoplatov, later remarked: "The information of

three nliable (my emphasis - V.K.) sources from within
Germany deserved special attention, [that] the leadership
of the Wehrmacht decisively protested against any war
on two fronts.'

Lack of trust of the intelligence information about a
German invasion was also caused by the disagreements
they contained about the dating of the beginning of the
war. They specified May 14 and 15, May 20 and 21, June
15 and, at last, June 22. . . Once the first May periods had
passed, Stalin... finally came to believe that Germany
would not invade the USSR in 1941 . . .'

In the 1960s and later many authors wrote, with great
indignation, for example, that no one believed the
information that arrived about a week before the
beginning of the war and which was obtained by the spy
Richard Sorge, who later became world famous, and
which gave the accurate date of the German invasion -
June 22. However, it was impossible to simply believe it
after a series of inaccurate dates that had been
communicated through sources considered 'reliable.' (by
the way, Sorge himself at first reported that the invasion
would take place in May). And contemporary 'analysts',
knowing - as does the whole world - that the war began
precisely on June 22, and therefore waxing indignant at
Stalin because he had neglected Sorge's precise
information sent out on June 15, seem naive at the vcxy
least..."

- Vadim Kozhinov, ^ssiia, VekXX. (1939-1964). Ofryt bespristrastno^
issledovaniia. Moscow: Algoritm, 1999, pp. 73-4 (His chapter 2 is enotled
"Suddenness and Lack of Preparation"), Also at
http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_k/ko2hin20v03.php

In the "Secret Speech" Khrushchev said (p. 26):

This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artiller}' and
planes. At the outbreak of the war we did not even have
sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized
manpower. I recall that in those days I telephoned to
Comrade Malenkov from Kiev and told him, 'Tcople

have volunteered for the new Army and demand arms.
You must send us arms."

Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send you arms. We
are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to
arm yourselves."

ng to Marshal Vasilevskii what really happened was quite differ-
In conclusion the Supreme Commander said that he
would take all measures to help the Southwestern Front,
but at the same time asked them to reply more on
themselves in this matter.

-It would be unreasonable to think - he said - that we
will give you everything already prepared on the side.
Learn to supply and resupply yourselves. Create supply
sections with each army, prepare several factories for the
production of rifles and machine guns, pull all the strings
you need to pull, and you will see that you can create a
great deal for the front in the Ukraine itself. That's the
way Leningrad is acting at the present time, using its own
machine manufacturing bases, and they are to a great
extent successful, already have had some success. The
Ukraine can do the same. Leningrad has already arranged
for the production of RS's. This is a very effective
weapon like a minesweeper, which literally crushes the
enemy. >X'hy not do this yourselves?

Kitponos and Khrushchev replied:

- Comrade Stalin, we will put all your orders into
practice. Unfortunately, we are not acquainted with the
construction details of RSs. We request that you order to
send us one example of an RS with diagrams, and we will
organize construction here. — This answer followed:

- Your people already have the diagrams, and you have
had samples for a long time. Your inattention in this
serious matter is at fault. Good. I'll send you a battery of
RSs, drawings, and instructors in their manufacture. All
the best, I wish you success."

338

Khrushchev I

- Marshal A.M. Vasilevskii, Deb vsei ^hi^ni (*My life's work"). 3rd
Moscow, Polidzdat 1978, Chapter 11. Gted from the Russian
http://www.victory.inil.nj/lib/books/mcmo/vasilevsky/l 1 .html

As Vadim Kozhinov points out,

Khrushchev, who in 1956 was striving to discredit
Malenkov, his competitor in the struggle for supreme
power, unconsciously discredited himself. For by June 22
he had already been 'supreme boss' in Kiev and over the
whole of the Ukraine for 3 '/2 years, since January 1938
(which, by the way, had a common border with
Germany since September 1939!) but, it turns out, had
not taken the trouble even to provide himself with rifles!
So either Khrushchev either did not pay attention to the
'eloquent evidence' that he dted in 1956, or else he did
nothing with this 'evidence' in a practical way (for in fact
the first secretary of the CC of the Ukraine and member
of the Politburo could have prepared those rifles in
plenty of time. . .)

- Kozhinov, V.V., RdssOo: Vek XX (1939-1964) Chapter 2, p. 50; also
http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_k/kozhin20v03.php

The German Army's disinformation plan to spread false rumors to the
Soviet leadership, signed by Keitel, is dated February 15, 1941. It is
online at

hup:// chss.montclair.edu/english/(urr/research/germandisinfo.htnil (
Russian only)

Marshal Meretskov, 1968

I must say something else. Inasmuch as at the very
beginning of the war England and the USA became our
allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, most people who
attempt to critical analyze the decisions made by our
government at that time mechanically evaluate them only
on the level of the Soviet-German war and thereby make
a mistake. For the situation in the spring of 1941 was
extremely complicated. At that time we could not be sure
that an anti-Soviet coalition of capitalist countries
including, let us say, Germany, Japan, England and the
USA, would not arise. Hitler decided in 1940 against an
invasion of England. Why? Did he not have the

strength? Did he decide to deal with England later? Or
were, perhaps, secret negotiations going on about a
united anti-Soviet front? It would have been criminal
negligence not to weigh all the possibilities, because in
truth the well-being of the USSR depended on selecting
the correct political position. Where will the fronts be?
Where should our forces be concentrated? Only on the
Western borders? Or is a war on the southern border
also possible? And what will be the situation in the Far
East? This multiplicity of paths of possible action,
together with a lack of a Hrm guarantee that the correct
path could be immediately chosen in a given case, made
for a doubly complicated situation.

K.A. Meretskov, Na slu^hbe narodu ("In Service to the People"). Mos-
)w: Politizdat, 1968.

arshal Zhukov:

I have thought for a long time about all this and here is
what I arrived at. It seems to me that the matter of the
defense of the country in its basic, broadest outlines and
directions' was carried out correcdy. During a period of
many years, in economic and social terms, everything, or
nearly everything, was done that was possible. As for the
period 6:0m 1939 to the middle of 1941, during that
period special efforts that demanded all our strength and
resources were made by the people and the party to
strengthen our defense.

G.K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i ra^myshleniia ("Reminiscences and
loughts"). Vol. 1, Ch. 9. Moscow, 2002

irshals Vasilevskii and Zhukov disagreed about whether Stalin should
vt ordered all the troops to take positions along the border. Comment-
\ on Vasilevskii's article in 1965, Zhukov wrote:

I think that the Soviet Union would have been smashed
if we had organized all our forces on the border. It's
good that this didn't happen, and if our main forces had
been smashed in the area of the state frontier, then the
Hiterlite armies would have had the possibility of
carrying out the war more successfully, and Moscow and

Leningrad would have been taken in 1941. G. Zhukov,
December 12, 1965.

- Shaptalov, B. Jspytania winy ("The Trials of War"). Moscow: AST, 200
Russian edition at http://militera.lib.ru/research/shaptalov/02.html .T
same passage, with a longer quotation from Vasilevskii's unpublished N
is found in Gor'kov, lU.A. Kremlin. Stavka. General Staff . Tver* 1995,
Chapter 4, p. 68. Russian edition at
http:/ /militera.Ub.ru/ research /gorkov2/ 04.html

Evidence of Betrayal by Gen. Dmitri Pavlov

Khrushchev does not explicidy name General Dmitri Pavlov, executed
July 1941 for dereliction of duty in not preparing the Belorussian Fro
for Hider's invasion.

There is a ^od deal of evidence now, from former Soviet archives, th
Pavlov was indeed guilty, and a member of a military conspiracy to Ixx
We omit this material here. Some of it and the references to it are co
tained in the original Russian language edition of this book (p.368).

31. Vorontsov*s Letter

Khrushchev:

We must assert that information of this sort concerning
the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet teriitor}
was coming in also £rom our own military and
diplomatic sources; however, because the leadership was
conditioned against such information, such data was
dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.

Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on May
6, 1941 by the Soviet military attache. Captain
Vorontsov, stated: "Soviet citizen
Bozer... communicated to the deputy naval attache that,
according to a statement of a certain German officer
from Hider's headquarters, Germany is preparing to
invade the USSR on May 14 through Finland, the Baltic
countries and Latvia. At the same time Moscow and
Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers landed
in border cities...

In Voenno-Isloricheskii Zhumal \>\o. 2, 1992, pp. 39-40 we have the full icxi
of Captain Vorontsov's statement. It is contained in a letter of May 6,

A|)pcnJix

341

1941 to Stalin from Admiral Kuznetsov. The crucial part omitted by
Khrushchev is in boldfiice:

Top secret

May 6 1941

No. 48582CC

CC ACP(b)

Com. STALIN J. V.

Naval attache in Berlin Captain 1 degree Vorontsov
relates: Soviet citizen Bozer (Jewish nadonality, former
Lithuanian subject) communicated to the deputy naval
attache that, according to a statement of a certain
German officer from Hitler's headquarters, Germany is
preparing to invade the USSR on May 14 through
Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia. At the same
time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and
paratroopers landed in border cities.

Our attempts to clarify the primary source of this
information and to amplify it have not as yet been
successful, as bozer has declined to do this. Work
with him and verification of the information
continues.

I believe that this information is false, specially
directed through this channel with the object of
reaching our government in order to find out how
the USSR would react to it.

Admiral KUZNETSOV

32. German soldier

Khrushchev:

The following fact is also known: On the eve of the
invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union by the
Hitlerite army, a certain German citizen crossed our
border and stated that the German armies had received
orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union on
the night of June 22 at 3 o'clock. Stalin was informed

342

Khrushchev lic<

about this immediately, but even this warning was
ignored.

The soldier, Alfred Liskow:

Many people know that on the night of June 22, 1941 a
German soldier fled to our side and reported about the
impending invasion of German forces. Beginning with
the time pmstroika it became fashionable to state that
this deserter was quickly shot as a provocateur. For
example, here is what is stated on this matter in a
biography of Stalin published in New York in 1990:

A German soldier and former communist bravely
crossed the border in order to report the precise
time of attack. Stalin ordered him to be shot
immediately for disinformation.

This is completely false. It is a reference to Lewis Jonathan, >XTiitehead
Phillip. Stalin. A Time for judgement. New York, 1990. p. 121, cited from
Zhores and Roi Medvedev, Neivyestniy Stalin , Russian ed. Moscow 2002,
pp. 309-10. The English edition of this book. The Unknown Stalin (\X'ood-
stock and New York: The Overlook Press, 2004), fully refutes Khni-
shchev's tale on pp. 240-1.

Khrushchev's story is false as weU.

We can do no better than to cite at some length from Igor' Pyklialuv's
eye-opening study Velikaia ObolganniM Voina ['The Great Calumniated
WarT Moscow, 2005. Chapter 9: "The Fate of a Deserter."

Many people know that on the night of June 22, 1941 a
German soldier fled to our side and reported about the
impending invasion of German forces. Beginning with
the time of perestroika it became fashionable to state
that this deserter was quickly shot as a provocateur. For
example, here is what is stated on this matter in a
biography of Stalin published in New York in 1990:

A German soldier and former communist bravely
crossed the border in order to report the precise
time of attack. Stalin ordered him to be shot
immediately for disinformation. *

But is this so. Let's tr^' to clarify the fate of this man.

343

German aimy soldier Alfred Liskow was detained on
June 21 1941 at 2100 hours at a unit of the Sokalsk
command of the 90th Border unit. At 310 on the night
of June 22 the UNKVD of the LVov oblast' transmitted
by telephone to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR a
message with the following contents:

The German corporal who crossed the border in the
region of Sokal' declared the following: His name is
Liskow Alfred Germanovich, 30 years of age, a
worker, carpenter in a furniture factory in the dty of
Kohlberg (Bavaria), where he left his wife, baby,
mother and father.

The corporal served in the 221st sapper regiment of
the 15th division. The regiment is situated in the
village of Tselenzh, 5 km north of Sokal*. He was
drafted into the army from the reserves in 1939.

He considers himself a communist, is a member of
the Union of Red Front-line soldiers, and says that
life is very hard for workers in Germany.

Around evening his company commander Lieut.
Schulz told them that tonight, after artillery
preparation, their unit would begin the crossing of
the Bug on rafts, boats and pontoons.

As a supporter of Soviet power, once he learned of
this he decided to flee to us and tell us.'

More details about this event are given in the report of
the commander of the 90th border unit Major M.C.
Bychkovskii:

June 27 at 2100 in the area of the Sokal'sk command
a soldier was detained who fled from the German
Army, Liskow Alfred. Since there was no translator
in the command station, I ordered the commander
of the area Capt. Bershadsky to take the soldier by
truck to the staff of the unite in the town of
Vladimir.

At 0030 June 22 1941 the soldier arrived in the town
of Vladimir- Volynsk- Through an interpreter at

Khrushchev

approximately 1 :00 at night Liskow said that on June
22 at dawn the Germans were supposed to cross the
border. I immediately reported this to the
responsible duty officer of the army staff Brigade
Commissar Maslovsky. At the same time I reported
by telephone personally to the commander of the
5th army Major-Gcneral Potavpov, who regarded
my report with suspicious and did not pay attention
to it. I personally was not firmly convinced of the
truthfulness of the report of soldier Liskow, but all
the same I called out the commanders of the zones
and ordered them to reinforce the guard at the state
borders, to put special listening posts at the Bug
river and in the case of the Germans crossing the
river to fire upon and destroy them. At the same
time I ordered that if anything suspicious is noted
(any kind of movement on the opposite bank) to
report it to me personally and immediately. I
remained the whole time in the staff HQ.

At 100 on June 22 the commanders of the zones
reported to me that nothing suspicious was noted on
the opposite side of the river, aU was calm. In view
of the fact that the translators in our unit are not
skilled, I summoned from the town a teacher of the
German language who has an excellent knowledge
of the German language, and Liskow again repeated
the same thing, that is, that the Germans are
prepared to invade the USSR at dawn on June 22
194L He called himself a communist and declared
that he came over to us on his own initiative
especially to warn us. >Xliile the intenogadon of die
soldier was not yet finished I heard from the
direcdon of Ustilug (the first command center)
strong artillery fire. I understood that this was the
Germans who had opened fire on our territor)-,
which the soldier under interrogadon confirmed. I
immediately tried to call the commander by
telephone, but the connecdon had been destroyed.

345

It's perfectly natural that Soviet propaganda tried to
make use of Liskow's deed for its own puq>oses. Here is
what is said about this in the memoirs of Major-General
Burtsev, who headed the section (£rom August 1944
division) of special propaganda of the Main Political
Directorate of the Red Army:

Already by June 27 the first leaflet of the German
anti-fascist Alfred Liskow had appeared. Risking fire
from both shores, he had swum the Bug in order to
warn our border guards about the imminent invasion
of the USSR. Liskow did this as soon as, in the
222nd regiment of the 75th division, where he
served, they had been read the order for the
invasion. We, of course, could not miss the chance
to speak with this first deserter. Soon Liskow was
brought to Moscow. A tall German "of working-
class cut" serving as a field medic seemed
sympathetic and trustworthy.

" I am from a working-class family in the city of
Kdhlberg," he said. "My parents and I hate Hider
and his regime. For us the USSR is a friendly
country, and we do not wish to fight with the Soviet
people. There are many such working-class families
in Germany. They do not want war with you."

His story was published in Pravday and it was that
story that served as the initial leaflet, printed with his
portrait, to inform the German soldiers that there
are within the Wehrmacht opponents of the war and
Hideiism, friends of the Soviet Union.

Many participants in the war remember the agitational
materials in which Liskow's name appeared. For
example, the Leningrad writer Dmitry Shcheglov:

June 28. . . In the newspapers pasted on the walls
people are reading the announcement: ^German
soldier Alfred Liskow, not wishing to fight against
the Soviet people, has deserted to our side.

Alfred Liskow has addressed German soldiers with
a call to overthrow the Hider regime.

346

Khrushchev Uo

And on a second sheet was Liskow's statement and
portrait: 'Among the Gennan soldiers a mood of
depression reigns.

Unfortunately I have not yet been able to trace the
further fate of Alfred Liskow. M.I. Burtsev writes:

After that A. Liskow perished, remaining to his last
breath true to the idea of the fight against fascism.

However even if it should be that Liskow was later
repressed, that did not happen during the first days of
the war.

Pykhalov*s whole chapter may be consulted (in Russian) at
http://militera.lib.ru/research/pyhalov_i/09.html

In his memoirs Khrushchev repeats the story of the German soldier:
desertion to warn the Soviets, but does not repeat his allegadon that tlu
soldier's warning was ignored. As with almost everything in Kiiru
shchev's self-serving memoirs, his version is incorrect, either through
design (i.e. a deliberate lie) or through faulty memory. At any rate, Kliru-
shchev was not present and had no direct knowledge of the event.

A soldier fled to us from the forward area. He was
interrogated, and all the details named by him and on
which his story was based, were described logically and
seemed trustworthy. He said that the invasion would
start tomorrow at three o'clock. First, why specifically
tomorrow? 'I'he soldier said that they had received dry
provisions for three days. And why at three o'clock?
Because the Germans always chose an early hour in such
situations. I don't remember whether he said that the
soldiers had been told about the three o'clock hour or
whether they had heard it through the 'soldier's radio',
which always learned the time of attack very accurately.
What was left for us to do?

- Khrushchev's memoirs: Vnmia, Liudi, Vlasl\ Vol. 1, Part 2, p. 299.

llie article featuring Liskow, with a photograph of him, from Prav<k
June 27, 1941, p. 2 may be consulted here:

http:/ / chss.montclair.edu/ english/ furr/ research/ljskowpravda062741.p
df

Appendix

347

33. Commanders Killed

Khrushchev:

Veiy grievous consequences, especially in reference to
the beginning of the war, followed Stalin's annihilation
of many military commanders and political workers
during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and
through slanderous accusations. During these years
repressions were instituted against certain parts of
military cadres beginning literally at the company and
battalion commander level and extending to the higher
military centers; during this time the cadre of leaders
who had gained military experience in Spain and in the
Far East was almost completely liquidated.

No doubt Khrushchev is alluding to the Military Conspiracy and the so-
called 'Tukhachevsky Affair." He doesn't mention them explicitly, and
completely avoids any question of their guilt or innocence. There is a
great deal of evidence that Tukhachevsky and the other high-ranking of-
ficers tried and executed with him were indeed conspiring with the Ger-
mans and -Japanese, and with the Rightist forces in the Opposition to
overthrow the Soviet government.

Khrushchev would rehabilitate them before long. It is telling that in 1957
and again in 1961 expurgated versions of Komandarm lona lAkir's letter
to Stalin of June 9, 1937, were used by Khrushchev's allies to smear Sta-
lin and those who supported him. The real text of I Akir's letter makes it
clear that he is guilty.

None of this means that all military commanders who were imprisoned,
beaten, tortured, and executed were guilty. Ezhov and his henchmen no
doubt framed a good many of them, as he did hundreds of thousands of
other innocent persons.

Marshal Konev speaking in 1965 with writer Konstantin Simonov:

To portray the matter as though, if these ten, twelve, five
or seven men had not been killed in '37-'38, but had
been leading the military at the start of the war, the war
would have turned out differendy - that is an
exaggeration.

- Konstantin Simonov, Glar^mi chelovtka moe^ pokoUmia ("Through the
Eyes of a Man of My Generation"). Moscow: Novosti, 1988, 393.

348

Khrushchev liui

To answer the question which of the men who were
killed then, how he would have fought the Germans,
how and how long it would have taken to beat the
Germans if these men were alive - all these questions,
unfortunately, are speculation. At the same time there
remains the undeniable fact that those men who
remained, who matured during the war and led the
armies, it was precisely they who won the war, at the
positions that they gradually came to occupy.

- ibid, C.401.

Khrushchev himself was directly responsible for "eradicating" most of
the commanders in the Kiev (Ukraine) Military District. Volkogonov
quotes a directive from Khrushchev, dated March 1938. The longer ver-
sion, from the Russian edition, is translated below; a much shorter ver-
sion is given in the English edition, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov, Stdin: Tri-
ufTiph and Tragedy. (NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 329.

Decree of the Militar)' Soviet of the Kiev Military
District concerning the Situation of Cadres of the
Command, Operational Command, and Political Staff of
the District.

1 . As a result of the great work carried out for the
cleansing of the forces of the Red Army of hostile
elements and of the promotion from below of
commanders, political workers, and operational
commanders, unquestionably devoted to the work of the
party of Lenin - Stalin, the cadre ... are firmly
consolidated around our party [and] around the leader of
peoples comrade Stalin, and guarantee political firmness
and success in the work of elevating the military power
of the units of the Red Army . . .

3. The enemies of the people [i^agi naroda — here
Khrushchev is using the very term he attacked StaUn for
'inventing' and which Stalin virtually never used - GF]
succeeded in doing a lot of damage in the area of placing
cadres. The Militar)' Council sets as its main task the
uprooting to the end of the remnants of hostile
elements, deeply studying every commander, operational
commander, [and] political worker upon his promotion.

Appendix

349

boldly promoting proven cadres, devoted and
developing. . .

The commander of the forces of the Kiev Military
District, Army Commander second rank Timoshenko;
Member of the Military Council Corps Commander
Smimov; Member of the Military Council, Secretary of
the CC of the Communist Party of the Ukraine,
Khrushchev."

Later Timoshenko, Smimov and Khrushchev reported
that 'in the total of mercilessly uprooting Trotskyite-
Bukhahnite and bourgeois nationalist elements' on
March 28 1938 there was effected the following
replacement of the leading staff of the District:

By rank:

Replaced corps commanders 9 9
Divisional commanders 25 24
Brigade commanders 9 5
Battalion commanders 137 87
Commanders of fortified areas 4 4
Heads of the staffs of Corps 9 b
Heads of divisional staffs 25 18
Heads of staff of the fortified areas 4 3
Heads of staff of battalions 135 78
Heads of sections of the staff of the District 24 19
- Volkogonov, Stalin. Vol. 1, Ch. 7, at note 608.

34. Stalin's ^^Demoralization after beginning

of war

Khrushchev:

It would be incorrect to forget that, after the first severe disaster and de-
feat at the front, Stalin thought that this was the end. In one of his
speeches in those days he said:

All that which Lenin created we have lost forever.

330

Khrushchev lied

The logbooks for June 21-28, 1941, were published in Istoricheskii Arkfnv
No. 2. 1996, pp. 51-54. They have been reproduced here:
http://www.hrono.ru/libris/stalin/16-13.html

Marshal Zhukov:

They say that in the Brst days of the war J.V. Stalin was
supposedly so distraught that he could not even ^ve a
radio speech and gave over his presentation to Molotov.
This judgment does not comport with reality. Of course
during the first hours J.V. Stalin was distraught. But he
quickly returned to normal and worked with great
energy, though it is true that he showed and excessive
nervousness that often hampered our work.

- G.K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i ra^yshleniia ("Reminiscences and
Thoughts"). Vol. 1, Ch. 9. Moscow, 2002, cited from the Russian at
http://n1ilitera.lib.ru/memo/n1ssian/2hukovl/lO.html

In his very useful book Velikaia Obolgannaia Voina Igor' V. Pykhalov de-
votes Chapter 10 of his book, a whole chapter, to this question. It is on
line in Russian at http://militera.lib.ru/research/pyhalov_i/10.htinl

Roi Medvedev:

Stalin did not go to his Kremlin office on the Sunday;
however, the assertion by two biographers, Radzinsky
and Volkogonov, that this was the day Stalin fled and
shut himself up in the dacha hardly corresponds to what
actually happened. Both authors have rather unreliably
based their conclusions on the fact that there are no
entries in the Kremlin office visitors' book for 29 and 30
June. But according to Marshal Zhukov, 'on the 29th
Stalin came to the Stavka at the Commissariat for
Defense twice and on both occasions was scathing about
the strategic situation that was unfolding in the west.' On
30 June Stalin convoked a meeting of the Politburo at
the dacha at which it was decided to set up the State
Defense Committee (GKO).

- Roi and Zhores Medvedev, The Unknown Stalin (Woodstock fit Wvii
York: Overlook Press, 2004), pp. 242-3.

Concerning what occurred during these two days, June 29 and 30, 1941
when the register of visitors at Stalin*s office show no visitors, we may

Appendix

351

mm to the work KPSS v re^liutsiiakh i resheniiakh s**e^ehv, konjerentsii I Pk-
nmov TsK. ("The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in resolutions
and decisions of congresses, conferences, and Central Committee Ple>
nums"), vol. 6 (Moscow. Politizdat, 1971), p. 19.

June 29, 1941, that is one week after the beginning of the
invasion was issued the Directive of the Council of
People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central
Committee of the All- Union Communist Party (b) to
party and Soviet organizations of the oblasts at or near
the front.

In regions occupied by the enemy, form partisan units
and diversionist groups to fight against the units of the
enemy army, to ignite partisan warfare everywhere, to
blow up bridges, roads, to ruin telephone and telegraph
communications, to set fire to stores, etc. In occupied
areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and
for all those who collaborate with thim, pursue and
destroy them at every step, break up all their
undertakings.

- Cited by V.V. Kvachkov, Spetsfia^ Rossii. Moscow: Voennaia literature,
2004, at http://militera.lib.ru/science/kvachkov_w/02.html . The full
document is quoted at http://www.battleield.ru/en/documents/87-
orders-and-reports/314-order-to-soviet-organizations-frontline-
1941.html

On June 20 1941 the decision to form the State Committee for Defense,
headed by Stalin, was formed.

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR,
and the Central Committee of the ACP(b) of June 30,
1941:

In view of the extraordinary situation that has arisen and
in the interest of the rapid mobilization of all the forces
of the peoples of the USSR for organizing resistance to
the enemy that has treacherously invaded our
Motherland, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the
ACP(b), and the Council of People's Commissars of the
USSR has determined it is necessary:

352

Khni$hchc\' licO

1. To establish the State Committee for Defense, with
the following members:

com. Stalin J. V. (Chairman)

com. Molotov V.M. (Deputy Chairman)

com. Voroshilov K.E.

com. Malenkov G.M.

com. Beria L.P.

2. To concentrate all the fullness of the power of the
state into the hands of the State Committee for Defense.

3. To obligate aU citizens and all party, soviet. Young
Communist League, and military organs to
unconditionally carry out the decisions and measures
taken by the State Committee for Defense.

Chairman of the Presidium

Of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. KALININ

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the
SSR

And Secretary of the CC of the ACP(b) J.V. STALIN
Moscow. The Kremlin. June 30, 1941.

- http:/ / www.hrono.ru/libris/stalin/ 1 5-21 .html
Volkogonov:

"No, Stalin suffered no great shock on the first day of
the war."

- Stalifiy vol. 2, Ch. 8, cited &om the Russian at ^
http:// militera.lib.ru/bio/volkogonov_dv/ 08.html

According to Pavel Sudoplatov in his memoirs:

In various books, and in particular in Khrushchev's
memoirs we read of the panic that seized Stalin in the
first days of the war. For my part I can state that I
observed nothing of the sort. ... The published notes of
the Kremlin visitors [to Stalin's office - GE^ prove that
he received people regularly and personally, direcdy
followed the situation as it worsened day by day.

- Ra^dka / Kma/', Zapiski fiet^behfe/'/iogo svidete/ia. Moscow, 1996, pp. 159-
60.

Appendix

35. Stalin A Bad Commander

Khrushchev:

Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real
situation which was developing at the front. This was
natural because, during the whole Patriotic War, he never
visited any section of the front or any liberated city
except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk highway
during a stabilized situation at the front. To this incident
were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all
sorts and so many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was
interfering with operations and issuing orders which did
not take into consideration the real situation at a given
section of the front and which could not help but result
in huge personnel losses.

Marshal Zhukov:

In directing of military struggle as a whole J. V. Stalin was
aided by his natural intelligence, experience of political
leadership, wealth of intuition, [and] broad knowledge.
He knew how to find the main link in a strategic
situation and, by seizing it, to find the road for opposing
the enemy, of successfully carrying out that or another
offensive operation. Undoubtedly he was a worthy
Supreme Commander. . .

Besides that, in guaranteeing operations, the creation of
strategic reserves, in the organizing of the production of
military technology and in general in the creation of
everything essential for waging war the Supreme
Commander, I tell you direcdy, showed himself to be a
superb organizer. And it would be unjust if we were not
to give him his due in this manner."

- Zhukov, Memoirs and Rejkctions^ Ch. 11, cited from the Russian at
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukovl/ll.html

Marshal Vasilevskii:

I also had good relations with N.S. Khrushchev in the
first postwar years. But they changed sharply after I
refused to support his statements that J.V. Stalin was not
able to understand operational-strategic questions and as

3S4

Khrushchev licJ

Supreme Commander led the movements of armies in an
unqualified manner. To this day I cannot understand
how he could have said that. Having been a member of
the Politburo of the CC of the party and member of the
Military Soviets of a series of fronts, N.S. Khrushchev
could not be ignorant of how the authority of the Stavka
and of Stalin was in questions of leading military actions.
Neither could he have been ignorant of the fact that the
commanders of the fronts and armies related to the
Stavka and to Stalin with great respect and valued them
for their exceptional competence in the leading of
military struggles.

- Marshal A.M. Vasilevskii, Delo vsei ^hi^ni ("My life's work"). 3rd ed.
Moscow, Politizdat 1978, Chapter 11, cited from the Russian at
http:/ / victory.mil.ru/lib/ books/ memo/ vasilevsky/ 1 6.html

Adminil N.G. Kuznetsov put it this way:

During the years of the war Marshal G.K. Zhukov met
with the Supreme Commander on military matters more
often than anyone else, and no one could give a better
characterization of him, and Zhukov called him *A
worthy Supreme Commander.* As far as I know, all the
military commanders who saw and met with Stalin are of
the same opinion, as far as I know.

- N.G. Kuznetsov, cited from his memoirs in Russian at
http://www.victory.mil.ru/lib/books/memo/kuznetsov_ng3/01.himl
Also in Voenno-lstoricheskii Zhumal^ 4 (1993), p. 51.

Marshal Golovanov:

Stalin's specific gravity [i.e. weight - GF] in the course of
the war was very high both among commanders of the
Red Army and among all soldiers and officers. This is an
indisputable fact....

I was fortunate to work with a great man, one of the
greatest, for whom nothing was more important than the
interests of our state and people, who Lved his whole life
not for himself and strove to make our state the most
progressive and powerful in the world. And I say this, I
who also went through the year 19371

ApptiuJix

355

- Felix Chuev, "Nespisochnyi marshal" ("An unscheduled [i.e. extiaordi-
nar)'J marshal"), dted from the Russian at
http://www.pseudology.org/Chuev/Golovanov_01.htm

Concerning Stalin's supposedly making all decisions instead of his gener-
als Marshal Bagramian, to whom Khrushchev referred as someone who
w'as present and who would confirm what he said, instead wrote the fol-
lowing:

Aware of Stalin's immense power and truly iron will, I
was amazed at his manner of leading. He could simply
command: 'Commit the corps.' — period. But Stalin, with
great tact and patience, iried to lead the person who had
to carry out the order to arrive at the conclusion that this
step was essential. Afterwards I myself, as front
commander, had the opportunity to speak with the
Supreme Commander rather often, and I became
convinced that he knew how to listen attentively to the
opinions of his subordinates. If the officer in charge
firmly stood his ground and, in defense of his own
opinion, set forth weighty arguments, Stahn almost
always yielded.

I. Kh. Bagramian. Tak nachinalas' mina. Kiev: Politi2dat Ukrainy, 1977.
Online at http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/bagramyanl/index.html .
This exact citation is in Part 4, "Krushenie mifa." Chapter 2: "Otkhod
otkhodu ro2n"',p. 404 (at

http: / / militera.lib.ru/ memo/ russian/ bagramyan 1 / 04.html )

36. Khar'kov 1942

Khrushchev:

I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one character-
istic fact which illustrates how Stalin directed operations at the
fronts. There is present at this Congress Marshal Bagramian,
who was once the chief of operations in the headquarters of the
southwestern front and who can corroborate what I will tell you.
When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for our
Army in 1942 in the Kharkov region ... And what was the result
of this? The worst that we had expected. The Germans sur-
rounded our Army concentrations and consequendy we lost

356

Khrushchev lit

hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. This is Stalin's miUta
"genius"; this is what it cost us.

According to Sergei Konstandnov:

It was not only many common people who were
thunderstruck and upset by Khrushchev's de-
Stalinization. How was it for those high-ranking militar}'
commanders sitting in the hall at the session of the 2D***
Congress, who knew ail Stalin's strong and weak sides, to
hear Khrushchev's bald-faced lie that in developing plans
for military operations Stalin used only a globe?
Khrushchev told an obvious lie in laying the whole
responsibility for the Red Army's catastrophe at
Khar'kov in 1942 exclusively on Stalin. Alexander
Vasilevskii, Georgii Zhukov, [and] Sergei Shtemenko in
their memoirs cite facts, fully confirmed by the latest
archival publications, about how the main weight of
responsibilit}' for this catastrophe should fail on
Khrushchev, on Semion Timoshenko, commander of
the South-West front, and on Ivan Bagramian, member
of the Military Council of that front. The majority of
higher military leaders who had gone through the war
with Stalin doubtless were very negative towards the dc-
Stalinization that Khrushchev carried out in the first
place because Nikita Sergeevich crudely falsified
historical facts. In addition some of these military
commanders harbored the warmest feelings towards
Stalin simply as a man. The Chief Marshal of aviation
Alexander Golovanov told the writer Felix Chuev about
the following episode. Once Khrushchev asked Marshal
Rokossovsky to write an article about Stalin in the spirit
of the 20''' Congress. As answer Khrushchev heard:
'Nikita Sergeevich, for me conirade Stalin is a saint." On
another occasion Rokossovsky together with Golovanov
refused to drink a toast with Khrushchev at some
banquet or other.

- Sergei Konstantinov. "Shokovaia terapia Nikity Khrushcheva." Nc^ar-
isimaia Ga^^a February 14, 2001. At http://www.ng.ru/stylc/2001-02-
14/16_therapy.html

Appendix

357

According to Samsonov, Zhukov disagreed with Khrushchev's account:

Concerning this situation Marshal of the Soviet Union
Zhukov wrote that J. V. Stalin, relying on the reports of
the Military Soviet of the Southwest front that said the
offensive must be continued, rejected the General Staffs
plans.

"The existing story about signals of alarm that
supposedly came to Stavka (the General Staff) from the
Military Soviets of the Southern and Southwestern
fronts, does not conform to the facts. I can attest to this
because I was personally present during the talks with
the Supreme Commander."

- Samsonov, A.M. Stalingradshna ^tva. 4 izd. isp. i dop. ("The Battle of
Stalingrad, 4th corrected and enlarged edition"). Moscow, 1938, Ch. 2, at
note 50, cited from the Russian at
http:/ /militera.lib.ru/h/ samsonov 1 /02.h tml

In his memoirs Zhukov does blame Stalin in part.
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukovl/15.html (However, Zhu-
kov was very angry at Stalin Stalin demoted him for stealing German
trophies. See Voennie Arkhivy Rossiiy 1993, pp. 175 ff. Zhukov's confes-
sion, 241-44.) Khrushchev knew this, and had it all quashed, undoubtedly
to get Zhukov on his side.

The Short His/ory of the Gnat Patriotic War carries this version, which
blames the front command, not Stalin and the GKO:

The main reason of the failure of the Khar'kof
operation was that the command of the Southwestern
direction incorrectedly evaluated the situation, and when
the forces of the Southwest front fell into a complex
position, they failed to stop the offensive in time. >X'hat's
more, they urged the General Staff to pennit them to
continue the offensive. The decision taken on May 19 to
cease the offensive was taken too late. The command of
the Southwest front did not take the essential steps to
protect the flanks by shock groups, were weak in
studying the opponent, and in part underestimated his
possibility for maneuver during the course of the battle.

358

Khrushchev lied

I'he staff of the front underestimated the forces of the
enemy by 30%.

- Ve/ikaia Olechestvennaia Votna. KmfkaJa isioriia ("The Short History of tiie
Great Patriotic War. Short edition."). Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970, 164-5.

This is consistent with Stalin's letter of June 26 1942 quoted by many
sources, including Portugal'skii et al.'s biography of Timoshenko, and
which blamed not only Bagramian, but also Timoshenko and - Khni-
shchevl

The Brst to go was Bagramian. He was removed by the
Stavka from the post he held for Ruling to fulfill his
duties and 'being unsatisfactory to the Stavka as a simple
bearer of information.' *What is more', remarked Stalin,
'comrade Bagramian was incapable of learning the lesson
from that catastrophe that developed on the
Southwestern front. In the course of some three weeks
the Southwest front, thanks to his carelessness, not only
lost the Kharlcov operation, already have successful, but
in addition succeeded in giving the enemy 18-20
divisions.' Having announced that Bagramian was being
named the chief of staff of the 28''* army and thus given
a chance to redeem himself in practice, the Supreme
Commander firmly underscored: 'It is to be understood
that this is not simply a case of comrade Bagramian. The
issue is also the errors of all members of the Military
Soviet and above all of comrades Timoshenko and
Khrushchev. If we had announced to the country the fiiU
extent of this catastrophe - with the loss of 18-20
divisions, which the front suffered and from which it will
still suffer, then I am afraid that it would have gone vet)'
hard with you. Therefore you must consider the errors
you have made and take all necessary steps that they not
take place in future.

- Portugal'skii, R.M., et al. Marshal S,K Timoshenko, M. 1994, Ch. 5, from
the Russian version at http://militera.lib.ru/bio/domank/05.html Ilie
same letter of Stalin's is also quoted by Beshanov, 1942 - uchebityi.
("The "Year of Learning" 1942"), Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. Chapter' 14:
"How Bagramian Alone Doomed Two Fronts", at

http:/ / militera.lib.ru/research/beshanov_w/14.html

.\pf)cndix

Volkogonov:

NS Khrushchev devoted a whole section of his report
to the 20<'> Party Congress to the events at Kharkov,
when he (Khrushchev] had been member of the Military
Council of the Southwest front. According to
Khrushchev, he phoned from the front to Stalin at the
latter's dacha. However, Malenkov came to the phone.
Khrushchev insisted on speaking personally with Stalin.
But the Supreme Commander, who was 'only a few steps
from the telephone' [this is a quote &om Khrushchev's
Secret Speech - GF], did not come to the phone and
through Malenkov instructed Khrushchev to speak with
Malenkov. After transmitting the request of the front
about stopping the offensive through Malenkov - as he
told the delegates of the 20*^ Congress, Stalin said Teave
everything the way it is!' In other words, Khrushchev
unmistakably declared that it was precisely Stalin who
was at fault in the Khar'kov catastrophe.

G.K. Zhukov sets forth another version, proposing that
responsibility for the disaster should be bom also by the
commanders of the Military Councils of the South and
Southwest fronts. In his book Memoirs and Ructions
Zhukov writes that the danger was sensed at the General
Staff before it was at the front. On May 18 the General
Staff yet again spoke out for stopping our offensive
operation at Khar'kov. . . . Towards the evening of May
1 8 the talk took place on this subject with the member of
the Military Council of the front N.S. Khrushchev, who
expressed the same views as did the command of the
Southwest front: the danger from the side of the
Kramator group of the enemy was seriously exaggerated,
and there was no basis for stopping the operation.
Relying on the reports of the Military Council of the
Southwest front that it was essential to continue the
offensive, the Supreme Commander rejected the views
of the General Staff. The existing story about signals of
alarm that supposedly came to Stavka (the General Staff)
from the Military Soviets of the Southern and
Southwestern fronts, does not conform to the facts. I

360

Khnishchcv lied

can attest to this because I was personally present during
the talks with the Supreme Commander."

I think that in this case the Marshal [Zhukov] was closer
to the truth. N.S. Khrushchev, conveying his personal
memories in the report, gave after the passage of many
years belated reaction to the disaster that he had had
when it had already become clear to everyone that a
catastrophe was in the making. Marshal Zhukov
repeatedly emphasized that the decision of the Supreme
Commander was based on the reports of Timoshenko
and Khrushchev. It's one thing if this was simply
forgetfulness on Khrushchev's part. But if this is an
attempt to create for himself a historical alibi after the
fact - that is something else again.

- Volkogonov, Stalin^ 2, Ch. 8, cited from the Russian at
http://militera.lib.ru/bio/volkogonov_dv/08.html

37. Stalin Planned Military Operations on a

Globe

Khrushchev:

I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him: "Alexander
Nfikhailovich, take a map" — Vasilevsky is present here -
"and show Comrade Stalin the situation which has
developed." We should note that Stalin planned
operations on a globe. (Animation in the hall.) Yes,
comrades, he used to take the globe and trace the front
line on it. I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: "Show him the
situation on a map..."

Marshal Meretskov:

In some of our books we And the story that J. V. Stalin
led military operations on a globe. I have never read
anything so ignorant.!

- K.A. Meretskov, Na slu^Ufe narodu ("In Ser\ace to the People"). Mos-
cow: Polidzdat, 1968, cited from the Russian at

http://niilitera.lib.ru/memo/russian/meretskov/29.html

Solov'ev and Sukhodeev, citing General Gribkov:

Appendix

361

The lie about the "globe" is refuted by operational
documents as well General of the aimy A.I. Gribkov,
who worked during the war years in the Operational
directorate of the General Staff, testifies: "N.S.
Khrushchev, in debunking the cult of personality around
J.V. Stalin, asserted that, supposedly, Stalin led the fronts
on a globe. Of course this is all a lie. The military
archives hold maps of various scales with notes in the
Supreme Commander's handwriting."

- B. Solov'ev and V. Sukhodecv, Stalin the Miiitary Leader. Moscow, 2003,
dted from the Russian at

http:/ /militera.lib.ru/research/solovyov_suhodeev/01 .html

Refutation of Khrushchev's slander on the 'globe' matter
can also be found from Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov in his
book On the Et/e. *It is a completely untrue, malicious
assertion that, supposedly, he [Stalin] evaluated situations
and took decisions with the use of a globe. I could cite
many examples of how Stalin, verifying the position on
the fronts with the miiitary leaders, knew when it was
necessary, even the position of each battalion.' In the
book by K.S. Moskalenko In the Southwestern direction:
*>X^en Nikolai Fiodorovich [Vatutin, front commander]
told us about his talk with the Supreme Commander, I
could not hide my amazement at the precision with
which Stalin analyzed military activities, and despite
myself I said 'What maps does the Supreme Commander
use to follow our activities, if he sees more and deeper
than we do?' Nikolai Fiodorovich smiled, and replied:
"On maps of the scale of 1:2000 and 1:5000 on the
fronts, and 1:100,000 for each army. The main thing -
and this is why he is Supreme Commander - is to make
suggestions, correct our errors. . .'

But Marshal of the Air Force Novikov gave the best
response to Khrushchev: *What is the worth of
Khrushchev's declaration that Stalin planed operations in
wartime and directed them on a large globe in his office?
This one assertion of the author of the report
[Khrushchev - GF] evoked at that time a fairly broad.

362

Khnishchcv lied

though silent, protest, especially among militaiy men,
and also among many rank-and-file veterans of the war."

- Balaian, Stalin i Khrushchev^ Ch. 22: "Polkovodets losif Stalin", at
http://stalin.su/book.php?action=header&id=20

Molotov:

Maps were on all the walls in the foyer. Khrushchev said
that he gave leadership on a globe, — on the contrary, he
loved geographical maps ver)' much.

- Chuev, F, Mololw: Poluder^havnyi Vlas/e/iriy 361 .

Marshal Zhukov:

The story that has been disseminated that the Supreme
Commander studied the situation and took decisions
using a globe does not conform to reality. . . He
understood the use of operational maps and the
situations drawn upon them very well.

- G.K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i m^yshleniia ("Reminiscences and
Thoughts"). Vol. 1, Ch. 9. Moscow. 2002, from the Rqssian at

http:/ /militera.lib.ru/ memo/ russian/ zhukov 1 / 1 1 .html

38. Stalin Downgraded Zhukov

Khrushchev:

"Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of
Comrade Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often
for my opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have
known Zhukov for a long time; he is a good general and
a good military leader."

After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsense
about Zhukov, among others the following, "You
praised Zhukov, but he does not deserve it. It is said that
before each operation at the front Zhukov used to
behave as follows: He used to take a handful of earth,
smell it and say, 'We can begin the attack,' or the
opposite, 'The planned operation cannot be carried
out.'" I stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not
know who invented this, but it is not true."

Appendix

363

It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for
the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of
Marshal Zhukov."

According to Zhukov himself, Stalin never insulted him:

G.K. Zhukov stressed more than once that "Nowhere
did Stalin say a single bad word about me", that "if
anyone Cried to insult me in his presence, StaJin would
tear his head off on my behalf."

- B. Solov'ev and V. Sukhodeev. Polkovodets Stalin ("Stalin the General").
Moscow, EKSMO, 2003, Ch. 1, cited from the Russian at
http:/ /militera.lib.ru/ research/ solovyov_suhodeev/ Ol.html

Zhukov was indeed demoted in 1 948. But that was because he had been
found guilty, and had admitted his guilt, in defrauding the Soviet gov-
ernment of very large sums by illegally keeping large amounts of looted
German treasure for himself This fact does not appear to be widely
known even in Russia, although the relevant documents were published
fifteen years ago. We have put these documents on line at

http:/ / chss.mDntclair.edu/ english/ futr/ research/ zhukovtheft4648_var9
3.pdf

The quotations below give some idea of Zhukov's crime, and why Stalin
demoted him.

Top Secret

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR.
To comrade STALIN J.V.

. . .During the night of 8-9 January of this year a secret
search was conducted of Zhukov's dzchAy which is
situated in the village of Rublevo near Moscow.

As a result of this search it was disclosed that two rooms
of the dacha had been converted into storerooms in
which a huge quantity of goods and valuables of various
kinds are stored.

For example:

Woolen fabrics, silk, brocade, velvet, and other materials
- in all, more than 4000 meters;

Khrushchev lied

Furs - sable, monkey, fox, sealskin, Astrakhan [fine
wool] - total 323 hides;

Kidskin of the best quality - 35 skins;

Valuable carpets and Gobelin rugs of very large size
from the Potsdam and other palaces and homes of
Germany - 44 pieces in all, some of which are laid or
hung in various rooms, and the rest in the storeroom.

Especially worthy of note is a carpet of great size placed
in one of the rooms of the dacha;

Valuable paintings of classical landscapes of very large
sizes in artistic frames - 55 units in all, hung in various
rooms of the dacha and a part of which remain in the
storeroom;

Very expensive table and tea services (porcelain with
artistic decoration, crystal) - 7 large chests;

Silver sets of table and tea place settings - 2 chests;

Accordeons with rich artistic decoration - 8 upits;

Unique hunting rifles by the firm Gotland - Godand and
others - 20 units in all.

This property is kept in 51 trunks and suitcases, and also
lies in heaps.

Besides that in all the rooms of the dacha, on the
windows, staircase, tables and bedside tables are placed
around great quantities of bronze and porcelain vases
and statuettes of artistic work, and also all kinds of
trinkets and knick-knacks of foreign origin.

I draw attention to the declaration by the workers who
carried out the search that Zhukov 's dacha is in essence an
antique store or museum, with various valuable works of
art hanging all around the interior. . .

There are so many valuable paintings that they could
never be suitable for an apartment but should be
transferred to the State fund and housed in a museum.

More than twenty large carpets cover the floors of
almost all the rooms.

Appendix

All the objects, beginning with the furniture, carpets,
vessels, decorations, up to the curtains on the windows,
are foreign, mainly German. There is literally not a single
thing of Soviet origin in the dacha. ...

There is not a single Soviet book in the dacha, but on the
other hand on the bookshelves stands a large quantity of
books in beautiful bindings with gold embossing, all
without exception in the German language.

>X^en you go into the house it is hard to imagine that
one is not in Germany but near Moscow. . .

Accompanying this letter please Bnd photographs of
some of the valuables, cloth and items we discovered in
Zhukov's apartment and dacha.

ABAKUMOV.

January 10, 1948.

- Voennie Arkhivy Rassri (1993), pp. 189-191; also at the URL above.

39. Deportations of nationalities

Khrushchev:

All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was
Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic I^ninist
principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state. We
refer to the mass deportations from their native places of
whole nations, together with all Communists and
Komsomols without any exception; this deportation
action was not dictated by any military considerations. . ..

Not only a Marxist-I^ninist but also no man of common
sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations
responsible for inimical activity, including women,
children, old people. Communists and Komsomols, to
use mass repression against them, and to expose them to

366

Khnishchcv I x-d

misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual
persons or groups of persons.

1. Pykhalov, on exceptions to the deportations:

According to the view generally held, all the Crimean
Tatars without any exception were subject to
deportation, including those who had fought honorably
in the Red Army or in partisan ranks. In reality this was
not the case, "lliose who had taken part in the Crimean
underground acting in the rear of the enemy were
excepted from the status of 'special settler', as were
members of their families. Thus the family of S. S.
Useinov, who had been in Simferopol' during the period
of the occupation of the Crimea and was a member of an
underground patriotic group from December 1942 until
March 1943, then was arrested by the Hitlerites and shot.
Members of his family were permitted to remain living in
Simferopol."

...Crimean-Tatar veterans of the front immediately
applied with a request that their relatives be exempted
from the status of 'special settler.' Such applications were
sent from the commander of the second air squadron of
the first fighter battalion of the Higher Officer School of
air combat Captain E.U Chalbash, Major of armored
forces Kh. Chalbash, and many others... Requests of this
nature were granted in part, specifically, the family of R
Chalbash was permitted to live in Kherson oblast.'

- I. Pykhalov, Vnmia Slalina: Fak/y pm/iv mifov. "Leningrad' (St. Peters-
burg), 2001, p. 84, citing N. Bugai, L. Beria - /. Stalinu: "So^asno I 'ashem
UkazanitM"... Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1995, pp. 156-7.

Chechen nationalist account of a pro-German anti-Soviet amied rebellion
in February 1943, when the German penetration towards the Caucasus
was at its greatest, from Radio Svoboda (Radio Liberty), Feb. 23, 2001:

Here I would like to add an unknown fact of history that
we have not yet touched on. The Chechens have always,
permanently, fought for their freedom and self-
detennination, and in February 1943 a rebellion flared up
in the mountains under the leadership of the ixwyez
Merbek Sheripov and the famous writer Khasan Israiiov.

Appendix

367

Taking advantage of the fact that the Geimans were
Gghting with the Russians the Chechens tiied to separate
from the USSR by armed struggle and to declare their
independence. Their final goal was a union with the
peoples of the Caucasus, in order to live freely in a
confederation independently from the Soviet empire."

-http://www.svoboda.org/programs/LL/2000/ll.022300-3.shtml

"Freedom" flag of Caucasian nationalist groups, with Nazi swastika:
http://stalinism.narod.ru/ foto/chech_l.)pg

Casualties among Chechen deportees during the deportation were low.

Operation Chechevitsa, which began on 23 February
[1944], was completed sometime during the third week
of March. NKVD records attest to 180 convoy trains
carrying 493,269 Chechen and Ingush nationals and
members of other nationalities seized at the same time.
Fifty people were killed in the course of the operation,
and 1,272 died on the journey.

- Bugai and Gomov, Russian Studies in History, vol. 41, no. 2, Fall 2002, p.
56. This is 0.268% of those deported, about 2.5 deaths of every 1000 per-
sons.

40. Leningrad Affair

Khrushchev:

After the conclusion of the Patriotic War, the Soviet
nation stressed with pride the magnificent victories
gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts.
The country experienced a period of political
enthusiasm. ...

And it was precisely at this time that the so-called
"Leningrad affair" was bom. As we have now proven,
this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their
lives included Comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov,
Rodionov, Popkov, and others. . ..

How did it happen that these persons were branded as
enemies of the people and liquidated?

Facts prove that the "Leningrad affair" is also the result of will-
fulness which Stalin exercised against party cadres.

368

Khrushchev liuJ

Beiia's letter to the Presidium of June 25, 1953 accused Riumin of falsify-
ing the Leningrad Affair

Specifically RIUMIN took part in the falsification of the
investigative materials in the so-called cases of the
"Espionage center in the Jewish Anti-Fascist
Committee" supposedly headed by LOZOVSKY,
MIKHOELS, FEFER and others, and of the "Leningrad
Affair," in the course of which, as is well known, were
arrested and convicted the leading Party and Soviet
workers of the city of Leningrad KUZNETSOV,
POPKOV, KAPUSTIN. and others. In November 1950
RIUMIN, on orders from ABAKUMOV, was assigned
the investigation in the case of the arrested professor
ETINGER. Knowing that ETINGER had been one of
the doctors who treated A.S. SHCHERBAKOV as a
consultant, RIUMIN adopted illegal means of
investigation and forced ETINGER to give imaginary
confessions about incorrect treatment of A.S.
SHCHERBAKOV, that supposedly led to his death.

Lat^ntii Beriid 1953. Stemgnamma iuPsko^ pknuma TsK KPSS I dmge do-
kument). Moscow, 1999, pp. 64-66.

Having blamed Stalin's "willfulness" for the "Leningrad Affair" arrests,
convictions, and executions Khrushchev claimed in June 1957 claim lhat
Stalin had been against the arrests of Voznesenskii and the others!

Khrushchev: Malenkov, you know — and this is well
known to Molotov, Mikoian, Saburov, Pervykhin ... the
comrades I have named know that Stalin was against
the arrests of Voznesenskii and Kuznetsov. He was
against the arrests, and those Jesuitical beasts, Beria
and Malenkov, influenced Stalin and instigated the
arrests and executions of Voznesenskii, Kuznetsov, [and]
Popkov. Malenkov, your hands are bloody, your
conscience unclean. You are a low-down person.

Malenkov: You are slandering me.

Khrushchev: Stalin said in my presence, and others heard
it too, why isn't Voznesenskii named to a post in the
State Bank, why- are there no motions to this effect? Bur
Beria and Malenkov presented the case to Stalin that

Appendix

369

Voznesenskii, Kuznetsov, Popkov and others were
criminals. Why? Because at sone time Stalin, deservedly
or not, promoted Kuznetsov instead of Malenkov, and
wanted to make Voznesenskii Chairman of the Soviet of
Ministers. That is why their heads rolled

-Maknkou, Molotov, Kaginoinch.1957. Stenogrumma iun'skoff) pUnuma TsK
KPSS I druge dokumenty. Moscow, 1998, pp. 201-2, emph. added GF.

41. Mingrelian Affair

Khrushchev:

Instructive in the same way is the case of the Mingrelian
nationalist organization which supposedly existed in
Georgia. As is known, resolutions by the Central
Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were
made concerning this case in November 1951 and in
March 1952. These resolutions were made without prior
discussion with the Political Bureau. Stalin had
personally dictated them. They made serious accusations
against many loyal Communists. On the basis of falsified
documents, it was proven that there existed in Georgia a
supposedly nationalistic organization whose objective
was the liquidation of the Soviet power in that republic
with the help of imperialist powers.

In the notes to the critical edition of the decrees of the Politburo on
bribery in Georgia and "the anti-Party group of Baramia*' of November
9, 1951 we read:

In the original of the transcript of the PB [Politburo]
sessions there is a copy of the decree written by
Poskrebyshev [Stalin's personal secretaiy - GF], and also
a typed copy of the draft with Stalin's corrections, . . .

There follow a number of Stalin^s corrections to the decree. Another
note in the same critical edition, this time to the decree of the Politburo
about the situation in the Georgian Communist Party, from March 27,
1952, reads:

In the original transcript of the PB sessions Stalin wrote
in the tide of the decree on the draft. The decree

370

Khrushchev lied

resulted from the Politburo sessions of March 25
and March 27 1952. (emphasis added, GF)

These texts and the relevant context are from the work PoUtbium TsK
VKP(b)i Soviet MimstrwSSSK 1945-1953. Ed. Khlevniuk, O.V. et al.
Moscow. ROSSPEN, 2002, pp. 351 and 354. These pages and the rele-
vant context (texts of decrees) are now at

http:/ / chss .montclair.edu/ english/ furr/research/mingrelianres.pd f

Boris Sokolov, in Rosstiskaia Ga^ela April 10 2003:

On April 10 1953 was announced the decree of the CC
of the CPSU "On the violation of Soviet laws by former
ministers of state security of the USSR and the Georgian
SSR." This decree annulled the previous decree of the
CC of November 9, 1951 and March 27, 1952
concerning the existence in Georgia of a Mingrelian
nationalist organization. The Georgian leaders who were
arrested earlier were liberated. However, soon thereafter
many of them were arrested again under accusations of
tics with Beria.

■

Boris Nikolaevsky's note to the N^I^^d^ edition:

51. "Khrushchev's statement on the "Mingrelian
conspiracy" does explain the purges in Georgia in 1952.
Though he implies that the "Mingrelian case," like the
"Leningrad case," was also staged by Beria and
Abakumov, this is a deliberate distortion. It was precisely
in November 1951 that S. D. Ignatiev, one of Beria's
bitterest enemies, was appointed Minister of State
Securit)'; the "Mingrelian case" was, therefore, trumped
up as a blow at Beria. It and the purges which followed
in Georgia (in April, September and November 1952)
undermined Beria's position and cleared the way for the
projected "second Ye^^hovshchini^^ which began, after the
19th Party Congress of November 1952, with the arrests
in the "doctors' plot."

According to Khrushchev, Ignat'ev was among the listeners at the
Speech:

"Present at this Congress as a delegate is the former
Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev." (p. 38)

Appendix

371

Ignadev was removed by the Presidium, of which Khrushchev was a
member, for gross misconduct in fabricating the Mingrelian Affair, the
Doctors' Plot, and other matters. See Bena's reports ^in Russian) at
http:/ / chss.montclair.edu/ english/ fiirr/ research/ mingrelianaff.pdf

42. Yugoslavia

Khrushchev:

The July plenum of the Central Committee studied in
detail the reasons for the development of conflict with
Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played
here. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems
which could not have been solved through party
discussions among comrades. There was no significant
basis for the development of this "affair"; it was
completely possible to have prevented the rupture of
relations with that country. This does not mean,
however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make
mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these
mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a
monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of
relations with a friendly country.

In July 1953 Khrushchev and other Presidium members attacked Beria
for trying to repair relations with Yugoslavia - that is, they did not want
rebtions as of one communist power to another.

Molotov: I think, comrades, that this fact - comrade
Malenkov read the draft letter to 'comrade Rankovic', for
'comrade Tito' - with this fact the traitor [Beria - GF]
showed himself red-handed. He wrote it to them in his
own hand and did not want the Presidium to discuss this
question. What kind of man is this?

True, we exchanged ambassadors.

Malenkov: And we wanted a normalization of relations.

Molotov: We wanted a normalization of relations, ... we
decided it was necessary to establish with Yugoslavia the
same kind of relations as with other bourgeois
governments... And what is this kind of thing: 1 make
use of this opportunity to transmit to you, comrade

372

Khrushchev lied

Rankovic, hearty greetings from comrade Betia and to
infoim comrade Tito that it would be expedient if
comrade Tito shares this viewpoint. . Etc. etc. What
kind of thing is this?

• • •

He might have found support among foreign capitalists
- Titos, Rankoviches, these are capitalist agents, he
learned £rom them. He went straight from them to us.

• » *

But isn't it dear what it means, this attempt by Beria to
reach an agreement with Rankovich and Tito, who
conduct themselves like enemies of the Soviet Union?
Isn't it clear that this letter, composed by Beria in secret
from the present Government, was still one more blatant
attempt to strike the back of the Soviet Government and
to render a direct service to the imperialist camp? This
fact alone would be sufficient to conclude that Beria is
the agent of a foreign camp, the agent of the class
enemy.

Lamntiii Beria. 195). Stenoffamma iul'sko^ pknuma TsK KPSS I dmgie do-
kumnty. Moscow, 1999. pp. 103-4; 246.

43. Doctors* Plot

Khrushchev:

I^t us also recall the "affair of the doctor-plotters."
(Animation in the haU.) Actually there was no "affair"
outside of the declaration of the woman doctor
Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by
someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of
the organs of state security) to write Stalin a letter in
which she declared that doctors were applying
supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.

Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an
immediate conclusion that there are doctor-plotters in
the Soviet Union, fie issued orders to arrest a group of
eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally issued
advice on the conduct of the investigation and the

method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said
that the academician Vinogradov should be put in
chains, another one should be beaten. Present at this
GDngress as a delate is the former Minister of State
Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If
you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will
shorten you by a head."

Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him
instructions, advised him on which investigative methods
should be used; these methods were simple: beat, beat
and, once again, beat.

Shortly after the doctors were arrested, we members of
the Political Bureau received protocols with the doctors*
confessions of guilt. After distributing these protocols,
Stalin told us, "You are blind like young kittens; what
will happen without me? The country will perish because
you do not know how to recognize enemies."

The case was so presented that no one could verify the
fa^ts on which the investigation was based. There was no
possibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those
who had made the confessions of guilt.

We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors
was questionable. We knew some of these people
personally because they had once treated us. When we
examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to
be fabricated from beginning to end.

This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not,
however, have the time in which to bring it to an end (as
he conceived that end), and for this reason the doctors
are still alive. Now all have been rehabilitated; they are
working in the same places they were working before;
they treat top individuals, not excluding members of the
Government; they have our full confidence; and they
execute their duties honestly, as they did before.

374

Khrushchev I JoJ

Dr I'imashuk's letters have all been published since the end of the
She had nothing whatsoever to do with the "Doctors' Plot"
af&ir. Her letters solely concerned the treatment, or mistreatment, she
witnessed of Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov in 1948.

In reality it was Beiia — probably at Stalin's suggestion — who put a stop
to the "Doctors' Plot" frameups.

Excerpts from Beria's report to the Presidium of April 1 1953:

Former Minister of State Secuiity [= the MGB , GF] of
the USSR com. IGNATEV did not fUlfdl the
obligations of his positions, did not guarantee the
necessary control over the investigation, came to the aid
of RIUMIN and of a few other MGB workers who,
taking advantage of this, tortured the arrested persons
brutally and falsified investigative materials with
impunity.

4) To review the question of the responsibility of former
Minister of State Security of the USSR com. '
IGNAT'EV, S.D., the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
USSR has taken measures to prevent in future the
possibility of a repetition of such violations of Soviet
laws in the work of the organs of the MVD.

Excerpt from Presidium decision on Doctors* Plot case of April 3 1953:

3. To propose to the former Minister of State Security of
the USSR com. Ignat'ev S.D. to present to the Presidium
of the CC of the CPSU an explanation of the most crude
violations of Soviet laws and the falsification of
investigative materials permitted in the Ministry of State
Security.

- Lavnntii Bena. 1953. pp. 21-25.

According to Soviet dissident Zhores Medvedev it must have been Stalin
himself who put an end to the persecution of the "doctor-wreckers" in
the press:

^^'''i'scT byla spasd zhixn' b»rnc>g()'. I'is'ma l.idii Timashuk v svuiu /ashchitu." (''llie
giial was to save the patient's life.' 1 jdia 'I'imashuk's letters in her own defense'l Istochmk
1997, No. l,pp. 3-16.

.Appendix

375

We can assume that Stalin called Pravda either on the
evening of February 27 or in the morning of February 28
and arranged for the cessation of publication of anti-
Jewish materials and of all other articles dealing with the
"Doctors' Plot.". . . In the Soviet Union at that time
there was only one person who was able, with a single
telephone call to the editor of Pravda or to the
Department of Agitprop of the CC CPSU to change
official policy. Only Stalin could do that. . .

Medvedev further stresses the following point:

Stalin's anti-Semitism, about which one may read in
almost all his biographies, was not religious, nor ethnic,
nor cultural [bytovym = based on lifestyle or mores — GF].
It was political, and expressed itself in anti- Zionism, not
hatred of Jews [iiudofobii].

- ZH.A. Medvedev. Stalin i evniskaia pwbkma. Nopry anali^. Moscow: Prava
cheloveka, 2003, pp. 216-7.

In plain language, Medvedev confirmed that Stalin was not anti-Semidc at
all, since opposition to Zionism is common among both religious and
non-religious Jews, including in Israel itself.

Svetlana Allilueva:

'The Doctors' Plot" took place during the last winter of
his life. Valentina Vasil'evna told me later that father had
been very saddened by the turn of events. She heard how
it was discussed at the table, during meals. She served at
table, as always. Father said that he did not believe in
their "dishonorableness," that this could not be - after
all, the "proof were just the accusations of Dr.
Timashuk.

- Twenty Lettm to a Friend, Letter 18.

44. Beria

Khrushchev:

In ofganizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very
base role was played by the rabid enemy of our party, an
agent of a foreign intelligence service - Beria, who had
stolen into Stalin's confidence.

376

Khiushchcv lied

Mikoian, at 1953 CC Plenum:

We have no direct evidence that he was a spy [or]
received assignments from foreign governments...

- Laurenlii Beria. 1953. Stemffamma iiul'sko^ pknuma TsK Kl^SS i dru^ie do-
kumnty. Ed. Naumov, V., lU. Sigachev. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond
'Demokratiia', 1999, p. 174.

Khrushchev:

Beria showed himself more deariy as a provocateur and
agent of the imperialists in the discussion of the German
question, when he posed the question of renouncing the
construction of socialism in the GDR and yielding to the
West. That means yielding 18 million Germans to the
rule of the American imperialists. He said: "We must
create a neutral democratic Germany."

The court has established that the beginning of L.P.
Beria's criminal treasonous activity and the establishment
by him of ties with foreign intelligence services relates to
the period of the Civil War, when in 1919 L.P. Beria,
being in Baku, committed treason when he accepted a
position as a secret agent in the intelligence of the
counterrevolutionary Mussavat government in
Azerbaidjan, which acted under the control of English
intelligence organs.

In the active struggle against the revolutionary workers
movement in Baku in 1919, when Beria entered his
position as a secret agent in the intelligence of the
counterrevolutionary Mussavat government in
Azerbaidjan, he established ties with a foreign
intelligence service, and thereafter supported and
extended his secret criminal connections with foreign
intelligence services until the moment of his exposure
and arrest, . . .

- Lavnnlii Sena, pp. 238; 388; 390.

Kaganovich:

I will say the following. They never gave us any
documents establishing that Beria was connected to

Appendix

377

impetialist powers, that he was a spy, and so on. Neither
I nor M olotov ever saw such documenis.

I [Chuev] asked Molotov: Was he a spy?" He said: "An
agpnt, not necessarily a spy."

I asked Molotov - said Kaganovich - did you have any
kind of documents concerning the charge that Betia was
an agent of imperialism? He said: There were none. They
gave us no such documents, and they did not exist.
That's how it was. They said that at the trial there were
[such] documents."

- Chuev, Feliks. TakgovorilKaginomh. Ispoved' Stalinshoffi apostola. Moscow:
"Otechestvo", 1992, p. 66. Same text in Chuev, Kaganotnch. Shepikw. Mos-
cow: OLMA-Press, 2001, pp. 83-4.

Molotov agreed, as he told Chuev:

"They argue to this day about Beria: was he an agent of
foreign intelligence, or not?

- 1 think, he was not, - said Molotov."

- Chuev, Molotov: Poluder^havniy VlasteiinMosca^. OLMA-Press, 2000, p.
409:

Even more striking is the rough draft of Malenkov's speech at the Presid-
ium session where Beria was ultimately either arrested or killed, and
where Malenkov had planned to propose the following:

a) MVD - to give this post to another (Kr[uglov]) and
the CC

b) To dismiss (Beria] from the post of deputy [Chairman]
of the Council of Ministers, to app[oint] him min[ister]
of petrol[eum] ind[ustry'.

- Lavnntii Beria, p. 70.

However, earlier in this draft speech Malenkov referred to "vragi" -
enemies - trying to use the MVD. That denotes a lot of hostility towards
Becia.

It appears as though what really bothered the other members of the Pre-
sidium (or some of them, including Malenkov and Khrushchev) was that
the MVD was overseeing the activities of the Presidium members and
other Party leaders. This meant that the Soviet government was above

378

Khrushchev lied

the Party, and Party leaders had to answer to the law. It would be similar
to the FBI investigating high-ranking government leaders in the USA.

[Beria's] arrest took place at a session of the Plenum of
the Central Committee on June 26 1953 [Note: This is an
error; it was, supposedly, a session of the Presidium of
the CC — GF), despite the fact that no concrete
accusations at all had been leveled at Beria. His
opponents understood this. At the outset even
Khrushchev spoke only of "detaining" him in the
interests of further investigation. "I said 'detain' him
because we had no direct criminal accusations against
him. I could have thought he was an agent of the
Mussavat, but Kamensky had talked about that. And no
one had verified these facts." It was proposed only to
remove him from the post he held. Against this was,
supposedly, Molotov, who was afraid to leave Beria at
liberty: 'Beria is vet)' dangerous, and I believe we must
take more extreme measures.'

n.l6: "His Presidium comrades arrested him
preventively. They feared him very much. In fact no
'Beria plot*, about which so much was said afterwards,
ever existed. They thought it up so as to be able to
explain, somehow, to the masses why they had arrested
Stalin's most faithful pupil." Interview with M.
Smirtiukov, Kommmanf-Vhst [a business newspaper]
August 2, 2000 .

- Piotr Vagner, in Arkhiv. No. 20, 2002. At

http:/ /his tory.machaon.ru/ all/number_14/ analiti4/ vagner_prini/index.
html; Smirtiukov article at

http:/ / www.kommersant.ru/ doc.aspx?DocsID= 16455

45. Kaminsky about Beria working with

Mussavat

Khrushchev:

Were there any signs that Beria was an enemy of the
party? Yes, there were. Already in 1937, at a Central

Appendix

379

Committee plenum, fonner People's Commissar of
Health Kaminsky said that Beiia worked for the
Mussavat intelligence service. But the Central Committee
plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was
arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's
statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beria, and that
was enough for him.

Pavlunovsky's letter of June 1937, attesting to the fact that Beria had
done underground work for the Bolshevik Party among nationalists:

To the Secretary of the CC ACP(b) com. Stalin
concerning com. Beria. In 1926 I was assigned to
Transcaucasia as the Chairman of the Transc. GPU.
Before my departure for Tiflis com. Dzerzhinsky,
Chairman of the OGPU, summoned me and informed
me in a detailed way of the situation in Transcaucasia.
Then com. Dzerzhinsky informed me that one of my
aides in Transcaucasia, com. Beria, had worked for the
Mussavat counterintelligence during the Mussavat
regime. I was not to allow this situation to confuse me in
any way or to bias me against com. Beria, as com. Beria
had worked in their counterintelligence with the
knowledge of responsible Transcaucasian comrades and
that he, Dzerzhinsky, and com. Sergo Ordzhonikidze
knew about this. Upon my arrival in Tiflis about two
months later I dropped in to see com. Sergo and told me
everything com. Dzerzhinsky had informed me about
com. Beria.

Com. Sergo Ordzhonikidze informed me that in fact
com. Beria had worked in the Mussavat
counterintelligence, that he carried out this work upon
the assignment of party workers, and that he, com.
Ordzhonikidze, com. Kirov, com. Mikoian, and com.
Nazaretian were well informed about this. For this
reason I should relate to com. Beria with full confidence
and that he, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, completely trusted
com. Beria.

In the course of two years' work in Transcaucasia com.
Ordzhonikidze told me several times that he prized com.

380

Khrushchev lied

Beria very highly as a developing worker, that a staunch
worker

would be developed from com. Beria, and that he had
informed com. Stalin of his evaluation of com. Beria.

In the course of my two years of work in Transcaucasia I
knew that com. Sergo valued and supported com. Beria.
Two years ago com. Sergo for some reason said to me in
a conversation, do you know that Rightists and other
such trash were tr}'ing, in their struggle against com.
Beria, to use the fact that he had worked with the
Mussavat counterintelligence, but that they will not be at
all successful in this.

I asked com. Sergo whether com. Stalin was aware of
this. Com. Sergo Ordzhonikidze replied that this was
known to com. Stalin and that he had spoken to com.
Stalin about it.

25 June 1937 Candidate to the CC VKP(b) Pavlunovskii.

- Aleksei Toptygin, Lavrentii Beria. Moscow. lauza, EKSMO, 2005, pp.
11-12).

Beria's own Party autobiography, including passages about his under-
ground work among nationalists:

From February 1919 to April 1920 while I was chairman
of the comm. cell of technical workers, under the
direction of senior comrades I carried out several tasks
of the area committee, and handled other cells as
instructor. In the autumn of that same year 1919 I
entered service in counterintelligence from the
"Gummet" party, where I worked together with
comrade Mussevi. In about March 1920, after the
murder of com. Mussevi I left work in
counterintelligence and worked in the Baku customs
house.

- Beria: Konels Kur'iety. Ed. V.F. Nekrasov. Moscow: Politizdat, 1991, pp.
320-5, at page 323. Beria's whole autobiography is online at

http:/ / chss.montclair.edu/ english/ fun/ research/beriaautobiog.pdf

Appendix

381

Zalessky, Impaiia Stalina:

In Apcil-May 1920 Beda was a plenipotendaiy of the
registration section of the Caucasus Eront attached to the
Revolutionary Military Council of the ll*** Army, and
then was dispatched to underground work in Georgia. In
June 1920 he was arrested, but was released at the
demand of the Soviet plenipotentiary representative S.M.
Kirov and was sent to Azerbaidjan.

- At http:/ / www.hrono.ru/biograf/beria.html
Beda to Ordzhonikidze, letter of March 2, 1933.

Dear Sergol

. . .IV. Levan Gogobeddze is resting in Sukhumi.
According to what com. Lakova and a number of other
comrades say com. Gogobeddze is saying the vilest
things about me and in general about the new
Transcaucasian leadership. In pardcukr, about my past
work in the Mussavat countedntelligence, he is asserting
that the Party supposedly did not know and does not
know, about this.

But you know very well that I was sent by the Party into
the Mussavat intelligence service, and that this quesdon
was settled by the CC of the ACP(b) in 1920, in your
presence, that of coms Stasova, Kaminsky, Mirza Davud
Guseinov, Harimanov, Sarkis, Rukhull, Akhundov,
Buniat-Zade, and others. (In 1925 I handed you the
official note of the decision of the CC AKB(b) about
this, in which I was completely rehabilitated, that is the
fact of my work in countedntelligence with the Party's
knottfledge vi/zs confirmed by the declaradons of coms.
Mirza Davud Guseinov, Kasum Ismailov, and others).
Com. Dadko, who will give you this letter, will tell you
the details.

Yours, Lavrentii Beda
March 2, 1933

- in Sovetskoe ?j4kovodstvo. Penpiska. 1928-1941. Moscow. ROSSPEN,
2001. No. 1 16, p. 204. Letter online at

http:/ / chss.montclair.edu/ english/ furr/ research/beriatoordzhon33.pdf

382

Khnishchcv I icd

Even Khrushchev admitted in memoirs written in the late 1960s:

. . .We had no direct criminal accusations against him
[Berta]. I might think he had been an agent of the
Musavetists, like Kaminsky said. But no one ever verified
this...

Khrushchev, Vrmia Liudi. VIast\(\'^ospo/ninamia). Kn. 2, Chast' 3. Mos-
cow: Moskovskie Novosti, 1999. Chapter "Posle smerti Stalina", p. 168.
Also in the online edition at http://hiono.ru/libris/lib_h/hrush48.htinl

46. Kartvelishvili (Lavrent*ev)

Khrushchev:

The long, unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and
Beria were widely known; they date back to the time
when Comrade Sergo [Ordzhonikidze] was active in the
Transcaucasus; Kartvelishvili was the closest assistant of
Sergo. The unfriendly rebtionship impelled Bcria to
fabricate a "case" against Kartvelishvili. It is a
characteristic thing that in this "case" Kartvelishvili was
charged with a terroristic act against Beria.

Beria uncovered an underground Rightist group in Georgia, including
Lavrent'ev- Kartvelishvili.

20 July 1937

No. 1716/s

Dear Koba!

The investigation on the matter of the
counterrevolutionaries in Georgia is developing further,
uncovering new participants in the vilest crimes against
the Party and Soviet power. The arrest of G.
Mgaloblishvili, L. Lavrent'ev (Kartvelishvili), Sh.
Eliava . . . shed a bright light on the traitorous work that
they were carrying on as members of the
counterrevolutionary organization of the Rights. ... In
the Transcaucasian counterrevolutionary center of Rights
are:

From Georgia: Eliava Sh., Orakhelashvili M, Lavrent'ev
L and Enukidze A.

.\ppcn(lix

383

- Lubianka: Statin I GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938. DokMmenty.Uosco^. Nla-
tehk, 2004. No. 142, p. 252. Hereafter Lubianka 2.

SERGEEV was connected in espionage and diversionary
work in Moscow with MUKLEVICH and STRELKOV,
in the Far Eastern Region with the regional center,
consisting of LAVRENT'EV, DERIBAS, KRUTOV,
KOSIOR.

- Uihianka 2, No. 196, p. 347 of Sept. 1 1 1937 (Liushkov document)

LIU-KU-SEN declared that there was one meeting at
LAVRENT*EV's apartment, at which they distributed
ministers' portfolios, etc.

- /M, No. 207 p. 370 of September 19 1937 (Liushkov document)

Former regional procurator CHERNIN arrested in
Khabarovsk admitted his participation in the plot, ties
with LAVRENT'EV, KRUTOV, and other active
conspirators.

- ibid. No. 309, p. 507 of March 29, 1938 (Liushkov document)

Kanvelishvili named by lakovlev (along with Kabakov and many others):

Besides that, through VAREIKIS-BAUMAN we were
connected with the group of Rights in Moscow -
KAMINSKY, BUBNOV; ... on the periphery with the
leading workers of oblast and region Party organizations
— Rights and Trotsky ites who led anti-Soviet
organizations, SHEBOLDAEV, KHATAEVICH,
KABAKOV, IVANOV, LAVRENT'EV,
SHUBRIKOV, PTUKHA, KRINITSKY.

- ibid. No. 226, p. 392 of October 15-18 1937.

The Rehabilitation file on Kartvelishvili blames Beria for everything.
Even if Kartvelishvili was framed, though, this cannot be the case. Most
of the documents against him are by Liushkov or, in the case of lakov-
lev's confession, have nothing to do with Beria at all.

47. Kedrov

Khrushchev:

Here is what the old Communist, Comrade Kedrov,
wrote to the Central Committee through Comrade

384

Khiushchcv liixl

Andreyev (Comrade Andreyev was then a Central
Committee secretary): "I am calling to you for help from
a gloomy cell of the Lefortovsky prison. Let my cry of
horror reach your ears; do not remain deaf, take me
under your protection; please, help remove the
nightmare of interrogations and show that this is all a
mistake.

"I suffer innocendy. .

The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found
innocent by the Military Collegium. But, despite this, he
was shot at Beiia's order.

Kedrov was in fact shot by order of Chief Prosecutor, not of Beria:

"October 17 1941 a decision of the NKVD of the USSR
was taken concerning the necessity to execute by
shooting, according to the direction of *the directing
organs of the USSR*, 25 prisoners. It was signed by the
chief of the investigative section for especially important
matters of the NKVD USSR L Vlodzimirsky, conHrmed
by the Assistant People's Commissar for Internal Affairs
of the USSR B. Kobulov, and with the consent of the
Procurator (= Attorney General] of the USSR V.
Bochkov. On the basis of this decision Beria signed, on
October 18, 1941, the order to shoot the persons
indicated."

- Or^any ^siidarstvemoi be^opatnos/i SSSR v Ve/ikoi Olechestvennoi Voine. 1.2.
Nacha/o, Kn.2. l-sentiabria — 31 dekahria 1941 ^da. Moscow: Rus', 2000.
No. 617, p. 215, n. 1.

"Sentence", implying a judicial proceeding:

To Senior Lieutenant of State Security com. Seminikhin
D.E. Upon receipt of the present you are instructed to
proceed to the city of Kuibyshev and to carry out the
sentence — the highest measure of punishment
(shooting) in relation to the following prisoners...
[emph. added GF|

- ibid, pp. 215-216.

Statement of the Prosecutor's conclusion (or, perhaps, a part of it) in
Kedrov's case (reprinted by Prudnikova p. 386):

Appendix

385

"The condemned prisoners Afonskii, Kedrov I.M and
Shilkin have fully confirmed their confessions about
Kedrov M.S. both at the preliminary investigation and at
the court.

On the basis of the aforementioned Kedrov Nfikhael
Sergeevich, bom 1878, living in Moscow, of Russian
nationality, citizen of the USSR, of higher education,
former landowner, member of the Bolshevik Party, a
pensioner before his arrest, is accused -

In that he is a participant in an anti-Soviet organization,
shared the counterrevolutionary ideas of the Rights and
has repeatedly conducted anti-Soviet and prevocational
conversations.

In the interests of the British imperialists he engaged in
traitorous behavior in the Northern fleet during the
period of 1918 - that is in committing crimes covered by
articles 58- la, 58-10 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation.

Considering the preliminary investigation of the case of
Kedrov M.S. closed and the charges laid against him
proven, as laid down by a special order of the directive
organs of the Union of SSR, -

Would propose:

That Kedrov Mikhail Sergeevich, bom 1878 - to be shot.

(Signed) Vlodzimirsky."

- Sukhomlinov, A.V. K/o ly, Lavnntii Beriia? Moscow: Detektiv-Press,
2003, p. 216. Reprinted in Prudnikova, Elena. Beriia. Pmtupkniia, kolorykh
ne hy/o. Spb: Neva, 2005, p. 386. Sukhomlinov believes Vlodzimirsky's
signature on the facsimile is forged, while Prudnikova accepts it as genu-
ine.

The report on M.S. Kedrov is attached to one of the "Stalin shooting
lists", that of March 28, 1941:

An active participant in the anti-Soviet organization
disguised as the society "Association of Northerners" in
Moscow.

Was connected to the leading participant in the
Zinovievite-Trotskyist organization CSafarov and

386

Khiushchcv I JliI

approved his counterrevolutionary methods in struggle
against the Party and Soviet power.

KEDROV is suspected of secret collaboration with the
Tsacist secret police ("Okhrana"] on the basis of the
following facts:

In 1912, after he had been arrested several times by the
Okhrana, he journeyed to Switzerland under suspicious
circumstances, where he established ties with the
Menshevist organization, and in 1914 received the right
to return to Russia as "politically reliable".

KEDROV was closely connected with the leading
participant of the conspiratorial organization in the
NKVD and active agent of German intelligence
ARTUZOV {condemned to death), whom he
recommended for work in the organs of the Cheka-
OGPU.

The brother of KEDROV's wife - MAIZEL' - who has
lived all this time in America, made contact with
KEDROV during several visits to the USSR.

MAIZEL' is known to the NKVD of the USSR as an
agent of American intelligence.

In addition it has been established that in 1918
KEDROV, in command of the Northern front, upon an
offensive by the British forces left Arkhangel'sk of his
own accord, disorganizing military action and opening
the front to invasion by the enemy.

He is exposed in hostile work by the confessions of
SHILKIN P.P. former worker of die People's
Commissariat of Water (sentenced to death),
AFONSKY V.A., former company commander
(sentenced to death), SAFAROV G.I. (under arrest,
undergoing investigation by the NKVD), in face-to-facc
confrontations with SAFAROV and AFONSKY, and
also by the confessions of witness TAG UNO VA V.I.
and by official documents about the treasonous work of
KEDROV on the Northern front.

- http:/ / stalin.mcmo.ru/ spravki/ 1 3-1 84.HTM

Appendix

387

But whatever the facts are about Kedrov's guilt or innocence, he was
executed by an order signed by the Soviet Prosecutor.

48. Ordzhonikidze's brother

Khrushchev:

Beiia also handled cruelly the family of Comrade
Ord2homkidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze had tried
to prevent Beria from realizing his shameful plans. Beria
had cleared from his way all persons who could possibly
interfere with him. Ordzhonikidze was always an
opponent of Beria, which he told to Stalin. Instead of
examining this affair and taking appropriate steps, Stalin
allowed the liquidation of Ordzhonikidze's brother and
brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a state that he
was forced to shoot himself

Sergo Beria:

I knew Papulia Ordzhonikidze well, because we lived in
the same house. He always occupied prominent posts,
but was better known as a carouser, a hunter, and
generally as a lover of the good life. He never called his
brother Sergo anything but, excuse me, shit. He cursed
socialism all day long.

Sergo was well informed about Papulia's riotous
behavior. He resented him and, when he came to Tbilisi,
made a show of staying with us. Maybe from today's
point of view Papulia could be considered a 'democrat',
but at that time abusing the existing social order was not
forgiven even in the case of a brother of one who was
leading and heading that sodal order. . .

- Raul Chilachava, Syn Lavnntiia Beriia roska^aet. . . Kiev, KITS Inko-
press, 1992, p. 17.

Khlevniuk's fiercely anti-communist study still exonerates Beria:

Valiko (Ivan) Ordzhonikidze worked as a budgetary
inspector in the financial department of the Tbilisi
Soviet. At the beginning of November 1936, one of his
colleagues filed a statement with the party committee
charging that Ivan Konstantinovich insisted upon the

388

Khrushchev lied

innocence of Papulia Ordzhonikidze and denied he
fraternized with Trotskyites. The party committee of the
Tbilisi Soviet issued a denunciation. Valiko was called
"on the carpet," and not only confirmed everything
written in the statement, but added: "Papulia
Ordzhonikidze couldn't go against his brother. Comrade
Sergo Ordzhonikidze, nor the leader of our people.
Comrade Stalin, whom he personally knows.... It's
impossible to believe such accusations against Papulia
Ordzhonikidze - they are all untrue." To the members
of the part)' committee, Valiko protested: "You can be
sure of the innocence not only of my brother, but of
others who will be freed in a short time." For such
impertinence, they expelled him from the group of party
sympathizers, and fired him.

Sergo then got involved in the case. In the middle of
December he phoned Beria and asked for help. Beria
showed remarkable concern this time: He spoke with the
accused and sought an explanation from th'e chairman of
the Tbilisi Soviet. Sergo received a package within a week
that contained an explanatory' letter from Beria. Beria
wrote: "Dear Comrade Sergo! After your call I quickly
summoned Valiko; he told me the story of his dismissal
and roughly confirmed that which is expounded upon in
the enclosed explanation from the chairman of the
Tbilisi Soviet, Comrade Nioradze. Today, Valiko was
restored to his job. Yours, L. Beria."

Khlevniuk, Oleg V. In Stalin's Shadow. The Career of 'J"«jo' Ord^homk/dzf-
(Armonk, London: M.E. Sharp, 1995), p. 108. The Russian edition of this
book, S/a/in i Ordsihonikidz^. Konjlikty v PoUtbiuro v 30'egod}' (Moscow:; Izd
"Rossiia Molodaia", 1993) is not identical to the English translation.

49. Stalin, Short Biography

Khrushchev:

Comrades: The cult of the individual acquired such
monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using ail
conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his
own person. This is supported by numerous facts. One

of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-
glotification and of his lack of even elementary modesty
is the edidon of his Short Biography, which was
published in 1948.

This book is an expression of the most dissolute (lattery,
an example of making a man into a godhead, of
transforming him into an infallible sage, "the greatest
leader, sublime strategist of all times and nations."
Finally, no other words could be found with which to lift
Stalin up to the heavens.

What did Stalin consider essential to write into this
book? Did he want to cool the ardor of his flatterers
who were composing his Short Biography? No! He
marked the very places where he thought that the praise
of his services was insufficient. Here are some examples
characterizing Stalin's activity, added in Stalin's own
hand:

"In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators,
the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and
Kamenevites, there was definitely welded together,
after Lenin's death, that leading core of the party. . .
that upheld the great banner of I^nin, rallied the
party behind Lenin's behests, and brought the Soviet
people into the broad road of industrializing the
country and collectivizing the rural economy. The
leader of this core and the guiding force of the party
and the state was Comrade Stalin." [(1) - see below
for discussion, GFJ

Thus writes Stalin himself] Then he adds:

Although he performed his task as leader of the party
and the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the
unreserved support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin
never allowed his work to be marred by the slightest

390

Khrushchev Ix-d

hint of vanity, conceit or self -adulation. [(2) - see below
for discussion, GF|

In the draft text of his book appeared the following
sentence: "Stalin is the Lenin of today."

This sentence appeared to Stalin to be too weak, so, in
his own handwriting, he changed it to read: "Stalin is the
worthy continuer of Lenin's work, or, as it is said in our
party, Stalin is the Lenin of today." [ (3) - see below for
discussion, GF] You see how well it is said, not by the
nation but by Stalin himself.

It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals
written into the draft text of that book in Stalin's hand.
Especially generously does he endow himself with
praises pertaining to his military genius, to his talent for
strategy.

I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning
the theme of the Stalinist military genius. *The advanced
Soviet science of war received further development," he
writes, "at Comrade Stalin's hands. Comrade Stalin
elaborated the theory of the permanendy operating
factors that decide the issue of wars, of active defense
and the laws of counteroffensive and offensive, of the
cooperation of all services and arms in modem warfare,
of the role of big tank masses and air forces in modem
war, and of the artillery as the most formidable of the
aimed services. At the various stages of the war Stalin's
genius found the correct solutions that took account of
all the circumstances of the situation." [ (4) - see below
for discussion, GF]

And, further, writes Stalin: "Stalin's miJitaiy mastership
was displayed both in defense and offense. Comrade
Stalin's genius enabled him to divine the enemy's plans
and defeat them. The battles in which Comrade Stalin

Appendix

391

directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples of
operational military skill" [(5) - see below for (fiscussion,
GF]

In this manner was Stalin praised as a strategist. Who did
this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist but in
the role of an author-editor, one of the main creators of
his self-adulatory biography. Such, comrades, are the
facts. We should rather say shameful facts.

V.A. Belianov, editor of Stalin's remarks:

His [Stalin's] supporters could even Bnd confiimation of
the Vozhd's modesty, since he crossed out numerous
phrases praising him that had been included by the
servile compilers (like "under Stalin's leadership,"
"genius", etc.)

Stalin's many changes included the addition of a paragraph stressing the
importance of the role of women:

One of Stalin's great services has to be the fact that in
this period, the period of the development of
industrialization and collectivization, when it was
essential to mobilize all our laboring forces to decide
great tasks, he gave full attention to the woman question,
the question of the position of women, of female labor,
of the very important role of women, female workers,
and women farmers in both the economic and the social-
political life of society and, having raised this question to
the necessary importance, gave it a correct resolution.

- /^/r/w TsKKPSSNo. 9, 1990, pp. 113-129. Online at

http:/ /grachev62.narod.ru/stalin/ tl6/ tl6_17.htm

Maksimenkov's conclusion:

In contradiction to Khrushchev's thesis in these two
examples what is obvious is the significant lowering of
ideological expressions of the 'cult' by Stalin himself, and
the exaltation of I>eninist dogmas. All the formulations
about "the teachings of Stalin" were removed. In the
draft of the biography of Lenin, prepared in 1950 in
accordance with Stalin's directives, the Vozhd [Leader,
i.e. Stalin - GF] himself s)'stematicaUy lowered the high

392

Khrushchev lied

Style of infonnation connected with the depiction of the
parallel "Lenin - Stalin." . . . For understandable reasons
N.S. Khrushchev, P.N. Pospelov, M.A. Suslov, L.F.
Il'ichev and other ideologists of **the Thaw" did not dte,
in their own public statements and articles, examples of
these corrections [by Stalin]. The present author is not
aware of any mention of these primary sources even
during the years of pmstroik/i.

• Leonid Maksimenkov. "Kul't. Zametki o slovakh-simvolakh v sovetskoi
politichesoi kul'ture" ("Cult. Remarks about word-symbols in Soviet po-
litical culture"). Svobodnaia M>'//'10 (1993). Also at

http://www.situation.ru/app/j_art_677.htm

Excerpt from Mochalov's notes about Stalin's remarks:

There are very many errors. The tone is bad, Socialist-
Revolutionary. I'm said to have all kinds of knowledge,
including some kind of knowledge of constant factors of
war. It appears that I have knowledge about
communism, while Lenin, you see, spoke only about
socialism and said nothing about communism. And I,
you see, spoke about communism. Further, it is as
though I have knowledge about the industrialization of
the country, about the collecbvization of agriculture, and
so forth, etc. In fact it is to Lenin that the achievement
of the posing of the question of industrializing our
country, as well as concerning the question of
collectivizing agriculture, etc. must be attributed.

There's a great deal of praise in this biography, the
exaltation of the role of the individual. What is left for
the reader to do after reading this biography? Get on his
knees and pray to me. . .

Here, about Baku it is written that, supposedly, before
my arrival the Bolsheviks had done nothing, and all I had
to do was to arrive and suddenly everything changed at
once. Believe it or not! In reality, how was it? We had to
form our cadre. We did form cadre of Bolsheviks in
Baku. I listed the names of these people in the
corresponding place.

Appendix

393

The same about another pedod — people like
Dzerzhinskii, Frunze, Kuibyshev, lived and worked, but
nothing is written about them, they are absent. . .

This has to do with the period of the Second Workl War.
It was necessary to take capable people, ^ther them,
forge them. Such people ^thered around the main
command of the Red Army.

Nowhere is it said that I am a pupil of Lenin. .. In fact I
considered myself, and still consider myself, a pupil of
Lenia I said this clearly in the well-known conversation
with Ludwig. . . I am a pupil of Lenin's, Lenin ^ught me,
not the other way around. He laid out the road, and we
are proceeding along this cleared road.

- Richard Kosolapov, Siovo tovarishchu Stalinu. Moscow: EKSMO-
Algoritm, 2002, pp. 470-472.

Elsewhere Kosolapov recounts a story — possibly apocryphal, though it is
attested by many others as well - about Stalin's disdain for his "image:"

Supposedly Joseph Vissaxionovich had a conversation
with his son Vasilii when, angered by the arrogance of
his sons, he uttered this reproach: 'IDo you think that
you are STAUN? Do you think I am STALIN? HE is
Stalin - there!" he said, as he pointed at the pompous
portrait

- Speech on 122^ anniversary of Stalin's birth, Solna truda No. 3 (2003),
pp. 3-4. At http://www.cprf.info/analytics/10828.shtml

Non-Stalinist authors like lUrii Bogomolov, correspondent for Iv^stiia^
dte similar stories:

A rumor has spread about a conversation between papa
losif and his son Vasia. "You think you are Stalin? You
think I am Stalin? THAT is Stalinl" said the Boss, as he
Bnished his moral lesson and pointed at a pomait

- "Stalin i TV", now at

http://web.archive.Org/web/20050224073133/http://www.politcom.ru
/2003/pv274.php

394

Khrushchev 1 Jcil

50. The Short Course

Khrushchev:

And when Stalin himself asserts that he himself wrote
The Short Come of the History of the AU-Union Communist
Party (Bolsheviks), this calls at least for amazement. Can a
Marxist- Leninist thus write about himself, praising his
own person to the heavens?

Molotov:

Chuev: I have heard the assertion that it was laroslavskii
who wrote The Short Course. . .

Molotov: - That's impossible. But it wasn't written by
Stalin. And he never said that he had written it. He read
to us the only chapter of his - the philosophical one.

- Chuev, Molotov: Poluder^havityi Vlastelin^ 302.

In reality, as Roi Medvedev has pointed out, Stalin's role in preparing the
textbook was far more significant. In the chapter with the title "Stalin -
main author of the Short Cours^\ Medvedev notes:'

Stalin . . . edited and wrote many of the pages of this
Short Course. To Stalin belong not only the general plan of
the book, but also the tides of each chater and
paragraphs within these chapters. He wrote all the
sections and pages of the book that related to theory....

Already on November 28, 1938 Fiodr Samoilov, director
of the State museum of the Revolution . . . wrote a letter
to A.N. Poskrebyshev, chief of Stalin's secretarial staff:

"To the CC of the ACP(b), com, Poskrebyshev. In
connection with the necessary exposition in the
Museum of the Revolution of the USSR of the Short
Coune of the History of the ACP(b) we must turn to
comrade Stalin with a request to permit us to receive
a few pages, written or corrected by him, of the Short
Course, or page margins corrected by comrade
Stalin's hand. If it is not possible to receive originals
of the indicated materials, then could not the
Museum be provided with photocopies of them?
The exposition of these materials would be
extremely valuable and interesting for visitors to the

Appendix

395

Museum." Poskrebyshev showed this letter to Stalin
a few days later, and the latter wrote his answer
directly on the letter form of the Museum of the
Revolution: "Com. Samoilov. I would not think that
in your old age you would bother yourself with such
trifles. If the book has already been published in
millions of copies, why do you want the
manuscripts? With greetings. December 6, 1938, J.
Stalin." This letter with Stalin's resolution was taken
from the archives at the end of 1955 in preparation
for the XX Congress of the CPSU. On the basis of
this document N.S. Khrushchev virtually blamed
Stalin f(x plagiarism. The Short Course, as Khrushchev
said, was written by a collective of authors, and in
the Short hio^iaphy of Stalin published in 1948 in
Stalin's own hand was inserted the phrase "the book
History of the ACP(b). Short Course was written by
comrade Stalin and approved by a Commission of
the CC ACP(b)." "As you can see, - exclaimed N.S.
Khrushchev to the closed session of the Congress in
his secret report, - this constitutes a conversion of
the work created by a collective into a book written
by Stalin.

In this case N.S. Khrushchev was in error. As is known,
not all the manuscripts were burned. A part of the
typescript of the Short Course with corrections and
insertions of various kinds by Stalin has been retained,
and these materials were published in 2002-2003 in the
journal 'Voprosy Istorii'.

- R.A. Medvedev, Uudi i Kjii^. Chto chital Stalin^. Moscow: Prava
cheloveka, 2005, pp. IXd-lXl.

51. Stalin Signed Order for Monument to
Himself on July 2, 1951

Khrushchev:

It is a fact that Stalin himself had signed on July 2, 1951 a
resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers concerning
the erection on the Volga-Don Canal of an impressive

396

Khrushchev I jcd

monument to Stalin; on September 4 of the same year he
issued an order making 33 tons of copper available for
the construction of this impressive monument.

February 16, 1951 the Politburo decision:

The Chairmanship at the sessions of the Presidium of
the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR and the Buro of the
Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR is to be
assigned by turns to the Vice-Chairmen of the Presidium
of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR comrades
Bulganin, Beria and Malenkov, to whom are [also]
assigned the duties of considering and taking decisions
upon current matters.

Decrees and announcements of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR will be issued under the signature of the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
comrade Stalin J. V.

- lU. Zhukov, Tainy Kitmlui. Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov. Mosco>»"
Terra-Knixhnyi Klub, 2000, pp. 544-5.

The original of this document:

http:/ / www.rusarchives.ru/ e vants/ exhibitions/ stalin_exb/ 29.shtml

The rubber stamps of Stalin's signature used to sign documents in his
name:

http:/ / www.rusarchives.ni/ evants/ exhibitions/ stalin_exb/31.shDnl

Politburo members speaking in July 1953 concerning Stalin's political
inactivit)' during final period of his life:

Khrushchev:

We all respect comrade Stalin. But the years take their
toU. During recent times comrade Stalin did not read
papers, or receive people, because his health was weak.

- Latntntii Beria, p. 236.
Kaganovich:

It must be frankly said that in Stalin's day, since we had
his general political leadership, we lived more calmly,
although comrade Stalin, as has been accurately said,
during recent times did not work very actively or take
part in the work of the Politburo.

.Appendix

397

- Lamntii heria^ p. 274.
Voroshilov:

Together with the rest of us he knew that, as a result of
hard work, during the past years he was often ill...

- Lamntii heria, p. 334.
Nlikoian:

Comrade Stalin at first took an active part in the
formation of these organs, but during the past two years
he stopped taking an interest in them.

- Lavrentiiheria, pi 70.

- All citations from Lamntii Beria. 1953. Ed. Naumov and Sigachev.
Moscow 1999.

52. Palace of Soviets

Khrushchev:

At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect
for Lenin's memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite
the' decision taken over 30 years ago to build a Palace of
Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Il'ich, this palace was
not built, its construction was always postponed and the
project allowed to lapse.

Maksim Volchenkov's, "Dvorets Sovetov" ("The Palace of Soviets"):.

Despite the stormy beginning of the construction, the
realization of the project had to be frozen. More than
this, the metallic carcass of the Palace of Soviets was
taken down during the war the capital needed metal for
defense materials against fascist Germany. After the
victory they did not resurrect the building, although the
idea of the structure of this grandiose conception never
left Stalin until his very death. The Vozhd wanted to
underscore, with this building, the superiority of the
Soviet system over the structure of capitalist states. "We
won the war and are recognized throughout the world as
great victors. We should be ready for the arrival of
foreign tourists in our cities. What will they diink if they
go around Moscow and do not see any skyscrapers?

398

Khrushchev I icd

When they compare us to capitalist capitals, it may be to
our decciment."

The resources set aside for the construction of the Palace
of Soviets were used for the reconstruciion of the state
after this very severe war. In addition, the "Cold War"
had begun, and many resources were needed to build the
atom bomb. What was the sense of a grandiose building
if the enemy, who had atomic weapons, could wipe the
whole country off the face of the earth? Who would then
admire the masterpiece of Soviet architecture? It was
clear that the actualization of this magnificent
conception was postponed for an indefinite time.
Despite that, the directorate of construction of the
Palace of Soviets attached to the Soviet of Ministers stiU
remained in existence for several years. Then it was
reassigned to the construction of other multistory
buildings, using the experience of the designs of the
Palace of Soviets that had been worked out with the
years. A few more years passed, and the directorate
would undertake the construction of the television tower
in Ostankino.

. ..[ Volchenkov quotes Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in
the Secret Speech.] Despite Khrushchev's harsh criticism
of the old project and its organizers, the new contest did
not produce anything better, and the country never saw
this building either during Khrushchev's time or later.

- Maksim Volchenkov. 'TDvorets Sovetov."
http://www.4ygcca.com/dv_sovetov.html

53. Lenin Prize

Khrushchev:

Appendix

399

In the notes to the critical edition of Khrushchev's Speech the editors say
nothing about any connection between the cancellation of the Lenin
prizes and the establishment of the Stalin prizes.

The Lenin prizes were awarded for exceptional
achievements in the fields of science, technology,
literature, art, and architecture. They were established in
1925, and were not awarded between 1935 and 1957. In
November [1955] to March 1956 the question of
renewing of the Lenin prize awards was discussed in the
Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of
the CPSU. From 1958 till 1990 they were awarded
annually on Lenin's birthday.

- DokJad Khrushcheva, p. 161, n. 89

The idea of establishing prizes in the field of literature seems to have
been first suggested by Gorky. Having read Stalin's speech to the unified
Plenum of the CC and the Central Control Commission of the ACP(b)
Qanuary 7-12 1933), the writer responded with an enthusiastic letter.

January 16, 1933

Dear losif Vissarionovich!

The accumulation of materials for the first four volumes
of the History of the Civil War has been completed by its
secretariat.

It is now essential that the main editorial group confirm
the materials of the authors who have been mentioned
for reworking, and I urge you in this regard. The authors
must submit their manuscripts by March 31.1 implore
you to move this matter forwardi I have the impression
that the main editorial group is sabotaging this effort.

I read your powerfiil, wise speech to the Plenum with a
feeling of the deepest satisfaction and enthusiasm. I am
completely certain that such a powerfial echo will
resound everywhere in the world of the working class.
Beneath its serene, powerfially forged form lies such a
resounding thunder that it seems that you have squeezed
into your words all the noise of the construction of the
years gone by. I know that you do not need any words of
praise, but I think I have the right to tell you the truth.

400

Khrushchev I jcd

You are a great man, a real leader, and the proletariat of
the Soviet Union is fortunate that at its head there stands
a second Il'ich by the force of your logic and by your
inexhaustible energy. I shake your hand firmly, dear and
respected comrade.

A. Peshkov.

On the reverse side of the writing paper in Gorky's hand are two notes,
in the second of which, among other things, is written the following:

Aleksei Tolstoy has in mind an All-union contest in
comedy - I hereby attach the draft revolution about this
contest.

Among our writers there is felt a strong sense of
renewed energy and the desire to work seriously,
therefore the contest might yield good results. But for an
All-union contest seven pn2es are too few, we should
increase the number to at least 1 5, and the amount of the
first prize to 25 thousand - the devil with them! - and
give to the prizes the name of Stalin (emphasis added,
GF), for indeed this plan comes from you.

In addition: why only comedy? Drama should also be
included. . .

Forgive me for boring you.
A.P.

On February 3 1 933 Stalin replied to Gorky;
Dear Aleksei Maksimovich!

I have received your letter of January 16, 1933. Thank
you for your warm words and for your "praise." No
matter how people may boast, no one can be indifferent
to "praise." Understandably I, as a person, am no
exception...

3. We will finish plans for a comedy contest soon. Will
will not refuse Tolstoy. We guarantee everything
according to your demands. Concerning **giving the
prizes the name of Stalin") I protest most strongly
(most strongly!). (Emphasis added, GF)

Greetings! I shake your hand!

Appendix

401

J. Stalin

P.S. Take care of your health.

- Soima, Vasilii. Zapreshchemtyi Stalin. NIoscow: OLMA -Press, 2005, pp.
20-21. This volume is online at

http://2apravdu.ru/index.phpP0p tion=com_con ten t& task =viewacid=79
&Itemid=51

This passage is on the second "page" of the online book, at
http://zapravdu.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=79
&I temid=5 1 ?&Itemid = 5 1 &liinit =1 &limitstart = 1

On December 21 1939 Pmvda published a decree of the Council of Peo-
ple's Commissars of the USSR concerning the establishment of prizes
and awards in the name of Stalin. The decree, issued under the signature
of Chairman of the CPC Molotov and the business manager Khlomov,
reads as follows (emphasis added, GF):

In commemoration of the sixtieth birthday of comrade
losif Vissarionovich Stalin the Council of People's
Commissars of the Union of SSR decrees:

I. To establish 16 prizes in the name of Stalin (of
100,000 rubles each), to be awarded each year to activists
in science and arts for exceptional work in the following
fields:

1. physico-mathematical sciences;

2. technical sciences;

3. chemical sciences;

5. agricultural science;

6. medical science;

7. philosophical science;

8. economic science;

9. historical-philological science;

10. juridical science;

1 1 . music;

12. painting;

13. sculpture;

14. architecture;

1 5. theatrical arts;

402

Khrushchev lied

16. cinematography.

II. To establish the Stalin prize, to be awareded yearly
for the best discovery:

Ten first prizes of 100 thousand rubles each,
Twenty second prizes of 50 thousand rubles each,
Thirt)' third prizes of 25 thousand rubles each.

III. To establish the Stalin prized, to be awarded yearly
for exceptional achievements in the field of military
knowledge:

Three first prizes of 100 thousand rubles each.

Five second prizes of 50 thousand rubles each.

Ten thifd prizes of 25 thousand rubles each.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Of the Union of SSR V. Moiotov

Business manager of the Council of People's
Commissars

Of the Union of SSR M. Khlomov

December 20, 1939

Moscow, the Kremlin.

- "Premii bez prenii", Kommersanl"-Den'gi^ February 7, 2005. At
http:/ / www.kommersant.ru/ doc.aspx?DocsID=544976

lliereupon still another decree was issued in which the question of the
Stalin prizes received a further elaboration:

In addition to the decree of the CPC of the Union of
SSR of December 20 1939 ... the CPC of the Union of
SSR decrees:

One - for poetry.

One - for prose.

One — for dramaturgy.

One - for literary criticism.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars USSR
V. Moiotov

Business manager of the Council of People's
Commissars USSR

Appendix

403

M. Khlomov

February 1, 1940

Moscow, the Kremlin.

From 1930 till 1991 the highest state award of the USSR was the Order
of Lenin, not of Stalin. The Order of Stalin was indeed proposed but, as
we have seen in Section 1 above, it was resolutely and successfully op-
posed by Stalin himself and never instituted.

Concerning the Establishment of Two New Orders of
the Union of SSR: "The Order of Lenin" and 'The Red
Star"

The decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive
Committee of the USSR [the highest State organ under
the 1924 constitution - GF] of April 6, 1930:

1 . To establish two new orders of the Union of SSR:
"The Order of Lenin" and 'The Red Star."

The Statute of the Order "Order of Lenin".

The decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive
. Committee of the USSR of May 5 1930.

The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of
the Union of SSR . . . decrees:

To confirm the statue below of the order "The Order of
Lenin..."

- Text at http://glory.rin.ru/cgi-bin/aiticle.pl?id=99

54. Stalin Suggested Huge Tax Increase on

Kolkhozes

Khrushchev:

>X'hat is more, while reviewing this project Stalin
proposed that the taxes paid by the kolkhozes and by the
kolkhoz workers should be raised by 40 billion rubles;
according to him the peasants are well off and the
kolkhoz worker would need to sell only one more
chicken to pay his tax in full.

Imagine what this meant. Certainly, 40 billion rubles is a
sum which the kolkhoz workers did not realize for all the

404

Khrushchev lied

products which they sold to the Government. In 1952,
for instance, the kolkhozes and the kolkhoz workers
received 26,280 million rubles for all their products
delivered and sold to the Government.

Did Stalin's position, then, rest on data of any sort
whatever? Of course not. In such cases facts and figures
did not interest him.

Khrushchev, at the July 1953 CC Plenum:

Khrushchev: Unfortunately when there was a third
variant [of a proposed tax increase) he proposed by the
way to raise the taxes on kolkhozes and kolkhozniks to
40 billion, but the whole income is only 42 billion.

Mikoian: To raise the current tax from 15 billion to 40
billion.

Khrushchev: No, raise it 40 billion more in taxes, lliat is
already, I don't know what.

Mikoian: That would be impossible.

•Launnttt Beria, p. 171. This same story is repeated in the second draft of
the same meeting on p. 313, but Mikoian's words are elaborated to take a
dig at Beria.

Malenkov later mentions the same figure, but makes it clear that he had
not heard it before the Plenum.

In the course of the work of the current Plenum you,
comrades, learned the following fact. In connection with
the problems of improving animal husbandry in
February of this year comrade Stalin insistently proposed
increasing the taxes in the countryside by 40 billion
rubles. We of course all understood the glaring injustice
and danger of such a measure. . .

Ihid- p. 351. Note that Khrushchev had said Stalin mention this "by the
way" or "as an aside" (poputno). Malenkov has turned tliat into "insis-
tently" proposed.

Mikoian does not repeat this story of "40 billion rubles" in the account of
this event in his memoirs. He says that it was Khrushchev that heard Sta-
lin propose an additional tax on the peasantry.

Appendix

405

Mikoian also fails to dte the "40 billion rubles'* figure. "An extra
chicken" per peasant family would not produce a large sum, much less
this colossal figure - though Mikoian admits he did not ever hear Stalin
say thisi Evidendy it was not Khrushchev, but "other CC members'* who
heard the remark about "an extra chicken.*'

It is interesting that Mikoian is very careful to state what he himself heard
from Stalin, and to make it clear that he did not hear any of this himself.
This could be interpreted as meaning he did not necessarily believe it,
especially Khrushchev's 6gure.

As always in the evening, when the other members of
the Presidium were also at Stalin's, Malenkov laid out the
essence of the matter in order to test Stalin's reaction. I
was not present. Khrushchev later said that Stalin got
angry and said that we were were renewing the program
of Rykov and Frumkin, that the peasantry was getting fat
while the working class was living more poorly. Other
CC members told me that Stalin spoke out on this
subject during the October [1952] Plenum and sharply
criticized me fcx the very idea of raising the purchase
prices on meat and dairy products. They said that he
looked very mean, walked back and forth as he usually
did, grumbled, and said about me: 'A new Frumkin has
turned upl' But truthfully, I did not hear that. Then I
heard he said we needed yet another new tax on the
peasants. He said 'What's that to a peasant. Me'll give up
an extra chicken - and that's all.'

And at that same discussion Khrushchev heard about
Stalin's proposal to levy an addidonal tax on the
peasanlfy and got upset, saying that if we were to raise
taxes on the peasants then we needed to include people
like Malenkov, Beria, and Zverev (the head of the
Ministry of Finance) on the commission. Stalin agreed to
that. After a time we actually met in our new
composition. The commission discovered that both
Beria and Malenkov considered it impossible to cany out
Stalin's directive. This was explained, of course, in
private conversations. They gave it to Zverev to do the
accounting and explaining. In general, they drew this
matter out as long as they could. Everyone considered

406

Khrushchev lied

Stalin's suggestions about new taxes on the peasantry
without any increases in the purchase prices to be
impracticable, (emphasis added, GF)

- Tak hyh (Mikoian's memoirs). Chapter 46, p. 578.

55. Stalin Insulted Postyshev

Khrushchev:

In one of his speeches Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction
with Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?"

Postyshev answered clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, Comrade
Stalin, a Bolshevik."

This assertion was at first considered to show a lack of
respect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act
and consequently resulted in Posryshev's annihilation
and branding without any reason as a 'people's enemy.'

Khrushchev is the sole source for this supposed statement by Stalin. This
quotation has never been located anywhere. No one else has ever claimed
that Stalin said it. Had it in fact been in a speech it would almost certainly
have been found long before now. We discuss this matter in the text.

56. ^^Disorganization'' of Politburo Work

Khrushchev:

Stalin's Proposal:

1. The Political Bureau Commission for Foreign
Affairs ('Sextet') is to concern itself in the future, in
addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of
internal construction and domestic policy.

2. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of
the State Commission of Economic Planning of the

Appendix

407

USSR, Comrade Voznesensky, and is to be known
as a Septet.

Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin.

\Xliat a temiinology of a card player! (Laughter in the hall.) It is
clear that the creation within the Political Bureau of this type of
commissions - "quintets," "sextets," "septets" and "novenaries"
- was against the principle of collective leadership. The result of
this was that some members of the Political Bureau were in this
way kept away from participation in reaching the most important
state matters.

Edvard Radzinsky, biographer of, and extremely hostile to, Stalin:

After Stalin's death Nikita Khrushchev in his famous
report on the cult of personality waxed indignant that
Stalin "diminished the role of the Politburo by the
creation within the CC of certain "sextets", "quintets",
to which were given spedal powers. ... "What a
terminology of a card player!" — fumed Khrushchev. But
he, addressing himself to the post-Lenin generation of
the Party, did not know (or pretended not to know) that
he was threatening one of the oldest Party traditions.
"Troikas", "quintets", and other "narrow structures"
created by the Vozhd within his leading group and
known only to the participants and the Vozhd himself,
had appeared in Lenin's day.

- Radzinsky, Stalin. Chapter 4. The Russian edition, Stalin. Moscow: Va-
grius, 1997, is on line at http://militera.lib.ru/bio/radzinsky_esl/02.htinl

57. Stalin Suspected Voroshilov as an
"EngUsh Agent'*

Khrushchev:

Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with
the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was
an English agent. (Laughter in the hall.) It's true — an
English agent. - p.48

Khrushchev's memoirs:

408

Khnishchcv lied

Stalin even said to a few of us [lit. "a narrow circle of
us," V u^kom krugUy GF] that he suspected Voroshilov
was an English agent. Of course, improbable stupidities.

- Khrushchev, N.S. Vremia. Liudi. Vlast'. Kn.2. Chast' 3. Moscow: Mosk-
ovskie novosti, 1999, pp. 128-129. Online at

http:/ / hrono.nj/libris/lib_h/hrush45.html

lliere is no other source for this story. None of Khrushchev's colleagues
in that "narrow circle" ever confirmed it.

58. Andreev; 59. Molotov; 60. Mikoian

Andreev

Khrushchev:

By unilateral decision, Stalin had also separated one
other man from the work of the Political Bureau -
Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most
unbridled acts of willfulness.

Efremov:

In the new list of those elected are all members of the
old Politburo - except that of comrade A.A. Andreev
who, as everyone knows now is unfortunately completely
deaf and thus can not function.

- '"V Ch'I Ruki Vruchim Estafetu Nashego Velikogo Dela?' NeopubUk-
ovannaia rech' I.V. Stalina na Plenume Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS. 16
Oktobria 1952 goda (po zapisi L.N. Efremova)" Sovetskaia RossJia. 13 ian-
vaiiia 2000 g. p. 6. Facsimile online at

http: // chss.mon tdair. edu/ english/ furr/research/stalinoct 1652.pdf Also
at http:/ / www.prometej.info/solnce/st03.htm

Konstantin Simonov:

I remember only Stalin's reply about Andreev, who was
not included among the members and candidates of the
Presidium of the CC - that he had withdrawn from
activity, and for all practical purposes could not work
actively any more.

Simonov, G/a^ami chehveka moe^ pokoleniia /"Through the Eyes of a Man
of My Generation"], 1988, p. 246.

Appendix

Molotov; Mikoian

Khrushchev:

Efremov:

It's necessary to touch upon incorrect behavior on the
part of a few prominent poUtical figures, if we are
speaking of unity in our affaiais. I have in mind
comrades Molotov and Mikoian.

Comrade Molotov - the most dedicated to our cause. If
called upon, I do nt doubt that, without hesitation, he
would give his life for the party. But we cannot overlook
his unworthy acts. Comrade Molotov as our Minister of
Foreign Affairs, having taken a litde too much liqueur at
a diplomatic deception, gave his agreement to the British
ambassador to publish bourgeois newspapers and
magazines in our country. Why? On what basis did he
have to agree to such a thing? Is it not clear that the
bourgeoisie is our class enemy and to disseminate the
bourgeois press amongst to the Soviet people can bring
us nothing but harm. This faulty step, if we were to
permit it, would be a harmful, negative influence on the
minds and world-view of Soviet people, would lead to
the weakening of our communist ideology and the
strengthening of bourgeois ideology. This is the first
political mistake of comrade V.M. Molotov.

And what about the offer by Molotov to give the Crimea
to Soviet Jews? This is a crude error by comrade
Molotov. Why did he have to do it? How could this be

410

Khrushchev lied

permitted? On what grounds did comrade Molotov
make this oiiet? We have the Jewish Autonomous
Republic. Isn't that enough? Let this Republic be
developed. And comrade Molotov out not to be an
advocate of illegal Jewish claims on our Soviet Crimea.
This is the second political error of comrade V.I.
Molotov! Comrade Molotov does not conduct himself as
befits a member of the Politburo. And we reject
categorically his fanciful offers.

Comrade Molotov has such deep respect for his wife
that no sooner has the Politburo taken a decision on this
or that important political question, that it is quickly
made known to comrade Zhemchuzhina. It seems as
though some kind of invisible thread united the
Politburo with Molotov's wife Zhemchuzhina and her
friends. And she is surrounded by friends who cannot be
trusted. Clearly, such behavior by a member of the
Politburo is impermissible.

Now regarding comrade Mikoian. He, do you see', is
categorically against raising agricultural taxes on the
peasants. Who is he, our Anastas Mikoian? What is it
that is not clear to him? The peasant is our debtor. We
have a first unity with the peasants. We have guaranteed
the land forever to the kolkhozes. They must render the
due debt to the state. Therefore we do not agree with
comrade Mikoian 's position.

(see former references under "Andreev").

Khrushchev's memoirs:

And at the Plenum Stalin, in his speech, hit Molotov and
Mikoian "upside the head," put their honesty in doubt.
In his speech he insinuated political distrust of them,
suspicion in some kind of political dishonesty. Well, well!

" Khrushchev, N.S. Vrnma, Uudi, Vlast\ Vol. 2 Part 3. Chapter "19'h
Congress of the Communist Party of our country". Online at
http:/ /hrono.ru/ libris/lib_h/hrush4 1 .html

D.T. Shepilov, one of the few eyewimesses to the Plenum who left a
written account of what took place, said:

Appendix

411

Stalin at the CC Plenum and without any basis expressed
political distrust of Molotov, accused him of
"capitulationism towards American imperialism" and
proposed not to appoint Molotov to the staff of the
Buro of the Presidium of the CC. That was done. V.
Molotov accepted this without a single word of protest.

Standing at the podium Stalin with a suspicious
expression spoke about how Molotov was intimidated by
American imperialism, that, when he was in the USA, he
sent panic-stricken telegrams, that such a leader does not
deserve our trust, that he cannot be in the leading
nucleus of the party. In the same tones Stalin expressed
political distrust of A. Mikoian and K. Voroshilov.

. . . Molotov sat unmoving behind the table of the
Presidium. He remained silent, and not a single muscle
moved on his face. Through the glass of his pince-nez he
looked straight out into the hall and only rarely moved
the three fingers of his right had on the tablecloth, as
though kneading a bit of bread. A. Mikoian was very
nelrvous. He delivered a trifling and disordered speech.
He too, defending himself from these fantastic
accusations, did not fail to kick out at Molotov that, as
he claimed, he had been friends with Voznesensky, who
was himelf a terrible criminal.

- Shepilov, Dmitrii T. Neprimknuvshii. Moscow. Vagrius, 2001, p. 19; p.
229. Online at http://www.pseudology.0rg/ShepilovDT/l l.htm

61. Expansion of the Presidium

Khrushchev:

Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members
of the Political Bureau. He often stated that Political
Bureau members should be replaced by new ones. His
proposal, after the 19th Congress, concerning the
election of 25 persons to the Central Committee
Presidium, was aimed at the removal of the old Political
Bureau members and the bringing in of less experienced
persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of
ways. We can assume that this was also a design for the

412

Khrushchev lied

future annihilation of the old Political Bureau members
and, in this way, a cover for all shameful acts of Stalin,
acts which we are now considering.

Efremov's notes:

Yes, we did hold the Congress of our party. It went very
well, and many of you might think that, amongst us there
exists full harmony and unity. But we have not this
harmony and unity of thought. Some people disagree
with our decisions.

They say, why did we significantly enlarge the
membership of the Central Committee? But isn't it self-
evident that we need to get new forces into the CC? We
old people will die out, but we must think to whom, into
whose hands we shall pass the baton of our great
undertaking. Who will carry it forward? For this we need
younger, dedicated people and political leaders. And
what does it mean to bring up a dedicated, devoted
political leader of the State? It takes ten, no, fifteen years
to educate a state leader.

But just wishing for this is not enough. To educate
ideologically firm state activists can only be done
through practice, in the daily work of carrying out the
general line of the party, of overcoming all sorts of
opposition from hostile opportunist elements who are
striving to slow down and interrupt the task of the
building of socialism. And we must have political
activists of Leninist experience, educated by our Party, in
the stru^le to defeat these hostile attempts and to
achieve complete success in the realization of our ^eat
goals.

Is it not clear that we must lift up the role of our party
and its party committees? Can we forget about
improving the Party's work among the masses, as Lenin
taught us? All this needs a flow of young, fresh forces
into the CC, the general staff of our Party. This is what
we have done, following Lenin's instructions. This is
why we have expanded the membership of the CC. And
the Party itself has grown a little.

Appendix

413

The question is asked as to why we relieved some
prominent Party and state figures &om their important
posiB as ministers. What can be said on this account? We
replaced comrades Molotov, Kaganovich. Voroshilov
and others and replaced them with new workers. Why?
On what basis? The work of a minister - this is hard,
peasant labor. It demands great strength, concrete
knowledge and good health. This is why we have
relieved some deserving comrades from the posts they
occupied and appointed in their places new, more
qualified, workers who take initiative. They are young
people, fiill of strength and energy. We must support
them in their important work.

(see previous references).

Bibliography and Sources

Many primaiy and secondary sources were consulted in preparing this
book. Most are in Russian only; as of the date of publication very few are
available in English. This is one reason for the many quotations from
primary and secondary sources in the text. All translations are by the au-
thor unless otherwise noted in the text.

To include the full text of the many hard-to-find primary sources, the
text of Khrushchev's Secret Speech, and a full bibliography would add
15%-20% to the cost of this book. Therefore:

• 'ITie full text of Khrushchev's speech in the transbtion used
by the author is available online at

http:/ /chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/ research /ki/ speech,
html

• For the convenience of interested readers who can read
Russian the author has made available many hard-to-find
primary sources online. The URLs for these primary sources,
as well as a full bibliography of primary and secondary
sources, are available at

http://chss.montclair.edu/ english/furr/ research /kl/biblio-
graphy.html

Editor

Index

Abakumov. Viktor S.. 365. 368
Afinogenov, Aleksandr N., 223
Afonskii, VJl., 386
Agranov, lakov S., 67, 272
Alksnis, lakov I., 173, 309
Allilueva,SvetlanaJ., 108. 375
Andreev, Andrei A., 47, 69, 1 1 3,

120, 132, 133, 153, 171, 172,

227, 287, 301, 302, 321, 322,

384, 408, 410
Andropov, lurii V., 216
Andpov, Nikolai K., 65, 66, 166,

169, 174,317,318,319
Aiistov, Aveikii B., 25, 41, 79, 87,

170, 257, 332
Artuzov, Artur Kh., 386
Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman G.,

328

Babel, Isaak E., 82
Babulin. Anatolii N., 67. 171. 320
Babulin. Viktor N.. 321
Bagramian, Ivan Kh., 93, 94. 355.

356, 358
Balkars, 97
Baramia, M.I., 369
Barmine, Aleksandr G.. 161
Bauman, Karl la., 309, 383
Bek, .\leksandr, 18, 19, 238
Belianov, V.A., 119,391
Benediktov, Ivan A., 21, 74, 80,

242, 323, 324, 332
Beria, Lavrenrii P., 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11,

23, 29, 36, 37, 38, 52. 53. 61. 67.

68. 69. 75. 77. 78. 81. 82. 83. 91.
102,103,104,105,107,108,
109, 110,111,112,113,114,
115,116,124,128,132, 138,
152,153,156,157, 169,170,
171, 172. 175. 178. 179. 180.
181, 184, 193, 194, 200, 201,
207,213,227,231,286, 290,
300,319, 321,324,327, 328,
333, 334, 352, 366, 368, 370,
371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376,
377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382,
383, 384, 387, 388, 396, 397,
404, 405

Bobrov, Vladimir L., 1, 6, 44, 89,
114,115,197,198,212

Bochkov. Viktor M, 113. 156. 384

Bogomolov, N.A., 320

Boldyrev, xM.F., 65, 318

Broue. Piene. 42. 160

Bubnov. Andrei S.. 169. 190. 191,
318, 383

Budienniy, Semen M., 44

Bugai. Nikolai F.. 98. 101. 255. 366.
367

Bukharin. Nikolai I.. 10. 14. 16. 29.

44. 45. 50. 63. 116. 140. 162.

174. 175. 176. 188. 197. 198.

199, 200, 206, 207, 212, 216,

236, 239, 279, 307, 308, 313, 314
Bulgaiiin, Nikolai A., 124, 164, 165,

249, 285, 396

Chechen, 97, 99, 100, 101, 366, 367
Chechen-Ingush. J'w Chechen
Chomsky. Noam. 142

416

Khrushchev lictl

Chubar, Mas la., 64, 65, 66. 81. 82,
152,155, 174,175,316,317,
318,319,333
Chuev, Feliks I., 55, 56, 59, 65, 66.
110,213,225, 238, 306.318,
319, 355. 356, 362, 377, 394
Chuianov, Aleksei S., 322
Conquest, Robert, 141, 144, 212
Ctimean Tatars, 97, 99, 100, 366

Dagin, I.Ia., 300
Dekanozov, Madimir G., 23
Deribas, Terentii D., 383
Dimitrov, Georgi M., 91, 222
Dmitiiev, Dmitiii M.. 29, 63, 66,

261,319, 326
Doctors' Plot, 104, 105, 107, 108,

153, 206, 207, 371, 372, 374, 375
Dridzo, Vera S., 17, 18, 19
Dzerzhinskii, Feliks £., 120, 393

Eastman, Max, 14, 234, 235
Efremov, Leonid N., 133, 134, 135,

136, 250, 408. 409. 412
Egorov, Aleksandr I., 89, 298, 299
Eideman, Robert P., 307
Eikhe, Robert I., 24, 25, 37, 48, 49,

50,51,52,53, 55, 56,152,159,

173, 176, 177. 178, 179, 180.

181, 183, 187, 189, 190, 191,

196, 197, 198, 199, 257. 288,

289,291,292,319
Eltsin, Boris N., 144, 149
Emel'ianov, lurii 28, 94. 260
Enukidze. Avel* S, 28, 38, 39, 152,

206, 269, 307, 308, 313, 382
Etinger, la. G., 368
Evdokimov, Efim G., 299, 300

Ezhov, Nikolai I., 3, 24, 25, 26, 36,
37, 41, 44, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65,
66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80,
82,83,89,111,112,113,139,
148,152,156,162, 168,169,
171, 172, 175, 176, 178. 179,
180.181,186,187, 188,198,
199,200,257,268, 272, 273,
286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292,
298, 300, 301, 303, 304, 305,
306,309, 311,312, 313,317,
319, 320, 321, 325, 326, 327,
328,330,347

Fefer, I.S., 368
Ferreira, Sergio, 1
Feuchtwanger, Leon, 230, 231
Fotieva, Lidia A., 16, 19, 238
Frinovskii, Mikhail P., 26, 49, 50,
52, 53, 54, 55, 61, 62, 67, 68,
113,148,168,169,175,180,
187, 198, 199, 200, 288, 292,
293, 299, 300, 303, 304, 311,
312, 319, 326
Frumkin, M.I., 405
Frunze, Mikhail V., 120, 393
Furr, Grover C, 1 , 2, 4, 30, 39, 54,

197,198, 266
Furr, Joseph G., 1

Gamamik, Ian B., 89, 174, 307,
308, 317

Gett)', J. Arch. 3, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44,
46, 47, 74, 78, 80, 116, 129, 160,
161, 162, 198, 200, 212, 253,
270, 279, 284, 304, 322, 323,
329, 330

Index

417

Glebova-Kameneva, Tat'iana I.,

260, 261
Glikina, Zinaida F., 67, 320
Goglidze, Sergei A., 23
Golovanov, Aleksandt E., 84, 93,

335, 354, 355, 356
Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 49, 58, 116,

121, 144, 149, 171, 194, 195,

197, 198, 207, 216, 270, 271, 325
Gorkii, Maksim (A.M. Peshkov),

27, 258, 399,400
Giibkov, Anatolii I., 360, 361
Gnmsley, Mark, 142
Grin'ko, Giigoiii F., 59, 174, 175,

318

Hammerstein-Equoni, Kun von,

299

Harris, John, 63, 176,316

Haymarket Affair; 145

Hider, Adolf, 85, 86, 266, 335, 338,

340, 341, 345
Hudson, Arthur, 1

lagoda. Geniikh G., 25, 26, 41, 50,

61, 63, 67, 174, 206, 257, 272,

307,312,313,328
lakir, lona E., 44, 65, 89, 165, 166,

169, 209, 210, 21 1, 307, 317, 318
lakovlev, A.S., 305
lakovlev, lakov A., 36, 51, 55, 80,

112, 272,304,305,306,325,

332, 383
Ibsen, Hennk, 27, 258
Ignat'ev, Semen D., 102, 104, 107,

370, 374
Ikramov, Akbal I., 14, 207
Ivanov-Razumnik, Razumnik V.,

328

Kabakov, Ivan D., 62, 63, 64, 152,
159, 176, 190, 191, 197, 312,
313,314,315,316,383

Kaganovich, Lazar' M., 23, 25, 29,
41,55, 65, 77, 79, 80.91,96,
109, 110, 120,124,155, 164,
165,171, 181,193,209,210,
211,213, 215, 227, 238, 253,
260,261,271,272, 273, 286,
306, 318, 319, 332, 369, 376,
377, 396, 413

Kalinin, Mikhail I., 28. 38, 120, 225,
232

Kalmyks, 97

Kamenev. Lev B., 12, 13, 15, 16,
17, 28,29, 64,116,152, 157,
162, 229, 233, 234, 236, 239,
260,261,313

Kaminskii, Gngoni N., 110, 153,
378, 379, 381, 382, 383

Karachai, 97

Karakhan, Lev M., 307, 308

KaqKJV, \ladimir V., 46, 47, 282,
283, 286, 287

Kartvelishvili, Lavrendi I.

(Lavrcnt'ev), 111, 112, 113, 153,
382, 383

Kedrov, I.M., 385

Kedrov, Mikhail S., 113, 114, 153,
156, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387

Keitel. Wilhelm. 85,338

Khataevich, M.M, 383

Khoziainov, T.S., 300

Khrushchev, Nikita S., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
7, 8, 9,10,11,14, 15,19,20,21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31,
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50,
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,
62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,
71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,

418

Khrushchev lic-d

80, 81. 82. 83. 84. 85, 86. 87. 88,
89. 90, 91. 92. 93. 94, 95, 96. 97.
98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107.
109,110,111,113,114,116,
117,119,120,121,122,123,
124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129,
130. 131. 132. 133, 134, 135,
137,138,139.^ 140,141.142,
143,144, 146,147,149,150,
151,152,153,154,155, 156,
157,158,159, 160,162,163,
164,165, 170,171,172, 176,
177, 178. 179, 180, 181, 182,
183,192,193,194,195, 196,
197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202,
203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209,
210,211,212,213,214,215,
216, 218, 225, 227, 228, 229.
230, 232, 240, 243, 244, 250,
251,252, 253, 254, 255, 256,
257, 259, 260,261,263, 264,
266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271,
272, 273, 274, 282. 284, 288,
292.304.306.310.312,316.
317, 319, 322, 323, 324, 325,
327, 328, 330, 332, 333, 334,
336, 337, 338, 340, 341, 342,
346,347, 348, 349,352, 353,
354, 355, 356. 357, 358, 359,
360,361,362,365, 367, 368,
369, 370, 371,372,375, 376,
377, 378, 382, 383, 387, 388,
391, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398,
399, 403, 404. 405. 406, 407,
408,409,410.411.414
Kirov, Sergei M., 39, 40, 1 10, 120,
144,152,157.224.269. 270.
379, 381

Kobulov, Bogdan Z.. 23, 113, 171,

178. 179. 187, 384
Kol'tsov. Mikhail E., 67
Komarov, P.T., 25, 59, 310
Konev, Ivan S.. 90. 347

Koiiman. Zinaida A., 320

Kork, Avgust I., 307

Kosarev, Aleksandr V., 44, 64, 65,

66, 67, 68, 69, 81, 152, 155, 159.

170, 171,172.182.316. 320.

321.322.333
Kosior. Stanislav V.. 54. 64, 65. 66.

81,82,152,155,166,169,181,

188,190,191,256, 292,316,

317,318,319,320, 333, 383
Kosolapov, Richard I., 121, 254,

274, 393
Kossior. See Kosior
Kostring, Ernst, 298, 299, 300
Kotol)'nov, Ivan I., 40
Kozhinov, Vadim V'., 84, 85, 93,

94, 195, 252, 335, 336, 338
Krestinskii. Nikolai N.. 59, 174. 308
Knnitskii, Aleksandr I., 383
Kniglov, Sergei N., 71, 377
Knipskaia, Nadezhda K., 12, 13,

14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 233, 234, 236,

237, 238, 239
Kuibyshev, Valerian V., 45, 71, 120,

166, 206, 245, 327, 384, 393
Kumanev, Georgii A., 92
Kuzneisov, Aleksei A., 102, 368,

369

Kuznetsov. Nikolai G.. 86. 91, 341 .
354. 361. 367. 369

Laiina, Anna M. (Bukhanna). 44

Lazebniy, \'.M.. 300, 301

Lenin, XHadimir I., 7, 9, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 27, 28,
31,32,35,42,43,51,90,118,
119. 120.121,123, 126, 127,
134,152,153. 157.213. 216.
220,221,222, 224,225, 228,
232, 233, 234, 235, 236,237,
238. 245. 246. 247. 248, 258,

Index

419

259, 260, 267, 273, 274, 276,
348, 349,389,390,391,392,
393, 397, 398, 399, 403, 407, 412

Leningrad Affaii, 101, 102, 104.
153, 367, 368

Leplevskii, Israil' M., 319, 320

Liskow, Alfred G., 87, 88, 342, 343,
344, 345, 346

Littlepage, John D.. 62, 176, 315,
316

Liushkov, Gemikh S., 1 1 1 , 1 12,

319.320,327, 383
Lozovskii, Semen A., 368
Lulov, G.N., 167,168,169

Mai2el'-Kedrova, Reweka, 386

Maksimenkov, Leonid, 120, 121,
122.123, 224,227, 391

Malenkov, Georgii M., 9, 10, 23,
74,77, 79, 80,91,94, 96,103,
105, 125.128. 132.164.171.
187. 193.194.200.209.211.
214, 215, 216,225, 226, 227,
231,253, 284, 301,305, 323,
332, 336, 337, 338, 352, 359,
368. 369. 371, 377, 396, 404, 405

Malyshev, Viacheslav A., 108

Mamonov, K.I., 73

Manuil'skii, Dmitiii M., 44

Marat, Jean-Paul, 27, 258

Maslov, K-I., 72, 73, 253

Medvedev. Roi A, 91. 92. 108. 123.
141, 144.212. 227.228. 342.
350, 374, 375, 394, 395

Medvedev, Zhores A., 108, 342,
350, 374, 375

Meierkhol'd, Vsevolod E., 82

Mekhlis. Lev Z.. 91

Memorial Society, Fund. 36. 104.
112

Men'shagin. Boris G., 327

Meretskov, Kirill A., 85, 338, 360
Merkulov, Vsevolod N., 23
Meshik, Pavel la., 23, 175
Mezhlauk, Valerian I., 181, 186,

188, 309
Mgeladze, Akakii I., 9, 10, 68, 69,

171,172,249,250,321,322
Mikhoels, Solomon M., 368
Mikoian, Anastas I., 10, 15, 22, 25,
92, 109, 120, 124, 128, 129, 131,
132,133,134,135, 153,160,
165, 193, 197, 203, 204, 227,
228, 232,241,242, 257, 285,
286, 368, 376, 379, 397, 404,
405, 406,408,409,410,411
Mikoyan. Sec Nfikoian
Nfingrelian Affair. 103. 104. 105,

108,153.369.370. 371
Mironov, Sergei N., 49, 55, 67, 187,

291,312, 326
Mirzoian, Levoi I., 63, 313
Mishakova, Ol'ga P., 68, 171, 172,
321

Mochalov, V.D.,121,392

Molotov, Viacheslav M., 23, 25, 28,
39, 41, 47, 51, 55, 56, 59, 65, 66.
77, 79, 80, 91, 95, 96, 105, 109,
110.120,122,123,124,125,
127,132,133, 134, 135,153,
155, 164, 165, 171, 181, 193,
209,210,211,213, 214,215,
225, 229, 231, 239, 253, 254,
271,272, 283, 285, 286, 290,
305,306,319,324, 332,350,
352, 362, 368, 369, 371, 377,
378, 394, 396, 402, 408, 409,
410, 411,413

Moskalenko, Kirill S., 361

Nikolaev, Leonid V., 39, 40

420

Khnishchcv lied

Nikolacvsky. Boiis, 2, 32. 104. 129,

267, 370
Nikolaev-Zhuxid, Nikolai G., 52,

178,179,186,187, 188
Nioradze. Mikhail T., 388
Norden, Karl, 317
Novikov, Aleksandr A., 361

Ordzhonikidze, Grigoiii K.

C'Seigo"), 110. 111,114,115,

116,120,153, 224, 379,380.

381,382, 387, 388
Ordzhonikidze, Papiilia, 1 15, 116,

153, 387, 388
Ordzhonikidze, Valiko. 115, 387,

388

P'engTe-huai,23
Pakhomov, N.I., 181, 186
Pavlunovsky, Ivan P., 110, 379
Petrov, Nikita V., 41, 50, 52, 55, 61,

63, 67, 73, 75, 80,82, 104,112,

175, 179, 199, 201, 273, 291,

295,301,304,305,311,312,

313,320, 321,325,327
Piatakov, Georgii L., 62, 67, 161,

162, 230, 308, 313, 316, 320
Pikina, Valendna F., 171
Pistrak. Lazar, 229, 230
Popkov, Petr S., 102, 367, 368, 369
Popov, Georgii M., 69, 70, 165,

203,318
Poskrebyshev, 91, 185, 187, 369,

394

Pospclov Report, 25, 36, 42, 48, 53,
54,57,61,66,87, 112,113,159,
163,164,165, 168,170,173,
176,177,178,181,183, 201,
202. 319

Pospelov, Petr N., 25, 35, 36, 37,
38, 41, 42, 48, 52, 53, 54, 57, 61,
63, 66, 75, 87,112,113, 122,
157,159, 163, 164, 165, 168,
170,173,176,177, 178,181,
182,183,193,201,202,207,
208, 212, 227,270, 288,315,
319, 328, 392

Postyshev, Pavel P., 45, 46, 47, 64,
65, 67, 74,80, 112, 129, 130,
152, 153, 155, 159, 162, 163,
164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169,
170,182,197,199, 256, 282,
284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 316,
317, 318, 323, 327, 406

Pramnek, EX., 65, 181, 186, 318

Prendergast, Kevin, 1

Ptukha, Vladimir V., 383

Pykhalov, Igor', 44, 90, 91, 98, 342,
346, 350, 366

Radek, Karl B., 10, 161, 228, 230
Radzinsky, Edvard, 131, 350, 407
Radzivilovskii, .Aleksandr P., 303
Rankovich. KK G., 105, 372
Razumov, NLO., 313
Redens, Stanislav F.. 72, 73, 252,
253, 327

Riumin, Mikhail D., 102, 104, 205,

368, 374
Robins, Col. Raymond, 221
Rodionov, Mikhail I., 102, 367
Rodos, Boris, 81, 82, 83, 152, 256,

333. 334
Rogovin, Vadim Z., 67, 160, 171,

223, 284, 286, 321
Rokossovsky, Konstantin K., 356
Rosenberg, Julius, 146
Rosengol'ts, Arkadii P., 308
Rozenblum, A.M., 59, 60, 310

Index

421

Rozengol'ts, Aikadii P., 59, 174,

175, 309
Rudenko, Roman A., 56, 57, 83,

159,172,182,191,201,202
Rudzutak, Ian E., 56, 57, 58, 59,

152, 159, 172, 173, 174, 175,

182,306, 307, 308, 309,319
Rukhimovich, Moisei L., 58, 175,

187,190,191,309
Rychagov, Pavel V., 174
Rykov, Aleksei I., 29, 44, 50, 63,

174,176,206,207,245,246,

248, 249, 272, 279, 307, 308,

313, 314,318,405

Sacco-Vanzetti case, 146
Safarov, Georgii I., 385, 386
Sakharov, Valentin A., 15, 16
Samsonov, A.M., 93, 357
Sedova. Natalia I., 15, 215
Service, Robert, 16, 121, 265
Shcherbakov, Aleksandi S., 73, 202,

203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 251, 368
Sheboldaev, Boris P., 313, 383
Shepilov, Dmitiii T., 21, 23, 65, 79,

96, 134, 238, 243, 303, 304, 377,

410,411
Shilkin, P.P., 386

Shtemenko, Sergei M., 21, 242, 356
Shvemik, Nikolai M., 25, 44, 120.

165,209,210
Simonov, Konstantin M., 90, 1 33,

134, 347,408
Smimov, Aleksandr P., 314
Snegov, .\leskei V., 70, 71, 204
Sokol'nikov, Grigorii la., 161, 162,

313

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., 141, 212
Soige, Richard, 86, 336
Stalin, losif v., 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11,12, 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,

20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38,
39, 40, 41 , 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,
57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69,
70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79,
81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92,
93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103,
104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109,
110,111,112,114,115,116,
117,118,119,120,121,122,
123,124,125,126, 127,128,
129,130,131,132,133,134,
135,136,138,139, 140, 141,
142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148,
149,152,153,154,155,156,
157,158,161,162,163,164,
165, 170, 171, 172, 173, 176,
177, 179, 180, 181, 183, 192,
193,194,195,196,199, 200,
203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210,
211,212, 213, 214, 215,216,
218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223,
224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229,
230, 231,232, 233, 234, 235,
236, 237, 238, 239,240,241,
242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248,
249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254,
255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262,
263, 264, 266, 267, 269, 270,
271,272, 273,274,275,276,
277, 278, 279, 280, 282, 286,
287, 288, 290, 291, 292, 293,
298, 301,303, 304,305, 306,
307,312,313, 321, 322, 323,
324, 325, 327, 329, 330, 333,
334, 335, 336, 337, 339, 341,
342, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351,
352,353, 354, 355, 356, 357,
358, 359, 360, 361,362, 363,
365, 367, 368, 369, 371, 372,
373, 374, 375, 378, 379, 380,
383, 385, 387, 388, 389, 390,

422

Khrushchev lied

391,392, 393,394, 395, 396,
397, 398, 399. 400, 401, 402,
403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408,
409,410, 411,412
Stoliar. A. la.. 63, 314
Sudoplatov, Pavel A.. 31, 40, 82,
83, 92, 264, 265, 270, 335. 352
Sukhomlin, K.V., 65, 318
Sukhomlinov, A.V., 113, 385
Suslov. Mikhail A., 22. 244, 392
Svanidze, A.S.. 320

Tamarin. Anton M., 59, 175, 309
Taubman. William. 2, 3. 4, 143, 254
Thurston. Robert W., 41, 74, 75,

273, 322. 327
Timashuk. Lidia F.. 106. 107, 207,

372, 374, 375
Timoshenko. Semen K., 91, 92, 94,

335, 349, 356, 358, 360
Tito. losip Broz. 105, 154, 371, 372
Tivel'-Levit, Aleksandr lu.. 161,

162

Tolstoy, .\leksei N.. 400
Tomskii. Mikhail P., 239. 313
Torture, 49. 75. 76. 78. 147, 158,

201, 328, 330
Trotskii, Lev D., 14, 15, 29, 30, 42,
51, 139, 140, 142, 144, 160, 168,
214. 215, 216. 234, 235, 239,
262.263.264.266, 270,271.
278. 307. 308
Tsepkov, \'.G.. 104
Tseq)ento, P.I.. 167, 168, 169
Tukhachevskii, Mikhail N., 58, 63,
88, 89, 131, 156, 166, 172, 198,
200,201. 209.211,287,304,
306, 307. 308. 309,313,347
Tukhachevsky. See Tukhachevskii
typology. 5, 150,151,153

Uborevich, leronim P., 89, 307
Ukhanov, K.V., 167, 168
Ukrainian. 46, 166. 205. 254. 256,

282. 283, 319. 320. 327, 343
Urianova. Maria I., 15, 19, 237, 238
Ul'rikh, Vassili ^^, 64, 66, 67, 165
Uritskii, Semen P., 67, 320
Ushakov. Zinovii M., 52. 178. 179,

180.186.187.188
Uspenskii, .Meksandr I., 74, 75,

255, 325. 326, 327

Vareikis. losif M., 383
N'asilevskii. .Aleksandr M.. 86. 93.

242. 337. 338, 339. 340. 353. 356
X'atutin, Nikolai F.. 361
Veinberg. S.Iu., 317
V'lodzimirskii, Lev E., 23, 384. 385
\^olchenkov. Maksim, 126, 397, 398
N'olga Germans. 97
\'olkogonov. Dmitiii A., 16, 29. 39.

90. 92, 94, 236. 239. 259, 269.

348, 349, 350, 352, 359, 360
Volkov, A.A., 72, 73, 253
Volodicheva, M., 19, 237, 238
\'orontsov, M.A., 86, 87, 153, 158,

340, 341

X'oroshilov, Kliment E., 25, 120,
131. 135,153,165,210,228,
231.246,247,286, 290,352,
397,407.408,411,413

Voznesenskii, Nikolai A., 102, 103,
131,134.242,367, 368, 369,
407. 411

Vyshinskii. Andrei la., 322

Yagoda. See lagoda, Geniikh G.

Index

423

Yugoslavia, 105, 153, 371

Zakovskii, Leonid M., 59, 60, 78,
310,311.312

Zhdanov, Andrei A., 31, 40, 41, 42.
69, 107, 120, 152, 171, 172, 204,
206. 229, 266. 271. 272, 321,
322. 374

Zhemchuzhina, Polina S., 410

Zhukov, Georgii K., Marshal, 21 ,
39, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 55, 61, 77,
85, 86,91.92,93, 95. 96,153,

155, 174, 194, 195, 196, 209,
210, 211,226,240,241, 252,
253, 284, 287, 289, 335, 339,
340, 350, 353, 354, 356, 357,
359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 396

Zhukov, lurii, 24, 80, 99, 125, 194,
195, 196, 201, 227, 280, 282,
290, 323, 332

Zinov'ev, Gngotii E., 13, 15, 17,
28, 29, 64, 116,152,157,161,
162, 229, 234,260,261,271

Zubarev, Prokopii T., 63, 176, 314

Zverev, S.A., 405

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Full text of "Khrushchev lied : the evidence that every "revelation" of Stalin's (and Beria's) "crimes" in Nikita Khrushchev's infamous "secret speech" to the 20th party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, is provably false"

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